RE-EXAMINATION OF NSCID: 11 AND 12

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01057A000100080051-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 51
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79S01057AO00100080051-5
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on en ptoyee's publishing, and attt-o*# s nitteedlY such publishing
could be controlled in CLA and other agencies without the benefit
of NSCW IZ, the Directive dues allow uniformity of action among
the agencies in the treatment of pabU* -!t.
S. An analysis of WSCtD# 11 and IZ, paragraph by para-
graph. has been made and is set forth in Tabs A and B.
Conclusion:
6. From this analysis it seems clear that NSCIIis 11 and
it should in substance be retained but should be refined to clarify
their meaning and eoaseelueatiy sharpen their effect. They should
be combined because of the interrelation of their subject matter
(and incidentally because the "pestsictod" ctassificatton of
NSC1L) IZ can no longer be used).
Recommendation:
7. That the proposed rovisian of N5CID 11 set forth in
Tab C be approved for discussion with the IAG agencies along
with this staff study. Tab A (less the last sentence of the last
comment. page 7), it being considered is appropriate and
unnecessary to disseminate Tab 31
CONCUR:
A ROPED (Disapproved):
Central
eputy Director (Intelligence) Deputy Director of Intelligence
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?
A ALY: OF CI 3-11
,'security of Information on Intelligence Sources
MA Methods"
Preamble:
NSCW 11 is written as being in pursuance both of Section
101(b)(Z) and of Section 1O2(d)j3) of the National Security Act of
1947. as amended.
Comment: White it is true that policy in NSCID 11
restates to "matters of common interest to the departments and
which
ove
nm
the
. -
g
,.
-
agencies 9016
security,, (Section 1O1(b)(Z)), this is 40 more so in this ease than
in the case of many of the subjects to which other NSCIDI are
directed.
usion: The reference to section 101(b)(Z) should be
eliminated as unnecessary.
s .sat 2: Reference to Section 10Z(d)(3) may give an
.,,,om
erroneWw conception the its of responsibility of the
Director. It should be noted that subsectten (d)(3) assigns to
the Agency certain duties respecting "`intelligence rotating to the
national security. " These duties are to be performed under three
stated conditions. These conditions are a limitation an the Agency
not on other agencies. In fact, they are stated in order to protect
the other agencies against a failure by CIA to maintain the integrity
of either the functions or the materials of other agencies. The
protection of other agencies' materials is provided by the third
condition, namely: "that the DCI shall be responsible for pro-
tecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. " or clarification, this could be stated as follows:
"In correlating, evaluating, and disseminating national intelli-
gence. the DCI must have the other agencies' intelligence informa-
tion, but he cannot use it carelessly; he must protect it. 11
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Part of NSGID I i does rest this condition in
paragraph 1O2(d)(I). but it would rest on 1OZ(d)(1) sad (Z)
more surely. Inasmuch as protection Si # Owes* and methods
of intelligence is itself an iatelUgeoce., aU ty. the *.ordination
of which is appropriate for rocommeaAMA+re to the National
Security Council.
Conclusion: That the l reamble should state that the
NSCID is in pursuance of docUet 10Z(d).
hes-aerapit6
The dee -artemlents and agencies of a govearn emt eapatted
rill rirll .rw .. _ " yl IlrlnY Illrr,rt Irrl r,r,
ime sto to r0r k unauthorizeed
in intelli geeece activities s
disclosure of information on 1I. d. iuterl s e sou rues and methods.
Continent: This is a aosM statement but sound be Improved
by changing it to make clear that the steps to be taken are to be
coordinated steps. In that form it would provide a base for existing
DCID 1 I / 1. and proposed DCID 1 IJZ. as well as future (but as yet
unidentified) problems requiring a DGIIi is, this ienerat field.
,conclusion: Retain bat improve.
yrrr,brrrr _
Each ages will det+ormtso its, - c
tip to release any such i
Comment: This is
?
C elusion It should be removed.
The delimitin phrase ""intelli ence sources and methods'
includes information ostensi overt which r uires security ,ro-
t"- A
&s=ea
geace information a
n
~^ r
r~wr~wrwrr++y~
rr
covered app ropria
.......rrrr....yrT . yi1 ,....rwf......r
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MI In the dreg of this language an effort was
made to exclude finished inteltlgfnnce. The statement is a clumsy
one.
Conclusion: That the following be siabestituted: "Intelligence
sources and methods" does not inclOW the substance of either
intelligence or intelligence information except insofar as the
means or origin of procurement may be revealed therein.
:far
...1..11.
The Director of Central "ML4 uc? shall coordinate
-- iIYYYYYYYYYYYY YF policies ~1 ~ lYl .YYYYIIYI
concerrnin the Protection. of Intelli .nco sources and
: aethods within the limits es s Sec ti" 19Z. a 64
National Securi Act of 1947 exce w?heree provision has alra-s>ei.
been made the National Sotwi
Comment: "Within the limits established by Section 102
of the National Security Act of 11947" may have been included to
confine the coordination specified so as not to include ;section
101(b) of the Act which is rof.#eae*eced in the Preamble. Since it
is recommended that this be reu vsd from the Preamble, this
reason no longer is valid.
The clause "+exaeept where provision has already been Made
by the NSC:, is understood to be required to take into account
responsibilities of the FBI. This is also designed to take into
account the provisions made by the NSC with regard to NSCID 9.
others that we do not know abo*t. or others which may arise in
the future.
Conclusion: Strike
Section 107. of National Security Act of 1947. " Retain the rest.
Paragraph 3
 C Wit: The dale of "need-to-know" should be
preserved but should be state*** be applicable generally, not
just to covert or sensitive informati
Conclusion: That this paragraph be deleted and the
seed-to-know principle be incorporated more appropriately in'
the new draft.
Cam This is in accord with tiSC-50 and seems
sound until analysed literally. As it sus of "any" reference
to CIA. and as this can mean "all" rotwesces to CIA., it makes
no sense within the LAC and MSG community. It is obviously
intended for "public" reference and reference in those govern-
mental quarters where there is as need-to-knew about specific
CIA activities other than its rots in coordination.
Conclusion: This should be revised to read: "... any
public reference to CIA or reference to CIA within the non-IAC
agencies should generally emphasize its duties as the coordinator
of intelligence. '{
Comment.- This is far too categorical and the point has
already been adeqUatel made is the foregoing. Specific instruction
in CIA Regulation I is more lenient than this and is in keeping
with the first sentence of this paragraph above underlined.
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ANALYSIS
1. This CW stab out at sae es
JACka *COtea SVOV MM IWO _
b) US *r.sirtcUo. as the 3 recto r with re +i to as.
C1os
it is issppropria
The retationsi
and certainly the
4. Retain policy as tyt
on d prapm is sebstaase to
so it document.
welt est&Wob*A
S. Strike last pas*g r`i on and dIsatobere
In dov . "
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AL S Cuai y COUNCIL INTLLL ' Cr
Security of InfwMauta on
and alid,
I. Any pubUcitye fac
Bence or iatellig*meo activities
XT)
of a l01
of iafarmatiea On lain sauce - --, ~._.-.....,,..R... .
Slowlems clad --#&" ds
Is
a
A.w+
detrimental to the effsctiwemoos sf i ltigemeo orgetat*ati u
and th
e aaM tt securit
y.
9. Insofar as roler.nc. to CIA as r+r elare# etilalcl
y or
axnoeeS the .IAC agtncies of die goveramhst
*"A."-
f
?
s o
as the coordinator of int*ltilgr 000 should ,generally be a nphasinad.
3. Inforamdom on f #tsas. sources and motbods
should be disclosed only tothos + o
such elms require
d. The delimiting rase "jatetti
tare* s ar
g
ses
emu Moce
does not include the substance Wit*itteor iatettitgonae or intelligence
infer
i
m;at
aoa except insofii
ar as sssestrve moans or origin of
cu roment may be revealed thereby.
5. The A)tr
coordt tioa of procedures to imptemea
.....,,
h+arrfn, *"*Pt where she a-wo- pm"m w.4? *=eQ
Procedures are separately eltabished
b
th
ti
y
e
waal Qec*rity Council.
6. ftatlonat %curity Ctomv4j
is herewith rescinded.
C UVi' No. l1
ligeace Somrses
;once 'active No. IA
' otse i iCID Mo. "Avoidance of Publicit
Conc
i
h
y
ern
ng t
e
Intelligence Ageaeies of the U. S. Goviernment. 1,1 was issued on