SE-39: PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN (REVISED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010021-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 6, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
6march 1953
SE4.39s Probable Consequences of
(Revised) the Death of Stalin
1. The problem of transfer of authorltyr from Stalin ie
one of the cost difficult which the Soviet eystem could face.
We believe that this transfer will be
initially effected in an
order],y manner, and that there will be no imnediate external
evidence of dissension within the ruling group of the USSR.
Authority is now being exercised in the name of the Central
Cormittee and the Council of Ministers. However, Malenkoyts
key position in the Party, his conspicurous and apparently planned
elevation since 19&8, and his prominent role at and since the
19th Party Congrea suggest that he will be the most powerful
figure for the iimediate future,
2a We cannot estimate whether Nalenieov has the qualities
necessary to conzsoll date his position and to attain unchallenged
lower, since he has always operated with the backing of Stalin.
Neither is it possible to estimate with confidence the capabili..
ties or probable courses of action of his Possible Opponents.
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A struggle for power could develop within the Soviet hierarchy
at any time, Given the nature of the Soviet state, such a
struggle probably would be carried on within the Party organi`
aaation, In any case the peoples of the USSR are unlikely to
participate actively in the struggle, and the hold of the Gem.
munist Party over the USSR is not likely to be ahakera,
3. The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while
ruthless and determined to spread Soviet power, did not allow
his ambitions to lead him into reckless courses of action in his
foreign policy. In the near future, the new Soviet leadership
will almost certainly attempt to follow the foreign and domestic
policies established during recent years. It is probable that
in the execution of these policies, the successors to Stalin
will have less freedom of action in the event. of crisis, Specs-.
fically, in foreign policy, the successors would pi-obably find
it more difficult to abandon positions than did Stalin. It
would be unsafe to asoume that his successor, or successors, will
have his skill in avoiding a direct collision with the West,
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4. The death of Stalin roves not only the dictator of
the Soviet Union, but the undisputed leader of World Commnism.
For some time, no successor can achieve comparable status or
similar significance as a symbol of the world-wide movement,
Therefore, at least temporarily, the cohesion of the world Ccm-
munisst movement will probably be impaired. If there should be
a struggle for potueer within the Soviet Communist Party, this
struggle would almost certainly spread to the Ccn$mu3isst Parties
outside the Bloc.
5. Kremlin control over the Satellites is so firm that we
do not believe it will be impaired by the death of Stalin.
However, in the unlikely event that a struggle in the Soviet Cam..
munist Party should spread to the Soviet Army and the Soviet
ascurity forces, Soviet control over the Satellites would almost
certainly be shaken,
6. Relations between Tito and Moscow are unlikely to change
as a result of the death of Stalin. The antagonism was not
purely personal, but arose from a genuine clash of Yugoslav
trational interests with the Soviet Con?nunist Party. Moreover,
both sides have taken action and adopted positions which would be
extremely difficult to reverse. The ICreeenlin could not recognize
Tito an an independent Communist ally without undermining its
position in the European Satellites.
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7. Tito's prestige and influence with fellow-trave11ers,
particu Ar],y in Western Europe, may a nd with the death of
Stalin. We do not believe that Tito's influence within the
Satellites will increase, unless there should be a prolonged
struggle for power in the USSR,
8. We believe that Stalin's death will have no immediate
offset upon Sino Soviet cooperation oil upon Chinese Communist
foreign policies. However, no successor to Stalin will have pres.
tige and authority in Asia comparable to his. The stature of Mao
as leader and theoretician of Asiatic Coknm nism will inevitably
increase with the disappearance of the former supreme leader,
Mao will almost certainly claim more influence in the determina-
tion of Bloc policy affecting Asia, but he will not seek or obtain
leadership of the international. Communist movement. The new Moscow
leadership will probably deal cautiously with Mao; if it does not,
serious strains in Sino-Soviet relations will almost certainly
develop.
9, We believe that in general the Western European leaders
will be disposed to conduct the East-West struggle with greater
hesitancy and caution. They will probably fear that any Western
pressure on the Bloc would increase the danger of war and faci].i-
tate the stabilization of authority in the USSR, !they will alas
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probably We that, it Western praeeuft is not wx.z ted, the
probl w involved in the transfer eft' authority in the '
Will fag & tout at least a to nparary re1exaticm of tensions
and enable tham to postpone disagreeable policy deoieicr.
CONFaNTIAL
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