REACTION OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD TO CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000050003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
REACTIONS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD
TO CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS
CURD Cf py
Published 24 April 1953
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 21 April 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3C '3' ;. 9T IND,
IN CLASS. ^
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[iJiiE: REVIEWER:_
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WARNING
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REACTIONS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD
TO CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable effects of current Communist "peace" tactics on the
peoples and governments of the non-Communist world.
ESTIMATE
1. The Communist shift in tactics has been
manifest for so brief a period that there is as
yet little evidence on which to base an esti-
mate of the effects upon the peoples and gov-
ernments of the non-Communist world. The
popular reactions have been on the whole at
least guardedly hopeful, while the reactions
of most governments and political leaders
have been tentative and cautious.
2. The fact that the change in tactics fol-
lowed almost immediately on Stalin's death
could easily be interpreted by the free peoples
as a real change in Soviet policy. Moreover,
the moment is one in which the governments
and peoples of the non-Communist world are
likely to be receptive to conciliatory gestures
by the Kremlin because they are presently
confronted with such problems as uneasiness
over possible US measures to end the Korean
War, the delay in the ratification of the Euro-
pean Defense Treaty and the German Con-
tractual Agreements, and economic strains
attendant upon efforts to raise defense pro-
grams to higher levels. Communist conces-
sions on the POW issue sufficient to bring
about an armed truce in Korea combined with
minor concessions elsewhere and a series of
conciliatory gestures and statements could be
well calculated to play upon this receptivity.
3. The peoples and governments of Western
Europe would welcome even minor conces-
sions as a contribution to peace, but the West-
ern governments would be disposed to await
further Soviet acts in the conviction that
minor concessions, and even the signing of
an Austrian peace treaty, would not end the
menace presented to Western Europe by Com-
munism and Soviet power. However, in the
unlikely event that the Kremlin offered to
surrender its control over East Germany and
agreed to the establishment of a united, dem-
ocratic and neutralized Germany, the govern-
ments of Western Europe, including the West
German Government, would almost certainly
accept such a proposal as evidence of a gen-
uine shift in Soviet policy.'
4. If, as we believe probable, the Kremlin is
unwilling to accept any solution of the Ger-
man problem which would jeopardize Soviet
control over East Germany, we do not believe
the "peace" tactics of the USSR would wreck
NATO or have other decisive results in West-
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that with respect to Germany, the
Kremlin may be willing to withdraw its troops
from East Germany, if the Soviet Union consid-
ered that by doing so, it could force the Western
Powers to withdraw their troops from West Ger-
many, frustrate the EDC program, and the re-
armament of Germany. The Communists may
also make proposals for, free elections and for
the reunification of Germany, in the hope that
they would be able to secure a demilitarized and
neutral German state.
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ern Europe. However, the Western defense
effort would probably slacken, military
budgets would be cut, and present force levels
would be reduced.
5. A relaxation of tension, no matter how
slight, would be used by the French as an
excuse to delay ratification of EDC. The
French reaction to EDC would be even more
negative, if the USSR went beyond concilia-
tory gestures and minor concessions and, for
example, agreed to an Austrian peace treaty.
However, over the long run, French action
on EDC would probably be determined by
the unwillingness of France to jeopardize
the alliance with the US or to risk a Ger-
man-American "understanding" from which
France would be excluded.
6. Far Eastern issues which may arise in con-
nection with or subsequent to an armistice
in Korea are likely to be the most immediate
source of danger to the relations between the
US and its European allies. The views of the
US and these allies might seriously diverge on
a political settlement in Korea, on the future
of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Gov-
ernment, on Communist China's admission to
the UN, and on trade with Communist China.
The consequences of such divergence would
be most serious if the European allies of the
US believed that the US was responsible for
the failure to settle Far Eastern issues, and
that this failure prevented the settlement of
other pressing issues, particularly in Europe.
7. If an armistice were concluded in Korea,
there would probably not be fundamental
shifts in the alignment of the non-Communist
Far Eastern states. An armistice would re-
sult in a widespread belief in Japan that a
major barrier to normal political and eco-
nomic relations in Asia had been removed,
and while the alignment with the US would
continue, there would be strong pressure for
the resumption of economic and political re-
lations with Communist China and the USSR.
An armistice would create serious problems
for the Chinese Nationalists and the Republic
of Korea. In Southeast Asia, the effects of
an armistice would be determined in part by
Communist ability to convince the govern-
ments in that area that the Indo-China war
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was a colonial war and that the Viet Minh
was not an instrument of Communist imperi-
alism. In any case, the neutralist govern-
ments of Burma and Indonesia would proba-
bly support Chinese Communist efforts to
gain UN membership.
8. Communist "peace" tactics would probably
have only minor effects in the Middle East
and South Asia, where the importance of the
East-West struggle has tended to be over-
shadowed by local concern over more imme-
diate problems such as the Palestine dispute,
the Kashmir issue, and the vestiges of colonial
power in the area. Greece and Turkey would
remain committed to the West. India would
feel vindicated in its refusal to align itself
with either power Bloc. In Iran it is unlikely
that the Soviet "peace" tactics would include
a lessening of Tudeh agitation against West-
ern influence, and this agitation would prob-
ably be more effective if Iranian fear of Soviet
aggression declined. In Egypt and Iraq, the
Communist "peace" tactics would strengthen
Nationalist arguments against Western con-
trol of military base facilities. The prospect
for the conclusion of regional defense arrange-
ments involving Western participation, such
as MEDO, would be further diminished.
9. Ostensibly attractive trade offers which
could be expected to accompany the "peace"
tactics might constitute an increasingly for-
midable Communist weapon, particularly if
there were economic reverses in the West.
Japan would be particularly receptive to Com-
munist trade offers following a Korean armi-
stice because any reduction in American mili-
tary expenditures in Japan would bring seri-
ous economic problems to the fore almost at
once. In West Germany any contraction of
export markets would greatly increase the
pressure for trade with the Bloc.
10. We believe that Kremlin proposals on dis-
armament are not likely to find acceptance
in most non-Communist countries or to divide
the Western allies so long as major political
issues remain outstanding between East and
West.
11. The reactions of non-Communist peoples
and governments will be influenced greatly by
the manner of the US response to the new
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Communist tactics. Should the US response
be seen abroad as adamantly negative, there
would be a decline in the willingness of other
states to follow US leadership. On the other
hand, if it appeared that the US, relying on
Communist professions of peaceful intent,
was about to reduce drastically its defense
effort and its aid to its allies, the confidence
of the Western Powers in US leadership
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would be shaken. If, however, the US ap-
peared willing to negotiate, in consultation
with its allies, but at the same time appeared
determined to maintain its military readiness
and defensive posture, there would be little
likelihood that the Communist "peace" tac-
tics would separate the other Western Powers
from the US, which is almost certainly a
primary aim of these tactics.
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