SE-22; CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600030011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 27, 1952
• Content Type: SE

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SEC1 OMATION
5397"
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL STRIATE
27 Few 1952
MMORA1 DI4 FOR TINS fl L a { IGrNCE ADVISOR' Ca241TTE
StJECT: SE- : Consequences of Certain Possible lE Courses
of A ion with Respect to Indooh .p Burmt or
Thailand _
1. The attached draft estimate has been approved by the
Board of National Ez timatea pwn t to a f3mal consideration
of it by the IA.C rep ;eaentat1i on Wednesday,, 27 brotary.
2. w of its priority, have placed this eatInnte
on the a nda of the TIC meting scheduled for 10.-30 Thursday
2BFe v m
25X1A9A
Eeouti' SQ0r8ttU7
- Distribution "An
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANCE IN CLAD. C7
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CNemnen
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECURITY IN1'Or?4 TION
53976-f
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I Q E N C T AG ENCY
27 February 1952
aU13JFl Ts ? SE-221 C67NS. rUT C";L OF CE'RTA1N K SSIBLE US LOURS ES OF
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA,, 3JIM9 OR
THAILAND
THE PROBLX4
To estimn4te the consequences of certain possible US courses
of action :44h. respect to an identifiable Chinese Co nist
military it terventionit in, Indochina,, Burma., or Thailand.
The United Kingdom France,, Australia and New Zealand will
join the United States in warning Communist China that the five
powers will meet Chinese Communist .military intervention in South-
east Asia with military oounteractiono Whether or not the four
other powers will join the US in such a warning is beyond the
scope of this esstimate~
Tfie stint T Chinese Communist military intervention"
is intended to cover either an open and acknowledged military
intervention or an unacknowledged military intervention of such
a scale and nature that its existence could be demonstrated.
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I. THE F J+!T OF A JOINT WARNING AGAINST CHINESE CO MUNIST 1.4T ITAR!
INTERVENTION IN SC*JTHEST ASIA
On Communist Intentions
to We do not believe that a joint warning against an
"identifiable military intervention" by the Chinese Communists in
Southeast Asia would tend to provoke such intervention. If,
however,, the Chinese Communists contemplate an early "identifiable
military intervention" in Southeast Asia, or if in the future they
should contemplate such an intervention, a joint warning by the
five powers would tend to deter them 3
2,, Even in the absence of a joint formal warning.* the Chinese
Cor nisi s probably estimate that "identifiable military intervention"
in Southeast Asia would entail substantial risk of Joint military
counteraction, and that such a risk is unwarranted in view of the
prospects for further Commaanist gains in Southeast Asia without such
intervention, They -n y, however, discount this risk, estimating
$~ OlR suggests that the following sentence be added to paragraph l
:;
"However if the Communist leaders conclude from Wjestern actions
and statements that the west intends to attack Comrunist Mina
regardless of Communist actions in Southeast Asia, the deterrent
effect of a warning would be nullified.
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that there are differences in policy wrong the five powers and that
these powers may not be able or willing to take time]yy and effec-
tive military counteraction.
3. The effectiveness of a joint warning as a deterrent would
depend in large measure on Conin unist conviction thats
ao The five powers were not bluffing,, and were united among
th elves as to the military counteraction to be taken.
b. The five powers were actually capable of timely
and effective military couxnteraotion. /
co The counteraction would be directed against Communist
China itself as well as toward repelling the Chinese
Communist inter verrtion./
lt. It the Communists were convinced on the foregoing points
th r would have to recognize that intervention in Southeast Asia
would bring military counteraction, the probable consequences of
which would be general war. in the Far Fast,, if not globsl war. It
is improbable,, therefore., that they would initiate an "identifiable
military intervention" in I ?rdoe-hI ac,A Burma, or Thailand in the face
1 Tl~a~ State arepreseastatlve held the view that the Communists might be
eer ouaiy concerned over the prospect of delayed military counter-
action, even though the believed that time counteraction need not
be feared. The State representative there ore believed that the words
"timely and" should be omitted.
2/ See footnote to paragraph 2 for position of State representative.
It The State representative proposed that an additional stub--paragraph be
added noting the possible differences between a warning conveyed to
the Commoniots privately and one announced publicly-. Alternatively,
the State representative proposed that the Assumption state that the
warning discussed in this estimate is a public one.
1
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of a joint warning by the five powers unless,, on the basis of
global considerations,, they were willing to accept global war or
at least general war in the Far East. So far both Communist China
and the USSR have shown a desire to localize the hostilities in
Korea, Indochina, Burma,, and Malaya. Furthermore, the favorable
prospects for the success of present Cyst tactics in South-
east Asia make probable a continuation of these tactics,, unless
because of global considerations the USSR and the Chinese Comm-
fists decide to accept grave risk of global warp
5. It is unlikely that additional signatories would increase
the effectiveness of a joint warning. India would almost certainly
refuse to participate in such a warning. It is improbable that
Japan would take such a provocative step at this time and uncertain
whether Thailand would do so. Few,, if ar r9 additional governments
would join in a formal warning. Even if the Philippines,, Japan and
Thailand did participate the Communists would discount their ad-
herence because of the military weakness of these countries and
their existing ties with the `Vest. The Communists would assume
Chinese Nationalist support of the warning, whether or not explicitly
expressed.
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Other Effects
6a A Public Joint warning would considerably- improve the
morale of the Thai and Vietnamese ;;:vsr entso In Burma any
encouragement derived from the warning would probably be offset
by fear of involvement in a conflict between the great powers and
general suspicion of Western "imperialist" motives.
7 -z Mee where in Best and South Asia the effect would be mixed,
There would be a tendency., notable in Japan and the Philippines."
to applaud this new manifestation of esterv determination to
check Communist aggression. On the other hand? the feeling would
be widespreadq especially in India and Indonesia,, that the warning
represented another instance of Western meddling in Asian affairs
in pursuit of colonial objectives
B. The effect of a warning on other countries probably would
not be of major importance.. A warning might well revive the fears
in the smaller NATO powers regarding the dangers of general war or
of an over-extension of Western strength in the Far Fists but it
is unlikely that the basic attitudes of these countries would be
changed