SE-43: REACTIONS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD TO CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000050011-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 15, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

VVIII IUL-11 I1ii..
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
15 April 1953
SUBJECTS SE4&3s REACTIONS OF THE NON-CO.WUNIST WORLD TO
CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable effects of current Comminist "peace"
tactics on the peoples and governments of the non-Communist world-
1. The Commnnigst shift In tactics has been manifest for so
brief a period that there is as yet little evidence on which to base
an estbnate of the effects upon the peoples and governments of the
non-Comtmunist world. The popular reactions have been on the whole
at least guardedly hopefuls while the reactions of most governments
and political leaders have been tentative and cautious.
2b The fact that the change in tactics followed almost iaanedi-
ately on atalinvs death could easily be interpreted by the free people
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as a real change in Soviet policy. Moreover, Western governments are
especially vulnerable to any suggestions of a moderation of the cold
war because they are presently confronted with such problems as latent
disagreement over possible US measures to end the Korean War, the. delay
in the ratification of the Hiropean Defense Treaty and the German
Contractual Agreements, and economic strains attendant upon efforts to
raise defense programs to higher levels. Comsunist concessions on the
POW issue sufficient to bring about an armed truce in Korea combined
with minor concessions elsewhere and a series of conciliatory gestures
and statements could be well calculated to play upon this vulnerability.
The moment is one, therefore, in which the governments and peoples of
the West are likely to be receptive to conciliatory gestures by the
Kremlin.
3. In Western Europe,, temporary and slight relaxation of tensions
would even further delay French ratification of the EDCC The French
reaction to EDC would be even more negative if the USSR went beyond
conciliatory gestures and minor concessions and, for example-, agreed
to an Austrian peace treaty then.
1 The peoples of Western I3irope would welcome even minor con-
cessions as a contribution to peace, but the Western governments would
be disposed to await further Soviet acts in the conviction that minor
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concessions and even the signing of an Austrian peace treaty, would
not end the menace presented to Western Harope by Conrrrwnism and
Soviet power. However, in the unlikely event that the Kremlin offered
to surrendod its control over East Germany and agreed to the establish-
ment of a .united* democratic and neutralized Germany, the governments
of Western Sarope, including the West German Government, would almost
certainly accept such a proposal as evidence of a genaine shift In
Soviet policy.
5. If, as we believe probable, the Kremlin is unwilling to
accept any solution of the German problem which mould jeopardize Soviet
control over East Germany, we do not believe the "peace" tactics of the
USSR would wreck NATO or have other decisive results in Western F ropes
So far as the EDC is concerned, French action, over the long run, would
probably be determined by unwillingness to jeopardize the alliance
with the US or to risk, a German-American "understanding" from which
France would be excluded. However, the Western defense effort would
probably slacken, military budgets would be cut, and present force
levels would be reduced.
* The Deputy Director, intelligence,, The Joint Staff,, believes that
with respect to Germany, the Kremlin may be willing to withdraw
its troops from East Germany, if, by doing so, it could force the
Western Powers to withdraw their troops from West Germany, frus-
trate the 1DC program, and the rearmament of Germany. The Conttrau-
mists may also make proposals for free elections and for the
reunification of Germany, in the hope that they would be able to
secure a demilitarized and neutral German state,
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6. Far Eastern issues which may arise in connection with or
subsequent to an armistice in korea are likely to be the most Janmedi--
ate"source of danger to the relations between the US and its allies.
The views of the US and its allies might seriously diverge on a polit-
ical settlement in Korea, on the future of Formosa and the Chinese
Nationalist Government, on Oomaznist China's admission to the UN, and
on trade with Communist China. The consequences of such divergence
would be mast serious if failure to settle Far Eastern issues appeared
to the European allies of the US to prevent settlement of pressing
issues elsewhere.
7. Even if an armistice were concluded in Koreap the continudtion
of the war in Indo-China would probably prevent any fundamental shifts
in the alignment of the non-Communist Far Eastern states. However, an
armistice in Korea would probably create serious problems for the
Chinese Nationalists and the Republic of Korea. In Japan also, while
the alignment with the US would continue, there would be strong pressure
for the resumption of economic and political relations with Conm2nist
Chula and the USSRn In Southeast Asia, the neutralist governments of
Burma and Indonesia would probably support Chinese Communist efforts to
gain UN membership.
8, Communist '"peace" tactics would probably have little effect
in the Middle East,, where the importance of East-West struggle is over-
shadowed by the more immediate problems posed by the Falestine dispute
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and relations with the West, Greece and Turkey would remain unequivo-
cally committed to the West, India would feel vindicated in its
refusal to align itself with either power Bloc. In Iran Tudeh agitation
against Western influence would continue. In Egyptp the Comnninist peace
campaign might strengthen nationalist arguments against Western control
over military base facilities in the Suez area. The prospects for the
conclusion of regional defense arrangements,, such as N[EDOO would be
further diminished.
9. Ostensibly attractive trade offers which could be expected to
accompany the "peace" tactics might constitute an increasingly formidable
Communist weapon., particularly if there were economic reverses in the
West. Japan would be particularly receptive to Communist trade offers
following a Korean armistice because any rechetion in American military
expenditures would bring, serious Japanese economic problems to the fore
almost at once. In West Germany any traction of export markets would
greatly increase the pressure for trade with the Bloc.
10. We, do not believe that any Kremlin proposals on disarmament
are likely to find widespread response in most non-Communist countries
or to divide the Western allies so long as major political issues remain
outstanding between East and West.
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11E The reactions of non-Communist peoples and goverrrtents will
probably he Influenced greatly by the marrer of the US response to the
new Communist tactics o Should the US response be seen abroad as
adamantly negative, there would tend to be a decline in the willingness
of other states to follow US leadership. On the other hand,; if it
appeared that the US, relying on Con nist professions of peaceful,
intent, was about to reduce drastically its defense effort and its aid
to its allies, the confidence of the Western Powers in US leadership
would be undermined. IfS however, the US appeared willing to negotiates,
in consultation with its allies, but at the same time appeared determined
to maintain Its military readiness and defensive posture, there would
be a good chance of averting the separation of the other Western kowers
from the US, which is almost certainly a primary aim of the new Cosmainist
tactics.
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