IMPLICATIONS OF STALIN'S COLLAPSE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010030-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 27, 2000
Sequence Number: 
30
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 4, 1953
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010030-5.pdf420.57 KB
Body: 
Approved For Relfdse 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP79S01e1A(VPW0-5 SECURITY ThF'OP,MATION Intolli once Est1L iate i;tx fiber 50 I:PLICATIONS OF STALIN'S COLLAPSE Date: March 4, 1953 State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file CONFIDENTIAL Sx'C URT9'Y TNF'ORM.AT TON Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP79S01011AO01000010030-5 Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP79SO104/&001 000010030-5 SECURITY INFORIvIkTION IMPLICATIONS OF STALIN'S COLLAPSE Stalin's illness and imminent death removes from the Soviet scene the most important single element in the Soviet-Coimmnist system. The remaining Soviet leaders consequently face a tremendous readjustment problem. The Soviet system is such that solution of this problem will necessarily present grave difficulties and will almost certainly pro- duce infra-leadership intrigues. It cannot be assumed, however, that these intrigues will lead to any serious weakening of the regime or to significant changes in Soviet foreign or domestic policies. In fact the necessity of displaying to the world a smooth transition to a new leadership would seem to require a continuance of previous policies. The 1952 Party Congress and Stalin's October Bolshevik article, together with /the ideological lines laid doT.in in the current vigilance drive,