PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES IN NON-COMMUNIST ASIA OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA BEFORE MID-1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001100050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 16, 1953
• Content Type: SE

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THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable reactions and consequences in non-Communist Asia of:
(a) the establishment of effective Viet Minh control over Indochina before mid-
1954, or; the attainment by the Viet Minh, before mid-1954, of a degree of
success which rendered the French union position in Indochina untenable;
(b) the intervention, before mid-1954, of US ground, naval, and air forces in order
to prevent the fall of Indochina to Communist control.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES IN NON-COMMUNIST
ASIA' OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN
INDOCHINA BEFORE MID-1954
ASSUMPTIONS2
For (a) above:
1. No Chinese Communist intervention in force had taken place.
2. No US combat units had been committed.
For (b) above:
1. No Chinese Communist intervention in force had taken place.
2. French Union forces still retained a foothold in Indochina.
CONCLUSIONS
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A VIET
MINH VICTORY IN INDOCHINA
1. A Viet Minh victory in Indochina
would remove a significant military bar-
rier to a Communist sweep through
Southeast Asia, expose the remainder of
that region to greatly increased external
Communist pressures, and probably in-
crease the capabilities of local Commu-
i Non-Communist Asia, as here used, includes
Japan, the ROK, Nationalist China, the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, the Associ-
ated States of Indochina, Burma, India, Pak-
istan, and Ceylon.
s The questions of probable Chinese Communist
courses of action with respect to Indochina and
of Communist reactions to a US intervention in
Indochina are not within the scope of this esti-
mate, and will be covered in NIE-98.
-- T
nists. There would probably be little ini-
tiative on the part of the governments of
the area toward collective defense.'
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that this paragraph should read as
follows:
"The establishment of Communist control over
Indochina by military or other means would al-
most certainly result in the communization of
all of Southeast Asia and the exposure of India,
the Philippines and Australia to increasing Com-
munist pressure. Communization of Southeast
Asia would, in effect, transfer the rice surpluses,
the oil, tin and rubber, now largely available to
the West, to the Communists and would facili-
tate their interruption of communication lines.
The loss of the rice surpluses would weaken the
bargaining power of the West with the rice-
deficient countries of India, Pakistan, Ceylon,
Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan, while
strengthening that of the Communist Bloc."
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2. Most Asian leaders would regard a Viet
Minh victory in Indochina as a defeat for
the West and a major blow to US power
and prestige in Asia. The policies adopted
by the non-Communist governments to
meet the new power situation in South-
east Asia would be largely determined by
the psychological impact of the Western
defeat, and by a number of contingent
developments such as the subsequent
policies and actions of the US, Communist
China, and the new Indochina.
3. Thailand would be most directly af-
fected by the Viet Minh victory. Unless
the US were able to give Thailand a spe-
cific security guarantee and to convince
the Thai Government that it could safely
continue to entrust Thailand's security
to the West, Thailand would almost cer-
tainly begin to reorient its position to-
ward the Communist bloc.
4. The governments of India, Burma, In-
donesia, Pakistan, and Ceylon would
probably not appreciably change their
present policies toward the Communist
bloc in the absence of further Communist
aggression in the area and so long as
Thailand retained essentially its present
orientation. However, Thai accommoda-
tion to Communism would probably impel
Burma, and possibly Indonesia, to aban-
don their neutral positions in favor of an
alignment with one or the other of the
power blocs. If Burma should clearly re-
orient itself to the Communist bloc, India
would be forced to reassess its non-align-
ment policy and the chances are slightly
better than even that in this circum-
stance India would seek quietly to move
closer to the Western democracies; Pak-
istan would probably continue its present
pro-US policy, particularly if the US were
prepared to give substantial military and
economic support.
5. Nationalist China, the Republic of Ko-
rea, the Philippines, Japan, and the Brit-
ish in Malaya would probably continue
essentially their present policies.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A US
INTERVENTION IN FORCE IN INDOCHINA
6.4 Nationalist China, the Republic of
Korea, and the Philippines would tend to
welcome a forceful US intervention in
Indochina; Japan and the UK would at
least acquiesce. These countries could be
expected to give diplomatic support and
might provide varying degrees of mate-
rial assistance. The Pakistan Govern-
ment would probably adopt a policy of
benevolent neutrality toward the US
action.
7. The non-Communist Indochinese lead-
ers would support US intervention if they
believed that such US action would soon
bring the Indochina war to a close and
would insure the independence of the
Associated States.
8. Thailand, initially at least, would prob-
ably attempt to avoid involvement in the
conflict. However, if Thailand obtained
satisfactory guarantees from the US, it
would probably permit the US to use Thai
territory and facilities.
'The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that paragraph 6 should be pre-
ceded by the following additional paragraph:
"U.S. intervention in force in Indochina would
effectively stop further Communist advance in
Southeast Asia, reduce their capabilities in In-
donesia, and provide a bulwark to the Philip-
pines and Australia; this would assure the avail-
ability of rice to the non-Communist rice-defi-
cient nations and guarantee to the West the con-
tinuing availability of the vital strategic raw
materials of Southeast Asia and its contiguous
areas."
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9. India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon
would disapprove interference in what
they still tend to regard as a French
struggle against an Asian nationalist
movement, and, at least initially, would
be fearful of an extension of war in Asia.
India would denounce the US action and
would probably seek a solution of the
Indochina problem in the UN; the other
neutralist countries would probably seek
to avoid any involvement.
10. Over the longer run, reactions in non-
Communist Asia would be largely deter-
mined by the success of the US interven-
tion. If the Viet Minh were quickly
defeated without leading to a Chinese
Communist invasion of Indochina, and if
truly independent and effective govern-
ments emerged in Indochina, non-Com-
munist Asian leaders would accept the
new situation and would welcome the set-
back of Communist expansion in Asia.
On the other hand, a protracted stalemate
in Indochina would almost certainly re-
duce support for the US throughout Asia.
DISCUSSION
PRESENT ATTITUDES IN THE NON-
COMMUNIST ASIAN COUNTRIES
TOWARD THE WAR IN INDOCHINA
11. Throughout non-Communist Asia, con-
sciousness of the full implications of the Indo-
china war as of other international issues is
largely restricted to government officials, mili-
tary leaders, journalists, students, and pro-
fessionals. The nature and intensity of the
attitudes of this policy-determining elite to-
ward developments in Indochina vary widely
and are determined largely by the degree to
which appreciation of Communist objectives
and policies in Asia modifies the nationalist
and often anti-Western attitudes held by this
elite. At present, however, nationalist atti-
tudes are generally dominant.
12. Present Asian nationalist and anti-West-
ern attitudes are in large part a heritage of
the struggle for independence from the colo-
nial powers. Many Asian leaders, particu-
larly in India, Burma, and Indonesia, view
Western objectives in Asia with strong sus-
picion and regard the Indochina war primarily
as a struggle between indigenous nationalism
and French colonialism.
13. Their past experiences with colonial rule
and their present real or imagined grievances
against the West tend to blind many Asians to
the threat of international Communism and
to the close relationship between the Viet
Minh and the international Communist move-
ment. Although most non-Communist Asian
leaders recognize the internal Communist
threat in their own countries and generally
acknowledge that the Communist bloc sup-
ports the Viet Minh, many believe that the
Indochinese nationalists turned to the Com-
munists for assistance only because of French
intransigeance, and some hold that these na-
tionalists would rid themselves of their Com-
munist colleagues once the French had with-
drawn from Indochina. Some non-Communist
Asian leaders even believe that their countries
should accommodate to Communism.
14. The strongly anti-Communist govern-
ments of Korea, Japan, Nationalist China, and
the Philippines, which rely on US power for
their security, probably find US support for
the French and Associated States a reassuring
indication of US determination to resist Com-
munist expansion. However, many Asian
leaders, particularly in India, Burma, and In-
donesia, are critical of US policy toward Indo-
china. They are convinced that the war has
been prolonged by US assistance and that US
"intervention" in what they consider to be a
war for independence has further embroiled
Asia in the struggle between the Western
Powers and the Communist bloc. They also
fear that US policies will lead to expansion of
the area of conflict in Asia.
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15. Nevertheless, there is a growing though
still inadequate recognition among leaders in
South and Southeast Asia of the expansionist
nature of Communist objectives and policies in
Asia. In addition, there is increased appre-
hension throughout non-Communist Asia con-
cerning the aims of Communist China, not so
much because it is Communist as because
Asians fear the expansion of Chinese power.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A VIET
MINH VICTORY IN INDOCHINA
(Assumptions:
(1) No Chinese Communist intervention
in force had taken place.
(2) No US combat units had been com-
mitted.)
16. A Viet Minh victory in Indochina would
remove a significant military barrier to a
Communist sweep through Southeast Asia
and would expose the remainder of Southeast
Asia to greatly increased external Commu-
nist pressures. There would be no indigenous
military force in the area capable of perform-
ing the current protective role of the Franco-
Vietnamese forces in Indochina, and there
would probably be little initiative on the part
of the governments of the area toward col-
lective defense.5
17. Most Asian leaders would regard a Viet
Minh victory in Indochina as a defeat for the
West and a major blow to US power and
prestige in Asia. The policies adopted by the
non-Communist governments to meet the new
'The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes this paragraph should read as fol-
lows:
"The establishment of Communist control over
Indochina by military or other means would al-
most certainly result in the communization of all
of Southeast Asia and the exposure of India, the
Philippines and Australia to increasing Commu-
nist pressure. Communization of Southeast Asia
would, in effect, transfer the rice surpluses, the
oil, tin and rubber, now largely available to the
West, to the Communists and would facilitate
their interruption of communication lines. The
loss of the rice surpluses would weaken the bar-
gaining power of the West with the rice-deficient
countries of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia,
the Philippines and Japan, while strengthening
that of the Communist Bloc."
power situation in Southeast Asia would be
largely determined by the psychological im-
pact of the Western defeat and by a number
of contingent developments, the most im-
portant of which we believe would be: (a) the
apparent success with which the Viet Minh
established and maintained effective control
over Indochina, and the apparent degree to
which the new Indochina was dominated by
Communist leaders; (b) the degree to which
the new Indochina appeared to become a
satellite of Communist China; (c) the degree
to which Communist China and the new In-
dochina pursued either aggressive or "peace-
ful" policies toward their non-Communist
neighbors; (d) the activities of the indigenous
Communist movements within the various
non-Communist countries; and (e) the poli-
cies and actions of the US in Asia.
18. Despite the numerous variables involved,
we estimate that the following reactions and
consequences are likely to result from a Viet
Minh victory in Indochina.
19. Thailand would be most directly affected
by the Viet Minh victory. The Thai Govern-
ment's concern for the security of the country
would immediately increase, and the govern-
ment would almost certainly seek a specific
guarantee that the US would protect Thai
independence. Unless the US were able to
give these guarantees and to convince the
Thai Government that it could safely continue
to entrust Thailand's security to the West,
Thailand would almost certainly begin to
reorient its position toward the Communist
bloc.
20. The governments of India, Burma, Indo-
nesia, Pakistan, and Ceylon, while probably
increasingly aware of the Communist nature
of the Viet Minh and of its relationship to
Asian Communist power, would probably be
slow to recognize the seriousness of the threat
to their security posed by the new power situ-
ation in Southeast Asia. In the absence of
further Communist aggression in the area and
so long as Thailand retained essentially its
present orientation, these governments would
probably not appreciably change their present
policies toward the Communist bloc. How-
ever, Thai accommodation to the Communist
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IWO-
bloc would probably impel Burma, and possi-
bly Indonesia, to abandon their neutral posi-
tions in favor of an alignment with one or
the other of the power blocs, but would prob-
ably have little effect on the policies of India,
Pakistan, and Ceylon towards Communism.
If, however, Burma should clearly reorient
itself to the Communist bloc, India would be
forced to reassess its non-alignment policy
and the chances are slightly better than even
that in this circumstance India would seek
quietly to move closer to the Western democ-
racies. Ceylon would probably seek economic
guarantees from the US and show interest in
defense arrangements with the West. Pak-
istan would probably continue its present
pro-US policy, particularly if the US were
prepared to give substantial military and eco-
nomic support.
21. In the event of a Viet Minh victory in
Indochina, the governments of Nationalist
China, the ROK, and the Philippines would
almost certainly continue to pursue strongly
anti-Communist domestic and foreign policies.
The British in Malaya would continue to re-
sist to the limit of their capabilities the in-
creased Communist pressures which would
probably accompany the extension of Com-
munist power in Southeast Asia. However,
the premised situation would facilitate an in-
crease in Communist effectiveness, thus re-
quiring an increase in British forces to counter
22. Japan would retain its pro-Western orien-
tation but would insist that the US fully guar-
antee its security and economic viability.
However, Japan would probably attempt to
expand economic and political relations with
the Communist states in Asia, as far as this
could be done without jeopardizing its rela-
tions with the US.
23. Most non-Communist Asian governments
would become more apprehensive over the
activities of local Communists and might in-
itiate more stringent measures against them.
Although local Communist movements in
Asia outside Indochina are not now capable
of overthrowing existing governments, a Viet
Minh victory would probably increase the
capabilities of local Communists, particularly
in Southeast Asia. If the local Communists
should intensify their efforts in support of
stepped-up political and economic pressures
from the Communist bloc, the awareness of
the Communist threat would increase in Asia.
However, in the short run local Communist
action would be likely to have less effect upon
the policies of the governments of non-Com-
munist Asia toward international Commu-
nism than would external Communist pres-
sures and each government's assessment of
the new power balance-in Asia.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A US
INTERVENTION IN FORCE IN
INDOCHINA
(Assumptions:
(1) No Chinese Communist interven-
tion in force had taken place.
(2) French Union forces still retained a
foothold in Indochina.)
24.6 Initial reactions to US intervention would
vary among the non-Communist Asian coun-
tries and within each country, depending
upon such factors as: (a) each government's
estimate of the likelihood that the US action
would lead to Chinese Communist interven-
tion in force in Indochina; (b) the policies
and tactics of Communist China with respect
to Korea and other Asian issues; (c) the cir-
cumstances of the US intervention, in partic-
ular the attitudes of the leaders of the Asso-
ciated States toward the intervention and
the state of political relations between France
and the Associated States; (d) the position of
the UN with respect to the US action; and (e)
the extent to which non-Communist Asian
leaders estimated that the US intervention
was of a scale and nature sufficient to defeat
the field forces of the Viet Minh.
'The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that this paragraph should be
preceded by the following additional paragraph:
"U.S. intervention in force in Indochina would
effectively stop further Communist advance in
Southeast Asia, reduce their capabilities in In-
donesia, and provide a bulwark to the Philip-
pines and Australia; this would assure the avail-
ability of rice to the non-Communist rice-defi-
cient nations and guarantee to the West the
continuing availability of the vital strategic raw
materials of Southeast Asia and its contiguous
areas."
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25.. The Asian nations with a strong anti-
Communist orientation would tend to wel-
come, or at least acquiesce in, a forceful US
intervention in Indochina, viewing such action
as evidence of US determination to prevent
further Communist expansion. These coun-
tries could be expected to give diplomatic sup-
port and might provide varying degrees of
material assistance. On the other hand, the
"neutralist" countries would, at least initially,
view US intervention with apprehension in-
duced by overriding fears of extension of war
in Asia. These countries would also disap-
prove interference in what they still tend to
regard as a French struggle against an Asian
nationalist movement, although this disap-
proval might be modified by some feeling of
reassurance over the exercise of US power.
26. The government of Nationalist China
would welcome US intervention in Indochina
but would be concerned that US aid would be
diverted from Taiwan. The Nationalist Gov-
ernment would probably welcome the threat of
Communist Chinese intervention in force in
Indochina in hope that, should it occur, it
would involve the US in war with Communist
China. The Nationalist Government would
probably not offer forces for service in Indo-
china.
27. The Philippine Government would wel-
come the intervention and would probably per-
mit the US to use Philippine territory and
facilities. In addition, the Philippine Gov-
ernment might offer token forces. The threat
of a Chinese Communist invasion in Indochina
would probably not dissuade the Philippine
Government from supporting the US action.
28. The non-Communist Indochinese leaders
would support US intervention if they believed
that such US action would.soon bring the In-
dochina war to a close and would insure the
independence of the Associated States. A
threatened Chinese Communist invasion
would probably appreciably lessen this sup-
port, unless the scale and nature of the US
intervention appeared to Indochinese leaders
to be adequate to deter or to defeat such inva-
sion.
29. UK and some British Commonwealth
forces are presently engaged in Malaya. The
UK, although apprehensive of the possibility
of war between Communist China and the
West, would probably approve a US interven-
tion in Indochina as necessary for the defense
of Malaya and for the prevention of further
expansion of Communist power in Asia. Aus-
tralia and New Zealand would clearly recog-
nize the threat of expanding Communism in
Southeast Asia and would give full support to
the US action. These three Commonwealth
countries might be able to provide token naval
and air support. However, none of these
countries would be capable of providing
ground forces at present unless units now in
Korea were diverted for service in Indochina.
30. ROK leaders would be apprehensive that
the US intervention in Indochina would divert
US military support from the ROK, but would
favor the intervention if they thought that it
would involve the US in a war with Commu-
nist China and thus improve the chances for
the unification of Korea under the ROK.
31. The Indian Government would probably
denounce the US intervention on the grounds
that it was undertaken to suppress a national-
ist struggle against colonialism and that this
US action would greatly increase the chances
of extending the area of conflict in Asia. In-
dia would probably seek a solution of the Indo-
china problem in the UN.
32. The Burmese would be apprehensive that
US intervention would provoke Chinese Com-
munist intervention in force in Indochina
which might involve Burma in war. The
Burmese Government would probably attempt
to maintain a neutral attitude towards the US
intervention. However, if India initiated UN
action, Burma might support it.
33. The Indonesian Government would be
critical of US intervention, but would probably
seek to avoid any involvement in the Indo-
china problem. Ceylon would be unlikely to
take any official position.
34. The Japanese Government would probably
lend diplomatic support, but without enthu-
siasm. The government would fear that the
US action might lead to the diversion of US
armed forces and material aid from Japan and
might even involve Japan in war.
y.el~e~warr
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35. The Thai Government's reaction would de-
pend almost entirely on its estimate of the
effect of US intervention in Indochina on
Thailand's own security. Thailand, initially
at least, would probably attempt to avoid in-
volvement in the conflict. However, if Thai-
land obtained satisfactory security guarantees
from the US, it would probably permit the US
to use Thai territory and facilities.
36. The Pakistan Government would probably
adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality toward
the US action, although some public opinion
would probably be critical of US intervention
because of nationalist feeling and because of
the fear of expanded war in Asia. The Pakis-
tan Government would probably not support
any UN action condemning US intervention.
37. Over the longer run, reactions in non-
Communist Asia to US intervention in force in
Indochina would be largely determined by the
success of the intervention. If the Viet Minh
were quickly eliminated or decisively defeated
without leading to a Chinese Communist in-
vasion of Indochina, and if military victory
were followed by the emergence of truly inde-
pendent and effective governments in Viet-
nam, Cambodia, and Laos, non-Communist
Asian leaders would accept the new situation
and would welcome the setback of Communist
expansion in Asia. On the other hand, a pro-
tracted stalemate in Indochina would almost
certainly reduce support for the US through-
out Asia.
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES IN NON-COMMUNIST
ASIA OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS
IN INDOCHINA BEFORE MID-1954
SE-52
Approved 10 November 1953
Published 16 November 1953
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 10 November 1953. The FBI abstained,
the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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