(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600060005-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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sharp increase in enemy military activity in Korea, the Communists
have not yet undertaken on a large scale many of the preparations
which heretofore immediately preceded major offensives. On the
basis of available indications alone., therefore, it is unlikely
that the Communists will undertake a large-scale ground offensive
in the immediate future (within the next two weeks).
3. The overall increase in Communist capabilities and the
recent step-up in Communist military activity suggests the follow-
ing possible short-range intentions: (a) to carry out a normal
relief of frontline units; (b) to prepare for a major Communist
offensive in the future; (c) to strengthen defenses in anticipa-
tion of a UN attack; or (d) to exert pressure on the armistice dis-
cussions.
Z. Communist conduct of cease-fire discussions in recent
weeks provide no positive indications of immediate Communist inten-
tions. There are no reliable indications that the Communists antic-
ipate an early armistice,, Their military activity appears to be
inconsistent with the conclusion of an early armistice except insofar
as it may be designed to influence the discussions.
,. On balance and taking into account broad #&viet and Chi-
nese Communist objectives, we still believe that the Communists
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CONFIDENTIAL
desire at least a continuation of the armistice discussions, if
not a satisfactory settlement, We believe, therefore, that they
are unlikely to endanger continued discussions by launching a large-
scale air offensive. However, they may feel it possible to under-
take a ground offensive in an effort to regain territory north of
the 38th parallel without serious risk of a break-off of negotia-
tions0 -
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I. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN KOREA
6. Since the instigation of the armistice negotiations, the
Communists have substantially :.ncreased their capabilities in Korea.
They have replaced their losses, re-equipped their units., reorgan-
ized their forces, re=-trained their troops, and re-disposed their
forces, There has been a steady build-up in the strength of the
ground forces to the present estimate of 875,000 personnel. Qual-
itative improvement has accompanied the quantitative build-up;
there have been very significant additions of armor and artillery;
the fire power of all units has been substantially increased,
7. The Communists have made excellent use of the long period
of fairly static operations to increase their logistical potential.
Although this quiet period has required decreased amounts of many
types of supplies during the past nine months, the Communists have
continued throughout this period with an apparently maximum effort
to bring up supplies. As a result the Communist logistical situa-
tion, despite continued air and naval attacks by UN forces, is far
better than at any time since the Chinese Communist intervention in
Korea.
8. The enemy ground forces presently in contact could attack
with very little warning and could be reinforced within a short time
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by the remaining enemy forces in Korea. It is estimated that the
Communists have the logistic capability to maintain the momentum
of an offensive for from 5 to 10 days.
90 The capabilities of the Communist Air Force in the Korean
area have improved steadily and rapidly. Airfield development in
Manchuria has been undertaken on a large scale; a well-integrated
system of air control and warning has been established, and Commu-
nist pilots hav been engaged in an intensive training program
which has included combat experience.
10. An air offensive could be launched at any time, This
offensive could include an initial commitment of over 500 Migv158s
as well as substantial numbers of piston-engined fighters and light
bombers. An attack of this nature might inflict serious damage
upon UN ground forces, naval and air installations, and lines of
communication.
U. INDICATIONS OF COMWTNIST MILITARY INTENTIONS IN KOREA
11. For the first time in several months there are indications
of a possibly significant redispositioning of Communist forces in
Korea.
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a.? The forward. movement of two Communist armies, one
towards the western sector and one towards the central sector,
has been accepted. The movement of three other CCF axrnies
toward the western sector has been reported and is considered
probable
by In the eastern sector, reports of PW8s and other infor-
mation point to the possibility of a forward movement of armor
from the Wonsan area, suggesting that elements of the CCF 3rd
Armored Division may have been displaced southward. Several
PELF reports have also referred to an expected southward move-
ment of the North Korean V Corps.
These reported movements point to an increase in Communist troop,,
armor, and artillery strength within operational distance of the
front,
12. During the past few weeks there has been an increase in
the number of FW reports of a new offensive. Within the last two
weeks,, two Communist PWRs referred to an enemy offensives to be
launched "when it is warmer" or "if the peace talks fail." Another
vague report states the North Korean V Corps is expected to move
southward to launch an attack during Mayo
13, Other Pea, however, have continued to refer to enemy de.?
fensive plans, including the strengthening of defense fortifications
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and the rotation of front-line units. The possibility that the
enemy is preparing for a relief of some front-line units is further
suggested by Fir/ reports that the CCF 67th Army will relieve the
68th Army and that the CCF 25th Army is to be relieved in the immed-
iate future, There is still no confirmation, however, that the
relief of any front-line units is as yet under way,
lI There has been one recent report that North Korean guer-
rilla forces are being trained to infiltrate UN lines (a tactic
which has preceded previous offensives), This report receives some
substantiation prom the recent capture by UN' forces of a, small num-
ber of line-crossers. There are low-grade reports that Communist
forces are being issued summer uniforms unusually early and that'
new Soviet rifles have been issued to some units.
35. The most significant recent development with respect to
enemy air activity and one which might foreshadow increased employ-
ment of enemy air forces, was a visual sighting on 13 April of 45o
jet a xcraft on Tatungkon airfield and 50 on Antung airfield. This
is double the number of aircraft ever before sighted on these air-
fields and very nearly the total estimated Mig-15 strength in Man-
churiao Although an error of up to 75 aircraft in this sighting is
CONFIDENTIAL
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is possible, full credence is given to this report, Within five
hours this concentration had disappeared and subsequent operations
during the day disclosed a total of approximately 200 aircrae", on
both fields. Possible explanations for this concentration are that
bad weather precluded the use of other Manchurian airfields or that,
this was a test of personnel and facilities under crowded conditions.,
It is also possible that this represented a "show of forcer" deaigned
to influence the armistice discussions, The concentration is also
significant as'an indicator of Communist capabilities to repair and
replace aircraft,, During the past six weeks Communist losses in
combat totaled 62 Migs destroyed, 14 probably destroyed, and 95
damaged, the equivalent of over four regiments n Since Communist
non-combat operations losses would probably increase significantly
these loss totals, and since the number of planes sighted indicates
that overall jet fighter strength is being maintained, it appears
that the Communists have an effective repair and replacement system,
l60 Despite the observed concentration of aircraft on the Yalu
River airfields, on 15 Aprils only 132 aircraft were seen airborne
over Korea on that date and Communist air activity during April is
about 60 percent of that observed during a comparable period in
March. Enemy losses so far in April exceed those for the entire
month of larch but at the same time enemy pilots have shown an.
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increasing willingness to engage UN aircraft and UN losses have
increased to some extent
17 o Another indication that the enemy may be preparing for
increased air activity., possibly including air operations over
South Korea on a large scale, was the reported observation on 1
April of a Mig-1S over the Seoul-Suwon area on what appeared to be
a photo-reconnaissance flight,
ITT. STATUS OF ARMISTICE NEGO'T'IATIONS
18. There has been no real progress in the ceasefire discus-
sions in recent weeks and no indication that the Communists have
changed their attitude on any of the basic issues of disagreements
The Communists have again intimated that they might be willing to
withdraw their demand for the. inclusion of the USSR as a neutral
observer in return for the right to build airfields. After a'recess
of several. days to recheck the.PW lists,, the Communists on 13 April
asked for a resumption of the secret talks on this question., Com-
munist propaganda,, however, continued to offer no hints that a con-
cession on the question of voluntary repatriation was to be expec-.
tedo The Peiping radio$ quoting a dispatch on a Communist corres-
pondent in Korea, reiterated the Communist contention that the prix-.
ciple of voluntary repatriation was a violation of the Geneva
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Convention and accused the UN of torturing prisoners to sign peti-
tions against return to Communist hands. An earlier statement of
the communist commanders that returned prisoners would be immune
from reprisals for anti-Communist activity has received little sub-
sequent attention in Communist pro-,taganda.,
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