SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01057A000500020024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 19, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
General Walter B. Smith 0 i' n in nothing of CI
Director of Central Intellige _!t-iowlr
August 19, 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
David K, Bruce Document Not
Under Secretary of State BMW of this document by CIA has
determined that
^ CIA has no objection to declass
The Honorable it contains information of CIA
William Co Foster Jai.. interest that must remain
Deputy Secretary of Defense classified at IS .. $
SUBJECTI Social Science Research
25X1A As you will remember, one of the first things which concerned
I Iwhen he became Director of PSB, was__the contribution?to
winning the cold war being made byre earch in the social sciences.
Ilee7 ~~as coo hat our efforts over the coming years to avoid
a continuing military stalemate with the USSR., will depend in large
part upon our success in developing novel, non-milty
changing the intentions of the present ime 'in the 93R, or in
bringing about a situation in -which it can be supplanted. Since
according to present evidence these means are yet to be conceived,
it is essential that we direct our research effort coherently along
the most promising lineso.
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25X1 A As a result of I Iconcern, I Iwas retained 25X1 A
to prepare a study or a purpose of suggesting any changes which
might be made within the government to improve the aefulne s of 25X1 A
this type..Qf_research. After six mon~hst investigation
last Apri',, completed a report in which he summarized 111S in ings,
drew conclusions from these findings and made recommendations for
such changes, Although in final forms tbs.runt was net submitted
to the Board, pending staff discussions with CIA regarding the pro-
r '
elyyooff-`ncluding information as to CIA's expenditures in this
Iri
ield, It was decided not to include this infformation but Genera],
4C Smith volunteered that he would satisfy any questions which the other
k Byars, members may have on this suject&
You will note that the report recommends, in effect, the dele,
gation to PSB of the responsibility for bringing about coordination
in this field, Although this suggestion has merit, I am not convinced
that it provides the best solution. Certainly organize~c interdepar#=
men al coordination is called for. However, this might well be better
carried out under one of the other alternatives in report.,
and I make no recommendation on this point. 25X1A
25X1A
Enclosure:
1. PSB D-32., Report on
Social Science Research
NEXT
OSDOS reviews completed SECURITY INFORMATION AL
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DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN
COLD WAR OPERATIONS
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Prepared by!
.tpril 11, 1752
SECURITY INFORMATION
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COPY
PSB
April 110 1952
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COPY
Security Information PSB D-32
COI,IFIDENTIAL April 11, 1952
STTh 4ARY
PAGE
I. THE RELATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH TO COLD WAR OPERATIONS.......
Research in the social sciences, though relatively a new field, can
make a significant contribution to cold war operations by
improving the bases upon which decisions can be made.
II. PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE GOVERNI IT.......... 4
Since World War II, the Federal Government has become a major
supporter of social science research. Over 20 separate organi-
zations within a dozen agencies committed , ,in fiscal 1952
for such research of potential assistance in winning the cold war.
III. DEFECTS IN HDTEPRESENT S`ISTENI ......................................?. 11
Lack of clarity in national objectives, overlapping and changing
areas of responsibility of Government agencies, the rapid growth
of research organization, the shortage of trained scientists and
administrators, and lack of awareness by top management of
potentials of social science research have all led to serious
inefficiency. Requirements for research are faulty; the distri-
bution of research funds is not related to the missions; no
central clearing house for coordinating such research exists.
V. POSSIBLE MEANS OF PROVIDllIG A COHERENT PRCGRANI ...................... ? 17
Coordinated leadership for Government social science research
can be provided either by the creation of central authori:tive
direction, by the establishment of a central coordinating mech.,
anism, or by providing separate coordinating units to deal with
different areas..
V. POSSIBLE N ETHCDS FOR COUNTERACTING THE YOUTH OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.. 23
The Government can encourage both the training of social science
research personnel and the training of Government operators and
planners in the use of such research.
VI. COPCLUS.i~QIyS .......... 00 24
Better integration of social science research can -materially in-
crease its contribution to the cold war. Leadership can best be
provided by delegation of the responsibility for coordination by
the National `.ocurity Council to the Psychological Strategy Board.
VII. RECQVTJIENDATIONS...................................................... 25
The Psychological Strategy Board should take the initiative in
having a suitable directive prepared for approval by the N~ -tioncl
Security Council which delegates responsibility for coordination
to the PSB and establishes an individual as coordinator presid-
ing over a coordinating committee.
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I. THE RELATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
TO COLD WAR OPERATION
The invaluable contribution from research in the natural and
biological sciences to modern military operations is well recognized.
The potential assistance from research in the social sciences in the
present period of tensions without full-scale war is less understood
or accepted. Nonetheless, it is considerable and unique.
I
and from the development of practical methods for dealing with every
day problems, and points out that the "practical arts" at first run
ahead of the science. Only after the science has developed does it
affect "practice" to a greater extent that "practice" affects it. In
the case of the natural sciences, physics and chemistry overtook the
art of building pumps and primitive metallurgy during the seventeenth
and eithteenth centuries, The biological sciences have only very
recently overtaken medicine and agriculture. The social sciences are
probably not yet abreast of such "practices" as personnel selection
and economic controls, While the transition from leadership by prac-
tice to leadership by the science in the case of the social sciences
will undoubtedly be gradual, there is reason to believe that we are
on the threshold and that the relatively near future will witness as
dramatic changes in "social practice" as have occurred in the past in
the practice of medicine.
Research contributes to all three I lareas; the
accumulation of data, the improvement of the practical arts, and the
development of the science, In the social sciences, it may aid the
practical operator or government official in roughly the same manner
that medical research aids the physician, since both fields are con-
cerned with the study of a multitude of dependent variables, some
"physical" and some "mental", far too numerous to permit an understanding
of the whole, The practical man today must frequently act without
sufficient knowledge, either because there is insufficient time to
learn what is known or because research has not progressed sufficiently
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differentiates science from the accumulation of data
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to permit reliable answers to his questions. The physician,
having at his disposal the results of centuries of medical research,
is in a much more favorable position to arrive at his decisions.
Similarly, social science research can lead to the formation of hypoth-
eses based on critical, exhaustive, investigation of facts and opinions.
While research can not completely solve the practical man's problem,
give him specific directions on how to conduct his business, or even
give him complete and rigorous answers to many of his questions, it
can aid him by bringing the parts of the problem into better focus,
presenting facts in an orderly manner, and offering hypotheses which
may aid in the formation of plans or policy.
The work during the last war
is an outstanding example of the contribution which social science
research can make to prgctical decisions. Using the techniques of
social science, he showed that the almost universally held belief in
the impossibility of a Japanese surrender was a myth, He predicted
that the Japanese would surrender in large numbers, emphasized the
unique importance of the emperor, described the conditions necessary
for surrender, and continuously assessed Japanese morale. Later
events and captured documents have shown that he was substantially
correct.
Bearing in mind that research in the social sciences can poten-
tially make an enormous contribution to the waging of the cold war,
it becomes necessary to determine whether this potential is being
fully exploited and, if not, what should be done about it. This latter,
in turn, breaks down into two further questions: How can research
effort and expenditure best be channelled into projects contributory
to the waging of the cold war, and how can the utilization of the
results of social science research by operational personnel be improved?
A study of these questions is the purso a of this paper.
While it is realized that no definition can be completely satis-
factory, research is considered herein as that effort which attempts to
bring order to unrelated facts and thus to increase the store of human
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knowledge. An attempt has been made herein to separate research from
intelligence gathering and from quick analyses made for an individual
operational decision,. Thus, no attempt has been made to assess the
large governmental and private mechanisms for assembling, as distinct
from evaluating, the facts: i.e, the intelligence services, the foreign
service, and news services. An attempt has also been made to exclude
from consideration that work primarily intended to be used only once
or for a limited period of time - i..e. spot intelligence.. Furthermore,
while an understanding of the United States itself is of vital importance
to any decisions in the cold war, research on the internal United States
is separate and has been excluded from this study. Any social science
research considered of value to the cold war has been included in this
study, even though it may also be directed to hot war requirements.
The social sciences have been defined broadly to include the humanities,
economics, and parts of geography and psychiatry in addition to the
regular social sciences. Since all of these dividing lines are a
matter of judgment, the figures in this study should be considered as
indicating an order of magnitude of effort, rather than precise amounts.
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II. PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
IN M GOVERMENT
The present stage of development of the social sciences cor-
responds roughly to that of the natural sciences during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and to that of the biological sciences in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For the first time, it appears
possible for the social sciences to develop theories which can be
partially checked by experiment and which provide a tentative basis
for explaining and predicting observed facts. As during the early
stages of the other two sciences, the experimental techniques are far
from adequate, since they still permit arrival at erroneous results
and the proposal of contradictory theories at the same time, None-
theless, during the last few decades the practical application of
the social sciences, such as economic controls and the selection of
personnel, has improved remarkably and many feel that they are on the
threshold of major advances.
Due to the limited stage of development of these sciences, however,
it is almost impossible to judge the quality of the research objective-
ly. While the calibre of the research personnel varies considerably,
it is probably not too different, on the average, from the quality of
the natural and biological research scientists.
Due to the youth of the disciplines, there are far fewer trained
research personnel than is the case in the natural sciences. There
are 34,000 members of U. S. social science professional societies as
compared to 175,000 in the natural and biological sciences. There are
7,500 psychologists as compared to 70,000 chemists. In addition, there
are about 400,000 engineers who, though not themselves scientists,
are essential to the process of making the results of research in the
natural sciences useful.
Among the social scientists, area and language specialists are
in particularly great demand by the Government. Not only are they few
in number, but their distribution is most uneven, the largest percentage
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specializing in Western Europe and South America. Reputedly, there
are only 160 individuals in the United States with knowledge of
Indonesia.
The Federal Government first gave major support to social science
research during World War II, While much of this effort was concerned
with economic controls and the selection, training and effective use
of our troops, some work was also done on psychological warfare, with
particular emphasis on studying the strengths and vulnerabilities of
the enemy. After the war, this support virtually ceased for several
years. Since 1947, however, it has increased rapidly until at the
present time the Federal Government is one of the major spohsors of
social science research.
Federally sponsored research is undertaken in order to fulfill
requirements which, in theory, are determined by the operators and
planners of each agency with the intent to utilize the product of the
research as the basis for making the decisions which are the responsi-
bility of the agency,: These requirements are then submitted to the
agency research administrators and serve as the basis for planning
their research programs. In practice, however, most requirements are
so broad that they permit many research projects quite unconnected with
agency responsibilities to be undertaken. In addition, many research
administrators detect gaps in their programs which they attempt to fill
by undertaking research justified only by the broadest interpretation
of the stated requirements. The scientists themselves also originate
J
projects, either because of particular interest or unique qualifications,
seeking financial support from a Government agency.
About a dozen separate. Government agencies support some social
science research of potential value to waging the cold war. In fiscal
1952, the total sum obligated to research in this category was on the
order of $
Although the present plans of most research administrators call for a
similar increase in 1953, there seems little doubt that this will be
reduced during the budgetary review.
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In addition to the spent on this type of research,
the Federal Government spends on the order of $36 million a year in
"general purpose statistical activities" in such organizations as
the Office of Business Economics, Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Census. The Department of Defense
spends an additional $10 million annually for social science research
concerned with selection and training of manpower. Total Federal
Government obligations for research in 1952, exclusive of social science
research, amounted to $2,7 billion, of which $2 billion was obligated
by the Department of Defense.
Outside of the Government, in fiscal 1952 the foundations, particu-
larly the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations, spent over $6 million
in the support of social science research of value in the cold war
and when the Ford Foundation becomes fully operational this figure
will probably be increased by several million dollar;3. The five major
radio networks spend over $2 million for social science research,
attempting to determine their effect on audiences. Private advertising
firms reputedly spend on the order of $30 million a year for market
analyses, Several of the major corporations operating overseas spend
over a half a million a year in' attempting to determine foreign re-
action to their presence. Thus, it is apparent that, while the amount
of money being spent in the Government on social science research of
potential value to waging the cold war is insignificant -. less than
% of the money it spent on hardware research - nevertheless, it
represents the major source of funds in social science research, being
-times as large as the amount granted annually by the founrlatinnn,,
Of this spent for social science reearch of value
to the cold war, the Department of Defense contributes
or more than . The Department of State spends about
Other Government agencies such as MSA5 Commerce, and
Agrici,lture, each contribute less than
$ Within the Department of Defense the Air Force is by
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far the largest contributor,) providing
the entire State Department* The Navy is second with about
and the Army spends
in this field.
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Since the research program within each agency is compartmentalized,
a more meaningful breakdown is by individual research organizationso,
(Balance of this paragraph has. been deleted on grounds of security.
It discussed the relative size of expenditures of the Office of
Research Reports and the National Intelligence Survey within CIA,
the Air Targets Division and the Human Resources Reearch Institute with-
in the Department of Defense,. and the Office of Intelligence
Research and the International Information Administration within the
State Department),
Reverting to the spent by the Government in this field,,
of this total approximately $ , s spent 25X1 A
within the Government laboratories. About of this
is spelt within the organizations to which the funds
are appropriated; with the remaining $ being sub-contracted
from one Government agency to another. OIR within State received
over P through such transfer of funds and the Library of
Congress received the bulk of the remaindero
Thee not spent within the Government, constituting less
than % of the total, is contracted to non-government organizations,
primarily universities,, The Department of Defense,, principally the
Air Force, provides ,
of these contract funds, with the TIA of
State providing the next largest amount,
The percentage of research done on contract
varies widely,.. the two extremes being HRRI of the Air Force, which
contracts out virtually all of its research, retaining less than 10%
largely for administration, and OIR of St ate, which has no external
research contracts whatsoever.
When this $ is broken down by functions, it will be
seen that approximately $ ~is spent on background
studies. These include all of the studies which attempt to determine
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the characteristics of foreign areas and peoples, including their
psychological and economic strengths and vulnerabilities. Defense
spends about
for background studies and the State Department
CIA spends for this purpose. Only
or less than j of the total , is spent on
the evaluation of either past action or proposed future action; Defense
and State each providing about $1 million,
or j
of the total, is earmarked for fundamental research either on methodology
or on basic human factors such as panic, and about 2/3 of'this is con-
tributed by the Department of Defense. This figure may well be incom-
plete, however, since much research undertaken primarily for background
study purposes or for evaluation has also contributed markedly to the
improvement of the methodology of the sciences.
Goog,-aphically sneaking, of the spent by the Federal.
Gov3r,,iriur.',- roughly lis spent on studies of the Soviet orbit:
the European eLv ell yes, and. China. Although the remainder
is s.rsa,' `?;lrc~ ~;hout the world, a large majority is devoted to
Western :C,.ropefi
As between the social sciences, slightly more than are
spent on economic studies. No other scientific discipline can be
separated, out since practically all social science research is conducted
as a team operation where several sciences are brought to bear on a
common problem*
of the research paid for by Federal funds is
classified and not generally available to the public.
Coordination within the Government of the research programs of the`.
various agencies is hampered by the fact that the administrators of the
Government research agencies usually justify their programs through
the regular budgetary review mechanism of their respective agencies.
Within the limits of their approved budgets, they have a relatively
free hand, being able to undertake the programs which in their judgment
beat meet the requirements for research which they receive from the
operating portions of their agencies. Even where there are several
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research organizations within one agency, they operate independently,
in most cases although naturally informal liaison exists to greater
or lesser extent at the working levels,,,
Within the Department of Defense, the situation is somewhat more
complicated by the review powers of the Research and Development Board,
but in the area of social science research of-potential interest
to the cold wary the Research and Development Board has not affected
the programs of the three Services to any great extent. The Research
and Development Board has attempted to maintain a file of social science
research supported by the Department of Defense, but this file contains
only that research classified as social science and reported to the
Committee on Human Resources. It does not contain research undertaken
by any of the military intelligence agencies or by the two special
contract agencies - RAND of the Air Force and ORO of the Army - and
is, therefore, of limited usefulness. No other formal mechanism exists
anywhere in the Government for determining what research projects are
being undertaken within the Government laboratories.
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There is no central index to which an administrator of a research
organization can turn in order to find out quickly rnd eas what
others are doing.
Coordination of non-governmental research is somewhat better becau,ce
the External Research Staff of OIR in State has developed excellent
informal relations with most of the private research organizations and
universities. It has a large file, by titles and authors, containing
the majority of social science research projects undertaken within the
universities, and receives the annual reports from over 40 foundations.
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As a result, theme is probably a better knowledge within Government of
privately sponsored research than. there is of that sponsored by the
Government itself. Since many of the foundation executives and many
of the university scientists serve on government review boards as
consultants or as contractors, there is probably a fair knowledge of
the government program within private institutions.
Utilization of the results of all this research is conditioned
by the fact that the research performed within the Government labora-
tories in response to a stated requirement is usually of an applied
nature and of obvious use. Since the researcher usually knows who is
going to utilize his results, his liaison with the operators in his
agency is relatively close, and he feels that his work is being utilized.
These internal research reports are usually circulated within the
research organization itself and are sent to the operating branch con-
cerned, When appropriate, many are used in the formulation of national
estimates and affect in some measure the formulation of policy. By
and large, the research reports done in one agency are not circulated
widely among other agencies except as they are incorporated in such an
estimate. For example, the results of research performed within the
Office of the Special Representative of ECA in Paris are virtually
unknown in this country.
On the other hand, there is sometimes uncertainty as to who will
actually use reports initiated by a research administrator or by a
scientist. This is particularly true of some of the larger and more
ambitious external contract programs which are usually more long-range.
Their tendency to be written in more technical language and organized
in scientific fashion results in it being more difficult for an agency
operator to comprehend what has been discovered, particularly what hypoth-
eses have been proposed. The implications for action are seldom stated
in these reports unor are the. scientists often encouraged to do so.
Normally, there is little direct contact between the researcher and the
ultimate users with the result that the researcher feels his efforts are
wasted and the operator feels that research has not given him anything
useful. These reports, however, are usually circulated fairly widely
within the various Government agencies.
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I-Ponsistent, nor generally agreed tp (.. In particul^.r, the different opinions
since World War 12 our national objectives have been neither clear
The foregoing statement of the existing situation makes it clear
that the current contribution to cold war operations from social science
research is far from satisfactory. One cause of this situation is that
concerning the likelihood of war with Russia and the different emphasis
on containment as against aggressive action short of war have made it
extremely difficult for any agency to assign priority to various broad
areas of research. Since research is necessarily a time-consuming process,
this uncertainty has tended to encourage a collection of heterogeneous
research projects rather than a logical program.
Another cause is the overlapping and changing designation of the
areas of responsibility of Government agencies. Partly due to the different
interpretations of the national objectives., but more directly resulting
from major reorc.anizations within the Government, such as the Defense Act
of 1947, the establishment of ECA, the establishment of the "R" Division
within State, and the emergence of IIA, the area of responsibility of each
agency and sub-group has been constantly shifting and subject to different
interpretations. Considerable overlap between the missions of many
research agencies has resulted.
Finally, the youth and rapid growth of governmental research programs
have made adequate coordination difficult. The overwhelming majority of
the Federal research agencies have come into being since World War II -
two during the current fiscal year. Moat have been continuously ex-
panding ever since their inception, leading naturally to confusion and
to difficulty in detecting and weeding out the less desirable programs
or in finding out what others are doing.
The confusion concerning objectives, coupled with the booming
growth, has resulted in a high percentage of unsatisfactory research
requirements. Some are of such short range that they are not properly
research requirements, but resemble more closely requests for soot
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intelligence. Others are so broad and vague that a host of research projects
might be justified under them. For example, a research requirement sent
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Research and Development Board
authorizes "research and development on new and improved methods of
determining feasible psychological warfare goals and targets and for
developing strategies for the attainment of specific goals." Many re-
search requirements issued by the operating or planning branches of one
agency for the guidance of its agency research program overlap require-
ments issued by another agency to its research organization. For example,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also requested the Research and Development
Board to undertake 'research and development of new and improved methods
for studying the nature of critical foreign populations and the extent of
their conditioning by rival propaganda and control". This would appear
to be very similar to the major research requirement .thich led to the formula-
tion of the IIA research grogram within State. Of eleven specific research
requirements issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, 1951, almost
half can be considered to overlap either the State Department, CIA, or
Civil Defense.
Due to the confusion and the broad overlapping research requirements,
most research administrators have, moreover, tended to consider their
programs as separate entities and have attempted to distribute"their
effort without sufficient consideration of the work undertaken by others.
The difficulty encountered by administrators in attempting to learn in
detail what others are currently doing or even the results of much of the
completed research has undoubtedly increased this tendency. Tsa_inde-
pendence has resulted in the concentration by a number of agencies on
the same obvious problems, such as the nature of the SOVIEt Government,
and in neglect by all of other areas. For example, much of the r, arch done
by the-Department of Defense deals with broad problems with which-..e S.ta;te
Department should be primarily concerned. At the same time, with the
exception of two R ND reports on the Soviet army and air force and one
Office of Naval Research (ONR) report on Soviet submariners, there have
been no studies of the psychological strengths and weaknesses of the
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armed i op rces o"Fgr e our it i/enaV or Sanyo f7 our01 is 0~am .i ar 0 0
work on the Japanese Army and the excellent studies of the 11ehrmacht done
during World War II. There are no thorough studies of the North Korean
army, the Chinese army, the satellite armies; the strengths and weaknesses
of the French and British armed services; nor the potentials of the East
and West German armies. All of these and many more are primarily the
concern of the Department of Defense.
Another example of a grossly undeveloped area is research on the
goals, methods, strengths and vulnerabilities of para-military operations.
While,one program is underway within the Army's ORO, it has made little
headway due to a series of administrative problems. Several groups of
operators, believing that the methods they developed during World War II
are the best, have been operating with different s if assumptions.
i#/Gs?..odo' +.~.= a\
The complexity of para-military operations themsly y sTand their inter-
action with political considerations offers an opportunity for the social
scientists to make a contribution and reduce the area of speculation.
As a result of the rapid growth and changing organization, the dis-
tribution of research funds has not paralleled the logical distribution of
responsibility. The most glaring example of this imbalance is the State
Department, whose mission is certainly central to much of the cold war.
It is not easy for the State Department
to correct this situation in view of its generally tight funds resulting
from its difficulty in obtaining adequate appropriations. By default,
the Defense Department has sponsored as much research in foreign areas
as has the State Department, with resultant confusion and resentment.
Furthermore, the difference in availability of funds causes widely varying
standards of living within the different research agencies. Within the
State Department's OTR, for instance, funds are exceedingly tight and no
funds can be spared for longer range external research contracts. Many
of the Defense agencies, on the other hand, have been under considerable
pressure to expand the magnitude of their effort in order more nearly
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to balance the large expenditures for research on military end items.
Most of the Defense research agencies are, therefore, more willing and
able to undertake the more ambitious research projects. They tend to use
the device of external contracts with universities as a means for committing
rapidly funds which they cannot readily absorb due to the rapidity of their
growth.
In addition to this lack of cohesion throughout the whole Federal
program, the comparative youth of the social sciences as noted above
introduces a major problem. The social sciences do not possess sufficient
knowledge or adequate techniques with which to answer many of the pressing
problems of today, just as medical research is not able to cure cancer
at the present time. This appears to be nartic, rue in the case
of evaluation of past or proposed actions, which is analogous to the
cancer problem. In fact, there appears to be
done now, particularly within the Department
less effective evaluation
of Defense,
than was-, done
durig the last war.
Another result of the youth of the social sciences is the shortage
of all types of personnel mentioned above, which becomes particularly
acute in the case of the senior scientists and research administrators.
The number of trained social scientists has been increasing very rapidly
during the past decade as has the number of natural and biological scient-
ists. but the absolute numbers were so small 20 years ago that there are
few able scientists with long experience in the social sciences. The
administration of large social science programs is virtually a new pro-
fession, because, prior to World War II, only a few of the major founda-
tions required research administrators.
The youth of the social sciences also has the effect that there is
a general lack of understanding of them among top management levels and
among operators and planners. Most senior administrators who are responsi-
ble for a general research program or who are concerned with the balance
between research, planning, and operations are ignorant of the capabilities
and limitations of social science research. Since the dollar volume is
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relatively small, they can not justify the time required to become familiar
with the problems. This is particularly acute in the case of the Department
of Defense, where, for example, in one department, the
of research administrators were unfamiliar with their own social science
research program. Each had supported it primarily because his next
p.,
junior recommended it and because it was monetarily insignificant. Many
operators and planners have either over-estimated the contribution available
from the social sciences, being aware of what the physical and medical
sciences have been able to contribute, or they have gone to the other
extreme and feel that social science is not a science and can contribute
nothing worthwhile. This situation appears to be gradually improving a:?
all hands gain more experience.
Finally, the social sciences present an unique security problem in
two ways. The first is that, by definition, the scientists most informed
on Communism are the most suspect. A 'chemist is expected to immerse himself
completely in his subject and his political beliefs have little or no effect
on his ability as a chemist. But if a social scientist desires to study
Communism, he must read much 6omrnunist literature and associate with many
Communists, ex-Communists, and fellow-travelers, if he is to acquire any
intimate knowledge of the way Communists think and act. This very associa-
tion makes him automatically a doubtful security risi'!
The second problem unique to the social scientist is that he is
in a position to distort his research results in a subtle manner very dif-
ficult to trace to Communism. Thus, Trofim Lysenko, the Russian geneticist,
distorted his research results to conform with Marxist theories of environ-
ment, but, biology being a more exact science, expertnents were available
to discredit him Immediately. Such deliberate distortion by a Communist
social scientist is harder to detect and much harder to prove.
A third problem, increased by security considerations, but not unique
to the social sciences, is that of assembling all tie data pertinent to
the subject to be studied. Data comes not only from a multitude of open
sources but also can come from any of the intelligence agencies. The lack
of suitable methods makes it difficult for the social scientists to check
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each possible source and to get all the necessary information together
in time. In addition, many of the intelligence agencies are unaware
of the type of data of importance to the social scientists and therefore
make no attempt to acquire this information.
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There appear to be at least four possible mechanisms for providing
coordinated leadership to Government social science research: create
authoritative central direction, establish a central coordinating mechanism,
provide separate leadership for different areas, or merely improve definitio
of objectives and areas of responsibility,
1. The most extreme of such methods would be to establish authorita-
tive central direction, and the most drastic form of this authoritative
direction would be the creation of a single, separate research agency with
its own funds and responsibility for performing all research. An example
of this type of organization would be the wartime OSRD or the Office of
the Director of Guided Missiles, established in 1950, reporting to the
Secretary of Defense. These examples are not strictly comparable since
the OSRD did not attempt to control the military research program, merely
conducti:I,g its own separate program, and Mr. Keller, the Director of Guided
Missiles, does not have his own budget, merely recommending to the
Secretary of Defense the guided missiles budgets of the three Services.
Another form which authoritative direction could take would, be that
of a single reviewing agency with budgetary powers. The Research and
Development Board in the Department of Defense is an example of this
type of agency which has power to direct any service to withdraw funds
from any project or to direct that more funds be spent in any area. This
type of organization does not undertake research itself, merely reviews
that of others.
The advantage of any strong central system is that it permits a
more rapid filling of gaps or a more rapid change of emphasis of the
program as the situation changes and would undoubtedly cut d?o m
duplication.
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There are, however, several major disadvantages inherent in authori-
tative central direction. The first is that major legislation would be
required to establish either of-the two variants described above. Such
a solution, furthermore, is at variance with the general concept of
organization of our Government and this problem can hardly be considered
important enough to warrant making an exception. Moreover, such a central
organization would transgress on the areas of responsibility of every
agency involved in social science research and would, therefore, be
bitterly resisted. Finally, it would have the disadvantage inherent in
all dictatorships that faulty direction at the top could defeat the entire
program. On the political side, a single agency with its own budget
would be particul fly vulnerable to drastic overall cuts in the budget.
2. A second and less drastic means of providing central leadership
would be to establish a formal mechanism for central coordination. An
NSC directive delegating the responsibility for coordination of Federal
social science research to some one agency would be required to effectuate
this solution. The appointment of an individual to be the coordinator
and the establishment of one or more committees on which each agency
would have membership to perform the. actual coordination would also be
necessary.
The advantage of this approach would be that it , could establish
for the first time a group primarily concerned with the overall problem.
Such a formal mechanism would undoubtedly increase the contacts of the
different agencies at the working level and should result in more intimate
knowledge by each of the other's programs. It shculd be flexible enough to
permit the formation of task forces to concentrate rapidly all of thm re-
sources required for a given problem. Such a method of organization
conforms with the normal governmental pattern and there is less possibility
of faulty direction seriously harming the program since it is always possible
for an agency to circumvent such an organization if it becomes necessary.
The inherent disadvantages are that the coordinator has no real authority
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and that the entire success of the mechanism is dependent on his skill and
personality. Without a doubt such a coordinating mechanism runs a greater
chance of being totally ineffective than does an authoritative director..
There are several possible forms which such coordination could take
with many varying degrees of formality and methods of composition of
committees. The most difficult problem would appear to be the decision
as to which agency is to be delegated the responsibility for coordination.
While it is conceivable that the NSC might retain this responsibility, this
appears unlikely in view of its general method of operation.
The NSC might delegate the responsibility to the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) and such course would have several advantages. The in-
telligence agencies are now performing the bulk of the research and would
probably be amenable to lAC leadership. The IAC is now performing a
similar function in the area of foreign economic research. Delegating
responsibility to the IAC would undoubtedly result in a closer tie between
research and the intelligence gathering mechanism. However, at present,
the research performed by the non-intelligence agencies is not closely
tied in with the intelligence sponsored research and delegating responsi-
bility to the IAC might further widen this breech. A second disadvantage
would be that the IAC might feel it necessary to further delegate the
responsibility of coordination to the CIA, with the result that the
coordination responsibility would be conferred not on an impartial higher
organization but on a major operator in the area.
A second alternative would be to delegate the responsibility to the
Bureau of the Budget, There would be some precedence for this since the
Federal Reports Act of 1942 gave the Bureau of the Budget the responsibility
cf reviewing, with minor exceptions, all questionnaires prepared by the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government which request information of more
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than ten persons (except federal employees considered as such). The
Office of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of the Budget has been
discharging this responsibility and in addition has provided considerable
leadership to the Federal statistical effort under the general authority
of the Executive Office of the President. The major deterent to
delegating the responsibility for leadership in social science research to
the Bureau would be that it does not now have close contact with the
operating personnel within the agencies for whore the research is performed.
It would also be possible for the DISC to delegate the responsibility
of coordination to the Psychological Strategy Board, with the advantage of
creating a closer tie between research and operations. This solution
should also promote a closer tie between the intelligence area and the
remaining research, but would suffer from the youth of PSB and the
uncertainty concerning the general area of PSB responsibility and its
degree of authority.
NEC could also delegate the responsibility for coordination to
one of the thr.o major agencies in the social science field, CIA,
Defense or State. Such a course would permit the coordinator to have
intimate knowledge of at least one segment of the program and, since
he would be running a large program on his own, he would have contact
at all levels with the other research agencies. However, since in
each of the three agencies mentioned, interests are specialized,
over-emphasis of some area would probably result. Certainly, also,
the existing inter-agency rivalry would hinder any attempt b. one of
these agencies to provide leadership for the others.
3. A third method for providing coherence wow.i?..d be to establish
separate leadership for each of several areas rather than a single
coordinator for all. The present Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC),
which is concerned with research on foreign economics, is an example of
such a solution. It was established by NSC Directive ID 15 and is
responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence. The use of this
method would require several NEC directives, each defining the area to
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to be coordinated and each delegating responsibility for research coordina-
tion within that area to a single agency.
The various areas for which separate leadership would be provided
could be divided several ways. One would be by functional interest with
a committee concerned with coordinating background studies; a committee
concerned with evaluation and evaluation research; and a committee con-
cerned with fundamental and methodological research. A second scheme
would be to divide the areas along geographical lines, viz: a committee
concerned with Russia, one with Western Europe, etc. A third possibility
would be to divide the areas along the lines of the scientific disciplines.
The existing committee on Economic research is an example, and there could
be others for public opinion research, demographical research, and the like.
The principal advantage of separate leadership for each of several
areas in this manner would be that each such area would be relatively
homogeneous and presumably more manageable. Improvement could be
achieved in some areas without the necessity of major changes and long
delays, and the difficulties encountered in some other more controversial
area would not slow down the whole effort. The disadvantages, however,
are formidable. Division into separate areas formalizes and solidifies
lines of demarcation which are artificJ.al at best and no rigid system
of division can be satisfactory in all cases, since each problem should
be considered functionally, geographically and scientifically. As for
division along scientific lines, with the exception of economics the
movement has been away from identifying research by discipline and
towards the team approach. Delegating the responsibility for coordina-
ting research in any of these areas to one agency would, moreover,
probably be opposed by the others.
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4. The fourth major possibility for solving the problem of lack
of coherence would be to institute no organizational changes, merely
continuing the effort for a clearer statement of our national objectives
and better definition of the areas of responsibility of each agency.
This proposal assumes that no major improvement in research leadership
is possible until national objectives and responsibilities are clearly
defined and that, once they are, research will automatically fall into
line.
If it were possible to clarify our national objectives and areas
of responsibility, one of the major causes of confusion in research
would unquestionably be removed. However, many attempts have been ira de
since World War II to accomplish these ends and, while progress has
undoubtedly been made, it appears that radical improve:.rent of definition
of responsibility would be more difficult to accomplish than the coordination
of research. Even if it were accomplished, it would remove only one of
the several causes of confusion.
The principal advantage of this method is that no additional. action
is required.
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V. POSSIBLE hJETHODS FOP. CCMTPMACT-I]1!G THE
YOUTH OF T2.0 SOCIAL SCIE NCZS.
In addition to providing administrative leadership in the Federal
research program,, there are several actions which the Government might
tame in order to increase the contribution potentially available from
social science research. The goal would be to increase the research
resources in the long run and the cost would be the diverting of same
of the present resources into training. The problem is analogous to
the diversion of a portion of a limited steel output into fabrication
of new steel mills.
The principal step should be the encouragement of training programs
for the several categories of individuals involved both in performing
and in utilizing social science research. Operators and planners should
be encouraged to take sabbatical leaves in order to bring themselves
up-to-date, iiore emphasis could be placed in the War College and other
Government schools on the capabilities and limitations of the social
sciences. NN1r. Rockefeller has just established a fund to permit "selected
Government officials" to study at any university of their choice and each
agency should encourage its most able personnel to take advantage of this
opportunity. The Government should also do what it can to encourage
the training by others of research scientists in the social fields by
providing scholarships similar to those provided by the AEC and by other
means. As a minimum, the Government might consider increasing contracts
with the lesser known universities as a moans of improving the training
in these institutions. If foundation funds prove inadequate, the
Government should cop-time its limited support of fundamental research.
It is essential that every effort be made to increase the supply
of research administrators and to encourage them to enlarge their central
staffs as schools for t ry: -f aturek-administra,tors. An attempt should
also be made to recruit able management personnel from industry and
from the universities, since research administration is fundamentally a
problem of management not of science.
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Security regulations must be kept flexible so that a mans potential
usefulness can be balanced against his possible bias and the degree of
uncertainty concerning his trustworthiness.
VI. COTTCLTJSIOPTS
The contribution to the cold war obtained from the current research
program in the social sciences could be materially increased by better
integration of the more than 20 separgto Government organizations now
performing such research, and particularly by providing leadership at
the national level.
Authoritative central direction of the program is neither justified
nor feasible at this time.
Dividing the program into homogeneous parts and providing separate
leadership for each is not as desirable as establishing central leader-
ship.
Leadership of the social science research effort can best be provided
by delegation cf the responsibility for coordination of research by the
IdSCmmto an existing agency. The agency should delegate the responsibility
to an individual coordinator and one or more c c-mittees made up of
representatives cf the interested agencies.
PSB is best oo+uipped to handle this responsibility.
Every effort should ':e made to increase the nation's resources for
social science research by supporting training programs and encouraging
fundamental research.
The limiting factor on the research effort is more personnel resources
than financial support. The present order of magnitude of fiscal support
is about right; it can not be increased drastically or rapidly, though a
slow increase is justified-as the resources are enlarged.
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VII. RECth E DATIONS
The following steps should be taken in sequence in order to provide
central leadership for the social science research program.
1. PSB should approve the conclusions of this report in principlQ,
particularly the desirability of providing central coordination
of social science research.
After approval,, the P6B should procure on a temporary basis
an able individual, the potential coordinator, with instructions:
a. To study existing organitati ns in detail.,
b. To recommend the directive he thinks workable.
c. To negotiate acceptance of the- propcs ed directive at the
staff level.
3. After approving the proposed directive in principle., the P1SB
should request the DISC to issue a similar directive which
wci l.d:
a, Delegate the responsibility for coordination to the PSB
b: Establish an individual as coordinator.
c.. Establish a coordinating committee with -representation
from each agency.
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