DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO VOA JAMMING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030018-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

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ecurity Information
Diplaatic Actions
Taken with respect to
VOA Jmming
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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QOA "am
on three occasions since April 1.948 direct diplomatic representations
have been made to the Soviet authorities with regard to interference
to American H.F. broadcasting stations. Such representations have
elicited a variety of reactions such as denial of Soviet use of the
frequencies involved, Soviet priority or no response.
The Secretary General of the ITU circulated to all members of
the Union a telegram from the United States which stated the
situation with respect to the intolerable interference to the VQA
being created by Soviet jnir,g program, and, advising that steps
would be tabor by the U.S. to protect its broadcasting transmissions,
but with every effort being taken to avoid inconvenience to other
members of the Union.
The question of Soviet jammning was also raised at the "Conference
on Freedom of Information" (Uruguay 1950) and the matter as referred
to the FCQSOC which resulted in resolution 306 which was in turn trans-
mitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations and adopted by
that body as resolution 406(V) at its 325th plenary meeting 14
December 195c, The United States delegation to the U.N. took occasion
to note that the United States supported the ECQSOC resolution.
However neither this or any other of the objections has had any effect
During the High Frequency Broadcasting Conference at Mexico City (1949)
the Chairman of the U.S. delegation denounced the U.S.S.R. for its jarring
activities. This denunciation stopped the Conference for several
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hours while the delegates from the U.S.S.R. made points of order
against the denunciation. The presentation of the U.S. position was only
accomplished by the tactical maneuver of proving the relevance of the
U.S. statements by rading them in open session to the Chairman of the
Conference.
BUNION
In view of the continuance of Soviet Jamming without regard to
these actions of the United States, the ITU or the U.N., certain
conclusions may be drawn. When it is considered that U.S.S.R. Jamming
activities have been confined almost entirely to programming of a pro-
paganda nature, and that the I.T.U. Convention and other pertinent treat-
lea provides the legal justification for member nations to protect them-
selves from telecommunications which jeopardize their national security,
it would seer obvious then that the U;SOS.Ra must consider its legal
position as being sound in taking action against what the Soviets must
recognize as a serious threat to their national security. Insofar as
their legal position rests entirely on comity among nations this may
also mean that they are prepared in some degree to protect themselves
from retaliation or that by confining their jamming to the "damaging
activities" of the political broadcasts they thereby run the least risk
of inviting retaliatory actions,
CONCLUSIONS
In view of the political, technical and legal factors entering
into the present and historical actions of the U.S.S.R. in its Jamming
operations, it would seem imperative that the U.S. must recognize within
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its own council (1) the futility of prateating against Soviet j,anmfn
for aty other purpose than providing a "cover" for U.S. political warfare
activities, (2) that the soviet fu]1 r recognizes the extre vulnerability
of diotatarsehipa to political warfare and the diversi m of resources in
defuse of the soviet regime may be justified on that basis alone
without regard to the possibility of collateral advantage accru3xzg to
its military capabilities.
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