Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 17, 1999
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 3, 1953
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050011-5.pdf1.15 MB
Approved For ReleW 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A00be'00050011-5 7 - #8 ?- (5925-b s,EC Rm INF Itl"IATION CENTRAL INTELLIGLNCE AGENCY BOARD OF NAT1t*IkL ESTIMITES 3 'March 1953 NEM(RANDUM FCIR THE nn=ICEIo ADVISORY Wffr V'EE SUBJECT : SE.-36: Soviet CaTiabi1itiee for an Attack on the United Stated before Mid-1955 1. The attacYed draft emir to has been approved by the Board of National. F,stimetss pursuant to a consideration of it by the IAC representatives. 2. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled fbr 2:30 Tuesday, 3 I.larch 1953. Distribution "As Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO101lA000800050011-5 . Approved For Releaae{2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79S01011A000 050011-5 ?P SECRET 3" 1'. ` Y INFORMATION C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y 2 March 1953 SUBJECT: SE-a36, SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US ' `111I 011 TAID-1955 To estimate the cat abilities of the USSR to attack the continental US by open or clandestine means, through mid-1955. This estimate is concerned solely with Soviet gross capaw. bi .ities for at-Lack an the continental US during the period z .d-1953 to zni,d-1955 It does not attempt to assess whether the USSR intends to att a lc the US during that period or what courses of action the USSR would adopt before, along with,, or after such an attack,, Fiwthermore,, the paper estimates Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US without reference to any commitments of mtli.t.ai7 forces which the USSR might make elsewhere and without reference to any advantages which the USSR might gain for an attack on the US by previously occupy rg territory that r1, s not now ul thin the Soviet Bloc o Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000800050011-5 POP SECRET . Approved For Relea 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79SO1011A0008'S 050011-5 PART I SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES I. SOVIET MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS A. Atomic Weapons to Generals The Soviet atomic energy program has been given and almost certainly during the period of this estimate will continue to receive, one of the highest priorities in the cello.. cation of resources available to the USSR. The emphasis of the program continues to be on weapon development with the objective of reducing the relative advantage which the US has in atomic weapons development, production, or stockpiles. The USSR has made substantial progress toward this objective, The development of new sites indicates that i atomic energy program is continuing to expand. By mid-1952 Irt had established a substantial plutonium production capacity, and a major increase in plutonium production probably became effective during the latter part of 1952. The USSR has achieved the production of weapon grade uranium-235, Uranium reserves available to the USSR appear to be sufficient to support a large program, but the rate of exploitation of these reserves will depend on the balance decided upon between atomic energy and other Soviet activities. In fission weapons the USSR has reached the point in technology at which the types of weapons Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SA (n 1 A000800050011-5 Approved For Rele2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000m6050011-5 TOP SECRET stockpiled can be dictated by military requirements rather than by technical limitations 2, Atomic Weapons Stdckpiles s While estimates of Soviet, plutonium production during the period up to mid-1955 are con- sidered reasonably firm, a relatively large uncertainty exists with respect to installed or planned uranium-235 production oapa.. city, Furthermore, other than some evidence of the compition anal efficiencies of the three bombs tested by the USSR, there is i.o specific information concerning the characteristics of weaponii presently stockpiled or likely to be stockpiled. In converti?rg fissionable material atookpiles to weapon stockpiles it has been assumed that both composite (i.e., containing U-235 and plutonium) and all-plutonima weapons win be fabricated. On this basis, the estimate of the cumulative Soviet atomic weapon stockpile for the period mid-1953 #ough mid-1955 is as follows: {d-d-1953 M. :t.d-1954 J Ld.1955 Number of Bombs (301001) 300 3, Variations and Uncertainty in Stockpile Estimates In view of the uncertainty in the evidence concerning the production of fissionable material, the stockpile for future dates may be- as Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP7 S301011A000800050011-5 TOP SECRET Approved For Releas O00/08/29 : C1A-RDP79S01011A00080@0150011-5 TOP SE MT a lw as one-third lees (ie., 200 for mid-1955) t1n, or as high as ticks (i.e., 600 for mid-1955), the figure given, It also should be noted that by changing weapon components it is possible to in- crease or decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile substan. tially. Such changes wouuld,, hwever, alter the kdlotonnege yield according to the quantities of fissionable material used in the individual weapons. It is estimated that the USSR is probably capable of producing fission weapons yielding 200-500 kilotons but in so do- ing would reduce the number of weapons in i& stockpiles On the other hand, the USSR could also make smaller weapons (as low as 5-KT) than those used in calculating the stockpile estimates given above, B. Thermonuclear 1 ppaW 4o It is believed that the USSR has not conducted the moon. nuclear tests and cons equently uw not stockpiling this type of weapon@ Research which my be relevant has been noted, but there is no evidence of development activity at the present time, There is no direct evidence on which to base an estimate of the lead the US may have in this field; nevertheless, there is a growing Soviet capa- bility for quantity production of thermonuclear materials, and there. fore more advanced research and development, and even field tee" by mid-l954, are possible. It would be unsafe to assume that the TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000800050011-5 Approved For Releasw2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79SO1011A000899050011-5 11? SECRET USSR will not have a wort ble thermonuclear weapon by mid-1955. G, Radiological We ?. It is moet unlilely, for technological reasons, that the USSR will have the capability to produce militarily significant quantities of radiological warfare agents during the period of this estimate. However, the USSR will have available small quanti? ties of gross or separated fission products which might be employed as RW agents, Biological Warfare 6, The USSR has extensive knowledge of botulism, plague, tularemia, brucellosis, various quick-acting intestinal diseases, and some virus diseases,. No information is available regarding the production or the stockpiling of BW agents, The USSR could probably mass-produce such agents if it so desired, Warfare 7, The USSR can probably engage in chemical warfare on i large scale. We asstn7ne that the stockpile of standard agents and Iinmitions accumulated during World War II has been maintained and will be available for use during the period of this estimate. In addition to these standard agents, the USSR may have been prod-acing Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDPa7,P0,4?IW00800050011-5 Approved For Relea9r+2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A0008b6O50011-5 '13P SECRET at least one of the nerve lea since 1949 anti may have developed one other nerve gas through the pilot plant stage. By mi.d-1955, stocks of nerve gases may be available for limited operational employment, 11. DELIVERT OF CONVENTION .L AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPON 8, Present Strength at l Range Aviation: Long Range Aviation, consisting essentially of three Air Armies, one in the Far East and two in the western USSR, constitutes the strategic striking force of the USSR, The TIP-4t which was copied from the American B?-29. is the ardy Soviet bomber., known to be in operational use, capable of carrying atomic weapons to dietntt targets, A s of 1 J a n u a r y 195 , a total of 900 to 950 TU-41s was estimated to be available for operational used (Table of Fouipment strength of Soviet: air regiments known to be equipped with or in the process of being equipped with TU i aircraft totes i,l90 aircraft. but the TUB regiments currently are estimated to bt- at only 75 to 3O percent at TIE strength] As of 1 January 5 3 approximately :9.80 TUB is (seven regiments with an aggrega TIE strength of 22i) were lcsc.ted in the Far East,, It is believed that deliveries of TUB.:s to the Far East are continuing-, 9. Future Strength and Composition of Long Range Aviation, :".e future strength and composition of the Soviet long-range of Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000800050011-5 SECRET Approved For Relea ;2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A0008Qj;O50011-5 TOP SECRET bomber force is difficult to estimate. There is very little in- formation on Soviet development work on new types of medium or heavy bombers. No prototype jet media bomber is known to exist. A prototype heavy bomber has been observed and was probably powered by piston engines. It may ultimately be powered by Kturboprop engine' This type of aircraft is not known to be in series pro- duction, It seems only safe to assume, however, that the USSR is planning to replace the obsolescent TU-4 with aircraft of higher performance characteristics, The following table of the estimated actual strength and composition. of the Soviet long-range bomber force through 1955 is based, therefore, on the assumption that the USSR. has begun production of a heavy bomber and that it will initiate such production of other advansed types of long-range bombers during the period of this estimate. It should be noted, however, that there is no positive evidence that this development has actually begun or is planred0 .d-1953 Mid-1954 Mid-1955 Medium Ember jet Possible Prototype 10/20 120 Piston 1,000 1,250 1,100 Heavy. Bomber Few 14080 180 Total 1,000 1,300-1,350 1,1400 a-7- Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CI pffi q l01lA000800050011-5 Approved For Rele a 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79S01011A00blM 1 05001 1-5 TOP SECRET 10, TU-+4 Aircraft Characteristics: The Tu 4, wider nor- mal operating corditiorse, is estimated to have a combat radius of 1,700 nautical miles and a combat range of 3,100 nautical miles with a 10,000 pound bomb load, Under cruise control condi- tions necessary to reach distant target areas, its speed would be approximately 175 knots at an altitude of about 10,000 feast, However, it is capable of attaining a maximum speed of 347 knots at about 32,500 feet for short intervals. Although there is 'no 44 4"u) U4AU 35 It intelligence to indicate the 9rrd;4 ~-- --- - - done so. lot,/Ss cor:- idered t capable of modifying the TU?4 to increase its range in the same manner that the American B-29A was stripped to produce the B-29B. This modification involves removal of defen- sive armament, except for the tail turret, and increase in the fuel capacity, with a net weight reduction of 2,600 pounds in take-off weight,, So modified, a TU-4 would have markedly reduced defensive capabilities against interceptor attack, but its com- bat radius would be increased to 2,150 nautical miles and its combat range to 4,000 miles carrying a 10,000 pound bomb load, n. With moderate technical advances, it is possible that boar mid-1955 the USSR may be able to improve performance characteristics of the TU-4 to some degree, but there is no current evidence of TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO101lA000800050011-5 ? Approved For Releas'V2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000MM50011-5 SECRET Soviet development or production of the more powerful piston engines which would be essential to najor improvement. We eon. si.der it more likely that the USSR would devote effort to develop- -Iz ing an aerial refueling capability for TU-4#9., and the creation 1 of a heavy bomber force. 13. Future Heavy Bobber Characteriatiees The prototype heavy bomber, assuming it is put in series production and equipped with a turboprop power plant, could have a combat radius of 3,9420 nautical miles aid a combat range of 6,600 nautical miles with a bomb load of 10,000 pounds. By mid?.1955 technical modifications and improvements on such a heavy bomber might permit a combat radius of 3,700 nautical miles and a combat range of 7,000 nautical miles with a bomb load of 10,000 pomade 314 Base Areas for Direct Air Attack on the United States. Three base areas, the Ohukotaki Peninsula in Northeast Siberia, the Kola Peninsula in Northwest USSR and Soviet and Soviet-con. trolled territory along the Baltic and in Eastern Germany, are the closest to the United Statue. From any of these bass areas the stripped-down TU-4 on a one-way mission with one i nf" f ht refuel- ing could reach any target in the United States. TU.-4 'a employed Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000800050011-5 Approved For Relea9d2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000 050011-5 TOP SECRET in this ter, having the 56D0 nautical mile range, could also operate from bases in the interior of the Soviet Union for strikes against the US. 15. Of the three base areas mentioned, the Chukotsld Penin- sula is nearest to the United States. The standard TU-Z (with no inflight refueling) on a two-way mission could not reach the United States. On a one-way mission it could reach targets within i&e arc drawn from San Diego to Lake Superior. The stripped-dawn TU-4 on a two-way mission could reach Seattle without infl.ight re- fueling, With outbound mnflight refueling on a two-way mission, this type of aircraft could reach targets within an arc Zee /L-o- Lake Superior. A one-way mission, without inflight re- fueling, would permit the stripped down TU-& to reach targets in all parts of the United States except Florida from the Chukotaki base area. Soviet heavy branbers, if actually produced, could operate from northeast Siberia on a two-way basis with one refuel- ing against targets anywhere in the United States, and even without refueling, against targets located north and west of an are drawn generally from central Texas through central New York, 16. Logistics problem are difficult in the Chukotski Peninsula, but these could be minimised by advance stockpiling and use of the area for staging bases only. Barbers attacking the Approved For Release 2000/08/29: Cl gQ 101 lA000800050011-5 Approved For Rele 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000se0050011-5 TOP SECRET United States from stern Siberia would have favWable tail winds mast of the year. 2~rse are now no known first-class airfields which could be need for sustained operations, and air- field information is not sufficient to enable positive identifi- cation of v specific installation as a launching site or staging base for n edi n bombers. t4arkovo (65-41x 179-i 5w) and Anadyr/ y * Wivnsny (64-48H 1?7-33E) could possibly support staging operations by TU-4+s, at least during nine months of the year, if adequate advance preparations took place. Other similar possibilities are yelal, T uners Magadan, a "i vlovsk, It is possible that t! 5 S!2 new airfields have been built without detection. The Ssris' e home emphasized use of frozen surfaces in the Arctic, which makes possible the wintertime use of airfields with a mum of pre- paratory efforts 17. TU-4 aircraft sorbied frcmt the Kola Peninsula and Baltic-East German areas Could not reach the United States and re- turn to their bases, even with one outbound refueling. The prin.. cipal TU-4 threat to the united states from these base areas would stain frown one-way missions flown by stripped-down aircraft possessing a combat range of 4,000 nautical miles. F'roam the Mur- mansk area, such a range would permit Soviet bombers to reach TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO101lA000800050011-5 Approved For Relee 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79S01011A0000050011-5 targets roughly north and east of a line from Charleston, South Carolina, to southern Oregon. Fran the Baltic area, such a range would enable TU441s to attack targets north and east of a line drawn generally from Charleeton,8outh Carolina, through Montana. All of the northeastern industrial centers of the United States could be reached from either area, The esti- mated characteristics of heavy bombers zhould enable them to reach the New York.New England area on two-way missions from either the Kola Peninsula or the Baltic area. With one outbound refueling they could attack Any target in the industrial north- east and return to home bases 18, There are now no known airfields in the Kola Peninsula area capable of sortie-ing TU-L 1s, However, Alakurtti, at the base of the peninsula, and MurmanskcVayenga, nine and a half uld readily be adapted to accommodate miles northeast of 'Iurmanak co l TU- ?sa Eight other airfields in 1945 offered runways or take-off areas 4,500 feet or more in length, It is possible that some or all of these bases could have been improved to accommodate medium bombers, As elsewhere in the Soviet Arctic, virtually all. of these airfields are extensible and all will bear the weight of TU-,?s during the six or more months of the year the ground is frozen, During the spring the a and summer months cnift permanent Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RL 'T9 M?1A000800050011-5 Approved For Rele~ww 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000490050011-5 TOP SECRET seck -4 H" all.veather runways of suitable length coinbe-ved0 Both Alakurtti and Murmarisk-Yaa are favorably situated logisti- cally, and great circle routes from this area would avoid initial overflight of nations friendly to the United States. The Baltic- East German area has adequate bases to support large numbers of medium bombers. These bases are favorably situated with respect to communications and weather and are adequately served by existing transportation facilities. A major disadvantage is that great circle routes to the United States pass over portions of Western grope or Scandinavia and any attempted air strike might be de- tected early enough to provide warning. 19. Crew Proficie s Achievement of a high-level of coma. bat effectiveness has been retarded by lack of combat experience and by restrictions upon flying Intensive training has been under. way for five years, but there is no evidence of extensive training in long-distance flying and navigation. It is probable, ho ever, that by mdd??l95 some of these deficiencies will be removed. It is also probable that even now a limited number of crews have been given sufficient trainirg to undertake an attack against the US. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-IID$79,.50101lA000800050011-5 Approved For Rele~km 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79S01011A0001t0050011-5 Aac, The USSR is able to 20. eti a Bop obtain the data necessary for identification of most targets In the US under visual and blind-bombing conditions. The USSR possesses optical bombsights equivalent to US World War II type models. Soviet aviators could therefore be expected to execute satisfactory bomb placement under visual conditions. The USSR has produced, and is equipping its TU-4 and IL-28 (light jet) bombers with blindbomb: and navigation type radars of the US AN/APS-15 and AN/APQ-13 vs.rlsty. It is estimated that a sufficient quantity of this equipment is available for use in aircraft employed in attacks on the continental M. The accuracy of the Soviet blind bombing system is estimated at about 3,000 feet CEP, but we have insufficient evidence to estimate the degree of accuracy which 4- Soviet crews would actually achieve. 21. Anilal~i - _t R t9 s.~Re~al e;eme or: From a variety of circumstantial evidence, including US experience, it is estimated that the W SR could have about 90 percent of its TU-4 strength operationally available for an initial, deliberately prepared surprise attack. However, the number actually sortied would depend upon a multiplicity of other factors. In view of the fact that most US target areas could be reached only by one- way aerially-refueled missions, the attrition rate would be ex- tremely high. The abort rate on those staged against US targets Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO101lA000800050011-5 TOP SECRET Approved For Rele 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79S0101lA0001W0050011-5 TOP SECRET is estimated at 20-25 percent without consideration for interception and poor navigation, and with variations in either direction acoord- ing to season, weather, extent of preparation, and other factors. No appareciable reserves of T( 's are believed available (the same would apply to argr new types of aircraft introduced during this period). At present, TU-,4 production is estimated at about 30 planes per month, a figure which could probably be increased slightly in the short run. 22. Weather: The USSR has consistently devoted considerable emphasis to both short and long period meterorological forecasting. Special techniques for upper air research and improved synoptic methods are being developed foar use in weather forecasting for periods longer than one ronth, although we cannot estimate the degree of success which will be achieved during the period of this estimate. By 1955 it is believed that the USSR will have achieved a short period prediction oapabiltty in at least the European USSR of 85 percent reiiabil ty as oaf with the present reliability of 60 percent. This prediction capability plus extensive experience in meteorological research in the extreme northern latitudes, good woacther reporting facilities in Siberia, availability of records of ureather conditions which have prevailed throughout North America for marry years., and constant access to current North American weather conditions and forecasts should Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000800050011-5 TCP SECRET Approved For Relea 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A00089,0050011-5 TOP SECRET enable the USSR to prediat both route and target weather with reasonable act. 23. Meotra-a' a Cruz sasureo: The USSR has had access to a wide variety of U8 defensive radar and to US jsaening equip- ment. The USSR is apperent3y well aware of the tactical advantage to be gained by Jamal ig defensive radar and other communications. We estate that today the USSR can seriously disrupt long-range radio communications between the continental US and its overseas facilities. We further believe that the USSR will Increase the effectiveness of its jamming equipment as well as the proficiency and number of its trained personnel throughout the period of this .estimate. It is believed probable that the USSR has produced sufficient electronic countermejeures devices to equip some TU-4 aircraft. It is not known whether Soviet TU-4 t s have in fact been equipped with such Jamming equiimant.. or what would be the effectiveness of those devices against US defensive radar. Use of effective jamming equipment right require the employmnt of extra aircraft equipped specifically for this purpose. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : 'A-WbWS0101lA000800050011-5 Approved For ReleI2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79S01011A000'89O050011-5 A. Quided Missiles 24. : There is no positive ianf'oarmation that the USSR now has slat guided missiles in an operational status. It is known that the USSR has been conducting an intensive research and develop- ment program. The V-2 and V-2 type weapons, which were used operationally by the Germans during World War II, are estimated to be the only missiles presently available. These types probably have been improved, and may be available in limited numbers. Neither is knoom to be in series production. 25. y-1 Characteristi.ce: The USSR has continued development on the V-1 missile. A single pulse-Jet version could carry a 2,000 poind warhead to a range of 210 nautical miles at a speed of 370 knots. A twin pulse,-het version has been developed which could carry a warhead up to 4,500 pounds: for shorter distances. Launching an improved V-1 fro a submarine is considered currently feasible and within Soviet capabilities. ftnwr,* to date, no launching equi.pnent,, stowage faoil'ties or missiles ha'v'e actually been sighted on Soviet submarines. While a few intelligence reports are available indicating that the USSR has launched guided missiles from submarines, these reports are of low or undeVrniined reliabi.lityy Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000800050011-5 TOP SE CR"'T . Approved For Releasir02000/08/29: CIA-RDP79SO1011A0008QW50011-5 und have not been. oenfiard, Conceivable that, the V-1 type could be fitted .rith an st inlet +ruurhriad, althoutrh there is no idi tion that the USSR has cither developed such a warhead type or Incorporated it in a guided masile. it is estimated that the 'USSR would net atter?nt to imprx ' this missile type in regard to range or speed, but wild accept the. factors of reliability, load- carrying characteristics, accuracy, and the techniques of rapid preparation and firing frrm the launching, crafty 26. V-2: The USSR hr?.s carried forty u d the development of the German V-2 type ' listic rissile; however, this missile could not produce a threat against the eo,tinental US during the period of this estimate. B. Man 1e 0e1 ae 27. 4oic Ua z The USSR j rape ble of producing, atomic weapons which COMM he --IFd into the U'S, either as complete assemblies or as come neat perta or r; The assembled -d,vioes could rant*ez from small v"'I:+ d weenons (e.g. 5 KT weighing a few hundred pounds to 1 rr -ro r -vi- ld caeapons (e.g. 30-50 KT) weigh- in,g several thousand founds. r o s i - could ranee from a package sr all ennutph to fit t;ja Iss o-ee a package large enour to :-or_rt Banns could be bro?- :.n doi,rn rr>?~r^rtrtent of on automobile to to an automobile, The smaller .C) r+ r ,Tiber of relatively simple Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000800050011-5 . Approved For Relea 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000SW50011-5 and readily transportable components which would not require Brea: technical skill to asreerble Such a small weapon would give a relatively low efficiency and kilotonnage yield. Weapons giving a higher yield would require more skill to assemble and would involve more difficulties in transporting to the point of detonation. It is conceivable that only the fissionable material (in small kilogram ecounts) need be introduced into the US, the other com- ponents being procurable an a ooni rcial basis. Such a plan, however, would require highly skilled personnel and subject the i xole enterprise to security hazards. 28. A variety of forms of clandestine delivery suggest hem- selves. Atomic weapons could be delivered by disguised T[T-4air- A craft, could be detonated in the hold of a merchant ship or sawn as underwater mines.. Either aampanents or assembled weapons could be smuggled in under the diplaanatic i munity, put ashore by sub- marines, smuggled across land borders, introduced through normal import channels, or even introduced as bonded merchandise await- Ing transshipment. The selection of the method of introduction, and of methods of assembly and transport to point of detonation, presumably would be wades according to the objective desired and the risk of detection which the Soviets i were willing to assume. It is not considered possible that the USSR could surmount the security and technical problems involved in delivering a-esetive s .ILF?.. !,L Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000800050011-5 i Approved For Releaas'2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A0008fiD050011-5 1W iftt AO . against the US by clandestine meazm. -a ire that the t has taken aW at-elm toward platrng azy nethodd of clandestine delivery. 29. WeanM: Some BW ogents are pecUI19r]q sapt- able to clandestine introduction. The introduction of small amounts of 3W agents would be diffleat to detect or identify as to aeo'z e, but Soviet operatives would be required for their dissemination, g-~-- tK tai k~ z o B4t ag~snts, and So et ty eoasidooas would be a liriit- ing factor In the scale and toning of such an attack. 30. Chemical Wea = Q1 agents are not easily adaptable to clandestine use. In addition to the limitations noted above as applicable to HW attack, (]I agents are easily identifiable by their Inmediate effects and it probably woi'ld not be feasible or to build up sufficient supplies/to prods the means clandestinely for their dissemination against large population centers. The most practicable use would be against personnel in key installations, but even this would be difficult. There Iszm- . -Td } USSR is developing the means for the clandestine delivery of ahem- ical weapons. o Approved For Release 2000/08/29 7A--qMS0101 lA000800050011-5 Approved For Release`2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000$te050011-5 IV. =A" M T1 MEMIM A. Covent1mial 11