TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-40: COMMUNIST REACTION TO A 'VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020015-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 23, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY 1M.TVATIO1I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
23 March 1953
SUBJECT: TEFL OF ftEFEREtICE: SE-40: CO?.IiUNIST REACTION TO
A "VOLUNTELR FREEDOM CORPS"
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable Cot mmist reaction to the implementa-
tion of a Volunteer Freedom Corps,"
QU T'ION BFAflIND ON THE PR013LEU
Io Tat factors, in connection with the implementation of a
Volunteer Preedaa Corps, would be most significant in deter-
mining the Crmmmcani.st reaction: The nature of the propaganda
attending its Implementation? The degree of success 'With
which escapees were attracted? The partite ar nationalities
groups behind the Iron Curtain to whom the appeal for
volunteers was directed? The nature of the aims and objectives
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of the Carps? The fact that it would be officered by
Americans? An offer of US citizenship eligibility? Timing
and term of service, and rate of pay? The locale in which
the Corps was activated, or stationed? The enthusiasm, or
lack of enthusiasm, with which US allies supported the project?
oth'ar factors?
:Wuld the M -Sit consider the implementation of such a project
a "provocative" act? If so, how provocative? '1ould the
Kremlin consider the implementation of the VFC as providing
evidence of any significant new trend in US policy? Would the
Xrezalin consider the VFC a significant threat to Its own
policies or its own security? Would it consider that the VFC
constituted a means for significantly threatening the loyalty
of satellite governments, or of undermining security in
satellite countries? Viould the Kremlin take the project
seriously?
III What courses of action would be open to the Kremlin for
hinlering or frustrating the implementation of the Mt.
Intensified neatres against escapees? Dipl amatic repre-
sentations to the Ua, and/or to US allies? Other measures?
Tfi,ltration?
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iv,, llhat would be the most likely courses of action for the
Bresalin to take In the event that the VFC was formed: What
would the satellite goverments be likely to do?
V. If for any reason the VFC were not a success, could its
failure be utilized to the profit of Cnist world policies?
?
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