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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010031-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORT

Cf1211FIDDITIAL
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Sr(Virlr MT!,r110?1104!
Followinc in our reply to this morning's telephone
-;108 one of I with addendum for attention of D/CI,
and DDIfi. Bear in mind throughout that we have no recent in-
talligence bearing on these matters except newspapers.
1 Our instinctive amateur feeling is that official
Soviet broadcast is correct that is, Stalin suffered stroke
on night of March 1-2, 1953.
2. Concerning possible developmenta in the internal
power position, three things may be maid over and above our
analysis in The Dynamics of Soviet Societzt
(a) Communist Party Congress was occasion
for relative elevation of Malenkov as against
the field).
(b) phrasing of announcement indicates likelihood
that decisions at present moment controlled
by Malenkov. In particular, note the priority
in phrase "the great misfortune which has
befallen our Party and our people."
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Crystallisation of power relationships may
take considerable time, hence post-death
evidence should not be taken as definitive.
enkovis public position and his role in Party
structure, unclear whether he holds requisite power for succes-
sion until there is evidence that he effectively and directly
controls the Secret Police and the armed forces. Thelact
that the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of
the Communist Party appear to be acting as the government
does not constitute in itself definitive evidence as to the locus
of real power. If, as is possible but not proved, Secretariat
of the Central Committee is operating in the role old Polit-
buro, this will be important evidence for rise of Malenkov
and Party back towards dominance of the state structure.
Secretariat contains none of older Bolsheviks except Krushchev.
As now constituted, Secretariat is certainly dominated by
Milenkov. Hence Secretariat control would imply that Berta
Bulganin, Mblotov, Voroehilov, Mikoyan, and Kagarrvich have
already been excluded from effective power. We have no evidence
that the Secretariat dominates the decisions of the Prosidium
or that the rising power of Malenkov has achieved the monopoly
stage necessary to constitute true succession. It is self-
evident that our intelligence must focus at highest priority
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on this issue. Aside fraa watching every clue as to the control
over the Secret Polio? and the armed forces (including evidence
in satellites, embassies, etc.) we sug.est that we establish
who no controls the Kremlin Guards, a unit which holds life-
and-death power over those who enter the Kremlin for meetings,
and a function of ancient importance in situations like the
present.
3. On assumption that struggle for power, if any,
at present confined within Kremlin, we expect the follewing
reactions in Soviet policy:
)
a dramatic and heightened effort_ to solidify
the country in the face of the alleged hostile_
world envirement;
(b) an effort to present to the outside world.
an appearance of governmental unity, strength
and, especially, continuity in policy;
(0) an avoidance for the time being of any risky
external adventures over and above those now
under way; end
(d) an effort to bridge the emotional and ideological
gap which Stalin's deathivill create throughout
the whole of the Communiet bloc. The. revimp
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will see it as vital to prevent the emergence
of the notion that Stalin's death opens up
fresh options in Soviet internal and external
policy. As in the case of Lenin's death, the
regime is likely to use the device of invoking
Stalin's name in justification for all its
major acts.
If we get evidence of any adventurous external move,
we believe this can be taken virtually as prima facie evidence
that the domestic power situation is not secure. No matter how
carefully preparations have been made for Stalin's death, no
matter how completely Malenkovia succession has been arranged?
if it has--the new regime will require time to organize itself.
And if.,-as is wholly possible--a succession has been only
incompletely arranged, Malenkotts instinct will be to avoid
new external complications so that he can devote himself whole-
heartedly to task or consolidation. Only in extreme case of
major struggle for power is it probable that some Soviet leaders\ '
might regard major war as the most promising device for the se-
curing of their power(see pp. 265-66, The Dynamics of Soviet
Society).
YI suggest testing the reaction pattern of Soviet regime
by raising certain issues for decision by the regime.which could
not (repeat t) be regarded as threatening by them or by the
soo
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Pree de
usgotiation
s so poets of the Austrian Treaty
considered for this purpose) the test
West Trade emoting in Geneva, or others that will readily occur
to you. The proposal at the end of this message might prove
the most effective teat of this kind*
We strongly emphasise importance of eppreciatinL the
emotional shock which Stalin's death will produce within the
Soviet Union and throw:Mut the Communist bloc, among friend
and foe, self.seeking bAreaucrat and enthusiast. In a ray
unique in modern times Stalin, as a eymbol of authority,
temporal and spiritual has been built into the lives of
citizens of Communist areas, Neither ealenkov nor any other
figure now alive can fill this gap in the imnediate future*
The shock effect will undoubtedly diminish with time, Over the
next deist however, it constitutes a unique vulnerability' a
method for the exploitation of *lids is suggested at end of
ASOMPO,
4. With respect to Naos he has entered into an alliance
With e Soviet Union on the basis of his comparative interests, as
he sees them, In particular, we believe it likely the
that the Soviet Union can examine over Manchuria
has played an extremely important part in the Sino-Soviet rata-
Mee has reserved to himeelf? both ideologically ant
in terms of internal police', a degree of independence shared
by no other Communist figure now alive (except, of courses. Tito)
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We: doubt that Mao will take or wil
any fresh initia.
tives vis-a-vis the Western world until he in Clear concerning
both the solidity of the new power arrangements in the Soviet
Union, and especially whether Soviet policy will increase or
decrease its degree of encroachment on areas of Mao's own
believed sovereignty. In time his performance is likely t
depend also on what he conceives to be the realistio alterna.
'aves held out to him by the non-Communist world*
Mao certainly will not accept an increased degree. of '
al dictation from a new soviet regime, If our view
is oorrect, however, his relationship depends lees on ideolo.
on the subetance Of Sic-Soviet relations concerning
trade, Southeast Asian communist parties, and Soviet
on to internal Chinese developent and the KorematIbur
es the situation in Moscow to be weakened, he may
press for an increased degree of sovereignty in Manchuria and
in other places where his mandate is now tempered by Soviet
influence*,
Manc
for the ur
as Becker,
wing is additional oomment we should like to add
attention of Mlles, Cabell and Wisner, as well
en the acute but temporary traumatic state of
emotion in the Soviet Unidn and in the Communist bloc, we
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believe the nment should consider a major Presidential
withininitiative the week made with Congressional backing if
possible, along the following lines.
le 4e should state that Stalin's death marks the end
of an era and opens up fresh option for the Russian people.
In particular it offers them a unique opportunity to re
their relations with the rest of the world;
2. The President should evoke the common wartime
effort d the commoawartime goals of the two nations for a
peaceful, orderly world;
3. Hs should emphasize and illustrate in concrete terms
that there is no incompatability between American interests
and objectives and the legitimate interests and objectives of
the Russian nation and its peoples.; and
4. He should announce his intention to initiate in .
concert with our allies a meeting in the near future designed
to re-examine the possibilities of agreement on controlled
armaments, Germany, Austria, and other substantive issues in
contention. There are, we believe, four reasons for such action:
(a) as a matter of historical record, the United
States must not let this possibly brief period
of unsettlement in the Russian outlook go by
without holding up an image of our true in-
tentions and purposes;
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(b) such an initiative would so3.idtty the
World in its posture towards our future rela-
tions with the Soviet Union;
(c) such an initiative would help ccunter the
fears of American aggression cultivated by.
Soviet propaganda and inevitably heightened
by Stalin's removal from the scene. It would
thus encourage those close to power who may
be prepared to consider internal and external
policies different from those of talin; and
such an initiative would immediately confront
the regime with a major policy decision of the
first order of magnitude and help reveal its
inner constitution and conflicts.
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