AUTHENTICATION OF FACTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01057A000100080030-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: March 19, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 20~~f7'3 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000100080030-
19 1~larch 1952
1~iE[~IORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: Authentication of facts
1. In response -co your request there is attached (Tab A)
a discussion of the problefa of identification and authentication
of facts in the production of inteJ_li;;ence. You may ti~rish to
distribute this paper for consideration at a meeting of your
Assistant Directors.
2. In arriving at the proposal to establish a Chief of
Production for the DD~I some tentative consideration zras given
to the related problem of the org3.nization of the DDfI staff
(Tab B) . A brief statement of the possible duties of the Chief
of Production appears as Ta'o C.
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PROBLEM:
~-,9 /3 a4
1. To provide more helpful, timely and reliable facts on which to
base our National Intelligence Estimates.
DISCUSSION?
2. The chief criticism of cur national estimates is that the facts
on which. conclusions are based are not revealed or if revealed are
questioned. ?-there conclusions have had to be deduced in the absence of
facts this has not always been made clear. t~Thile the dearth of factual
information on the Soviet orbit is generally recognized and while inade-
quate collection is frequently made the whipping boy of highly speculative
conclusions in estimates, collection as such is not the first place to
lock for a remedy though its proper role will become clear as the
"problem of the available facts" is attacked and solved.
3. The problem of the Available Facts will be solved when we have
asked the right questions of fact of the appropriate researchers and the
answers have been authenticated. 1~Tot only tirill gaps be revealed which
may in part be filled by additional research but also the gaps which
must be filled by ne~?r collection will become more apparent. This should
result in sharper and so more useful and manageable collection requests.
~+. How can we get the right questions asked? first we must choose
the proper subjects for national estimates and ensure that they are suf-
ficiently tailored to current and anticipated policy problems. While
the major members of the IAC are ex~,~osed in their departments to develop-
ing policy situations and ~~rill continue to provide advice to the estimat-
ing machinery, it is expected that further guidance in this regard will
flow from arrangements Erhich have been made with the NSC Senior Staff
and the Director of the Joint Staff, JCS, to review proposed terms of
reference of NSE`s and offer criticism and suggestions in order to
sharpen them relative to the needs of ;,Manners and policy makers. The
current~NlE production program should be examined periodically to be
sure it is as complete and well-rounded as possible and that it provides
maximum advance notice to the preduc-cion ofx"ices regarding the subjects
on t~rhich their support will be needed. Perhaps a section should be added
listing possible NIE's which have 'seen proposed cr might be useful to
undertake but have not yet been accepted for ;production.
5 . Next we must r~.ke maximu;n use cf the terms of reference of
national estimates. In addition to the outline for the estimate as now
~m itten there should also be a ~orecise statement of the principal "factual"
questions on which the answers to the various sub-estimates logically
depend. While the asking of the right questions, including the detailed
questions, may be a cooperative velrcure er decentralized to the contri-
buting organizations, nevertheless in view of ONL's leadership role ~
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the estimating field it has tn.e majcr responsibility for the success of
'che system. Since theether agencies are apparently not formulating the
questions or answering them with suffycient precision or dependability,
ONE should do what they can to ir~.prove their perfcrmance either by elabor-
ating their present draft terms cf reference by writing and getting agree-
ment on subsidiary "fac'cual" -terms of reference, or by asking for separate
memoranda on particular points.
6. In areas other than national estimates the same insistence on
formula-i,ing as precisely as possible the right questions for intelligence
support is the only salvation from the many pressures which squeeze "not
enough researchers" t-ri'ch too many deadlines. The need for clear and
precise thinking at this stage has been-demonstrated by the very broad
generalized requirements, almost encyclopedic in nature, which have
frequently been served on intelligence units. The formulation of the
right questions is part of the respcnsibility of each Assistant Director,
administrator, staff officer or analyst in any of the IAC agencies.
Organizational tools to assist him are the same as those used to authen-
ticate the facts . ( cf . paragraph 8 )
7. What is involved in the authentication of facts? Those whose
function is to estimate or to determine policy on 'the basis of estimates
have a right not only to the fac'cs behind the estimate but to the
authentication of the most impor'cant facts. The authentication of facts
involves a a clear, reasoned paper by the responsible official with
some showing of credibility other than his lsnewn integrity; and (b) the
concurrence of those other intelligence organizations with a pertinent
responsibility or competence. The cri'cical nature of the world struvgle
today and the dependence of our foreign and domestic policy en intelli-
gence, demand that our facts be able to withstand criticism. Although
the military and State departments have been given the responsibility
for "military" and "political" intelligence (NSCID 3), the definition of
these terms and the overlapping nature of related responsibilities give
a joint character to many problems even in 'these fields. Without attempt-
ing to dispute the primary role of these agencies in their fields, their
importan'c facts can be examined by others operating under the aegis of
national intelligence, current intelligence, economic or scientific
intelligence, and perhaps even psychological intelligence and external
research.
8. How can we get authenticated facts? This is the responsibility
of each administrator and Assistant Director. Gdhere the facts bridge
several responsibilities joint preparaticn may be called for or a joint
revies~r after preparation and prior to publication. This is essentially
the current practice of the :economic Intelligence Committee, of the JAEIC,
and of the Watch Committee. A different set of facts might be the concern
of a "Current Intelligence Committee" (primarily concerned cri'ch authentica-
ting a Current Intelligence Review, quite apart from who drafted it), a
"Psychological Intelligence Committee" and~or an "External Research
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Committee." While formal mechanisms come mos-c easily to mind, the
mention of them should not obscure the possibility and desirability of
authenticating many of the facts through more informal or ad hoc means.
Each of these areas should be examined separately with a view to deter-
mining the best arrangements for each.
g. What will be the effect on the research production offices?
The producing cffices are continually trying to staff themselves up to
meet the demands being placed on theca from various important quarters.
Producticn of 1VP.~'s has already taken a considerable portion of the
efforts of the agencies away from wlza-c they think they should be working
o~z, from the demands of their own de-~~artmeizt (including SiZAPE, FECGNl,
etc.), and from the NIS l~regram. j;chile some of 'chose requests coincide
and although our questio~zs raay be more important than sane other demands,
the agencies may be expected to resist a further "encroachment" on their
time. Sore should recognize that -che more insistent our demands become
and the more we press for coordinated, authenticated papers, the more
we are in effect exercising a control er direction (however incomplete
and polite) ever the production ~rograras of -che ether agencies. This
is probably the right direction in which.-to move, but to be successful
it will need to be done gradually and t~~ith finesse and we should never
expect to monopolize all the enemies of the IAC agencies.
10. t~That steps should be taken to assisi, identification of questions
and authentifica'cion of facts? Responsibility for these functions is so
~~idely shared in the community that it is not felt that generally lectur-
ing the community will produce much result. On the other hand, it trould
be impossible to alter radically the existing responsibilities. I'c would
probably be possible and reasonably effec'cive, he~rever, to adopt a middle
course and attempt to supply the leadership necessary to achieve a limited
and voluntary coordination of production effort. This would be a delicate
and continuing job but could be undertaken by a senior staff officer to
the DD~I with the help perhaps of a couple of carefully selected people.
Such a Chief of Production would be responsible for assisting the DD~I
in his guidance of 'che substantive work of CIA and in his leadership of
the IAC production community.
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~v/z
L~ecu-~ive Cficer
and Stan'
Chief
Coordination
Chief
Production
TAI B .~
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DU^1 T'., ~S OIL' C1~T:~i~ 0~ F ~ODUC^l IOid
As a stair arm of the llD~I he t,*OLZ1cL:
1. i~evietr and con~:~en-c on the produc-cion programs and
actual output of the CIA offices under the DD~I.
2. IyTaintain familiarity z~ritn. the production programs and
actual output of the other IAC agencies.
3. Advise the various produc-cion of~ices to the extent
practicable so as to i;~prove the timeliness, usefulness
and reliability of the products of the 1~ederal Intel-
ligence Syste~a.
~+. Exercise initiative and leadership t~rith respect to
social science research on foreign areas performed by
or for any agency of 'che Government.