SOVIET ADJUSTMENTS TO STALIN'S DEATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 9, 1953
• Content Type: IR

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1100 6226 Date: March 9, 1953
Office of Intelligence Research
SOVIET ADJUSTINdTS TO STJ1LIN'S DEATH
PART 1. G-7,M1T 1L, fl L'XCP,T IOTr>
The government and Party reorganization effected in the Soviet:,
Union on the narrow of Stalin's death was clearly designed to insure.:
an orderly transfer of power and to prepare against any domestic or
foreign eventuality.
The reorganization was striking for its speed, thoroughness, and
orderliness. It involved a concentration of both poi.er and operatic-na1
responsibility in the hands of a key group in the old Politburo in a
manner reminiscent of emergency measures taken during World War 11.
The actions taken, the tone and content of the official annourc:e-
rients, and the accompanying commentaries demonstrate that the Soviet
leaders are inl ent upon giving an appearance of unity regardless of
any personal rivalries that may exist among them. To the ran:: and
file of the Soviet Party, to the "asses of the Russian peoples, to
the, satellite regimes, to the leaders of foreign Parties, and to
presumed foreign enemies, the regime has presented what is made to
seen an unbreakable front and one that is capable of meeting any
situation that may arise. Moreover, the new set-up seems especially
designed to leave no question as to rigid continuity. Faces have
been rearranged, but no new ones have made an appearance and none
that has been at the forefront has been suddenly dropped.
The physical void left by Stalin's elimination appears thus to
have been filled, at least for the time being.
Steps have also been taken to fill the spiritual void. Eviden'cly
recognizing the impossibility of effecting an early substitution of
any individual for Stalin as the personal embodiment of the Soviet-
Communist world, the regime has attempted to reestablish the symbolic
importance of the Soviet Party itself. This process began in fact
?with the first announcement of Stalin's collapse and has continued
without let-up since,
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In the realignment of top government and Party organs, Georgi
M. Malenkov emerged in the Number One position. Already ranking Party
Secretary after Stalin's death, Malenkov assumed Stalin's post as
Premier or Chairman of the Council of Ministers and headed the
membership list of the reconstituted Party Presidiu,the renamed
Politburo...
Malenkov worked closely with Stalin from the mid-1920's, first
as his personal secretary and then as his supervisor of Party personnel
matters, He is known as an administrator and an industrial efficiency
expert. He has avoided any independent theoretical pronouncements,
having only paraphrased Stalin in such doctrinal statements as he has
been called upon to make. Malenkov's attitude toward the West was
probably reflected in his speech in 1949 at the November anniversary,
which was the most intransigent statement made on the occasion in the
postwar period,. Like most top Soviet leaders he has never been
outside the Soviet bloc.
While Malenkov's position as Number One cannot be doubted, he
has not so far taken over the full measure of power that was Stalin's.
This he evidently shares with some five fellow members of the old
Politburo: Beriya, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and eirushchev. The
first four of these not only hold membership in the new ten-member
Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, but as "First
Deputy Chairmen" of the Council of Ministers constitute with Malenkov
the "presidium" of the Council of Ministers, the supreme executive
body of the state. All except Kaganovich head key ministries.
Khrushchev,while holding no government post, appears to have been
given the leading position, after Malenkov, in Party affairs.
Of these five, Beriya, particularly, and Bulganin and Khxuhev
appear to be in the forefront. By virtue of their positions, they
personally command key areas of power. Within the new five-man
Presidium of the Council of Ministe#s, Beriya has resumed leadership
of security forces (again joined together in a single agency) and
Bulganin has again taken personal charge of the war ministry.
Meanwhile Khrushchev ha^ been relieved of local Party duties in
order to concentrate completely on the over-all Party situation, a
designation that means he will share the immediate direction of
various Party matters with Malenkove
The extent of Malenkov's power will rest in part on how suc-
cessfully he has utilized his long association with personnel
matters within the Party. Although a ministry may be under the
personal direction of another Presidium member, it may actually
respond to Malenkov, in the event of any show-down, if an adequatO
rmber of its top officials consider themselves personally indebted
-o?.Malenkov for their rise and t'-us accord him their personal
loyalty.
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The changes in the Government and Party showed these additionEL.l
trends:
(1) Junior Politburo members are moving to the fore, In the
five-man Presidium of the Council of Ministers, three members did rid,
receive full Politburo status until 1946, although they admittedly
carried heavy responsibilities during the war. They are Malenkov,
(51 in January), Beriya (54 on March 29), and Bulganin (57).
(2) Senior Po 't mbe have bee edged d ard. Molotov
(63 on March 9) gave up his long-held second position in top Party
listings to Beriya. Although third in order on both the Government
and Party presidiums, his responsibility for foreign affairs does
not afford him a power apparatus within the Soviet Union. So long
as Stalin lived, Molotov benefited from his long association with
the leader. With Stalin dead., he appears to have dropped somewhat.
If his responsibilities should entail relations with Communist China
and the satellites, however, his prestige would be enhanced.
Voroshilov, at 71 the oldest Politburo member and, like Molotov, a
personal friend of Stalin since the Revolution, has been given the
honorary position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,
legislature of the USSR, Since Soviet law provides that a minister
cannot serve on this Presidium, Voroshilov holds no executive post
in the government. He replaces Shvernik (64 or 65) who returns to
his old job as head of the trade unions and who was dropped in the
Party presidium to the alternate level. Kaganovich, nearing 60, is
the fifth member of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. He
does not have an assigned ministerial responsibility and will prob-
ably be charged with direction of economic affairs.
(3) Power gen. rall-v is being more closely concentrated. Top
party and government organs have been reduced in number and in size.
The Presidium of the Council of Ministers has been limited to five
members. The Presidium of the Party's Central Committee, recently
raised to 36 members including 11 candidates at the XIX Party Congress,,
has been pared to 7.4 members, including four candidates. The bureaus
of both the Government and Party presidium have been abolished.
Important government ministries have been merged into single agencies.
These various steps are similar to those taken just before and durin,
World War II. Politburo members have taken over direct control of
the ministries, reversing the trend since 1946. Organization of the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers as a small top directing bod.
recalls the establishment of the five-man State Defense Committee in
1941. Announcement of the office of first deputy chairman of the
Council of Ministers harks back to the creation of this rank in the
spring of 1947.. The reappearance of Marshal 7?hukov, who except fay
one brief period in 1951 has been largely out of the public eye
recalls the public attention given to military figures in 1'41
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Despite the extensive realignment of personalities, it appears
most unlikely that any new policy grouping has emerged, It is in
fact uncertain whether significant policy differences actually exist
among top Soviet leaders. Where such have been reported, they have
invariably been based upon speculation. Even in the speculative reports,
however, the five top leaders of the moment have never been placed
together in a single policy group. Rather they have invariably been
split into rival groups. As a matter of fact the personalities now in
control represent a cross section of those who have dominated the
Soviet scene for the past thirty years. The group, small as it is,
includes individuals who could be considered as falling into each of
the "interest groups" ordinarily assumed to exist in the Soviet
hierarchy; i.e., government, Party, militar'r, production, Old
Bolsheviks, Young Bolsheviks, etc. If policies of recent years re-
flected any onets thinking other than Stalin's, then the newly
established masters must have contributed to their formulation. On
the basis of existing evidence, for Malenkov and his associates to
advocate a new policy line in either the foreign or domestic field
would be to repudiate themeselves and all they have stood fora
The nature of the reorganization measures, as well as the manner
in which they have been adopted and promulgated, leave no doubt of
keen awareness on the part of those now in charge of the Soviet Union
of the dangers inherent in a transfer of Stalin's power? Moreover
there appears to be a firm resolve on the part of the leaders to
subordinate, for the time being at least, all other consideratim s to
that of safeguarding against these dangers.
It consequently seems most unlikely that for at least the short
run the Soviet power structure will be beset by either paralysis,
confusion or internal conflict. Whether this will remain the case
after an orderly transition has been effected is, of course, conject-
ural. Certainly all the elements requisite for a more or less ex-
plosive power struggle will remain presents some time. The sharing
of power that circumstances }-ave apparently forced upon Malenkov
leaves the way open for a serious challenge of his position by one or
more of his associates, particularly by those who enjoy direct
authority over a power base (Beriya, Khrushchev, and Bulganin). Also,
since this sharing process leaves Malenkov?s power position incomp:'ete,
it will inevitably keep him under greater or lesser pressure to
enroach on the prerogatives of these associates, Only in this way
can he finally secure his hold on power. While a successful extent ion
of I'Ialenkov's authority would, of course, increase stability, pre-
mature or unskillful efforts along these lines might provoke a strong
reaction on the part of those whose positions were being threatener
and thus jeopardize the regime.
It should be noted, however, that the situation generally is far
more conducive to stability than it was at Lenin's death. When Lenin
died, there existed within the Party well defined and long establi. hed
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antagonistic power groupings. Division also still reached deep into
the population. The long incapacity of Lenin had made for intrigurc;.
More significantly, Lenin's preeminence was due to the force of his
influence and not to his exercise of certain functions the taking
over of which would automatically carry with it the leading role,
Even granting these differences, however, in the final analysi>
the fate of the new set-up will depend upon Malenkovts own ability.
Malenkov's apptrent position is far stronger than was that of Stalin
in 1924. Assuming skill and resolution on his part, he should be
able to make himself master of the situation, Malenkov's experience,
personality and capabilities appear, therefore, key to the problem of
future prospects. While little firm information about these is
available, what there is sug-ests that his hold on power, like
Stalin's, will increase rather than slacken.
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PART II: MALEOV TTH
Malenkov was close to Stalin from the 1920's. Although employed
in many undertakings, his principal concern has consistently been
determining the assignments of party personnel, a useful position, as
Stalin found, in which to build up a personal political machine.
Born in Chkalov in 1902, 1v lenkov volunteered for duty in the Red
Army at the age of 17 and from 1919 to 1922 served as a political
commissar in Central Asia where campaigns were being waged to crush the-
local nationalist resistance to the Bolsheviks.
Following Soviet victory in Central Asia, Malenkov, like many
young Communists, was sent to an eng4neering school in Moscow for tra thing
to help replace the Tsarist specialists who still provided most of the
technical skill.. His career in the Central Committee apparatus started
as soon as he left school in 1925, and the "responsible" work that he
engaged in until 1930 was apparently service in Stalin's personal
secretariat, which after 1928 was officially designated as the Special
Sector of the Central Committee's Seoretariata
Malenkov's work with Party cadres began in 1930 and in a few yet rs
expanded to cover assignment of workers in all fields. His first task
was in the Moscow Party organization where, as head of the Organizational
Section# he aided Kaganovich in intensifying the purge of the opposition
to Stalin. In 1934 during a reorganization of the Central Committee
apparatus he became chief of the newly-formed Section of Leading Party
Organs. In this position he supervised the work of the Party machine
during the vital purge years and directed the assignment of Communists
first to posts in the Party machine, then after 1937 to posts in all
fields. His rising stature in the Communist Party was signalized in
1935 when he became a junior member of the Liquidation Commission for
the Society of Old Bolsheviks under Andreyev and Shki ryatov, About this
time he became editor of the Party's periodical Party Construction
(since abolished) which concentrated on organizational matters. The
expulsion of about two-thirds of the Party's members after 1932 cleared
the way for Malenkov's rise to new positions of power in 1939. He be-
came the head of the newly-organized Cadres Administration, which con-
trolled all Party personnel, and was added to both the Secretariat and
the Orgburo at this time.
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On the eve of the German attack in 1941, iIalenkov became an
alternate member of the Politburo, which gave official recognition to
the powers he already wielded. HI remained in charge of the Cadres:
Administration at least until 1948, Soviet sources indicate,: and became
a full member of the Politburo in March 1946 while retaining membership
in the two other top Party bodies. Soviet sources suggest that he did
not function as a Party Secretary from May 1946 to July 1948,
After the German invasion Malenkov's high position in the Soviet
power set-up was signified by his inclusion in the original five-man
all-powerful State Defense Committee, The original group consisted of
Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, l:a],enkov, and Beriya; later additions !vere
Voznesenski, Mikoyan, Bulganin replacing Voroshilov, and Kaganovich. An
indication of his crucial role during this period is the decoration that
he received in 1943 for increasing aircraft production. As late as 1947,
Malenkov was still reported to be in charge of the aircraft industry.
In 1943 Malenkov actually received a post of command over other members
of the Politburo, although he was officially only an alternate member of
that body, He was appointed head of the Committee for Restoration of
the Economy in Areas Liberated from the German occupation. Members
under 4alenkov were Beriya, ilikoyan, Voznesenski, and Andreyev.
Except for these emerg:.my situations9 Nalankov's role in the
government has been comparatively small, He was elected to the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet in 1938, a nominal position that he appears to
have retained until 1946. He became a Deputy Chairman of the Councs_1 of
People's Commissars (now Council of canisters) some time before
November 1944. He was not reappointed when a new government was formed
in March 1946, but a few months later he again received the post. The
election campaign biographi3s of this period described Malenkov as ousy
restoring the economy in liberated areas; a year later similar sour-.es
said that he had been "directly" engaged in agricultural work,
His opportunity to regain his former prominence in ?arty wor::
came in the summer of 1948 when, following Tito's defection, he again
became active as a Secretary of the Central Committee. He simultan3ously
retained his post as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, t'rereby
becoming the first man other than Stalin to work in both bodies. JY2ring
the past five years Malenkov seems to have steadily improved his position
among those close to Stalin. In 1949 he gave the speech at the
anniversary celebration of the October Revolution. At the 19th Party
Congress in October 1952, he delivered the Central Committee's repot
which traditionally had been given by Stalin.
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Personality
Malenkov is one of the Soviet leaders about whom comparatively
little is knowno Since he first became prominent in 1941 he has
delivered few speeches, and has had almost no contact with non-Commun5st
foreigners. Nevertheless, a careful reading of his public utterances plus
other fragmentary data provide certain clues to his ideas and personality,
!/ialenkov is quite obviously a person of great energy and efficiency.
His ability to handle the complex affairs of the Soviet state is attested
to by the wide variety of tasks which he has successfully carried out in
the past. A good example of his businesslike approach to a