TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-40: COMMUNIST REACTION TO A 'VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS'

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020015-1
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 10, 2000
Sequence Number: 
15
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 23, 1953
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020015-1.pdf91.44 KB
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Approved For R+ei' P79S011A001000020015-1 SECURITY 1M.TVATIO1I CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 23 March 1953 SUBJECT: TEFL OF ftEFEREtICE: SE-40: CO?.IiUNIST REACTION TO A "VOLUNTELR FREEDOM CORPS" THE PROBLEM To estimate the probable Cot mmist reaction to the implementa- tion of a Volunteer Freedom Corps," QU T'ION BFAflIND ON THE PR013LEU Io Tat factors, in connection with the implementation of a Volunteer Preedaa Corps, would be most significant in deter- mining the Crmmmcani.st reaction: The nature of the propaganda attending its Implementation? The degree of success 'With which escapees were attracted? The partite ar nationalities groups behind the Iron Curtain to whom the appeal for volunteers was directed? The nature of the aims and objectives Approved For Release 11AO01000020015-1 P-Q ALM r,% r- &14 14' Approved For RM I *TLRDP79S011 A001 000020015-1 110 of the Carps? The fact that it would be officered by Americans? An offer of US citizenship eligibility? Timing and term of service, and rate of pay? The locale in which the Corps was activated, or stationed? The enthusiasm, or lack of enthusiasm, with which US allies supported the project? oth'ar factors? :Wuld the M -Sit consider the implementation of such a project a "provocative" act? If so, how provocative? '1ould the Kremlin consider the implementation of the VFC as providing evidence of any significant new trend in US policy? Would the Xrezalin consider the VFC a significant threat to Its own policies or its own security? Would it consider that the VFC constituted a means for significantly threatening the loyalty of satellite governments, or of undermining security in satellite countries? Viould the Kremlin take the project seriously? III What courses of action would be open to the Kremlin for hinlering or frustrating the implementation of the Mt. Intensified neatres against escapees? Dipl amatic repre- sentations to the Ua, and/or to US allies? Other measures? Tfi,ltration? Approved For Release 2000/0 I 1000020015-1 Approved For Fuse 79S 1lAO01000020015-1 iv,, llhat would be the most likely courses of action for the Bresalin to take In the event that the VFC was formed: What would the satellite goverments be likely to do? V. If for any reason the VFC were not a success, could its failure be utilized to the profit of Cnist world policies? ? Approved For Rele_ P79S0101lAO01000020015-1