OIR CONTRIBUTION TO: SE-51: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001100040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SEP 1 1953
OIR Contribution to: SE-51: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEU INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT 25X1A
Conclusions
1. The Ali Cabinet in Indonesia, formed on August 1st after
nearly eight weeks of political maneuvering, represents a coalition
of the dominant PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and a number of
minor Moslem, nationalist, Marxist, and Communist front parties. The
new cabinet is notable in two major respects:
a. Increase in Communist influence -- Although the Indonesian
Comunist Party (PKI) is not represented in the Government, its votes
are necessary to give the Government a majority in Parliament. Further-
more, four of the cabinet's twenty ministers are members of Communist
front parties or are willing cooperators with the Communists and an
additional four are opportunists or naive politicdns who in the past
have been used by the Communists.
b. pecline in influence of moderate parties -- For the
first time in any Indonesian Government, Masjumi, the party with the
most parliamentary strength and the greatest public support, is not
represented. Also in the opposition are the outspokenly anti-Comuaunist
PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) and the centrist Catholics, Christians,
and Democrats.
2. The present position of the Communists reflects the success
of their "united front" policy in Indones 4. The party's capabilities
for subversive action were seriously weakened as a result of the arrests
of Communist leaders in August 1951. Since early 1952 the PKI has
followed a policy of supporting the Government in Parliament. Its moderate
policies and close cooperation with the PNI eventually,,.,-.. led to the" CIA has
of the predecessor Wilopo government. XLJ
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3. The Communists have not now, nor are they likely in the
near future to gain, sufficient strength to take over the government
by force. However, they are in excellent position to increase their
capabilities by infiltrating some of the key sectors of the Indonesian
Government, including the Ministry of Defense.
4. The Communists are unlikely to press for adoption of a
radical program for fear of precipitating the fall of the government
or of stimulating the use of force by the conservative opposition.
The process of forming the cabinet and the ultimate composition of the
cabinet have concentrated attention on Communism as a political issue,
and thus contributed to the crystallization of anti-Communist sentiment
among the opposition parties.
5. In foreign affairs, the Goverment will probably adhere
to an "independent" policy. In an attempt to balance present
relations with the West, the government will probably open an embassy
in Moscow, seek a bilateral peace treaty with Japan and seek to expand
trade relations with the Soviet Bloc.
6. In domestic affairs few changes are likely to be made since
the government will probably attempt to avoid controversial. issues in
order to prolong its existence. Under these circumstances the
government probably would not last until elections can be held. It
most likely would be succeeded by an executive cabinet.
7. It is possible however that the government may take strong
action against the Darul Islam dissident movement or attempt to
interfere with army organization and leadership. Under these circum-
stances, civil warfare or a rightist coup might occur.
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OIR Contribution toe
SE-51s THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEVI INDONESIA GOVERNMENT
Formation of the Ali Oabinet
1. Fall of the Wilo o Government.
Following the October 17 Affair, feelings between leaders of the major
political parties and between members of the Cabinet and Parliament became
increasingly exacerbated. The October 17 Affair itself, an anti-Parliamentary
demonstration by elements disgruntled by legislative interference in military
matters, was the direct result of the passage in Parliament on October 16, 1952,
of the Sophian motion. This motion, critical of the Minister of Defense, was
supported by the Nationalist Party (PNI), Indonesia's second largest party,
centrist parties anxious to topple the cabinet in the hope of gaining posts in
a succeeding government, and the parties of the left, including the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI). PNI members in Parliament voted for the controversial
measure despite the fact that the PNI held four cabinet posts including the
Prime Minstership and the important Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Notwithstanding Parliament's criticism of the Minister of Defense, neither
the Masjumi nor the Socialist members of the cabinet who backed the Minister's
policies resigned and the Wilopo cabinet remained In office. The anomalous
position of the PNI, whose Parliament representatives voted against policies
accepted byi its party members in the Cabinet, was repeated in February with
the passage of a motion to reduce taxes on small business firms, and in April
with the passage of a motion to open an embassy in Moscow. In each of these
cases the PNI-PKI-centrist parties opposition in Parliament, while attacking
primarily the Masjumi and Socialist parties, principal government opponents of
the measures, also attacked the four PNI cabinet ministers.
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In March 1953 Communist.-inspired demonstrators opposed government efforts
to clear land illegally occupied by squatters in North Sumatra after World
War II. Police fired upon the demonstrators, killing a nunber of them.
Thereupon, Kertapati, a member of the Communist-controlled Progressive faction,
introduced in Parliament a motion calling on the government to cease its land
distribution program. Because the Minister responsible for the program was a
member of the Masjumi Party, the Kertapati motion fell into the pattern of
previous similar attempts to embarrassthe government. This time, however,
without waiting for the motion to come to a vote, the cabinet, certain of the
motion's passage, resigned on June 2.
It is not altogether clear why the Wilopo government, which had survived
previous criticism of an equally pointed nature, succumbed at this particular
time. Most observers had felt that the desire to proceed with Indonesia's
first general elections in accordance with the election law passed by
PaPliament in early 1953 would continue to motivate the Wilopo cabinet, and
that it would continue to find workable compromises or to postpone implementa-
tion of controversial decisions until elections could be held. Frayed tempers
probably played as much a role as any other factor in causing the final
resignation of the government,
2. Efforts to form a new cabinet.
The purpose of PNI parliamentarians-in precipitating the fall of the Wilopo
Cabinet was apparently to bring the PNI into the position of being called on to
form a government without Masjumi or PSI participation. PNI control of the
government both preceding ind during elections would enable the party to influence
the results in its favor. Without such an advantage it is likely that the
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PNI would emerge from elections a poor second to Masjumi.
The cabinet fell on June 2 and four attempts failed before President
Sukarno accepted the list proposed by Wongsonegoro of the PIR (Greater
Indonesia Association) on July 30. Initially Sukarno named as formateurs the
outgoing Minister of the Interior, Mohammed Rum (Masjumi)# and Mangunsarkoro
of the left wing of the PNI. The Kertapati motion had been directed at Rum.
Mangunsarkoro, as Education Minister during the revolution, had attempted to
curtail Islamic instruction. Thus each was among the candidates least acceptable
to the party of the other. After they failed to form a cabinet, as had been
expected, Mukarto, outgoing PNI Foreign Minister, attempted to form a cabinet
without the Masjumi. He was able to draw up a list commanding a parliamentary
majority, but Sukarno,, in contrast to his later acceptance of Wongsonegorots
list, refused to accept Mukartots proposal because it would depend on Communist
support. Mukarto was then given a second chance as formateur, this time with
mandate to form a "national business cabinet." Failure of the PNI and
Masjumi to agree on a cabinet program, together with Masjumi insistence that
either Mohammed Run or Governor Hakim of North Sumatra be given the post of
Interior, caused Mukarto to return his mandate on July 6. Next choice as
formateur was Burhanuddin Harahap of Masjumi. Insistence of the PNI on receiving
the prime ministership and the unwillingness or inability of the Masjumi to
participate in a cabinet without the PNI caused his effort to fail as well.
When Wongsonegoro of the PIR was named as the next formateur, it was
generally conceded, because of the earlier failures of representatives of the
major parties, that he stood little chance of success. It was conjectured that
Sukarno intended by this appointment to demonstrate that the smaller parties
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could not form a cabinet and that only a coalition based on the PNI and the
Masjumi could be successful. Wongsonegoro initially tried to form a government
with both IiIasjumi and PNI participation, his own party being willing to forego
the post of Prime Minister. When it was apparent that Masjumi could not agree
to the proposed division of seats, Wongsonegoro proceeded to compile a cabinet
list including the PNI, PIR and representatives of eight other factions and
parties in Parliament. Along with Masjumi, the Catholios, Democrats, and
Christians refused to participate; the PSI was excluded. This list was accepted
by President Sukarno on July 30.
Sukarno's motives in accepting '.ongsonegoro?s proposed cabinet are
uncertain. Some Indonesian observers have suggested that the President had
no constitutional alternative when Wongsonegoro presented a list that commanded
majority support in Parliament. But he showed no such compunction in refusing
MMukarto's list, which could call forth a parliamentary majority in a similar
manner .._ with Communist support. A second theory is that Sukarno did not wish
to give in to increasing demands that he or Vice President Hatta personally form
a cabinet, both because he wished to avoid responsibility and because he did
not wish to see Hatta exercise increased powers either as acting chief executive
or as prime minister. His speech of August 17 on the occasion of the eighth
anniversary of Indonesian declaration of independence, tends to bear out this
theory. It is possible that Sukarno looks forward to the early failure of the
Ali government in order to prove the necessity of cooperation by the major
parties in any pre-election government. Again perhaps the President felt that
the October 17 affair had resulted in the alighment of the Masjumi and PSi
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ag -inst him, and that the present cabinet would afford him opportunities not
only to retaliate but to consolidate his personal position.
Whatever Sukarno's motives, and there are too few facts available for a
proper assessment, it is clear that his position on the Indonesian political scene
is somewhat altered. That his aoo.eptanoe of this government indicates a change
in his political orientation is unlikely, particularly in view of his August 17
address. His references to foreign affairs were mild in tone, his approach to
domestic affairs was constructive. He referred to good relations with the
United States and praised aspects of the TCA program and of private American
philanthropic efforts. But it is doubtful that the present opposition parties,
notably the Masjumi, PSI, Catholics and Christians, will ever again accept the
President as being above party. Rather, he will probably be regarded as
actively concerned with the fortunes of the PNI.
Sukarnots relationship to Vice President Hatta undoubtedly influenced his
fictions with regard to the present government. Vice President Hatta was not
present in Djakarta during the final stages of formation of the cabinet. It
is apparent, in the light of his political views, that he was not consulted
as to its acceptance. For some time a growing aplit has been reported between
Hatta and Sukarno. Hatta's known fear of Cormnunist infiltration of the
government and his failure to associate himself with recent political maneuvers
tend to support the view that there is a breach between the two leaders. It
is noteworthy that Sukarno has failed to take exception to a series of public
demonstrations on the part of leftist groups which, in the course of demanding
action against the Darul Islam, have openly attacked Latta.
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B. Composition and Strength of the New Government
1. Composition of the Cabinet.
The PNI is the dominant party in the cabinet. It holds the post of Prime
Minister as well as the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, and
Finance. Except for Prime Minister Ali, all are members of the party's left
wing. Nahladatul Ulama (NU) and PSII, minor Moslem parties, hold five cabinet
positionst Agrarian Affairs, Religious Affairs, Communications, Public Welfare,
and the second deputy prime ministerhsip. Together NU and PSII have only eleven
votes in Parliament, but their support, obtained at at the price of diapropor<
tionate number of cabinet seats, was apparently considered necessary to counter-
balance the lack of participation by the major Moslem party, Masjumi. The only
other party with more than one seat is the PIR. Besides Wongsonegoro, first
deputy prime minister, this party, with fifteen votes in Parliament, holds the
portfolios of Interior and Public Works. Minor nationalist parties hold four
seats, while Marxist parties and a Marxist independent also hold four seats
including the important Defense Ministry.
The most outstanding characteristic of the All Cabinet is the apparent
leftist inclination of the ministers holding some of the most important port-
folios. None are avowed members of the PKI. However, four ministers, rwa
(Defense, Progressive), Ong (Finance, PNI), Abidin (Labor, labor), and
.Sadjarwo (Agriculture, Indonesian Farmers Association) are considered because
of their views or their parties, to be willing cooperators with the Communists.
Iwa spent 1926 in Moscow, has a long history of activity in leftist causes, has
been associated with Tanmalaka, onetime leader of the Indonesian Communists, and
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