MILITARY INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE LARGE- SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1952
• Content Type: SE

e 1999/09/08: CIA-RDP79S01011 '6(iOe600ctl -'
02925.j
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
MILITARY INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE
LARGE-SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA
IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
SE-25
Published 28 April 1952
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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SEC INFORMATION
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
MILITARY INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE
LARGE-SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA
IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the prepa-
ration of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 24 April
1952.
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MILITARY INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE LARGE-SCALE
COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
THE PROBLEM
To estimate, on the basis of military indications, Communist intentions with regard
to a large-scale military attack in Korea in the immediate future.
CONCLUSIONS
1. There has been a general strengthening of Communist military capabilities
in Korea since the beginning of the armistice negotiations. The enemy is credited with
a greater offensive potential than he had previously enjoyed and is believed capable of
launching a major ground attack with little warning, and air attacks which initially
could be of substantial proportions.
2. In recent weeks there has been increased enemy activity in Korea. There have
also been reports, partly unconfirmed, of aggressive enemy intentions. These activi-
ties and reports do not constitute acceptable indications of a Communist intent to in-
itiate large-scale offensive action in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the
increased military activity in Korea and the general situation in Korea may repre-
sent preparations taken in anticipation of a political decision either:
a. To launch a limited offensive, with little or no warning; or
b. To undertake a large-scale offensive.
DISCUSSION
Communist Capabilities in Korea
3. During the armistice negotiations, the
Communists have substantially increased
their capabilities in Korea. They have re-
placed their losses, re-equipped their units, re-
trained their troops, and reorganized and
redisposed their forces. They have built up
their ground forces from an estimated 502,000
to the present estimate of 866,000 personnel.
Qualitative improvement has accompanied
the quantitative build-up; they have made sig-
nificant additions of armor and artillery and
have substantially increased the fire power of
all units. (A detailed chart of build-up since
July 1951 is attached hereto as Annex "A.")
4. The Communists have made excellent use
of the long period of fairly static operations to
improve their logistical position. As a result
the supply position of the Communists in for-
ward areas, despite continued air and naval
attacks by UN forces, is far better than at any
time since the Chinese Communist interven-
tion in Korea.
5. The enemy ground forces in Korea could
launch a major attack with little warning. It
is estimated that the Communists have the
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logistic capability to maintain the momentum
of a major offensive for from 5 to 10 days.
Difficulties in connection with the movement
of supplies from forward dumps to the attack-
ing units would be the limiting factor.
6. The capabilities of the Communist Air
Force in the Korean area (North Korea, Man-
churia, and Northeast China) have improved
steadily and rapidly. During the armistice
negotiations, the estimated Communist com-
bat aircraft strength in the Korean area has
increased from 500 aircraft to the present
total of 1,250 aircraft plus 75 transports, in-
cluding an increase from 450 jet fighters to
the current 800. There are also 400 combat
aircraft deployed in south and central China
which could not be committed in Korea with-
out redeployment. There is a sufficient num-
ber of operational airfields in Manchuria from
which attacks by the above aircraft could be
launched against UN forces. An apparently
effective system of air control and warning is
believed operating in North Korea. Commu-
nist pilots in Manchuria have been engaged in
an intensive training program. The Commu-
nists have also demonstrated a significant
capability to support logistically a sizeable air
force in Manchuria.
7. The Communist Air Force in the Korean
area could launch an air attack which might
inflict substantial damage upon United Na-
tions ground forces, naval and air installa-
tions, and lines of communications in Korea.
Initially, a force of approximately 500 MIG-
15's, 150 piston-engined?fighters and 150 light
bombers could be made available, but without
unusual success in countering UN efforts
against this attack, it is believed it could not
be sustained.
Indications of Communist Military
Intentions in Korea
Ground
8. In recent weeks there have been several
indications, generally unconfirmed, of in-
creased enemy activity in Korea.
a. The movement of two Chinese Commu-
nist armies, one forward towards the western
sector and one eastward towards the central
sector, has been accepted. The movement of
three other CCF armies toward the western
sector has been reported but is unconfirmed.
b. Reports of PW's and other information
point to the possibility of a forward movement
of some armored vehicles from the Wonson
area on the east coast. Elements of the 1st
and 3rd Armored Divisions are accepted as at-
tached to or in direct support of front-line
units on the west and west central fronts.
Other elements of these two divisions remain
unlocated. During the past several months
unconfirmed reports have also referred to the
southward movement of the North Korean V
Corps.
9. During the past few weeks there have been
four PW reports of a new offensive. Most
PW's, however, have continued to refer
to enemy defensive plans, including the
strengthening of defense fortifications and the
rotation of front-line units.
10. The possibility that the enemy is prepar-
ing to relieve some front-line units is further
suggested by PW reports that the CCF 67th
Army will relieve the 68th Army and that the
CCF 26th Army is to be relieved in the imme-
diate future. There is no confirmation, how-
ever, that the relief of any front-line units is
under way.
11. There has been one recent report that
North Korean guerrilla forces are being
trained to infiltrate UN lines (a tactic which
has preceded previous offensives). This re-
port receives some substantiation from the
recent capture by UN forces of a small num-
ber of line-crossers.
Air
12. The most significant recent incident with
respect to enemy air activity was a visual
sighting on 13 April of 450 jet aircraft on
Tatungku airfield and 50 on Antung airfield.
This is approximately twice the number of air-
craft ever before sighted on these airfields and
very nearly the total estimated MIG-15
strength in Manchuria. Although an error of
up to 75 aircraft in this sighting is possible,
this report is regarded as substantially accu-
rate. Subsequent observations during the day
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disclosed that this total has been reduced to
approximately 200 aircraft on both fields.
Possible explanations for this concentration
are that bad weather precluded the use of
other Manchurian airfields or that this was a
test of personnel and facilities under crowded
conditions. It is also possible that this repre-
sented a "show of force" designed to influence
the armistice discussions.
13. Other indications that the enemy may
be preparing for increased air activity, possibly
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including operations over South Korea on a
large scale, were: (a) the reported observa-
tion on 1 April of a MIG-15 over the Seoul-
Suwon area on what appeared to be a photo-
reconnaissance flight; (b) recent increased
willingness of enemy pilots to engage UN air-
craft; (c) reported repairs of Pyongyang air-
fields; and (d) observation of some vehicle
activity at Taechon airfield on 13 April, the
first observation of activity at any of the three
airfields in the Sinanju area in some time.
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