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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 -49P-INC11144- 75925 SECURITY INKIINATION CENTRAL INTILLIGINCE AGENCY le February 1953 NEMCOANDIDI Fat Mr, Sward Wiedemenn (OW Lt. Co 'anal Dean Taaderhoeft ESA (04) Commander William Mark, USN (MI) chamsta Jack Thomas* USAF (A10,111-2B) Colonel Linecott Halls 113AF (ina) SUBJECT I SE-36: Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the In through 1116-1955 =PERMC1E Diernoranther to the ?AC dated 9 February 1953 1. 'The attacked draft has been Trepared by the 0/11E Staff on the basis of existing national aud departmental esti,- mates. 2. Where different setimatee exiat on important points the range of the T5.4), have includeCeet . 3. This text has ad been reviewed by the Bout of National Estimates. The primary purpose of circulating it to you now is to get working-level review and ammendronte in order to permit a revision of the text along the lines which it would haw taken had there been time to get written contri, buttons from you in the first butane*. 4. The next step will be discussed at a meeting now scheduled for 10:00 Thereday, 19 February, in Room 132 South Building. No nreneration la required by you for this meeting. co: OK) 25X1A9a .Director Ada. National Estimates 25X1A9a 4P9P-SEGINNI-- Approved For Release 20.9a4(airiPMerlirriA000800050022-3 ? ? Approved For Releair2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101140000800050022-3 Strtql;jP a 4'CRE_CIFORMAT TION CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 0 OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 17 February 1953 SUBJECTS SE-361 SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US MOOR, MID-1955 (Pnaiminary draft) VE PROBLEM To estimate the cap*ttUtiee of the USSR to attack the continental US by open or clandestine means, through mid-1955. 1. The USSR has deci an attack would ASSUMPTION attack the US9 reoogniaing that guch generaliser with the US. 2. The USSR has comquded $hat circumetandes are such that a general war with the USvircel. Ile an acceptable method ofoontributing to its long-range oblective of a nommuniet world dominated by MOSCOO, ?UP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 .Approved For Relefue 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S010V000800050022-3 TOP SECRET 10 SOVIET )SS ;$ ES Ao Atomic reepons Genera]. ! The riet atomic energy program has enjoyed and almost certainly during the period of this estimate will continue to enjoy, OW Of the hiOlest priorities in the Soviet allocation 4 resources. The objective of the program continues to be on weapOA development and the achdemement of. rate of weapon production ani flexibility which will plsre the USSR in the best possible power position vis-a-vis the US The USSR has made substantial progrear toward this objective,. in stoma? weapons F the USSR has reached a wint in weapon technology at which the weapons stockpiled can be dictated by military requirements rather than by technical limitations. 2. Atoaic. v;etiE?ns riteciVLes Other than some information 1 on the composition and efficiencies of the bombs tested by the US$Rt there is no specific information available concerning the characteristics of weapons presently StOOkrdled or Akely to be atockpiled during the period of this estimate. Tr calculating stockpiles it has been a umed that the USSR will fabricate both all-vlutonium weapons and composite veaponsj, and that it 'will produce as mew composite weapons as possible? The table below contains v,he boot available estimate of the Soviet stockpile for the period mid-. 95? to mid-1955s TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 Approved For Rel se 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S010:V000800050022-3 TOP mcfmr Da'te Mid-1953 Mid-1954 Mid-1955 Mother of Bombs (30-100 KT)* 120 200 300 3. Error and VarIations on Stockpile Estimate: Because ,1.7 the nature of the information on which it was based T the above estimate is subject to considerable error., in view of the uncertainty in the production of fissionable materials, particularly uranium-4359 the stockpile for the period under review may be as low as one-third less (i.e?, as low as 200 far mid-1955) or as high as twice (Le,, 600 for mid-1955) the figure given, It is also possible, by changing the weapon components to increase or decrease the number of weaponl In stockpile substantially with a given quantity of fissionable material. Such changes would hceever, alter the kilotonnage yields according to the quantities of fissionable material used in the indivi- dual weapons, Judging by ttte high efficiencies achieved in the second and third atomic teeter the USSR could probably obtain kilotonnage yields Close to the high 6,1nd of the 30w.100 KT yield used in the tab e for a given quantity of fissionable material. It is estimated that the USSR is probably capable of producing fission weapons yielding TOP* '..)iieNET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 Approved For Rewe 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01*1A000800050022-3 TO? tzcrfflr 200.500 kilotons but in so doing would reduce the number of weapons! In their stockpile. On the other hand, they could also make smaller weapons than those wed in calculating the stockpile estimates made in the above table. It is possible, therefore, that by the end of _the period of this estimate the USSR il1 be approaching a stage in whi4h the availability of weapons may not be a major limiting factor in the scale of an attack which coeld be launched against the United States. B. Thermonuc ear Weapenst 4. It is believed that the USSR has not conducted thermo- nuclear tests. Reaearoh which may be relevant has been noted, but there is no evidence of development activity at the present time. There is, however, a growini Soviet capability far quantity production of thermo- nuclear materials. Consequently, more advanced research, developornt, and even field testing are possible by mid-1994. We cannot assume that the USSR will not have a workable thermonuclear weapon by C. amR114.%_.12111jitsellt 56 It is most unlikays for technological reasons, that :the USSR will have the capability to produce militarily significant qyan- tities of radiological warfare agents, although the USSR will have available small quantities of gross or separated fission products which might be employed as RW agents primarily for their peychological effect. 4 Approved For Release 2000/08/2WieCfMNP79S01011A000800050022-3 ApprOvedForReledrik62000/08/29:CIA-RDP79S0101.41A000800050022-3 roe SECRET D. 131,11.......12/2,Efare2 6. Intelligence information and Soviet scientific puha cations indicate that the USSR has extensive knowledge of the dissemination of agents causing botulism, plague* tularemia, brucellosis, various quick- acting intestinal diseases, and some virus diseases. Little information is available regarding the prcduation of, and none regarding the stock- piling of, EU agents. The USSR could probably mass-produce such agents if it so desired E, Chemical Warfare: 7. The USSR can probably engage in chemical warfare on a large scale. It has large stocks pf chemical warfare agents including nerve gases. Moreover, research is continuing and new nerve gases are probably under development, 110 DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS DESIRICTION WEAPONS IN AIRCRAFT 8, Present StreAll?f*.lemilawli_viation: Long-range- nisilmimmonho?sowswerrs..., Aviation, consisting of three Air Armies, one in the Far East and two in the western USSR, constitutee the strategic striking farce of the USSR. The TU-Z4 is the only Soviet timber, known to be in operational use, capable of carrying mess destruction weapons to distant targets. In December 1952 the number of TU-Lols believed to be operational use Approved For Release 2000/08/26?: CTRIEW79S01011A000800050022-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 ?40, 3E0RET was estimated at 900 aircraft. (This figure vas based primarily upon the Table of Equipment strength of Soviet air regiments known to be equipped with, or in the process of being equipped with, TU4i aircraft-) About 20%, or about 190 TV-404, of the medium bonber strength is located in the Far at 9. Future streNt of Lohg-Range Aviation Future Soviet long-range bomber tx'eng+,h ie difficult to estimate, No prototypi jet medium, bomber capable of attack on the continental. US from Soviet bases has yet been Observed, A Prototype heavy bomber has been observed and was probably powered by a piston engine. It is speculated that it may ultimately be pcwered by a turboprop engine. This type of aircraft not known to be in seriee production. Estimated future strengths Ire also uncertain becauee there is not adequate intelligence on rates of production of the TU-4 and botaule even estimated rated, bawl upon presently known j oduticn fecilitieeF could becane obsolete if the 05.5T were to devote additionel reeagrees to production. The future strength estimates given below are baser! !Ton the assumption that the USSR It now producing, or is about to ibitinte Reties production of, other types than the TU-4. Medium Bomber !dd-1954 mid-1955 Jet. Poseftle Prototype 10/20 120 Piston 9fl0 1000 900 Heavy Bomber Rew 40/80 180 Total 900 1050 - 1100 1200 = 6 - Approved For Release 2000/08/41; c*O1pP79S01011A000800050022-3 ?Approved For Releap 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101y000800050022-3 TOP SECRET 10. TU64 Aircraft Characteristics: The TU-4, under normal operating conditions, is estimated to have a combat radius of LS10.97 nautical miles, and a combat range of 53227 :nautical miles with 1 10,000 pound bomb load. ander cruise Control conditions neeessar,i to reach distant target areas its speed would be approximately 175 knots at an altitude of about 10,000 feet. HOwever, it is capable for P limited period of time of attaining, a maxims speed of 347 knots et about 32,500 feet with a aerates ceiling of 39,500. 2Fith technical modifications and improvements, the TU-4 by mid-1955 might be able to increase its combat radius to 2650 nautical miles (3700 with one aerial refueling) and its -range to .5000 nautical miles :7 11. Future Bomber Characteristics: It is estimate that the prototype heavy boatel assuming it is equipped with a turboprlp Z3429) power plant, would by mid-1955 have a combat radius of 277027 naut,4a1 56007 miles and a range of 1.70067 nautical miles carrying a 10,000 pound bomb load. It would have a speed of 360 knots at 30,000 feet ander otuise control conditions necessary to accomplish long distance mission? the flight speed would be somewtat lessened. Aerial refueling with this aircraft is not considered practicable in view of the limited numbere which would be available even f series production was undertaken. 7 - TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 .Approved For Relece 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S010213A000800050022-3 TOP ai'URT 12, Base Arae for direct air attack on the US: The olos base areas to the US are the Kola Peninsula area in the northwest USSE Soviet and Soviet-controlled territory along the Baltic and in Yzetern _ Germany, and the Chukotakl Penineula in northeast Siberia. Of these three, the Chukotski is nearest to the US, From this area, the present Soviet TU-4 under normal operating conditions ,gould bomb only northwest extremities of the IS and return to the base. Flying a nne may mission from Chukoteki rwh a plane could barely reach New /Cak. but could strike anywhere north and west of a great circle from Fic-IT to San Antonio, including all of the Great Lakes and Upper Mississippi Valleys Ir mid-1955, if the USSR made the technical improvements and modifications in the TU-h of which it is probably capable and developed aerial refueling techniques, planes based in the Chukotski Peninsula ould reach all of the tJS ectreot southern Florida and perbably return to their bases? On one-erey rdestons, such aircraft could rev.h an point in the US.7 gould not hmMb even the northwest extremities cf the US and return to their bas. s, Flying a one-way mission from Chukotski such a plane eculd not reach New Tack or the (teat Lakes industrial region. bat oould etrike in the Los Angeles area, If the USSR is willing to accept the high attrition attendant with aerial refueling over defended territory even with fully developed aerial refueling techniques it is possible to reach all important tercet areas in the US on a ons-awar rieston fair EECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 ' Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 TOP SECRET 13, However, the Chukotaki Peninsula is a poor base area from the standpoint of woather and logistics. /t has now no known first-class airfields which oould be used for sustained operations, although there are several airfields which could be employed as staging areas for a limited neither of sorties. 14. Present TU-4 aireraft based in the Kola Peninsula area and the Baltic-East Gerearky area could not reach the US, and return to their bases. _en oneamay missions they could barely reach New York, but could range over New England and Upper New York State. ay m1d-1955 if the USSR made the technical modifications and improvements in the TU-4 of which it is probably capable and developed aerial refueling techniques, planes based in these areas could reach most of the northr. ern and northeastern US, including the Great Lakes, and return to their bases, On one-may missions they could reach any point in the US., gar could they, on one-way missions, reach New York City or the indus- trial area of New England and upper New Yark State. If the USSR was willing to accept the high attrition attendant upon aerial refueling over defended territory, TU4118 on one-way missions could reach the northeastern US, but could not reach the southern, south-central ar western parts of the countryg 15. The Kola Peninsula area does not now have bases capable of scrtie-ing medium bombers, but has several airfields which could readily be adapted to do so,, Supply would not be a difficult problem. ? Approved For Release 2000/08/2VFdRikbP79S01011A000800050022-3 Approved ForRele2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01044A000800050022-3 10I SWRET This area would afford the advan-age of great circle routes which!?ould obviate overflight of mations friendly to the US. The Baltic-East German area has adequate banes to support large nuMbers of medium bombe's. Weather and logistics woad be favorable. They are hoUiver, even more distant from key Wtarget areas, flights would be subject to greater risk of detection? and only a very limited number of target areas could be reached even or one-way missions using aerial refuoring 16, Crew Proficiency Achievement of a high-level of canbat effectiveness has been retarded by lack of combat experience and restrictions upon flying laipoeed by the Sacrist security system, Inten- sive training has been undetway for five years, but there is no evidence of extensive training in toevedistance flyinu and navigation, or of the development of operational aertaL refueling techniques and equipment. 17 It is possible*,Ii Is that bf7 mid.1955 some of these deficiencies will be removed, it is also possible that even now a limited number of crews has been given sufficient training to undet- take an attack against the US. If the Soviet aviators should be tiained and equipped with the nav5gational aids which the USSR could probably produce in quantity if it chose to do so, Soviet aviators could prbbably cross even the polar region Int stay an course. 10 - VP WHET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 A pproved For Releait 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S010141/4000800050022-3 TR SECRET 16 autitItt and Emlibing Accuraszs The USSR is able i obtain all the data neoessary for identification of targets in the US under visual and blind bombing conditions. The USSR possesses actiosi bombsights equivalent to US World War II type models. Soviet avi tore could therefore be expected to exeoute satisfactory bomb placemert under visual conditions The USSR has produced, and is equipping its TU-4 and IL-28 (light) bombers with blind-bombing and navigation type radars of the US AN/APS-15 and ANAFQ-13 variety. The accuracy of the Soviet blend bombing syytem is estimated at about 3000 feet CEP, 19.! Abort Rate Replacement Factors From a variety of circumstantial evidenoe, including US experience, it In estimated that the USSR could sortie about 90% of its TU-4 strength for an initial, deliberately-prepared surprise attack, However, consider- ing the limitations of base areas for use against the US only a limited percentage of these aircraft could be staged against targets in the US, In view of the fact that Zioar.ghai7 US target areas could be reeohed only by one-way aerial refueling missions, the attrition rate would be ff00gilmost 1047. The abort rate on those staged against US targets is estimated at 20-25% without consideration for interception and poor navigation, and with varying Increases according to season, weather, extent of preparation, and other factors. NO appreciable reserves of TU-Isgs are believed available (the same would apply to any new types of aircraft introduced during thisperiod). At present, TU-4 production Approved For Release 2000/08/Y: 8a1VDP79S01011A000800050022-3 . Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S4911A000800050022-3 TO? SECRET is estimated at 20 planes per uh a figure which could probably be increased slightly in the short run. A considerableexpansion of plint capacity, or the conversice of ther plants to bomber production would be necessary if the USSR uere to plan on a sustained strategio bombiztg campaign. 20. Weather No niteiligence is available concerning Soviet doctrine for the tactizal 1390 of weather conditions. The USSR has excellent weather reporting facilities in the Siberian area and is probably capable of making reaenrably accnrate predictions of route weather conditions on a day-to-day basis. Weather conditions in potential base and rout e areas rIlezt .7ertain1y would have a serious limiting effect upon operational mioabilities in certain seasons, 21. Klectromic Countermeasures: The USSR has had access to a wide variety of US defensive radar and to US jamming equipment. The USSR is apparently well aware of the teetical advantage to be gained by Jamming defensive radar and other communications. It hassdemonstrated a high proficiency in jaxii.n nv.nttona1 broadeaste? From circum- etantial evidence, it is believed prebable that the USSR has produced sufficient electronic countermewuree devices to equip some TU4i air-. craft. It is not known whether SoiIrt TU-42s have in fact been equipped with such jamming equipment, or what would he the effectivenese of theee devices against US defensive radar Approved For Release 2000/61#2?ItcerA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 ? Approved For Relea1.2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01014000800050022-3 TOP 3FCRET III. DELIVFAT OF CONVJJTIONAL AND MASS DESTUCTION WEAPONS BY OTRUI WANS A. Guided Missiles 22. Oemrals There is no positive information that the USSR nom has any guided missiles in an operational status. It is knCen that the USSR has been contwting an intensive research and development program, ani it appears tha-r. an objective of that program is to produce operational missiles at the earnest possible date. The V-4 and'i type weapons, which were used operational-14r by the Germans during World War II, are estimated to be the only missiles presently available These types probably have been improved and may be available in -Limited nuMbers. Neither i8 knewri to be in series production. 23, V-1 Characteristics: The V-1 is a winged missile Al which the USSR has continued development. A single engined version could carry :a 2000 lb. warhead .to a range of 210 nautical miles At a speed of 370 knots. A twin jet version has been developed which 'could carry a warhead up to 4500:1b. to s range of 75 nautical miles with a compensating increase in range with decreased warhead weight. There is fragmentary evidence that the USSR has investigated the possibility of launching V-los from submarines; this could also apply to surface. vessels. It is conceivable that the :V-1 type could be fitted with an atomic mar- beads although there is no indication that the USSR has either developed 13 - TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 Approved For Rele4e 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S010114000800050022-3 1? oECRET such a warhead type or incorporated it in a guided missile. It is estimated that the USSR would not attempt to carry inommements IA this missile type toward inormas in range or speed but would aceent the factors of reliability, load carrying characteristics, accurazy, and the techniques of rapid preparation and firing from the launehing craft. 24 V.2: The MI, has carried forward the development of the German V-2 type ballistic missile; however, this missile could not conceivably produce a threat against the continental US during the period of this estimate B. Clandestine Deliver( 25 Atomic reaponms ii;o be prepared upon receipt of ipecial JAEIC contributiaad 26. Bial2,1 Keepons: BP agents are peculiarly adaptable to clandestine delivery. and they could be introduced preceding or after an open surprise attack or without an open surprise attack even 'taking place. Small amounts of MK agents introduced under cover of diPlomatic immunity or by smuggling would be difficult to detect or identify as to source. In almost all oases the dissemination of BC agents Would require the clandsetir collaboration of DB residents, and this le a serious limitation upon either their massive dissemination or because lh - Approved For Release 2000/08/21,61%19P79S01011A000800050022-3 'Appr:ovedForRelgefie2000/08/29:CIA-RDP79SOldiliA000800050022-3 AP? SECRET of Soviet security consider us, their use immediately preceding an open surprise attack. There is no evidence, however, that the USER is developing the means for the clandestine delivery of biological weapons. 27. Chemical Weefens: Unlike BR agents, Cg agents are: not easily adaptable to clandestine use. In addition to the limitations noted alkyls as applicable to HW attack, CW agents are easily identi- fiable by their immediate effects and it would hardly be feasible to build pp sufficient supplies or procure the means Clandestinely tear their dissemination against large population centers. The most prac- ticable use would be againist personnel in key installations immediately preceding an open attack. , In this instance, Soviet security consider- ations might preclude suchen effort. There is no evidence that the USSR is developing the means for the clandeetine delivery of chalice' weapons . IV. ATTACK ON T annum ONLL NAVAL AND AIRBORNE FORCIT, A. Conventional Naval Attack 28. Soviet capabillties for attacking the US with naval forces carrying conventional armament are comparatively low,4/ The -------- - As noted in paragraph 22 above, the USSR could, if it chose, develop a capability for the delivery of guided missiles carrying an atomic warhead by launcning & V-1 type missile from a !submarine or surface Y58351. Approved For Release 2000/08/Ai SA4DP79S01011A000800050022-3 Approved For Re se2000/08/29:CIA-RDP79S01*AA000800050022-3 'Or SFRET Soviet surface fleet is geographically divided, lacks advance ba has limited operational experience, and does not possess a shipbotne air arm. Its minor combatant vessels, including amphibious types, are entirely unsuited for transoceanic attack. The Soviet merchant marine, which would be called upon to provide the lift, could not be developed into an efficient auxiliary element to amphibious operations or aay significant scale. The only sUbstantial naval threat to the US which the USSR could muster wrovld be that of its sdbmarine force. In acidition to its potential in connetiom with the of mass destruction weapons, the snbmarine forte oould, at least in the initial phase of a conflict, inflict serious damage on certain US overseas communidations and carry out offensive mining in the shipping approaches to prinauel US harbors RTeept for enlargement of the submarine force, replaCement of older and limited-rang," *steels by new snorkle types, and the akapta- tion of submarines to missile launching, little change in the over?all Soviet naval capability is expected during the period of this estiaate. Airborne Attaok ???????1.1?????4?.????Wa???????. +????=0.n?=/? 29, Soviet oapbUitia for airborne attack upon the US are also very limited, The USSR does not possess any operational tran aircraft capable of two-way miseions to the US. TU4i's could be adapted for troop-carrying service and operate within the same limits and under the same conditions as the TU-4 bomber. There is no indication - 6 - Approved For Release 2000/0830 "F'}eNI1DP79S01011A000800050022-3 * Approved For Reliteise 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0164t1/A000800050022-3 FSCaET that the USSR has sads any plans for the dropping of airborne force in the US, but the USSR could, if it chose, drop apectally trained asaault and sabotage forces for attack upon important but difficilit bathing targets. V. SOVIET AIR TIMM 30. The oviet rulers have devoted to the improvement of their air defense system an allocation of effort and resources whih is probably second only to the oviet atomic weapons program, Thp air defense effort has faced numerous developmental and production problems, and despite considerable progress, deficiencies artill egi There are insufficient number oi trained personnel, modern interreptors? radars, and heavy AA guns. 'kart of the air defense ocamunicatione net- work ie subject to long-range jamming. Interceptor capabilities under conditions of poor visibility are seriously limited. By mid-1951i name of these deficiencies will be reduced. The interceptor force wilI probably be fully jet-equipped, all-weather interception facilities improved, and comminications,minershilities reduced. Further isprove- manta will be acoamplished by mid-1955. Nevertheless, we do not, believe that the Soviet rulers will at any time during the period of this esti- , mato conclude that their air defense system would be of sufficiep quality to prevent aijlastaatial numbers of attacking planes from finding strategic targets. 17 - Approved For Release 2000/08/29r ZINARDP79S01011A000800050022-3 Approved For Relemire 2000/08/29 : CIAVDP79S0101411k000800050022-3 TOP SECRET VI. EFFECT OF UVERALL SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND VDINFROILITIES UPON TWIR'STRATEOY IN THE ASSUMED SITUATION 31. The Soviet rulers would probably estimate that: a. If not blocked, the US could inflict an unacceptable level of damage upon the USSR by strategic air attack. b. There is not adequate assurance that the Soviet air defense system could prevent an unacceptable level of damage from occurring. c. The U3 would be unable to invade and occupy the .US by military force. d. The US and the other free world countries poetess an overwhelming quantity of the world's resources and if permitted to mobilize tholes resources could probably defeat the USSR. 32. The Soviet rulers probably woulds, therefore, pursue the following strategy: a. They wouId employ the maximum effective air bombard- ment effort against US strategic air facilities in the US and overseas. b. They would attempt to deny to the US access to or control over strategically important areas of the Eurasian land mass. To this end, they would attempt to occupy as much of the - 18 - Approved For Release 2000/08/2PPCMHP79S01011A000800050022-3 Approved ForRipase2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S131011A000800050022-3 4 Eurasia as possible and te sever its communications with the qs. They would utilise such resources as remained (after allocatisn to US strategic air facilities) to assist in establishing such control and to prevebt. the US from assisting or reinforcing defending forces. Thevimmad attempt to destroy the overall US ability to wage war against the UbSR by additionally utilising such re sources as remained eggwially air bombardment resources) agsinet military and quasi-military targets in the US,and the general industrial, economic and psychological strength of the US. dc, Aside from la conceived priority in the general allocation of resour, 4 6ov1et rulers might make sp cial efforts in ardor to achieve damage or destruction of critical targets or to achieve political or psychological advantagee 33. Its among the available forces and weapons for attacking the US, the USSR would be Obliged to rely primarily upon open military, attack with atomic bombs deliTered by TU-4 aircraft, for the folicming reasons; The lc CP tbilities of conventional naval forces and airborne forces. b The st uifficulties inherent in large-eca1,? clandestine attack the ooviet rulers have a pathological -19- _,9 TOP iisT Approved For Release 2000/08/2 : GIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3 Appfoved For Relgoote 2401ORDENIFEW1044-A000800050022-3 AMML4EGNE41- distrust of their own people, including Communists, and almost certainly would not trust them in massive clandestine operations under circumstances in which defection or failure would have potentially disastrous consequences for the USSR itself.) co Other metbode of delivery of atomic weapons are insufficiently developed for effective use. d. Other mass destruction weapons are insufficiently developed or subject to other handicaps in their large-scale use. 34. The Soviet gnaws might, however, rely upon other methods of attacking the US concurrently with or Immediately following an open and direct atomic attack. In the C4808 of guided missiles, airborne attack, submarine bombardment, and biological warfare, Soviet capabili- ties at best appear to be severely limited. Chemical attack in connec- tion with, or subsequent to, atomic bombing is a more serious possibility. 35. It Is entirely reasonable to expect that it will do so, and that magnitude of the Soviet threat will be greater. We believe, however, that their overall strategy and the priorities assigned to offensive resources, will remain throughout this period essentially the same as those outlined in paragraph 32. Likewise the ooviet rulers throughout this period would be obliged to rely primarily upon open military attack with atomic bombe delivered by TU-4 aircraft, although additional types of 'wows and aircraft may be available in limited numbers. Approved For Release 2000/0009Vie TOP MOM IIIMIC11A000800050022-3