D/I USAF PROPOSED CHANGES TO INITIAL DRAFT OF SE-36

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 24, 1953
• Content Type: SE

Approved*KWIPASIgaf%a.AWKASYM.12601P3*050003-4
for-fr
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'
ituth JSAF
14,
LL'FRoosED CHANGES TO BRUT 0? 3E-36
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2/4 Feb 53
1. ale-9_2, komml_. 2. Ohanpe second sentence as follows:
"In calculating stoc;zrilea it hes been assuned that the USSR
ail fabricate both all-plutoniuD .wspous and composite weapons, and that
it will produce as many- of .the rcreeffic eni-t composite tue woapons as
possible."
2. Pam...2z Pamta_ph,8: ac follows:
8. Present qreygth_cfAilc,..B.R,ng9....Aviation: Long Range Aviation,
consisting essentW1E of three Air Arnica, one in the Fax East and two in
the western USSR, constitutes th.- strategic striking force of the USSR. The
TU-4, vticLual_suied from t fols,,ican B-12, is the only Soviet bomber,
known to be in operational use, cayable of carrying mass destruction weapons
to distant targets. Za-Pcentea,-.19AT-the-ntaskep-G-TU-44-inaAaveg-te-be
ftn-erewat&enal-uss-was-estivated-at-990-alreaaaft. As of 1.J.Fisa,m_-3,2.5,73.., a
LA
tpte.4.1 of IMI:52.32.?13.Ws.vqs pqtiTated tp.je available oteraticpal use.
WAs-Ligues-was-baeed-prEaillay-T,,ipea-Wr.3 Table of Equipaent strength of
Soviet air regiments .known to be equipped with or in the process of being
equipped with TU-4 aircraft*-).- totals_ll2p 9.1117s01,6_10,, the al=4...0.gum.q..q.
cux-eWily.aresestoti tp bat O4y._72,.ts...ELyer cent of TiO str.2.12,z2
?'0?14..- 4, out 20j64===iats,
,at.17enjjkL.: of ggagaLja_. to .2294-434?---the-rsr
strength is located in
the Far East.
3,. 12.m......e 6..LAssgrs..p....i: Inr.,ext new table as follows:
.. -
Doomed No. .
Review of this doctored by INA boa
determined that
verli has no oblation to dodos
It contains Information of CIA arrl . !:, ?":7-z..-
ti LI.
ti 1?.;, !I ,j) p il- p 1!. T
,,,-.) i(1.LoliA. 1
_.
ac:1.------
pa,......---r? of -rge
interest that must remain e.,_..?,,
classified at TS 3
Authority' HR 70-2
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Data 2 2 Boviswor /916.0
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&dim Bomber
Jet Possibly RectotyTe
Piston 1,000*-4:?1
Heavy Bomber Few
Total
10/20
300/.3 50
1,400
4. RalmaawmeratA Briftse as follows:
10. The TU-49 under norral operating conditionsp f,t.s estinated
to have a comba,t radius of vco, rial.i.tical miles and a combat range of
3,329 nautical miles with a 10,000 pound bomb load. Umler crass con-
trol conditions necessary to reach distant target areas? its sEx..,,ed
approximately 7,5 19Q knots at aa altitude of about 10,000 feet. flowever?
it is capable of attai morimmo pd of
347 imote at about 321,500 feet
ceilingog is 39,500 fest., ?.0.:thoyill thce..re po inteIlAwnse to indicate .
Sovi.9ts have done.?..g.o,_ tp. nonF4dered theT am. c5L.altle .of n9./dittim..tbe.
XJ:kk_to sa7.0 ,p,ara2,2r that . the. Azprican 13-29A
gsuatagle 1.1729B. Tklie_modification iwolyes. removal of
defemive_jmee for thr,-., tx.2.104,..and increq.se in the fuel
mattlag.,r,2-4h a net weiejt ?reduction of...a3_600 wands in ta.k-e7oD.L3Lekh.t.
go modifie_AlLLTU-4 wyuld have na2lcadArmrqduced fenivees
a a4tat interoe&s.,_.? at,,,taok 'gut its_cozabat r uld be increased to
a 10 000
ideal miles and its combat male
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CRopfl Awl) :4.01 Cqn.p.:i.de:5,1114:, t.12-o.. marfrin.a.t. yanev . characteristicswer the
Sovlets would gpe sera,cuy._att-mt:Zon tp, all roans a extendinF?its_nasea
inckilding_mrg.1 refuellpi ItIth,ake x:ef,:pelina0_covibat, radins clf a modified
4% :be 1,119m9e. milP to_UP.E.?7-1,-TP't.107 lax?
naLltka,114.2tegu.and. On a cna-.1-27!,,,- rdesin.n SUCh tArqrilft VSSLIL?:16 be, able to
strike anzjimget 11,1 tke ily4tod S,.tp..tfeg as weP. as thejammg, ith
taehnisal-medlfIcat&ne-enovetents7-the-TU-h-lev-mid.-1955-TsIgkb-Iae-able
t,e-Inerease-Ate-seat-ranl-t-24.5g-nautleal-RAles-437GC-AVR-one-aepial
pefueling)-an4-its-pance-G-41am'4Aeal-miles;7, With mc4crate technical
adve,nces t i jassiblej, nid71912 the Sovistmlim be able to_immE
mformance characteristics of :,he TU-4 somewhat but there is no current
evidence of outitt ce the ',Tore enrrines which would be
essential to major Filiprevel-ent.
Soviets- soh to i4role c, ,J_A...epteDities of tha TU-4 bLrefueling
technie2g,and develotnent and production effort to heavy
? 0
kle?lavelyv?, llg Delete and rewrite as follcvs:
11, It is estimated 1..hst the prototype heavy bomber, assuming it
it; sq.-pined with a turbe-pvep T:ewer plant, may be available in a very
limited number in add-1953 And Lf 3* Will have a probable =tat radius of
39420 nautical riles an., P '-10-17 range of 6,600 nautical wiles with a bomb
load of 10,000 pentdo. 117- 711.(1-953 it i olieved that technical modifi-
cations and improvements CA thin heavy bomber could terEdt a combat radius
of 30700 nautical miles anel a comb,kt ralgp of 7,000 nautical wiles with a
chtJ2,
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modified TU-4 poses a more serf.oun threat, since it could reach Sv,attle
north and west of an arc draw). rrom about San Diego to Lata.1 Snprior. A.
one-way, non-refueled niess cotIV reach targets only in that area
and return to base .w-Ithout ref uolibg. With one outbound refueling it could
cover almost as much of tho US On A t,W.Mln;7" mission as the Imodified
TU-4 could reach on a one-way basis. F4ing a one-way, not -refue/ed mission
from ChukotsRi bases the vcdified TU-4 could reach targets anywhere in the
United States except Florida. Sous improvement in TU-4 capabilities mgy
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10,000 pound bomb load. P4e.y:2,.....1 vEAmling a this inproved heavy bober
coulito accomplishbd wfuh TU-4 typo tanIcerop theraby permitting increased
range capabilities to permit Aifick on any target in the United. States on
a two-way mission basis.
6 * I:1aq 42.2Ar17,gril14 Jeloto and substitute
12. 22192.21, at4ok_on the iNg The closest
base areas to the US are ti o Fort:112sula in the northwest USSR, Soviet
ard Soviet-controlled torritw,7 along the Baltic and in Sastern Germanyp
and the ChUkotski Peninsula )11.7 noTtheest Siberia. Of these three areas,
the Chuketski Peninsula is neFv.est to the United States. From this area,
TU-4vs equipped as were the Allican D-29/e which the Soviets had as models,
could net reach the continental United States on two-weg missions sol4yen
occur before nid-19551, but it w4:)u1d appear more logical to expect that
principal effont would ha applied to improving the Soviet long range
refueling capability and to creation of a heavy bomber force. If the expected
developments in this latter field actually take place, soviet heavy bombers,
in limited numbers, could operate from northeast Siberia on a two-way basis
with one refueling against targets anywhere in the. United States, and even
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athout refueliag against targec loczsed north and vast of an arc drawn
general.y from central Teas throp.ah central New York. How wall the Soviets
would be able to utilize an intercontinental heavy bomber in the first year
or tw after it be operat:IonaUT available can only be speculated
upon, but if th) bombers 1T3170 14 ,Alits it shou3d be empected they would be
utilised againe, the continontU linjted States.
7" Ikas2A.hraaTP4 1.ata and substitute:
13. Logistics problews are difficult in the Chukoteki Peninsula,
but, these could be minAndsied / edwmcm stockpiling and use of the area for
staging bases onl;y. Bombees ata .n the United States from northeastern
Siberia =mid have favorable tet1 winds most of the year. Airfield informa-
tion, however, is not sufficient to amble positive identification of any
specific installation as a latutching site or staging base for medium boe;srs.
Markovo (65-41N 179-150 an1.1 Aralyr/Mys Nismenny (64-48N 177-33E) could
possib:1,y support minimm operations by TU-4,s, at least during nine months
of the year. Other possibilit::tos are Valkal, Tanyurar? Nagadan, and
Petropavlovsk. It is satire poasible that newairfields have been
built without eptection. The Soviets have emphasised use of frozen surfaces
in the Arctic, uhich makes possible use of airfields with a
T11-2.1,VA of prepe.mtory effort.
8. PW.1 ftragrark: belate and substitute:
14. Present TU4 rArcraft based in the Kola Peninsula araas and
Baltic-Eamt Germany ayes ccuad not :each the United States and return to
their bases, even with 040 oatboand refueling. Unless the Soviets develop
a refueling capability which they consider uould make both an outbound and
an inbound refueling operation feasible, principal ZU-4 threat to the United
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States from these base arca e lteN from cno-Ilar mlooicals flown by
modified aircraft pdosessing a ccsbat range of 3,960 nautic41 niles. From
the Murmansk area, ouch a range te,12.d ert Soviet bombeit to reach targets
roughly north and east of a We fr Gharlesten, South 04,-o1ina2 to
southern Oregon. From tha 3ak::1,c ave&.. such a range would enable TU-Vs
to attack targets north and cast of a line drain goner from Charleston,
South Carolina, through Nentane- All of the industrial northeastern centers
of the United States could be reached from either area. vid-1955 it is
possible that the Soviet heavy bodoer -propram will have reached such a
point that at least litlited nupbers ce-ad be used against the United States
on a sustained basis. The estfoated characteristics or such bombe:J..8 should
enable them to reach the New Yerk-How ngland area on two-way missions
from either the Kola Peninsula cfr the Baltic area. With one outbound refueling
they could attack anr target in the industrial northeast amd return to hema
base.
9. PagL2,,JarAgraph_2.: Delete and substitute;
15. The Kola Peninsula has faek airfields -- Alahurtti, at the
base of the peninsula, and Nurgans-Vayanga, nine ?and a half miles northeast
of Murmandk -- which readily could be aapted to accommodate T1J-4%. Bight
other airfields in 1945 offered ruawayt or takeoff areas 4,500 foot or wore
in length. It is possible that sone or all of these bases could have been
improved to accommodate medium bombers, a1thoui available intelligence is
.insufficiont to enable any exact assessment. As elsewhere in the Soviet
Aretic? virtually all of these airfields are extensible and all will bear
the weight of TU-4!s during the six or more menthe of the year the ground
6
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iEi?Crozon. rhyring the t':',,11_"1",:i arid stakosr xnentho permanent, all-
weather rUnDINIF5 of suitab.V.1 lenc,,t71. could be Ltsod. :Soth alakurtti and ?
krillnilarAcittiayanga& favoral.;:i;!T sAtuated logi caUy, and great circle
routes frau this area mull avoid overi.'light of nations friendly to the
United States.
The lilalticast (eax re has adequate bases to support
large miters of Irtzdium bCfabal.'34. These. 138,F3OG are favorab7 situated with
respect to cortrfaiiliCatiOlaS Trpec,her and are efie qtato1y served, by axisting
transportation faci:lities. A itim?lov dir;advantage is that great circle
routes to northeastern prts of the Urted States lmos over portions of
*stern Europe or Scandinavia eny attem, 6od, air strike might be
detected ear:ty enough toprowide
10. bge Ch atrp a, follows:
16 kohietreEtent or hiqkt level of combat effectiveness has been
tarded by lack of coMbat erizrience
c
i.Intensive training has been underway for
five sroarop but there is no evidence of exte,nsive training in long-distance
ElrIng and navigatioav... er-1.142----6.?,..e-tisifelepimntr-ef-eyerallonta--aerial-reemel-
ARC;
coucerdwr Soviet
ght techn1ows 6o not 11,:sose it.lerious technical problems and
er.p.a-r reweer- Lamm.
iY'0010.430 the tieSii" has had Ar-cess to the technirines ane; equilment eT:Iplasd
in the hisllly successful US e.,-;garf',...ence in this fie.ld it would be iniuma4ent
to asecums that the Soviets bla."Te;,' not deimloped both the techniluss arA? the
.t.q_uipaint for oztrational In-f1:14-Fht refuelim.
. Nft,iitoct ,N,4...14,14.10 4 yr.* ru,occmzepe :
11. Pan 11. kraramil. Char,f4e as follows:
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l'arzeriv_arite:-.A.Acit_mcp; The is able tu obtain
'eea4-
the data necessa:ey fo, identification of 'irargets in tho US under visual
A
and blina bombing conditions. The USSR possesses optical bombsights equivalent
to US World War 11 type mc.61s. Scuiet aviators souldt, therefor e9 be ex-
pected to execute satisfactory bodc: p74,acement under visual conditions. The
USSR
ha s produced,. and is equItT:q:ng. its TU-11. and XL-28 (light jet) bombers
with blind botAbing and navigational tne radars of the US AN/APS-15 and
ARA1q-13 varioty. It ip ested_t'pat a sufficient number of these
191- could be made available to permit their use in aircraft empypd
TheA accuracy of the Soviet
in attacks o the continental United Statos.
blind bombing system is ostlr,r3t6 at, about 3!2_2!P*[
12. Zazt_12 Parammz,a
Dalete and substitute the following:
20. ykaikor: Th- Soviets have cc ient1y devoted considerable
emphasis to both short and long J'ares: Loterological forecasting. Special
techniques for upper air ::-esearch and improved synoptac nethods are being
deve1oped for use in weathel, f.crecastng for periods longer than one
month. By 1955 it is believed that the Scrlets w:111 have achieved a short
range prediction capability in at lazet European USSR of 85% reliability
aa compared with the present raTiabilit7 of 60%. This prediction capaToility
plus extensive experience in .rotoorelop;ical research in the extrema northern
latitudes?-xcellent -weather reporting facllities in Siberia, availability
of records of weather conditions which have prevailed thro lout North
America for mny yearS and constant access to current North American weather
conditions and forecaotE; di-on414 enable:. the Soviets to predict mcgtham both
route and target weather with maaonable accuracy.
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