POSSIBLE COMMUNIST REACTION TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US/UN MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000030008-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 8, 1953
• Content Type: PAPER

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
97
PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
POSSIBLE UN /US MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN WAR
SE-41
Published 8 April 1953
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concurred in this estimate on 2 April 1953.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CEGLASSIEIE0 CLASS. CGE
CCHANCED TO. TS S C NEXT REVE!W
NEXT R`EVIEW DATE: AUTH: i1-2
AUTH: Ify ftFed,F
DATE: EYEWER:- pprr R 000/04
~~
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PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE
UN/US MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO THE KOREAN WAR
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable military and political reactions of Communist China
and the USSR to the following possible UN/US military courses of action with re-
spect to the Korean war:
Course A - The UN/US to continue for the foreseeable future military
pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up
ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of US forces from
Korea.
Course B - The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military opera-
tions but increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground
operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to
making hostilities more costly to the enemy, in the hope that he might agree
to an armistice acceptable to the US.
Course C - The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military opera-
tions but continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launch-
ing a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line followed
by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to
inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and materiel in Korea and
to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.
Course D - The UN/US to extend and intensify military pressures on the
enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against
Manchuria and Communist China, and, if required, increased ground oper-
ations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy
that a favorable settlement of the Korean war might be achieved.
Course E -- The UN/US to undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist
of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against
Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum pos-
sible destruction of enemy forces and materiel in Korea consistent with
establishing a line at the waist and to achieving a favorable settlement of
the Korean war.
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Course F - The UN/US to undertake a coordinated, large-scale offensive in
Korea and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Man-
churia and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of
the bulk of the Communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean
war on the basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.
SCOPE
This estimate is directed toward the exam-
ination of probable Communist reactions to
certain UN/US courses of action in Korea.
Without prejudging current Communist over-
tures, which are still to a large degree am-
biguous, it is assumed for the purpose of this
estimate that the Communist proposals will
not result in an armistice.
ESTIMATE
INTRODUCTION: RELATION OF KOREA TO
OVER-ALL SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST
OBJECTIVES
1. In order to achieve their over-all objective
of weakening and destroying the Western
Powers, as well as to consolidate, strengthen,
and protect the bases of their power, the
USSR and Communist China are united in
their intention to expel the West from Asia.
In Korea, they have appeared for the past
year to be reconciled to the existing military
stalemate, possibly estimating that the UN/
US would eventually weary of the strain and
that a solution could then be obtained lead-
ing ultimately to Communist control of all
Korea.
2. We believe that the Communist objective
eventually to gain control of all Korea will
remain unchanged. We also believe, how-
ever, that the Communists desire to avoid
general war over the Korean issue and that
Communist courses of action in Korea will
be determined by Communist global in-
terests.)
The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
this paragraph should read as follows:
"We believe that the Communist objective
eventually to gain control of all Korea will re-
main unchanged. We also believe that Com-
munist China currently desires to limit hostili-
ties with the UN/US forces to the Korean issue
and that the USSR desires to avoid any expan-
sion of hostilities which would put at risk funda-
mental strengths of the Soviet Union."
3. Communist reactions, political and mili-
tary, to UN/US military initiatives in Korea
will be conditioned by the following interests :
a. Retention of substantially all Korean
territory north of the 38th Parallel.
b. Survival of a Communist regime in a
substantial portion of North Korea.
c. Maintenance of Communist military and
political prestige.
d. Security of Chinese Communist armed
forces in the Korean theater.
e. Security of the Manchurian industrial
complex.
f. Security of the Manchurian and Soviet
borders.
4. If prior to the onset of any UN/US military
course of action, the Communists recognized
that they were faced with a clear choice
between making the concessions necessary to
reach an armistice, or accepting the likeli-
hood that UN/US military operations would
endanger the security of the Manchurian and
Soviet borders, destroy the Manchurian in-
dustrial complex, or destroy the Chinese
Communist armed forces, the Communists
would probably agree to an armistice. How-
ever, it would be extremely difficult to present
them with a clear choice of alternatives be-
fore such action was begun. Moreover, once
such UN/US action was begun, Communist
power and prestige would become further in-
volved, thereby greatly increasing the diffi-
culties of making the choice between agreeing
to armistice or continuing the war.
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PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO
UN/US COURSES OF ACTION WHICH DO
NOT INVOLVE EXPANSION OF THE WAR
BEYOND KOREA
Course A - The UN/US to continue for
the foreseeable future military pressure
on the enemy at substantially the present
level, while building up ROK forces, with
a view to possible limited redeployment
of US forces from Korea.
5. Communist China and the USSR would
probably not be able initially to interpret the
intent of the UN/US build-up for such a
course of action. The Communists might
consider that the UNC was either gradually
building up for greatly intensified hostilities,
or merely building up ROK strength so that
the US could disengage its forces from Korea.
6. In any event, the Communists would al-
most certainly continue to build up their
military strength in the Korea-Manchuria
area,2 and, once it became clear that the US
was withdrawing forces, would probably seek
to exert additional military pressure in
Korea. The Communists would probably
estimate that such a UN/US course of action
would not threaten any of their principal in-
terests in Korea, and therefore they would
almost certainly not feel compelled thereby
to make concessions to secure an armistice.
Although the Communists may desire to force
the US to continue to maintain the concen-
tration of its forces in Korea, the Commu-
nists have other objectives, above all eventu-
ally to bring all of Korea under Communist
control. The substitution of ROK for US
forces might be regarded by the Communists
as improving their chances for obtaining
these other objectives.
7. Course A would probably have little or no
immediate effect upon Sino-Soviet coopera-
tion in Korea.
Course B - The UN/US to maintain cur-
rent restrictions on military operations
but increase military pressure on the
2 See NIE-80, "Communist Capabilities and Prob-
able Courses of Action in Korea through 1953,"
dated 3 April 1953, for a discussion of Communist
military capabilities in Korea.
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enemy by stepping up ground operations
while continuing aggressive air and naval
action, with a view to making hostilities
more costly to the enemy in the hope that
he might agree to an armistice accepta-
ble to the US.
Course C - The UN/US to maintain cur-
rent restrictions on military operations
but continue aggressive air and naval
action in Korea while launching a series
of coordinated ground operations along
the present line followed by a major
offensive to establish a line at the waist
of Korea, with a view to inflicting maxi-
mum destruction of enemy forces and
materiel in Korea and to achieving a
favorable settlement of the Korean war.
8. The Communists would probably not be
able initially to interpret UN/US intention
with regard to these alternative courses of
action. They would probably base their esti-
mate on the size and composition of the
UN/US build-up for these intensified military
operations and on the degree of mobilization
within the US. Unless there were a marked
reinforcement of UN/US forces in Korea, the
Communists would probably estimate that the
UN/US strength and determination for these
proposed alternatives would not be great
enough to sustain military operations which
would seriously threaten their principal in-
terests in the Korean theater.
9. The initial Communist reaction, once such
military operations had begun, would be to
counter vigorously. The Chinese Commu-
nists would make a maximum ground defense
effort against these UNC operations, and
would also launch strong counteroffensives.
They would make a maximum air defense
effort over Communist-held territory and
would probably launch air strikes against
UNC amphibious operations. We have no
basis for determining whether during the first
phases of the action, the Communists would
or would not commit the Communist Air
Force in China (CAFIC) II to large-scale oper-
The term CAFIC is meant to include North Ko-
rean air units and Soviet units which are be-
lieved to be operating with the Chinese Com-
munists.
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ations over UN-held territory. They almost
certainly would not commit Soviet ground
forces in Korea or Soviet air forces over UN-
held territory. We believe that the Commu-
nists would accept substantial losses of men
and materiel in countering or containing
these UNC operations. We are unable to esti-
mate whether such losses, however great,
would in themselves induce the Communists
to seek an armistice.
10. If UN forces launched a general offensive,
as contemplated in Course C, the Commu-
nists would probably estimate that the UN/
US was determined to drive the Communist
forces from all Korea. If the Communists
estimated that they would be unable to halt
the UN advance without expanding the war,
they might accept the risks of general war
involved by committing their air force un-
reservedly over UN-held territory or even in-
troducing Soviet ground units to stiffen the
Communist defense. Before accepting these
risks, however, they would probably attempt
to secure an armistice which would leave a
substantial part of North Korea in Commu-
nist hands.
11. If, on the other hand, the Communists
retreated without expanding the war or seek-
ing an armistice, and UN/US forces halted
at the waist, the Communists probably would
reconstitute their forces and continue the
war.
12. Courses B and C would probably not afgy[ec'
Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea.
PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO
UN/US COURSES OF ACTION WHICH IN-
VOLVE EXPANSION OF THE KOREAN WAR
Course D - If the UN/US were to extend
and intensify military pressures on the
enemy by stages, including air attack and
naval blockade directly against Man-
churia and Communist China, and, if
required, increased ground operations in
Korea, with a view to making hostilities
so costly to the enemy that a favorable
settlement of the Korean war might be
achieved.
Course E - If the UN/US were to under-
take a coordinated offensive to the waist
of Korea, and a naval blockade and air
and naval attacks directly against Man-
churia and Communist China, with a
view to inflicting maximum possible de-
struction of enemy forces and materiel in
Korea consistent with establishing a line
at the waist and to achieving a favorable
settlement of the Korean war.
Course F -If the UN/US were to under-
take a coordinated, large-scale offensive
in Korea and a naval blockade and air
and naval attacks directly against Man-
churia and Communist China, with a
view to the defeat and destruction of the
bulk of the Communist forces in Korea
and settlement of the Korean lvar on the
basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.
13. If, prior to actual initiation of such
military operations, the Communists should
become convinced that the strength and de-
termination of the UN powers were sufficient
to endanger their principal interests in the
Korean theater, and that these dangers could
not be averted without serious risk of a gen-
eral war, they would probably make the con-
cessions necessary to reach an armistice.
14. If, as a result of Communist miscalcula-
tion of UN/US capabilities and intentions, or
because the Communists were not willing to
make the compromises necessary to obtain
an armistice, the war were expanded to Man-
churia and China proper, the Communists
would almost certainly assume, particularly
if UN ground forces launched large-scale
attacks in Korea, that the UN/US was pre-
pared to accept great risks in order to drive
the Communists from Korea. The Commu-
nists would almost certainly assume that any
UNC air attacks against Manchuria or
China proper would sooner or later include
air attacks against their Chinese Communist
industrial complex.
15. We believe that in response to the initia-
tion of any of these courses of action, the
Communists would offer maximum resistance,
including greatly increased Soviet participa-
tion in the air defense of Manchuria and
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China proper and CAFIC attacks on UN
forces and bases in the Far East. So long as
they estimated that they would be able to
maintain the security of their forces in
Korea, inflict serious losses on the UN air
forces attacking China and Manchuria, and
protect Manchurian industry, we believe the
Communists would not be willing to sacrifice
any of their important interests in Korea in
order to obtain an armistice.4 Under these
circumstances, their unwillingness to com-
promise their position in Korea would be
strengthened if their political and psychologi-
cal countermeasures appeared to have the
effect of significantly reducing UN and/or US
determination to sustain an expanded war in
the Far East.
16. If, however, in the implementation of any
of the above courses of action, the Commu-
nists were unable to counter UN/US air oper-
ations against Manchuria and if it appeared
to the Communists that the Manchurian in-
dustrial complex were threatened with de-
struction, we believe that the Communists
would be willing to sacrifice some of their
interests in Korea in order to obtain a cessa-
tion of hostilities. If simultaneously with
air attacks on Manchuria and China proper,
UN/US forces were advancing in North Korea,
the Communists, while seeking to negotiate
an armistice that secured continued Commu-
nist control over a substantial portion of
4 SE-37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of
Certain Courses of Action Directed at the In-
ternal and External Commerce of Communist
China," dated 9 March 1953, concludes that a
large-scale and sustained air and naval bom-
bardment of key Chinese Communist transpor-
tation lines, in conjunction with a naval block-
ade, would not in itself induce the Communists
to accept a Korean settlement on UN terms.
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North Korea, might commit Soviet air units
over UN-held territory and might introduce
Soviet ground forces into Korea. The USSR
would, in any event, leave to the UN/US the
responsibility for recognizing the commit-
ment of Soviet forces as a casus belli.
17. Although we believe these UN/US courses
of action would impose strains on Sfno-Soviet
relations, we do not believe that these courses
of action would cause the Chinese Commu-
nist leadership to alter basically its alignment
with the USSR.
EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
18. We believe that if atomic weapons were
employed by UN/US forces in any of the
above alternative courses of action, the Com-
munists would recognize the employment of
these weapons as indicative of Western de-
termination to carry the Korean war to a
successful conclusion. We are unable to esti-
mate whether this recognition would by
itself lead the Communists to make the con-
cessions necessary to reach an armistice.
We believe that the Communist reaction
would be in large part determined by the
extent of damage inflicted.
NON-PARTICIPATION OF UN POWERS
19. If UN powers refused to participate in
these courses of action, the Communists
would be encouraged to resist in the hope of
further straining US relations with its western
allies and in the hope that US determination
to sustain the war alone would falter. The
Communists would also feel that the risks of
general war would be lessened and therefore
they might be less restrained in their mili-
tary reactions against US operations.