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December 20, 2016
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October 13, 2006
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Publication Date: 
March 19, 1952
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79S01057A000100080030-8.pdf331.09 KB
Approved For Release 20~~f7'3 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000100080030- 19 1~larch 1952 1~iE[~IORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence) SUBJECT: Authentication of facts 1. In response -co your request there is attached (Tab A) a discussion of the problefa of identification and authentication of facts in the production of inteJ_li;;ence. You may ti~rish to distribute this paper for consideration at a meeting of your Assistant Directors. 2. In arriving at the proposal to establish a Chief of Production for the DD~I some tentative consideration zras given to the related problem of the org3.nization of the DDfI staff (Tab B) . A brief statement of the possible duties of the Chief of Production appears as Ta'o C. Approved For Release 2006/10113 :CIA-RDP79S01057A000100080030-8 Approved For Release 2006/10113 :CIA-RDP79S01057A000100080030-8 Approved For Release 2006110/y_~}~CQP79S01057A000100080030-8 PROBLEM: ~-,9 /3 a4 1. To provide more helpful, timely and reliable facts on which to base our National Intelligence Estimates. DISCUSSION? 2. The chief criticism of cur national estimates is that the facts on which. conclusions are based are not revealed or if revealed are questioned. ?-there conclusions have had to be deduced in the absence of facts this has not always been made clear. t~Thile the dearth of factual information on the Soviet orbit is generally recognized and while inade- quate collection is frequently made the whipping boy of highly speculative conclusions in estimates, collection as such is not the first place to lock for a remedy though its proper role will become clear as the "problem of the available facts" is attacked and solved. 3. The problem of the Available Facts will be solved when we have asked the right questions of fact of the appropriate researchers and the answers have been authenticated. 1~Tot only tirill gaps be revealed which may in part be filled by additional research but also the gaps which must be filled by ne~?r collection will become more apparent. This should result in sharper and so more useful and manageable collection requests. ~+. How can we get the right questions asked? first we must choose the proper subjects for national estimates and ensure that they are suf- ficiently tailored to current and anticipated policy problems. While the major members of the IAC are ex~,~osed in their departments to develop- ing policy situations and ~~rill continue to provide advice to the estimat- ing machinery, it is expected that further guidance in this regard will flow from arrangements Erhich have been made with the NSC Senior Staff and the Director of the Joint Staff, JCS, to review proposed terms of reference of NSE`s and offer criticism and suggestions in order to sharpen them relative to the needs of ;,Manners and policy makers. The current~NlE production program should be examined periodically to be sure it is as complete and well-rounded as possible and that it provides maximum advance notice to the preduc-cion ofx"ices regarding the subjects on t~rhich their support will be needed. Perhaps a section should be added listing possible NIE's which have 'seen proposed cr might be useful to undertake but have not yet been accepted for ;production. 5 . Next we must maximu;n use cf the terms of reference of national estimates. In addition to the outline for the estimate as now ~m itten there should also be a ~orecise statement of the principal "factual" questions on which the answers to the various sub-estimates logically depend. While the asking of the right questions, including the detailed questions, may be a cooperative velrcure er decentralized to the contri- buting organizations, nevertheless in view of ONL's leadership role ~ Approved For Release 2006/1011 Approver Release 200 'i~,- R D P79~57A000100080030-8 the estimating field it has tn.e majcr responsibility for the success of 'che system. Since theether agencies are apparently not formulating the questions or answering them with suffycient precision or dependability, ONE should do what they can to ir~.prove their perfcrmance either by elabor- ating their present draft terms cf reference by writing and getting agree- ment on subsidiary "fac'cual" -terms of reference, or by asking for separate memoranda on particular points. 6. In areas other than national estimates the same insistence on formula-i,ing as precisely as possible the right questions for intelligence support is the only salvation from the many pressures which squeeze "not enough researchers" t-ri'ch too many deadlines. The need for clear and precise thinking at this stage has been-demonstrated by the very broad generalized requirements, almost encyclopedic in nature, which have frequently been served on intelligence units. The formulation of the right questions is part of the respcnsibility of each Assistant Director, administrator, staff officer or analyst in any of the IAC agencies. Organizational tools to assist him are the same as those used to authen- ticate the facts . ( cf . paragraph 8 ) 7. What is involved in the authentication of facts? Those whose function is to estimate or to determine policy on 'the basis of estimates have a right not only to the fac'cs behind the estimate but to the authentication of the most impor'cant facts. The authentication of facts involves a a clear, reasoned paper by the responsible official with some showing of credibility other than his lsnewn integrity; and (b) the concurrence of those other intelligence organizations with a pertinent responsibility or competence. The cri'cical nature of the world struvgle today and the dependence of our foreign and domestic policy en intelli- gence, demand that our facts be able to withstand criticism. Although the military and State departments have been given the responsibility for "military" and "political" intelligence (NSCID 3), the definition of these terms and the overlapping nature of related responsibilities give a joint character to many problems even in 'these fields. Without attempt- ing to dispute the primary role of these agencies in their fields, their importan'c facts can be examined by others operating under the aegis of national intelligence, current intelligence, economic or scientific intelligence, and perhaps even psychological intelligence and external research. 8. How can we get authenticated facts? This is the responsibility of each administrator and Assistant Director. Gdhere the facts bridge several responsibilities joint preparaticn may be called for or a joint revies~r after preparation and prior to publication. This is essentially the current practice of the :economic Intelligence Committee, of the JAEIC, and of the Watch Committee. A different set of facts might be the concern of a "Current Intelligence Committee" (primarily concerned cri'ch authentica- ting a Current Intelligence Review, quite apart from who drafted it), a "Psychological Intelligence Committee" and~or an "External Research Approver Release 2 ~ ~~5: CIA-RDP79S~57A000100080030-8 Committee." While formal mechanisms come mos-c easily to mind, the mention of them should not obscure the possibility and desirability of authenticating many of the facts through more informal or ad hoc means. Each of these areas should be examined separately with a view to deter- mining the best arrangements for each. g. What will be the effect on the research production offices? The producing cffices are continually trying to staff themselves up to meet the demands being placed on theca from various important quarters. Producticn of 1VP.~'s has already taken a considerable portion of the efforts of the agencies away from wlza-c they think they should be working o~z, from the demands of their own de-~~artmeizt (including SiZAPE, FECGNl, etc.), and from the NIS l~regram. j;chile some of 'chose requests coincide and although our questio~zs raay be more important than sane other demands, the agencies may be expected to resist a further "encroachment" on their time. Sore should recognize that -che more insistent our demands become and the more we press for coordinated, authenticated papers, the more we are in effect exercising a control er direction (however incomplete and polite) ever the production ~rograras of -che ether agencies. This is probably the right direction in which.-to move, but to be successful it will need to be done gradually and t~~ith finesse and we should never expect to monopolize all the enemies of the IAC agencies. 10. t~That steps should be taken to assisi, identification of questions and authentifica'cion of facts? Responsibility for these functions is so ~~idely shared in the community that it is not felt that generally lectur- ing the community will produce much result. On the other hand, it trould be impossible to alter radically the existing responsibilities. I'c would probably be possible and reasonably effec'cive, he~rever, to adopt a middle course and attempt to supply the leadership necessary to achieve a limited and voluntary coordination of production effort. This would be a delicate and continuing job but could be undertaken by a senior staff officer to the DD~I with the help perhaps of a couple of carefully selected people. Such a Chief of Production would be responsible for assisting the DD~I in his guidance of 'che substantive work of CIA and in his leadership of the IAC production community. Approved For Release 200611011-RDP79S01057A000100080030-8 ~v/z L~ecu-~ive Cficer and Stan' Chief Coordination Chief Production TAI B .~ ~, ~~. % Approved For Release 2006/10113 :CIA-RDP79S0,1057A000100080030-8 DU^1 T'., ~S OIL' C1~T:~i~ 0~ F ~ODUC^l IOid As a stair arm of the llD~I he t,*OLZ1cL: 1. i~evietr and con~:~en-c on the produc-cion programs and actual output of the CIA offices under the DD~I. 2. IyTaintain familiarity z~ritn. the production programs and actual output of the other IAC agencies. 3. Advise the various produc-cion of~ices to the extent practicable so as to i;~prove the timeliness, usefulness and reliability of the products of the 1~ederal Intel- ligence Syste~a. ~+. Exercise initiative and leadership t~rith respect to social science research on foreign areas performed by or for any agency of 'che Government.