NIE ON INDIA AND PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000800010004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 21, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2005104J2&: CIA-RDP79S01011A000800010004-7
THY 7),,,PARTMENT OF STATE
Deputy Under Secretary
R - Mr. Armstrong
February 21, 1952
SUDJECT: NI A on India and Pakistan
0
I should be sorry to cause CIA to waste any effort in its NIE
work or to produce a paper that was too hedged with contingencies to
have any meaning, but I believe the proposed study on India and
Pakistan is a worthy project and should be pursued.
The problem should be modified so that it would not be limited
to the consequences of Pp Tilde-Pakistan mar, but would consider the
loss of the subcontinent no matter what events might deliver it to
the Communists. The question could also be improved so that
psychological consequences will be specifically studied. It might
be reworded thus:
"Vihat would be theieconomic, military,] olitical and
psychological impact on the Fast-West balance of power of
the loss of the India subcontinent to international com-
munism, either as a. result of the chaos that might accompany
an Indo-Pakistan war,, or an internal economic breakdown, or
as a result of communist rise to power through other internal
or external develOnmentS?"
The problem should be stud-ied, I think, on the assumption that
the subcontinent could fall to the Communists even before Southeast
Asia or the Middle est. Thi s is a possibility which NEA considers
realistic.
I do not believe TM 56 end NIE 59 will make this study un-
necessary though they should takeimportant material readily available
for it.
Although I understand that the subject might lead easily to some
obvious general ansers, I also find that those who assume they know
the answers often give forth merely broad, vague and even conflicting
opinions. This suggests to me a lack of precise appreciation of the
25X1 significance of the region to us. Therefore, T should like to repeat
my request that the NIE he prepared.
Approved For Releas:.
H. Freeman Matthews
2005id4126:t1A-RDP79S01011A0008000100044
St
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tions'on file
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pEPARTMENT OF ...LATE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
2/22/52
ARS ONAL
FOR: Mr. Sherman Kent
FROM: V. Park Armstrong, Jr.
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To* 0 - Mr. Matthews
Subjects NI' on India-Pakistan
February 8, 1952
About two montha ago you requested us to initiate a National
Intelligence Estimate addressed to the question) "What mould be the
economic, military, and political impact on the East-West balance of
power of the loss of the Indian sub.-continent to international
Communism as a consequence of the chaos produced by an Indo-Pakistan
war?" This arose out of your desire to get clarification of an NSC
paper Which predicted that an Indian-Pakivtani war would open the way
to "possible Communist control of the sub-continent" and ',threaten a
orisi0 of CoPiter, Proportions in relation to US national security
than tho current crises in Egypt and Iran."
Such On estimate was authorized as NIE-61. It was specifically
t to consider the probability either of an Indian-Pakistani war or
the loss of India and Pakistan to the Communists. The estimate, there-
fore, has been restricted essentially to an sssessment of the strategic
importance of the sub-continent. .
CIA has twice come back to us with difficulties over this. They
now specifically sok us to withdrew our request, manly because ouch
particularly if couched in terms of "consequences of
present great difficulties in the doing and when
of dubious value. The following reasoning is put for-
. N1E43. "Indiais Position in the ut*Weat Conflict"
(4 SeOtemher 1951) deals with Indies strategic importance in
the EastAest conflict. There is no reason to believe that the
basic conclusions reached therein need be revived, even though
the estimate be broadened to include Pakistan.
t4 NIE46 "Likelihood of Loss oflAportant Economia
resources in Selected Foreign Areas" end 103491 "Relative
Strategic Importance of East-Nest Trade to the Soviet Orbit and
to the Rept of the World" (both of which are in process) should
together provide ample coverage of the impertance of Indiale
economic resources to the Western worlds as well 40 the like.-
lihood of their being lost to the West.
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tiAlt
r1-7-
. Past experience has demonstrated the difficulty of deal-
ing lteartilieteny with the military aspects of a paper such as
IIIE41. The TAC agencies are unable to go beyond a discussion
of fairly obvious geographic factors and local military capabilities
without entering the "war gaming" business and without access to
operational plans which have hitherto been withheld.
A further difficulty with the paper as now contemplated
is its hypothetical nature which makes it difficult to arrive
at useful 70i11 tary and economic conclusions and makes it ?
impossible to arrive at valid or useful political coral=
They. is ,almost universal agreement that mainland Southeast Asia
and possibly the Middle East are likely to ome under Communist
control, beforethe Indian sub-continent. The IAC is thus faced with
the task of estimating the impact of an event on the East-West
balance of power position, when that impact would be heavily
influenced by other more likely changes in the power balance.
144 TA AlthOrtt the paper would co to some 3,angtha to tel]. you
that the sub-continent is of great strategic Importance and that
is loss woad be a serious blow to US security. For the remainder,
it would de0l. with possibilities so hedged with assumptions and
contingencies as to be of scarcely any asSiOtanee in the formulation
311 light of the above, and also because of a heavy load on NIE
resources, I would like your concurrence in cancelling the request
for the estimate.
R:FHome:ejg
(sed) W. PAR N E-1.7:f="1,JP
it. Park Armstrong, Jr.
cc: OIR MR. EVANS
,01.0
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