COMMUNIST CHARGES OF US USE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600050006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 25, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
028867
COMMUNIST CHARGES OF US USE
OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Published 25 March 1952
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NO-CHANCE IN CLASS. 13
o DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED T01 TS S0 c~~
NEXT REVIEW DATE: __- -~
AUTH: HR 10.2
DATE I2 C- REVIEWER=-018557
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WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE
MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE
U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REV-
ELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UN-
AUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CHARGES OF US USE
OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the prep-
aration of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 20 March
1952. See, however, footnote to paragraph 16.
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COMMUNIST CHARGES OF US USE OF
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the significance ?f the Communist psychological warfare campaign
alleging use of biological warfare by the US in Korea and China.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The current large-scale propaganda cam-
paign charging US forces with bacteriological
warfare in Korea and China has been care-
fully coordinated throughout the Communist
Orbit. It has been directed at both domestic
and foreign audiences. The scope and inten-
sity of this campaign has exceeded that of any
recent Communist propaganda effort.
2. The campaign began with a charge by the
North Korean Foreign Minister on 22 Febru-
ary that the US was using BW in North Korea.
On 6 March the charges were extended to in-
clude Communist China when the Peiping
People's Daily, an official Communist organ,
stated that the US had sent a total of 448
planes on germ warfare missions over Man-
churia during the preceding week, and had in
addition bombed and strafed at least one area
in Manchuria.
3. On 8 March statements by Chinese Com-
munist Premier Chou En-lai and an editorial
in the official Chinese Communist Party
organ:
a. Charged that American use of BW
weapons was aimed at "wrecking the armi-
stice talks in Korea, prolonging and expand-
ing the aggressive war in Korea, and instigat-
ing new wars";
b. Called upon the "peace-loving people of
the world" to "rise up and put an end to the
sinful designs of the United States Govern-
ment";
c. Threatened that US pilots "using bac-
teriological weapons over China" will be
treated as "war criminals" when taken pris-
oner.
4. Communist and Communist front organi-
zations have protested to the UN and to the
International Red Cross against US use of
bacteriological warfare. At the UN on 14
March, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik
gave official Soviet support to Peiping radio
accounts of US use of BW. So far, no Com-
munist government has asked for any specific
international action aside from "condemna-
tion of the US" by the UN, nor has the sub-
ject of BW as yet been brought up by the
Communist officials at Panmunjom.
5. The accusations regarding bacteriological
warfare have been directed against the US
rather than against UN forces generally.
6. The campaign has been supported by al-
leged "evidence." From a technical stand-
point, however, both the Communist descrip-
tion of the attacks and this "evidence" con-
tain flaws and inconsistencies.
7. Elaborate local efforts have been taken to
alert Communist military personnel and
civilians to carry out countermeasures. It is
probable that many of the Communist mili-
tary personnel in the combat area have been
convinced that the reports of the attacks are
authentic.
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8. Last spring there was evidence of extensive
typhus, cholera, typhoid, and smallpox in
North Korea. There is at present no evidence
of a recurrence of these conditions and the
Communists have denied that there are any
epidemics in North Korea. However, neither
the absence of evidence nor the Communist
denial precludes the possibility that these con-
ditions have recurred. In view of the season
and existing public health conditions in North
Korea, Communist leaders may be expecting
an early outbreak of epidemics of serious pro-
portions. (See Appendix A.)
9. The Communists have reported diseases of
epidemic proportions in specific localities in
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Communist China, but have not related these
epidemics to the alleged BW attacks.
10. Although Communist forces in Korea are
estimated to have the capability of conduct-
ing small-scale BW attacks, they are ill pre-
pared either to guard against the possibility
of such an effort backfiring into their own
ranks, or to defend themselves against possi-
ble UN retaliation in kind. If the Soviets pro-
vided the means, Communist capabilities for
offensive employment of BW might become
substantial. However, UN vulnerability to
Communist BW attacks is probably far less
than Communist vulnerability to UN BW at-
tacks. (See Appendix B.)
POSSIBLE PURPOSES OF THE CAMPAIGN
11. A major purpose of the campaign is al-
most certainly to serve internal Communist
propaganda needs. In this respect the follow-
ing objectives are probably most important:
a. The establishment of an alibi for existing
epidemic conditions in Communist China
and/or Korea or in anticipation of such epi-
demics, with which Communist authorities
might be unable to cope;
b. The stimulation of civilian and military
public health and sanitation efforts;
c. The stimulation of hatred of the US
throughout the Communist world.
12. The scale and nature of the campaign are
such, however, as to suggest purposes beyond
those of internal propaganda. Such broader
purposes may be limited solely to general for-
eign propaganda aims, or may involve prepa-
rations for some early major Communist
move. Regardless of its original intent, the
final purpose of the campaign may be deter-
mined by the extent of success achieved as it
gains additional momentum.
13. Among probable foreign propaganda pur-
poses are:
a. To discredit the US in the eyes of its al-
lies and the rest of the non-Communist world;
b. To arouse fears that the US is aggravat-
ing an already explosive situation in Korea
and in the East-West struggle.
14. Among possible foreign propaganda pur-
poses are :
a. To strengthen the moral position of the
Communists in the event that the Commu-
nists undertake large-scale offensive military
operations in Korea or elsewhere;
b. To weaken the moral position of the US
in the event that large-scale hostilities are re-
sumed in Korea and the US attempts to ex-
pand the Korean conflict.
15. The campaign is entirely consistent with
and could be in preparation for an early Com-
munist political move with respect to the truce
negotiations, or for a renewal of large-scale
military action. However, the current cam-
paign, which is still gathering momentum,
does not yet, in itself, provide a basis for deter-
mining whether a major political or military
move is imminent. If the Communists should
undertake large-scale military operations in
Korea, we do not believe they would em-
ploy BW.
16. There are no firm indications that a Com-
munist military offensive is imminent in Ko-
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rea or elsewhere, and there is no firm evidence
regarding future Communist moves in the
Korean cease-fire negotiations.*
* The Director of Intelligence, United States Air
Force, would add the following as the final para-
graph to this estimate:
"It is estimated that the current propaganda
campaign, which is increasing in intensity and
stature, contains within itself a potentiality which
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ATTACHMENTS :
Appendix "A": Disease in the Korean Area
Appendix "B": Communist BW Capabil-
ities in the Korean Area.
could serve as justification for any move, including
general war. The lack of intelligence to relate the
campaign to any specific Soviet objective necessi-
tates consideration of even those possibilities pres-
ently considered least likely."
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APPENDIX A
DISEASE IN THE KOREAN AREA
1. Available intelligence does not indicate the
present incidence of typhus, cholera, small-
pox, typhoid, and other diseases in North Ko-
rea. Because of the ;poor diagnostic compe-
tence of the Chinese Communist and North
Korean medical services, it is doubtful whether
factual information on the incidence of each
disease will ever be available. Consequently,
true current incidence of any given disease in
the North Korean (and China/Manchuria)
area is likewise not known by the Commu-
nists. However, the area contains the natu-
ral conditions causing many diseases to be
endemic and epidemic.
2. Diseases historically follow the movement
of armies, and there is every reason to believe
this happened in the case of the Chinese mili-
tary movements into North Korea. Moreover,
hygiene and sanitary conditions in the NKF
and CCF have become progressively more pro.
pitious for disease outbreaks as the Korean
conflict has continued. Exhausting forced
marches and inadequate food and shelter have
lowered the resistance of the troops. Dirty
mess-gear has been commonplace. Lack of
medical equipment and non-utilization of
sanitation personnel, even in rear areas, re-
flect negligent preventive-medical practices.
The absence of an effective lousicide is an-
other factor contributing to the generally
primitive sanitary condition in the field.
(DDT is ineffective against certain types of
Korean and Manchurian lice.)
3. During 1951 cholera, smallpox, and typhus
were reported to be widespread among North
Korean and Chinese Communist troops. Ty-
phus fever had a high incidence among enemy
troops during the spring, but the rate fell
sharply early in July. It was reported that in
some areas of North Korea 50 percent of all
civilian communities contracted the disease,
with a resulting 30 percent mortality. In
March, 1951, there were reports that typhus,
typhoid, and smallpox had affected a large
proportion of civilians and North Korean
troops in the Ch'unch'on area; the mortality
rate was reported to be 50 percent. In April,
1951, the NKF and CCF disease victims were
reported to equal battle casualties.
4. In November, 1951, GHQ, FECOM, concluded
that "lack of an effective lousicide, together
with the apparent neglect of universal typhus
immunizations and the high louse infestation
of enemy troops will inevitably result in many
cases of typhus." In March, 1952, one covert
report stated that 30 percent of the 8th Corps,
NKA, were bedridden with typhoid fever or
typhus, with about 60 percent mortality.
5. There have been several recent reports of
an unusual disease in both the NKF and the
CCF. The disease is characterized by an acute
onset with headache, chills, and fever; nose-
bleed, vomiting, and abdominal pains were
reported in some instances. While there was
no mention of conjunctival hemorrhage (or
"red eye") in connection with these reports, a
large percentage of PW's were found to be suf-
fering from some form of conjunctivitis at the
time of capture. No estimate of incidence of
the malady in enemy troops can be obtained.
6. There was one covert report of a smallpox-
like disease epidemic in North Korea during
November-December 1951; no confirming in-
telligence is available.
7. CCF Immunization. There are indications
of extensive inoculation of CCF troops, al-
though the degree of protection received is
not known due to doubtful efficacy of im-
munization. Prior to CCF intervention in
1950, vaccines were plentiful in China and
Manchuria, and were also available for revac-
cination of CCF troops in Korea during the
spring of 1951 (except for tetanus toxoid).
Vaccines were made in China and Manchuria
at any of a number of centers such as the
Peking Central Epidemic Prevention Bureau
and the Dairen Municipal Sanitation Center.
Intelligence does not indicate use of Soviet or
US made vaccines by the CCF.
a. Smallpox: Vaccination universal in 1950.
In 1951 about 90 percent coverage of military
forces, 10 percent being omitted because of
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pressure of military operations and fear of be-
ing vaccinated.
b. Typhoid-Paratyphoid-Cholera: Combined
vaccine. Given in divided doses of 0.5cc, 1.0cc
and 1.0cc at intervals of 1 week. Universal
coverage in 1951 for first dose, about 90 per-
cent coverage for second dose, and about 80
percent coverage for third dose. Lack of full
coverage for last two doses due to pressure of
military operations.
c. Tetanus: Given in divided doses of 0.5cc,
1.0cc and 1.0cc at intervals of 3-4 weeks. Uni-
versal coverage in 1951 for the first dose, about
40 percent coverage for the 2nd dose, 15 per-
cent for the 3rd dose. Lack of full coverage
for last two doses due to pressure of military
operations and to a shortage of toxoid.
8. NKA Immunization. The immunization
program in the NKA was far less universal
during the first half of 1951 than in the CCF.
Intelligence does not indicate use of specific
inoculations for tetanus, cholera, or Japanese
B encephalitis. It is estimated that 15 - 20
percent of troops received no immunization of
any kind in 1951.
a. Smallpox: Vaccination universal in 1950.
Only about 1/3 of troops revaccinated in 1951.
b. Typhoid-Paratyphoid: Combined vaccine.
Given twice yearly in divided doses of 0.5cc
and 1.5cc with a one-week interval. About 90
percent coverage in early 1950 and about 30
percent coverage in 1951.
c. Typhus: None in 1950. Given in two di-
vided doses of 1.0cc each to approximately 60
percent of troops between February and May
1951.
d. Typhoid-Paratyphoid-Typhus: Combined
vaccine given in divided doses of 1.0cc each to
approximately 60 percent of troops in 1951.
e. "Nisin-Baktin": This is the phonetic pro-
nunciation of a Russian combined vaccine
given to approximately 80 percent of NKA
troops between March and May 1951. Inocu-
lation of one dose results in fever of three or
four days duration. No fatalities resulted. As
far as can be ascertained, the vaccine con-
tained immunizing agents against the follow-
ing diseases : typhoid, cholera, probably para-
typhoid A and B, and tetanus or dysentery.
Information concerning the use of this vac-
cine is reliable, but the list of diseases against
which it is supposed to be effective is not.
9. From current reports it appears that both
the Chinese and North Koreans have ordered
(at least on paper) plague and cholera im-
munizations for civilians as well as for troops.
Anti-plague corps are said to be carrying out
emergency decontamination and epidemic
prevention work in front-line positions and
villages affected, and epidemic prevention sta-
tions reportedly have been set up in germ-af-
fected areas.
10. Military sanitation orders include the boil-
ing of all drinking water, the burning of gar-
bage, and the setting up of latrines in speci-
fied areas. Insect and rodent control meas-
ures have also been instituted. It is empha-
sized that while these orders exist on paper,
it is not known how thoroughly they are being
carried out.
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 APPENDIX B
COMMUNIST BW CAPABILITIES
IN THE KOREAN AREA
OFFENSIVE
1. There is no proof of Chinese Communist or
North Korean biological research for the ex-
press purpose of waging biological warfare.
Available intelligence on Communist BW
capabilities in the Korean area is almost en-
tirely concerned with possible CCF activities,
although it must be assumed that some tech-
nical interchange takes place between the
Chinese Communists and North Koreans.
2. Intelligence indicates that the Chinese
Communist Government may have estab-
lished a small basic and applied laboratory
BW research program. This program is prob-
ably carried out in three scientific institutes
located in North China and Manchuria. Re-
search appears to be centered on enteric dis-
eases of man and selected food-crop-killing
hormones.
3. Top control of the BW research program
probably rests in the "Chinese Communist
Military Council"; technical assistance is ob-
tained from specialists in the various research
institutes. Control by the Council is exercised
through three main scientific institutes in
areas where the requisite laboratory facilities
are already available for biological research.
The principal institutes are at Peiping (Pei-
ping Scientific Research Institute) ; Chang
Chun (The People's Army Chemical Warfare
School and Research Laboratory under the
Northeast Scientific Institute) ; and Peian
(Paichia Special Diseases Research Institute).
Other institutes possibly connected with the
Chinese Communist program are located at
Harbin (branch of the Continental Scientific
Research Institute) ; Mukden (Cattle Disease
Research Laboratory) ; and Dairen (the Dai-
ren Sanitary Research Laboratory).
4. The Chinese BW program, intimately re-
lated to the CW program, is reported to be
closely supervised and supported by the USSR.
Non-Chinese are prominent in the research
program. Soviet personnel participate as di-
rectors of the principal laboratories, and as
many as 50 percent of the scientists and tech-
nicians are reportedly Soviet. In addition, 120
Japanese specialists from the former Kwan-
tung Army BW units have been integrated
into the program by the Chinese Commu-
nists.
5. Reported work of these facilities and scien-
tists covers bubonic plague, typhoid, cholera
and other intestinal diseases. The Chang
Chun institute has facilities closely associated
with airfields; however, there is no evidence to
confirm or deny actual employment of air-
craft in munition or agent tests. Likewise,
there is no evidence from the other research
centers to indicate pilot-plant or large-scale
BW production, field testing of agents, or de-
velopment and testing of BW munitions and
equipment.
6. Recent tests by the US Army Chemical
Corps have served to illustrate the ease with
which limited area targets can be attacked
with BW agents. In view of the results of
these tests, it seems probable that the Com-
munists could, in limited areas, sabotage
South Korean crops, wells, municipal water
systems, and populated points with BW
agents.
DEFENSIVE
7. BW defensive capabilities are closely tied
to the public health system, medical facilities,
and medical supplies. In China and Korea
all three are very poor. The Communists are
attempting to improve these in their basic
public health program and such improvement,
when realized, will be of value in com-
bating BW.
8. The Chinese Communist Government an-
nounced in 1951 an expansion of epidemic
control and prevention units and the expendi-
ture of large sums for medical and sanitation
work. Although inoculations against conta-
gious diseases have been reported, it is doubt-
ful whether a significant percentage of the
population has been protected. Many CCF
PW's in Korea report that inoculations are in-
complete or entirely omitted. The Soviets
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 have been aiding and advising the Commu-
nists in China and Manchuria, particularly
regarding prevention and control of plague;
whether this Soviet interest is primarily
benevolent or is associated with the BW pro-
gram is not known.
9. It is possible that Soviet developments in
BW equipment and munitions might be made
available (at least in design) to the Commu-
nists in Korea if it was determined that BW
should be employed. However, in view of the
Communists' relatively poor defensive capa-
bility vis-a-vis US defensive capability, large-
scale employment of BW with Soviet muni-
tions, agents, and the necessary concurrent
air superiority, is considered highly unlikely.
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