CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01060A000100240001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1951
• Content Type: CIAPER

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VOL. I. No. 17
5 December 1951
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Copy No.
73
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
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UATE REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD . . .
? Page 3
WORLD COMMUNISM" SOVIET PROPAGANDA SUGGESTS NO MOVE TO REDUCE C
TENSION O D o O 0 ? p 0 O O O ? O O 0 O O O tl O ? Page 5
A review of the major Soviet political addresses and propa-
ganda themes since January 1951 provides no indications that the
USSR will make any real move toward relaxing international tensions.
Soviet propaganda has steadily continued to prepare Orbit peoples
for eventual war with. the West. The tone is softened or hardened
from time to time but the basic anti-Western themes'remain un-
changed., and the, United States is consistently pictured as the
chief aggressor.
ASPECTS OF JAPAN'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA . ?Page 7
Export restrictions imposed by both the Tokyo and Peiping
goveruments?have now largely dispelled the hope held by Japanese
and Chinese trade interests that an expanding and'profitable com-
merce could exist between the two nations despite all political
pressures. While Japan will undoubtedly continue to cooperate
with'the US'in export controls., it will eventually pattern its
trade policy after that of the Western European countries.
THE CO +tONTH B T'-S! .BALANCE OF'-;,PAYMENTS . CRISIS,. v Y page
~_ . I
Britain's effort to secure added assistance on the dollar
gap from the independent members of the sterling area, at the
January meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers will meet re-
sistance, since the overseas countries are expected to demand
priority consideration of the problem of their sterling balances
.and their need for capital goods.
ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTIVITY CONTINUES THROUGHOUT POLAND . . . . . . Page 12
Despite Polish Security Police action anti-Government ac-
tivity in Poland during the past three months seems to have been
on,-at least-as high a level as.a year ago. These varied reports
of resistance from all parts of Poland indicate that the popular
will to resist has not been broken.
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THE COUP D'ETAT IN THAILAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The coup d'etat of 29 November in Thailand resulted in the
seizure of control of the Thai Government by a nine-man group of
military leaders headed by the army commander. Although the gov-
ernmeit's foreign policy will not be'altergd by this military
domination, its stability is by no means assured. Not only will
civil leaders resent their relegation to impotence but disruptive
rivalries among the military leaders are. almost certain to re-
appear.
PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST SHOW SIGNS OF DETERIORATION . Page 15
Pakistan's recent, diplomatic actions suggest that it is
attempting to bring pressure on the West for a quick solution
of the Kashmir question by affecting a cooler attitude toward
the United States and Great Britain.
SPECIAL ARTICLE. SOVIET DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST WESTERN
REARMAMENT e. r 6 o e b? a s a. a a ?? a e.? ?.. Page 16
It is impossible to determine, on the basis of present
evidence,, what recent Soviet diplomatic notes to Western
nations portend. The protest notes have presumably, to the
satisfaction of the Kremlin, established a firm basis for the
Russian argument in any Four Power conference which may tfke
place.
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Secret Big Four disarmament talks began in Paris during the past
week after somewhat tardy Soviet acceptance of the proposal for dis-
cussions which Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria had advanced in the UN General
Assembly's Political Committee,
If any possibility exists for Soviet concessions during this
session of the General Assembly, it is likely that they will be made in
the field of general disarmament, where territorial questions are not
directly involved. In such discussions, the Soviet Government might
hope to obtain from the West either assurances that as part of a general
agreement on reduction of armaments no further action would be taken to
expand the scope of NATO, or else it might hope that, as a result of a
general armaments agreement, the Western powers would not be able to
pursue their objectives for defense with the same solidarity as in the
past. Judging from experience, any disarmament agreement with the USSR
will be negotiated only after the most bitter wrangling and hard-headed
horse trading extended over many months. The negotiations will be
characterized by frequent setbacks, and have at least an equal chance of
complete failure.
For the present, Moscow is leaving nothing to chance and has again
managed to have the last word in its series of protests against Western
rearmament. Since 1 October, scarcely a week has passed without the
dispatching of one'and sometimes two notes to nations cooperating in
NATO. On 30 November the latest Soviet note to Ankara repeated an earlier
protest against Turkey's joining NATO and declared that this action "will
inflict serious damage on 'Soviet-Turkish relations."
Following the Soviet example, Rumania, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria
have protested the US Mutual Security Act as evidence of the aggressive
intentions of the United States, The notes charge that the Act con-
stitutes proof that the US is financing exile groups to carry out
espionage and sabotage in Eastern Europe`, The USSR is already utilizing
the incident of the US C-47 military aircraft, which it has now admitted
was forced down in Hungary by Soviet fighters, as additional evidence of
American espionage operations,
In Eastern Europe the week's events were highlighted by the arrest
of Rudolf Slansky, former Secretary-General of the Czechoslovak Communist
Party, on charges of anti-gtate activity. Slansky's fall from power
marks the first time since'the war that major political purges of the
Satellite parties have included a top Moscow stalwart,
In the Czechoslovak party and government reorganization in :September,
Slansky's powerful -position of ..Secretary General was abolished and its
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functions transferred to Party Chairman Klement Gottwald and a newly
created 7-man Politburo of which Slansky was made a member. Slansky was also
made a Vice-Premier.
Slanskyts arrest may be attributed to several factors. In his
.position as Secretary General, he had the responsibility for successful
implementation of broad economic policies. His downfall, which. occurred
at a critical point in the sharpening economic crisis caused largely by
the heavy demands which the USSR has placed upon the Czechoslovak economy,
can probably be traced to Czechoslovakia's failure to resolve this dilemma.
Premier Zapotocky, who is a member of the new politburo, immediately after
the September reorganization attacked economic failures in a series of
important speeches which blasted weak points in the present situation
and dealt extensively with remedies.
Unlike other Satellite parties, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had
no politburo prior to the reorganization in September. Power was.cen-
tralized in Rudolf Slansky, as Secretary-General of the party. There is
some evidence that Slansky, while demanding strict adherence to Soviet
directives, was not an efficient administrator. Party organization,
therefore, possibly suffered from his emphasis on discipline and con-
formance rather than on competence. This weakness was pointed up in re-
cent weeks by strong and pointed criticism of party organization for
which he was ultimately responsible. A shakeup through the district
and regional levels of the party is indicated, and in all probability
an extensive purging of personnel will occur in the near future.
The problem of personal struggle for power also has certain appli-
cations to the Slansky case. For some time, the leading pre-war Commu-
nists, who included President Gottwald, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Siroky, and Premier Zapotocky, have been distinguished as a group from
Slansky and another top Communist, Bedrich Geminder, who have worked in
the. less publicized key positions of power, and there were numerous re-
ports of rivalry between the two groups.
For whatever reasons Slansky was purged, it is clear that the re-
sponsibility for solving Czechoslovakia's current economic and party
problems has been placed squarely upon Gottwald and Zapotocky., Their
recent statements indicate that they are fully aware that their future
depends upon their success in satisfying Moscow's demands, regardless of
the cost to Czechoslovakia.
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WORLD COMMUNISM: SOVIET PROPAGANDA SUGGESTS NO MOVE TO SOFTEN TENSION
A review of the major Soviet political addresses and propaganda
themes since January 1951 provides no indications that the USSR will make
any real move toward relaxing international tensions. Soviet propaganda
has steadily continued to prepare Orbit peoples for eventual war with
the West. The tone is softened or hardened from time to. time in response
to Western actions in Korea and the build-up of NATO, but the basic anti-
Western themes remain unchanged, and the United States is consistently
pictured as the chief aggressor.
Last January a note of greater war imminence was introduced by
Pospelov, head of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, in his Lenin anni-
versary speech. He cited an alleged record of United States military
action against the Soviet Union and quoted Lenin to picture the United
States as Russia's most hated enemy. Lenin's "it must be remembered that
we are always a hair's breadth away from any invasion," was related to
General Eisenhower's arrival in Europe to point out that "the danger of
a European war has been brought nearer."
Stalin's Pravda interview on 16 February appeared to be a reaction
to the growing strength of the West. His close adherence to the lines
of the Communist peace campaign set the stage for the Berlin meeting of
the World Peace Council. However, the tone was not entirely one of
peace. He described the North Atlantic nations and the Latin American
countries as the "aggressive core" of the UN, stated that the Anglo-
American forces in Korea would ultimately be defeated, and threatened
that war, while not inevitable "at present," may become so. Heretofore,
Stalin had merely stated that war was not inevitable if the capitalist
world would cooperate with the Soviet Union.
Emphasis on the "peace" line was increased for a time as Soviet
propagandists played up Stalin's interview and the World Peace Councilts
demands for a Five-Power Peace Pact. As soon as the Deputy Foreign
Ministers' Conference opened in Paris, however, the "Western aggression"
theme rose quantitatively above the "peace" line. The tone of this new
aggression approach may have appeared somewhat softened, but only because
the economic angle rather than the military aspects of US Western ag-
gressiveness was being stressed in order to alarm Western European
audiences.
Although output on the May Day celebration emphasized the "peaceful
coexistence" theme, subsequent propaganda through the month of June re-
vived the term "capitalist encirclement," accenting the global scope of
US military bases and the threatening aspects of the Deputy Foreign
Ministers' agenda. In fact, the over-all Soviet reaction to the Paris
talks, was one of violent denunciation of "Western aggression" as
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exemplified chiefly by NATO and US bases.
Malik's proposal in June for a cease-fire in Korea initiated another
"peace" interval. This, however, did not stop Soviet propagandists from
warning against neutrality and defining the aim of capitalist encircle-
ment as "the preparation and unleashing of aggression against the USSR..".
Further intermingling of diverse propaganda themes during this interval
appeared in.the PravdaMorrison exchange, Shvernik's reply to President
Truman's.expression of Americals friendship for the Russian people,
and in Moscow's English-language magazine News. During the same period,
the official speeches of Voroshilov, Molotov and Zhukov at the Rumanian
and Polish holiday celebrations showed no trace of a lessening of the
Kremlin's vituperations against the United States.
Immediately following the San Francisco Conference in early September,
Soviet propaganda media marked time. Lack of emphasis on any one theme
gave the impression, that the Kremlin desired to reduce international
tension. The opening of the USSR signature campaign for a Five-Power Peace
Pact necessarily resulted in a sharp but short-lived rise in attention
to,the "peace" theme. Loss of face. at San Francisco and Moscow's con-
cern over the Pacific defense pacts and the Foreign Ministers and NATO
conferences in Washington, Ottawa and Rome, however, soon brought a
sharp rise in outright aggression charges.
Moscow's latest official pronouncements -- Stalin's Pravda inter-
view on the atomic bomb and Beriya's address on the occasion of the
anniversary of the October Revolution -- were designed for a double
psychological effect. The strong, aggressive, and belligerent tone
served notice on the West, particularly the United States, that the Soviet
Union's position on international issues remains unchanged. At the same
time, the statements were designed to bolster Communist confidence in
Soviet, strength.
Soviet "peace". output is at its lowest point since early January.
Although the All-Union Peace Conference which opened in Moscow on 27
November, and the buildup for the International Economic Conference
scheduled for April in Moscow, are placing stress on, the alleged Soviet
desire for peaceful coexistence with capitalist nations, the Kremlin is
continuing a basically hard line.
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ASPECTS OF JAPE'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHID
The hope held by both Japanese and Communist Chinese trade interests
that an expanding and profitable commerce could exist despite all politi-
cal pressures is being dispelled through the restrictions imposed by
Tokyo and Peiping. Japan's stringent export controls now prevent the
shipment of most of the items which Communist China is willing to accept
in exchange for the raw materials which China historically has supplied,
to Japan.
The significance of Prewar Sino-Japanese trade to both economies
its illustrated by figures for 1936, the last non-'war year,, which show that
15 percent of Japan's total foreign trade was with China proper and
Manchuria,, and 31 percent of their total trade with Japan. Japan's
exports to China proper and Manchuria between 1931 and 1939 averaged
approximate) 200 million dollars annually, or 22 percent of Japan's total
exports; in 1950 this figure had decreased to 19.6 million dollars, and
in the first seven months of 1951 it amounted to only five million dol
tars, or less than one percent of Japan's total exports. During August
and September of this year,, exports to China had dwindled to only 64,,000
and 41,000 dollars respectively.
Current SC.P export control policy permits the shipment of non-
strategic and non-critical materials to Communist China in exchange for
raw materials of critical importance to the Japanese economy. Shipments
to Communist China in 1951 consisted primarily of textiles, bicycles,
sewing machines and miscellaneous consumer goods in exchange for Chinese
soy beans, edible oils, hides and coal. The Japanese Government hopes
to obtain coking coal, salt, iron ore and soy beans in future barter
deals.
The recent decline in Sino-Japanese trade is due to a reluctance on
the part of Chinese Communist authorities to -continue importing non-
strategic consumer goods from Japan in exchange for materials basically
strategic in nature. Recently, a scarcity of textiles has induced them
to approve an exchange.-of coking coal for Japanese cotton goods. The
Chinese, however, are not eager to continue this type of trade in view
of expanding domestic textile output and the continued availability of
textiles from other areas. Consequently, there is little prospect for
an immediate resumption of large-scale trade.
The eagerness of Japan's businessmen for trade with Communist China
is partly based on the idea that China might again become the market it
was in the pre-World War II period. This is unlikely, however, since a
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substantial portion of prewar trade represented Japan?s expanding invest-
ments in Manchuria and North China, and the needs of Japanese living in
those areas. Japan would also now find itself competing for trade with
the Communist Orbit and with an expanding Chinese industry.. This desire
for trade, however, is indicative of the strong belief that Japan's
uncertain economy cannot afford to depend entirely upon the non-Communist
bloc.
Consequently, the Japanese Government already is under strong
pressure for the establishment of a modue-vivendi with the Communist
nations, if it can be accomplished without alienating the United States.
Prime Minister Yoshida and other government spokesmen.. possibly as a
reaction to these pressures, have lately been emphasizing that the China
trade is not essential and, in any event, cannot reach prewar proportions.
The Japanese, however, can be expected to take full advantage of the fact
that Great Britain favors a diversion of Japan?s competitive trade from
Southeast Asia to Communist China.
There is little question that Japan will continue in the post-treaty
period to cooperate in Western export controls. Aside from compelling
political and military considerations which bind Japan firmly to the free
world, the Japanese are fully aware that their economy for the foreseeable
future is far more dependent on the 'Nest than upon the Communist bloc.
Despite the great appeal of cheap coking coal, soy beans, salt, and iron
ore from China, these items can be obtained from other, although more
expensive, sources.
On the other hand, such important basic items as food, cotton, wool,
oil and rubber are obtainable in adequate quantities only from non-Orbit
sources. Moreover, the relative importance of Sino-Japanese trade to both
economies is so nearly equal that it is unlikely either nation can use it
as a significant political weapon.
General recognition of Japans political, military and economic
dependence on the West undoubtedly accounts in part for the lack of.
opposition within-Japan to the control system covering strategic mate.
rials. As far as can be determined, the Japanese business community
appears to be making a conscientious effort to conform to current con-
trol directives. It is to be expected, however, that the Japarese
Government will wish to pattern its post-treaty export policy after those
of the Western European countries, rather than continue the stricter con-
trols now imposed by SCRAP.
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THE COHMONWEA,LTH AND BRITAINtS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISIS
Great Britain$ as part of its efforts to cope with the new balance of
payments crisis,,, will ask for assistance from the other independent members
of the sterling area when the Oonurgwealth Finance Ministers meet next month.
Great Britain is primarily concerned with closing the sterling greats dollar
gap,, but India,, Pakistan. Ceylon.. Australia, New Zealand., and South Africa
will probably be more interested., at least initially., in their own long-
deferred demands for capital goods needed to carry out economic development
programs,
These demands, coming at a time when British industry is increasingly
occupied with the rearmament program,, carry with them an implicit threat
to the United Kingdom's ability to maintain its predominant position in
what is still the worlds largest trading area,
Britain is expected. to ask these countries specifically for new re-
ductions in their dollar imports., for continued restraint in drawing upon
their growing sterling balances in Zondon until the United Kingdom is again
able to export capital goods in quan?I ityi and for "price stabilization" of
raw materials in favor of the Inited Kingdom,
The independent sterling countries, whose over-all contributions to
postwar solvency of the sterling area have been less consistent than that
of the dependent British territories,,have already indicated that their first
responses will be dictated by their own internal needs. They will probably
reply that heavy equipment and consumer goods now being purchased with,
dollars cannot, be obtained in sufficient quantity within the sterling area;
that there seems to be little prospect of Britain's paying off its sterling
obligations in capital goods until its rearmament program has been completed;
and that raw: materials prices, which have dropped sharply. since the middle
of this year, are already adjusted heavily in Britain's favor..
These divergent attitudes point up the double role that Britain must
play if it is to maintain the sterling area as one of the main supports of
its position as a world power. As banker for the whole area,, the United
Kingdom must see. that an external eq ibrium is maintained with other
trading areas At the same time,, Bri tai. n must preserve an internal equilib-
rium between the other members of the sterling area and itself,, their prin-
cipal producer of capital goods, Since early in World War II,, howwever9, the
sterling area has maintained a formal external equilibrium only by large
.dollar grants and loans., A formal internal equilibrium has been sustained
only by the accumulation on the part of the overseas countries of large
sterling balances which cannot be converted immediately into goods or other
currencies
Although substantial progress towards closing the sterling area's
dollar gap continued during the first six months of. 1951.. the_problem,of
:ritain's sterling liabilities to the other members became more acute..
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For example., while the central gold and dollar reserves increased from an
all-time low of 1?340 million dollars in September 1949 to a postwar high
of 3,867 million on 30 June 1951, the sterling balances held by overseas
countries increased from a sterling equivalent of 6,586 million dollars
at the end of 1949 to 8,675 million on 30 June 1951. Moreover,, in the
reduction of the sterling area's dollar gaps Britain's contribution
exclusive of colonial earnings __- consisted only of reducing its own annual
dollar deficit from 2,,316 million dollars in 1947 to 300 million in 19509
The overseas countries on the other hand, with the help of abnormally high
sales of raw. materials to the US since the outbreak of hostilities in
Korea, earned large dollar surpluses; and as a result there were unofficial
statements in those countries that they, as independent dollar earners,
ought to be allowed to buy dollar goods with these earnings,,
In the third quarter of this year,., there was a reversal in the sterling
areas dollar position which led to the current crisis. This development
was due not only to the cessation of abnormal sales by the overseas coun-
tries, but also to a large increase in the rate of dollar imports by the
United Kingdom* Dollar deficits are nqw tentatively forecast for all in-
dependent sterling area countries in 1951.' .
The British consider cuts in dollar purchases as the most effective
short-term means of reducing the dollar gap. Their decision to cut non-
sterling imports by nearly 1,,000 million dollars annually will probably
prompt a similar request to the overseas countries.. Most of these countries,,
despite their disclaimers, have liberalized their import policies in the
past year and have evidently been making large non-sterling purchases. In
the 1949. payments crisis, when British industry seemed well on its way to
resuming peacetime production, the Commonwealth Finance Ministers agreed
to an average out of 2,5 percent in their dollar imports. New, however,., the
overseas countries must reconcile their loyalties to the sterling area with
their. poorer prospects for obtaining with their sterling resources the
equipment needed to carry out their long-term development programs.
It is generally agreed that the long-term solution of the sterling
area v s financial difficulties depends primarily upon Britain's ability to
increase its exports of capital goods to other sterling area countries.
Although Britain now 'plans to give higher priority to such exports,, the
competing demands of the rearmament program mean that even partial ful-
fillment of the overseas co .tries4 needs would call for an enormous in-
crease in British coal and steel production. Britain's rearmament program
will leave even less capital goods available for export to sterling coun-
tries.
Since the sterling area?s gold and dollar reserves are considered
large enough to forestall an-early financial collapse, and since the drain
on these reserves is not expected to continue at its present high rate,
the overseas countries may well insist that the problem of growing sterling
balances is as serious as the dollar deficit. Although both sides at the
Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting will probably realize the need for
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continued cooperation in confronting the sterling areas difficulties., the
attitude of the overseas countries on sterling balances will necessarily
constitute an additional pressure upon the United Kingdom's rearmament
program*
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ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTIVITY CONTINUES THROUGHOUT POLAND
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Anti-regime activity throughout Poland since August appears to have
been on at least as high a level as a year ago, even in'areas where the
government has made special efforts to auppres$ resistance. As in the
past several years, acts of sabotage have been carried out by small
bands of partisans and not by groups under the control of the existing
organized underground, which remains passive.
Escaped, Polish refugees have reported that as late as last September
small units of anti-Communist partisans were operating in the forest
areas of Bialystok Province in eastern Poland.
In Lublin Province to the south at least four Security Police opera-
tions were carried out from 19 October through 2 November. At least
twelve collaborators of sought-after bands were arrested, but inapone
of these operations, despite the relatively large number of troops in-
volved, were the bands themselves captured.
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I forty persons were
arrested in October for sabotaging an putting out of commission two
furnaces of the Batory Ironworks in Katowice. In early November he re-
ported a trial in Krakow at which the condemned were accused of assassinat-
ing the secretary of a local Communist cell and of beating up several
party.members. The latter incidents occured near Wolbrom where similar
acts led to a trial in Krakow last January.
Armed bands were reportedly active in mid-September in the wooded
hilly area between Krakow and Przemysl in southern Poland, killing
Communist officials and Security Police. On 9 September, one of Polish
Radio's star commentators was killed by an armed band which broke into
his apartment and shot him. In the vicinity of Gorzow in western Poland,
an underground group has been conducting raids on the local Communist
Party headquarters. _
These reports, coming from all parts of Poland, indicate that the
anti-Communist population, perhaps in part motivated by the increasingly
serious shortages of basic consumer supplies, is becoming more willing to
strike back against the regime and that their will to resist has not been
broken despite the imposition of additional security measures. The bands
operating in Poland, though small, tie down a disproportionately large
number of the Security Police in a country which is becoming increasingly
short of manpower
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The coup d'etat on 29 November in Thailand resulted in the seizure
of de facto control of the Thai Government by a nine-man group of mili-
tary leaders headed by the Amy Commander, General Phin? This junta
immediately abolished the Parliament and replaced the existing constitu-
tion with one promulgated in 1932 which facilitates centralized authority.
The committee then returned all executive functions to a reshuffled cab-
inet led by Premier Phibun,:
These moves were clearly designed to complete the domination of Thai-
land by the military and to perpetuate it. The cabinet shakeup involved
the replacement of independent ministers with loyal military supporters.
The constitutional change strengthened the military clique's position by.
reducing the King's powers and reestablishing a unicameral legislature,
one-half of whose membership is appointed by the cabinet.
The timing of this coup to coincide with the return of the King from
his studies in Switzerland for permanent residence was also significant.
The Junta undoubtedly wished to be firmly entrenched before the King arrived
in Bangkok, and thus to profit from the national veneration for the mon-
archy. In addition, it will now be difficult for the King to deal with
political factions hostile to the military.
For the present,. the authority of the military leaders appears to be
unquestioned. Thailand's anti-Communist policies and Western orientation
will not be altered, and the retention of Phibun as Premier should assure
a certain degree-of political peace. Lasting stability in Thailand is by
no means assured, however. The coup has undoubtedly augmented the number
of the government's political oppoPents, and this opposition will become
more embittered if, as is expected, the government acts in an increasingly
authoritarian manner.
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PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST SHOW SEGNS OF DETERIORATION
Despite protestations to the contrary, Pakistan has apparently
embarked upon a course of action designed to suggest a cooling of relations
with the West. Its immediate aim seems to be a quick solution of the
Kashmir question. Continued delay in effecting a settlement right lead
to a real rift between Pakistan and the West and to a closer alignment of
that nation with the Islamic bloc.
Several recent diplomatic actions illustrate Pakistan's tactics.
The Pakistani Foreign Minister made a speech before the UN G neral Assembly
on 1!4 November? in which he condemned colonialism and the domination of
Ntii.e over colored peoples. Pakistan also made a joint submission to the
Caeral Assembly on 26 November, along with Syria and Iraq, of a resolutio*i
calling for Big Four talks on disarmament.
The Pakistani Government was presumably aware that these moves would
embarrass either Great Britain or the United States. Still more recent
was Pakistan's hesitancy to accept US economic aid on the terms on which
it has been offered. There had previously been no hint of a possible re-
fusal.
To same extent, this trend away from the West may be explained by the
assassination of pro-Western Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and his re-
placement by amore conservative., orthodox Moslem, who may be expected to
exhibit greater interest in Islamic affairs and the unity of the Moslem
world. In larger part, the trend probably results from Pakistan's pique
at the UN Security Council's continued failure to take firm action against
India on the Kashmir question9 for which failure Pakistan. blames the United
States and Great Britain.
Pakistan is unlikely to provoke war with India as a means of settling
the Kashmir problem. Short of war, there is little Pakistan can do to
hinder Indians consolidation of its position in the disputed state. Pakistan
therefore seems to have decided to exert pressure on the West rather than,
on India in an effort to obtain a solution.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
SOVIET DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST WESTERN REARMAMENT
The new series of Soviet diplomatic notes protesting developments
in Europe and the Near East is a reaction to Western initiatives which
are making the North Atlantic Treaty Organization a growing threat to
the USSR. By the same tactic, the Soviet Union is seeking to counter-
act the extension of this alliance system through the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, where the USSR feels itself particularly vulnerable to attack.
The Soviet notes, which are also designed to prepare a record of
protest on which the USSR can base future action, include the following:
11 September to France on German remilitarization
1 October - to Norway on war graves
11 October - to the Western Powers on revision of Italian peace
treaty
15 October - to Norway on bases
19 October - answer to France on German remilitarization
31 October - answer to Norway on war graves
4 November to Turkey on adherence to NATO
12 November - answer to Norway on bases
17 November to the Western Powers on base at Trieste
21 November - to Arab states and Israel on Middle East Command
21 November - to the United States on appropriations for sub-
versive activities
24 November - to the Western Powers and Turkey on Middle East
Command
The determination of-the Western Powers to override Soviet opposition
at San Francisco, and the subsequent impetus given to Western rearmament
by the meetings at Washington, Ottawa and Rome, impressed the USSR with
the seriousness of Western rearmament. Intensive Soviet diplomatic
activity occurred during other critical periods of NATO evolution., notably
in early 1949 with its formation and in late 1950 following the Western
decisions on German rearmament.
.The USSR may still hope to hinder fruition of NATO in Europe by
emphasizing once again its strong objections to the "aggressive" nature
and aims of the alliance. The USSR probably has a greater expectation
of blocking its extension to the Near East'because of inflamed national-
ism in the Arab states, which jeopardizes military cooperation in that
area.
The Soviet notes directed'toward Europe were aimed at West German
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 Approveq'
rearmament, the establishment of NATO bases in Norway, revision of the
Italian peace treaty, and the status of Trieste -- all of which are
closely tied to the Western defense effort.
The current phase of the campaign against NATO was inaugurated in
early September by a Soviet note to France which charged that the Pleven
and Schuman plans were fostering German remilitarization. The timing.`
and tone of the note suggested an effort to intimidate France,on the
eve of tripartite talks in Washington, but the French Government main-
tained a firm stand.
Two Soviet notes to Norway were directed at another facet of
Western defense, the strengthening and extension of NATO bases. Norway
was accused of violating its treaty commitments and its previous as-
surances to the Soviet Union by making its territory available for such
bases. Concurrently, two strong protests on a relatively minor issue --
Norwegian movement of Soviet war graves -- were probably intended to in-
crease the feeling of strained relations in order to influence Norwayts
attitude toward NATO bases. Official Norwegian opinion was not unduly
disturbed but the government, while remaining steadfast in its commit-
ment to NATO, is now likely to be even more circumspect in negotiations
over bases.
A Soviet note to the three Western Powers rejecting their proposal
for revision of the Italian peace treaty, as desired by Italy, maintains
that the proposal was aimed at more effectively utilizing Italy as a
member of NATO. Moscow laid down as one condition for revision of the
treaty Italy?s withdrawal from NATO. Italy, however, is unlikely to
swerve from its present policy supporting NATO.
Closely connected with the Italian treaty is the question of
Trieste, which was the subject of still another note to the Western
Powers. The USSR charged that Trieste was being converted into a mili-
tary and naval base linked to the North Atlantic bloc. The note 'which
took cognizance of a possible Italo-Yugoslav agreement on Trieste,
probably reflected Russian concern that successful negotiations on this
issue might lead to a rapprochement between the two countries and Yugo-
slavia's eventual cooperation with NATO.
The current effort to expand the scope of NATO by creating a Middle
East Command, which would embrace the eastern Mediterranean countries
as well, evoked a Soviet attempt to deter the Arab states and Israel
from participating in such an arrangement. In the Near East, as opposed
to Western Europe, where the NATO program has not only been accepted
but partially carried out, Moscow has a far, greater opportunity to dis-
rupt Western plans. The USSR, quick to exploit the lead taken by Egypt
in opposing the Middle East Command, recently issued notes warning the
Arab states against adherence. This move, which directly supports'cur-
rent Arab disaffections and aspirations, seeks to arouse suspicion of the
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 Western defense plan as a cover for occupation by foreign troops and the
reestablishment of spheres of influence.
Moscow apparently considered Greek and Turkish membership in NATO
an inevitable confirmation of their ties to the West, and therefore
limited itself to a propaganda attack against these countries at the time
of their acceptance in mid-September 1,951. The official Soviet warning
to Turkey against joining NATO, not dQlivered until 4 November, merely
rounded out Moscow's current documentation of protests to NATO countries.
Neither this note nor the protest addressed to Turkey and the three
Western powers on their sponsorship of the Middle East Command has in-
fluenced Turkey's firm Western irientation..
The series of notes gives, no hint of Moscow's future intentions.
The notes emphasize that the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent" to
developments that affect its special interests in Spitsbergen and "the
outlet to the sea in the West,," which are described as of "extraordinarily
great importance to the Soviet Union and,-the security of the north."
Similar language was used to protest the establishment of military bases
on Turkish soil at the frontiers of the USSR, but to date, there have
been no signs of Soviet retaliatory measures in these areas.
It is impossible to determine, on the basis of present evidence,
what these warnings portend. Present disarmament talks at the UN provide
the Soviet Union with an opportunity to demonstrate any willingness to
initiate serious negotiations.
Recent suggestions for four power talks have generally met with a
cool Soviet response, however, with the.implication that any negotiations
will have to hinge on discussion of the whole Western rearmament program.
The protest notes have presumably, to the satiafaotton of the Kremlin,
established a firm basis for the Russian argumentin any Four Power con-
ference which may take place.
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