IMPLICATIONS OF STALIN'S COLLAPSE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010030-5
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 27, 2000
Sequence Number:
30
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 4, 1953
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010030-5.pdf | 420.57 KB |
Body:
Approved For Relfdse 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP79S01e1A(VPW0-5
SECURITY ThF'OP,MATION
Intolli once Est1L iate
i;tx fiber 50
I:PLICATIONS OF STALIN'S COLLAPSE
Date: March 4, 1953
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
CONFIDENTIAL
Sx'C URT9'Y TNF'ORM.AT TON
Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP79S01011AO01000010030-5
Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP79SO104/&001 000010030-5
SECURITY INFORIvIkTION
IMPLICATIONS OF STALIN'S COLLAPSE
Stalin's illness and imminent death removes from the Soviet scene
the most important single element in the Soviet-Coimmnist system. The
remaining Soviet leaders consequently face a tremendous readjustment
problem.
The Soviet system is such that solution of this problem will
necessarily present grave difficulties and will almost certainly pro-
duce infra-leadership intrigues. It cannot be assumed, however, that
these intrigues will lead to any serious weakening of the regime or to
significant changes in Soviet foreign or domestic policies. In fact
the necessity of displaying to the world a smooth transition to a new
leadership would seem to require a continuance of previous policies.
The 1952 Party Congress and Stalin's October Bolshevik article, together
with
/the ideological lines laid doT.in in the current vigilance drive,