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January 16, 1952
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Approved For Relebsi 2f /0 p : ESA000.~0300001-1 VOL. 11 No. 3 16 January 1952 Copy No. ? 4 State Department review completed DIA review(s) completed. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REVIEW DOCUMENT NO. , 3 NO CHANGE IN CLASS f 1 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: T1SrS NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: H 0M DATE, V ? REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Approved For Relea TOP SECRET e 100300001-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 r Approved For boo.1-1 25X1 SUMMARY OF CONTENTS 25X1 THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . Page 14. AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN EASTERN EUROPE . . . . . . . . Page 7 The scope of the Soviet airfield construction and develop- ment program in Eastern Europe is such that the Red Air Force can now operate from four times as many major fields as existed seven years ago. In.l945,, there were in Soviet-controlled Europe only 11 fields with runways of over 6,000 feet. Now there are 45 such fields, with an additional 30 undergoing con- struction to make them suitable for all types of operations. (SEE MAP) DELAYS IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE PLANNING CONTINUE TO HAMPER NATO ., Page 14 Although the European Defense Community negotiators are now agreed on most points, several fundamental issues are still to be decided. The current government crises in France and Belgium are expected to delay agreement and may prevent action on this question at the forthcoming Lisbon NATO meeting. COMMUNISTS PLAY ONLY MINOR ROLE IN CURRENT PANAMANIAN INSTABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 The present Panamanian crisis began to reach serious pro- portions last October when the notoriously corrupt former police chief. Antonio Remon was nominated as a candidate izi next May's presidential elections. This candidacy set off a particularly Approved Forl 25X1 Approved For bitter campaign which has seriously divided the country and poses a continuing threat to stability. In the event that the government is overthrown,.the Communists may attempt to profit. from the general disorder but there is no indication that the party. has the potential for playing a significant role in Panamanian politics. SPECIAL ARTICLE. TEE CHILEAN COPPER SITUATION . . . . . . . . . Page 18 There has been considerable evidence in recent months that the Chilealh Government is unable, and to some extent unwilling, to assure the uninterrupted flow of its total copper production to Western nations. How much and at what prices Chilean copper will be available for Western defense needs in 1952 is at best uncertain. 25X1 25X1 Approved Fo4 Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79S01060A00010~300001-1 Approved For The Soviet Union's concern over the Western rearmament effort and the defeat of*recent Soviet disarmament maneuvers in the UN appear to have led Vyshinsky to submit new atomic energy proposals to the General Assembly in Paris. The new Soviet resolution is a catch-all for such past Russian proposals as those on NATO, Korea and a Five Power Pact. It contains "concessions" on the questions of inspection and timing which are the most vulnerable points in Moscow's demand for immediate prohibition of the atomic bomb. However, the USSR is still asking the West to agree in principle to prohibit the bomb without any assurance that agreement on control or an adequate inspection system would be forthcoming during subsequent long-drawn-out negotiations. The USSR would also remain un- committed to verification of its own strength in conventional armaments. While Vyshinsky and the other spokesmen of the Kremlin were talk- ing about disarmament and relaxation of tensions at the UN meeting, TASS, the Soviet news agency, was charging that President Truman's State of the Union message provided further proof that the US disarmament plans actually cloak war preparations, According to TASS, it is well known that American leaders intend to extend imperialist aggression in Asia, particularly in Indochina, and that they have no intention of agreeing to a just and reasonable settlement in Korea. Although the Satellite governments have recently been in the fore- front of attacks on the Mutual Security Act, the USSR now has made it the subject of a new protest to the United States. The Soviet Govern- ment, which often asserts that it never interferes in the internal affairs of other states, called upon the US to "take appropriate measures for repeal of the above mentioned lawn An unsigned article in the authoritative Soviet Communist Party magazine Bolshevik asserts that western military programs are under- mining the capitalist economies and that this situation "cannot but lead within a short time to an economic crash." Since 1948, when the leading Soviet economist Varga was forced to recant on his view that a Western economic crisis would be postponed for at least a decade (until 1955), Russian theorists have been careful to avoid any predictions of dates when such a crash would actually occur. Heretofore the party line had been that armaments expenditures temporarily postponed the collapse of capitalism. It is difficult to determine whether this expectation of a crisis within a "short time" is published purely for propaganda purposes or actually includes some wish- ful thinking by Soviet economists based on current British and French financial difficulties. 25X1 25X1 Approved For'2elease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79S01060A0001003001001-1 Approved ForlRelease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79SO106OA000100300001-1 25X1 One of the most important of the Soviet Union's military-economic construction projects, the Volga-Don Canal, is still scheduled to go into operation in the spring of 1952 despite the fact that it is re- ported to be short of five locks and three pumping stations. If past Soviet practice is any guide, the canal will be proclaimed with great fanfare to have been completed on schedule. However, present intelli- gence indicates that the whole complex of projects which are included in the plans for the Volga-Don Canal are unlikely to be finished this year. Thus the strategic link provided by this canal which is to connect the Black Sea with the Caspian, Baltic and White Seas will not be effected until such time as the other projects are in fact completed. Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria have announced that their state economic plans for 1951 were fulfilled, and that targets for 1952 are being substantially increased. Rumania claims that oil output was increased by 20 percent over 1950 and that the heavy industry plan was completed in eleven months, while Bulgaria boasts that overfulfillment of the 1951 plan has created conditions for the completion of its Five Year Plan in four years. The Czech and Bulgarian claims are at variance with admissions in October of failures to achieve third quarter goals but probably indi- cate over-all success in achieving true 1951 production goals. The citations of success, however, are designed to bolster the morale of party workers, and at the same time to prepare the laboring force for even more ambitious production goals in 1952. As a feature of their economic plans for 1952, Hungary and Czecho- slovakia plan to undertake major stockpiling programs. The Czecho- slovak Government has announced that a large-scale buildup of state reserves of the "means of production" will be undertaken in order td assure plan fulfillment and to strengthen national defense, while Hungary has set aside one billion forints (US $86,058,529) for stockpiling in its 1952 budget. These plans suggest that, following the practice of the USSR, the two countries may establish Ministries of State Reserves in 1952. By the end of the year, 70 percent of Czechoslovak foreign trade will be with the Soviet Orbit as opposed to 55 percent in 1950. Simultaneously with the announcement of plans to reach higher pro- duction goals in 1952, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are calling for additional sacrifices from their people in order to aid the North Koreans. Czechoslovak workers are being encouraged to work overtime and to con- tribute the pay to a fund for aid to North Korean civilians. A major Bulgarian drive for the collection of gifts and donations for the people of Korea was undertaken on 3 January. A similar campaign was conducted in Rumania between 24 November and 9 December but there have been no ex- tensive campaigns for aid to Korea in Poland and Hungary since last sum- mer, plans for the production of MIG-15's 25X1 Approved ForiRelease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79S01060A0001003g0001-1 Approved ForlRelease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79SO106OA000100300001-1 25X1 in Poland are being drafted, while in Czechoslovakia production is al- ready under way. Production in Poland is to consist of airframe and engine assembly while the more complicated components of the planes will be imported from the USSR. In Czechoslovakia, production reportedly has begun and is expected to reach a maximum of twenty MIG's per month by 1 April. However, the US air attache in Prague believes that the Czech aviation industry is incapable of attaining a production figure of twenty MIG's per month before September, if then. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79SO106OA000100300p01-1 Approved Foil $00001-1 AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN EASTERN EUROPE The scope of the Soviet airfield construction and development program in Eastern Europe is such that the Red Air Force can now operate from four times as many major fields as existed seven years ago. In 1945, there were in Soviet-controlled Europe only 11 fields with runways of over 6,000 feet. The construction program, begun on a large scab, in 1949, has increased this number to 47, and an additional 30 ? are now undergoing runway or other construction which will make them suitable for all types of operations. Another seven existing facilities can readily be expanded. (See Map) In all, the USSR has at its disposal in Eastern Europe and its occupation zones in Germany and Austria a total of 323 airfields. In addition, hundreds of abandoned World War II fields could be activated in case of need. Soviet standards are generally lower than those of the Western Powers for equivalent aircraft. Only airfields with run- ways of over 5,000 feet -- considered by the Russians to be the minimum length for TU-4 and sustained jet unit operations -- are covered in this report. Prior to 1949, the Soviet policy of improving air facilities in Eastern Europe was limited largely to the rehabilitation of bomb-damaged fields and the improvement of personnel, accommodations for civil and military use in the Soviet zones of Austria and Germany as well as in Albania and Hungary. However, some military construction was noted in other ~atellites. The acceleration of the Soviet program was manifested during 1949 in the start of construction on seven fields with runways of 6,000 or 7,000 feet in the Soviet zone of Germany, four in Czechoslovakia, and two in Hungary. Improvement of the East German airfield complex continued at the same high rate in 1950, and the construction program was extended to in- clude Bulgaria, Rumania, and Poland. The level of construction activity was maintained through 1951, the largest number of projects being in the Eastern zone of Germany, in Poland, and in Rumania. The following airfields of Class I, II and III categories are cur- rently available to the Russians in the Satellites and the Soviet zones of Austria and Germany: 25X1 25X1 Approved Fort Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79S01060A000100;00001-1 Approved Fq CLASS I*1 Austria 0 Bulgaria 0 Czechoslovakia 5 Germany 12 Hungary 6 Poland 1 Rumania 0 300001-1 CLASS III 2 3 15 0 0 3 3 1 1 TOTAL 24 23 8 The 30 airfields which are now undergoing runway and other construc- tion, and which will probably be suitable for either sustained or limited heavy and medium bomber operations, are located as follows: Austria, one; Bulgaria, five; Czechoslovakia, four; Ciurtgary, 'Itwo; 'Pbland'y ;etP;. ivu ile', Blight; . .. Indication are that the intensive construction program in the Soviet zone of Germany is nearing fulfillment. There is evidence that rork'"will soon be initiated on at least two sites in Czechoslovakia anc . Hungary. The large-scale construction program in Bulgaria is proceeding at a slower. rate than in the other Satellites. The airfield improvement program in Poland did not progress as rapidly as in other Satellites until mid-1950, when major construction and rehabilitation were apparently begun on as many as 15 Polish fields, and evidence points to an acceleration in 1952. In Rumania, eight long runways are currently under construction and a plan for the development of a total of approximately 60 runways is known to exist. Albania possesses no jet fighter or heavy medium bomber airfields Class I. Permanent surface runways of 7,000 feet and longer, suitable for heavy, medium, and jet bomber operations. Class II. Permanent or temporary runways capable of supporting limited heavy and medium bomber operations and sustained jet fighter tactical aupport operations. Class III. Potential heavy and medium bomber airfields, currently ' capable of supporting sustained jet interceptor operations. dotal includes Allied airfields in the Berlin area which would most probably fall to the Russians immediately following an outbreak of war. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79SO106OA000100100001-1 I Approved F P001-1 LONG HARD-SURFACED RUNWAYS IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES :JAN 1952 0 inn gee Airfields capable of supporting. sustained operations of Heavy.Bombers/Medium Bombers and Jet Light Bombers. Runway length 7000 feet or more. Airfields capable of supporting limited operations of Heavy Bombers/Medium Bombers and sustained operations of Jet Tactical Support Fighters. Runway length 0000 feet or more. Potential Heavy Bomber/Medium Bomber airfields presently capable of sustained operations of Jet Interceptor Fighters; improvable to Class I or Class 2. Runway length 5000 feet or more. 25X1 25X1 Approved For A Approved For 300001-1 and no airfield development is known, but there have been recent un- confirmed reports of the arrival of Russian aircraft. The importance of the airfield construction and development program to the USSR emerges in the readiness with. which Soviet authorities divert men, machinery, and materials, vitally needed for industrial rehabilitation and expansion, to the development of the system of air basesin the Satellites. The current intensive expansion in Poland of facilities for high performance aircraft, and the reported construction of similar bases in the Baltic area of the USSR, will provide airfields from which long- range bombers could fly missions by the polar route for attack on US industrial targets. The construction of a chain of airfields stretching south from the Baltic Sea toward the Black Sea greatly enhances the military capabili- ties of the USSR by giving Soviet air force units in the Satellites greater maneuverability and providing suitable air facilities for ex- pansion of Satellite airforces. The airfield network also provides bases for mounting air attacks from the Balkan countries against the Middle East, from Polish and East German bases against the Scandinavian countries, and from the German complex against England and Western Europe. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79SO106OA00010030g001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79S01060A000100300001-1 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79S01060A000100300001-1 Approved Fo DELAYS IN EUBDPEa-,, DEFENSE PLANNING CONTINUE TO HAMPER NATO The.recent meeting of the foreign ministers of the six countries planning a European Defense Community made considerable progress toward solving the political problems which the technical-level Paris Conference was unable t o decide. Fundamental issues are still to be settled, however, and in view of the French cabinet crisis, there is. little possibility that an agreement can be reached before the February NATO meeting in Lisbon. In the past two months the Benelux countries have modified their attitudes extensively, and all the governments concerned now seem convinced that the proposed European Defense Force can be realized. The ministerial discussions narrowed the areas of disagreement stemming from the basic conflict between the Benelux view of the European Defense Community as a loosely knit coalition under the larger NATO pact,' and the French-German-Italian concept of a unified political entity'which may one day become a federation of European states. The points at issue are not new. While the financial problem is probably the most pressing, of greater importance is the distribution of power between the executive organ of the proposed Defense Community and the Council of Ministers representing the participating states. Since agreement has been reached on a common budget for the final period of development, the French-German insistence on common financing from the first day will probably be accepted. Benelux reluctance to invest the European Defense Community with real authority continues to be a major stumbling block. The larger countries have agreed to an executive commission, but insist that the president of this group have a preponderant voice. The Benelux countries would subordinate the commission to the council, thus ensuring national control. Additional issues include Benelux insistence on national control of internal defense forces as opposed to Community control, as well'as the question of the treaty's duration. Because the smaller countriep want the emphasis on a close relationship between the Defense Communi~y and NATO, they favor a 20-year pact to parallel NATO; France, Germany and Italy prefer a 50-year treaty which will stress the permanent character of the proposed Community and serve, with the Schuman Plan, as the framework for a real European union. Furthermore, questions on Which there had previously seemed to be substantial agreement, such as the attempt to make the use of the defense forces depend on council unanimity, may still cause trouble. 14 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79S01060A000100390001-1 Approved For While the French and Germans see eye to eye in general on t }e defense organization, there is still dispute over security control of German armament production and the German financial contribution to defense. Adenauer and Schuman expect to iron out the first difficulty in a fashion acceptable to the US and Britain, and the French are inclined to accede to Adenauer's arguments that the second should be subject to the criteria governing the other participants and that the German contribution must not appear as a continuation of occupation costs. If the French and the Germans can resolve these differences, the Benelux countries may allow themselves to be pushed into a suprs.- national body sooner than they'had intended. Belgium and the Netherlands resent the French tendency to blame them for any possible failure of the project, and feel that Francelie trying to introduce a federal structure through the back door. The Benelux Foreign Miiisters have nevertheless endorsed the federation plan and can be expected to sacrifice national prerogatives for an eventual political union. The pressure American representatives are exerting on Belgium and the Netherlands, and United States insistence on close ties between TO and the EDC, will probably be the determining factors. The technical discussions of the Paris Conference have resutied, but the current government crisis in France will probably delay the meeting the foreign ministers had expected to hold in January. Even if a new government is formed before February, the French Assembly will want to discuss Schuman's commitments before NATO acts on the basis of the ministers' decisions. Therefore, while the eventual formation of a European Defense Community now seems fairly certain, the present NATO schedule cannot be met, and parliamentary hurdles must still be reckoned with in all the participating countries. 15 25X1 25X1 Approved ForIRelease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79SO106OA000101300001-1 25X1 25X1 Approved For CONI4tJNISTS PLAY ONLY MINOR ROLE IN CURRENT PANAMANIAN INSTABILITY 25X1 The Panama Government is highly unstable because (1) President Arosemena is a weak executive with little popular appeal; (2) the presidential candi- dacy of Jose A. Remon for the elections next May is highly controversial; (3) anti-Remora forces are using Communist-linked student groups as one in- strument for protesting against the candidacy of a "military" figure, ex- police-chief Remon; and (4) deposed president Arnulfo Arias is maneuvering to get out of jail. The only apparent Communist contribution to the present instability is participation in a current strike of school and university students. While the strike has led to minor clashes,., it has not been supported by mass demonstrations. The student strike began at the end of last October in pro- test against Remon1s candidacy and influence with the administration. The students reportedly are about evenly divided between the anti-administration faction which supports the strike and the opposing pro-administration faction. The two organizations which appear to be supporting the strike are the Popular Revolutionary Youth. and the Patriotic Front. The Popular Revolutionary Youth was formed in October 1950 by the Communist People's Party and, at least prior to the current student strike, was politically 25X1 unimportant_ Act of early 1951 this youth group had an estimated membership The Patriotic Front, on the other hand,, is important politically. It was formed in 1944 and claims the 7,500 adherents requisite for formation of a Panamanian political party. Its newspaper, controlled by nationalistic, non-Communist Harmodio Arias, is reportedly the most influential in Panama. Its leader, Jorge.Illueca, is reported to be under Harmodio's influence. Though a number of Communists have infiltrated the organization and have made common cause with the chauvinist members in their political activities, the Communists have been in control..of the organization. The People's Party is not believed rgapable of making a major contri- bution to Panamanian instability. ;Warty membership in recent years has been estimated as approximately 800, but an estimate made in December, by the US Embassy in Panama gives a figure of only 700. 16 25X1 Approved For Approved For The high point of Communist activity in 1951 was the cost-of-living demonstration on 10 July,. a Communist-inspired movement with widespread political. support. An attempt to repeat the demonstration 2'C days later was a failure., however,, despite the fact that there was no significant change in the economic situation, Evidence indicates that the failure was caused by exposure of the Communist leadership of the first demonstrations The present crisis has its origins in the campaign for next May's presidential elections. It began to reach serious proportions when the notoriously corrupt former police-chief Remon was nominated last October., setting off a particular bitter campaign which has seriously divided the country and which poses a continuing threat to stability, In the event that the government is overthrown, the Communists may attempt to profit from the general disorder., but there is no indication that the party has the potential for playing a significant role in Panamanian politics, 25X1 25X1 Approved Fob- Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79S01060A00010p300001-1 Approved For SPECIAL ARTICLE THE CHILEAN COPPER SITUATION There has been considerable evidence in recent months that the Chilean Government is unable.. and to some extent unwilling, to assure the uninterrupted flow. of its total copper production to Western nations. This has been shown by Chile's divergence from certain terms of its copper agreement with the US and its failure to cooperate fully: at the International Materials Conference. There are indications that Chile might even take steps to abrogate the US-Chilean agreement and possibly withdraw from the International Materials Conference. For these reasons,, it is now uncertain in what quantities and' at what prices Chilean copper will be available for Western defense needs in 1952. Chile is the world's second largest producer of copper and the largest single foreign source of copper for the United States. Production during 1950 exceeded 360,000 metric tons, and the 1951 production may have been slightly higher. Expansion programs may bring the output to over 400,000 metric tons in 1952. About 95 percent of this copper is produced by three US-owned companies whose combined investments are estimated at 350 million dollars. In the first ten months of 1950, Chile supplied about 44 percent of all US copper imports, and about 20 percent of United States consumption in 1950. While Chile, like other foreign sources, supplied the United States with less copper during the same period in 1951, it still accounted for approximately 55 percent of all US imports. No direct Chilean copper shipments to the Soviet Orbit have been reported since May 1950. Italy, France, Brazil, Germany, and Britain in recent years have taken major portions of whatever Chilean copper was not taken by the United States. In May 1951, the United States and Chile reached an agreement designed to settle differences involving the two countries and the large American companies. The agreement increased the price of copper sold to the United States from 24.5 to 27.5 cents per pound and established a quota of not higher than 20 percent of the large US-owned companies' production that could, be exported by Chile to countries other than the US and also used for local manufacture and consumption. According to the agreement Chile was to take measures to assure that its exported copper will not be re- exported, and to make no sales to countries which are potential enemies, or for non-essential needs. The United States agreed to assist in carrying out expansion programs by providing essential equipment and supplies and, in the case of the smaller mining properties, to consider granting loans and providing engineers. 18 25X1 25X1 Approved Foil Approved For There is nothing in the agreement td prevent the shipment of all or part of the Chilean free-disposal copper to the US. The Chilean Government, however, has established a minimum price of 1,200 dollars per metric ton, f.o.b. Chile, for free disposal copper as opposed to the approximate 606 dollars per metric ton for the 80 percent of large-mine production which Chile agreed to make available to the United States. Several factors on the Chilean domestic scene have militated against the smooth operation of the agreement, and have had a decidedly unfavorable effect upon the government's attitude toward serving Western interests. First$ Chilean political parties since early 1951 have been working toward the September 1952 presidential election, and the copper problem has be- come an increasingly bitter political issue. The US-Chilean agreement is unpopular, and strong criticism involving "the inadequate 20 percent quota" and "the low price paid for copper by the United States" is being leveled against the administration., the Washington government, and the producing companies, Second, Chile is short of dollars, Bad crops, the increased need to supplement local food supplies by imports from other areas, inflation, and the government's ineffectual economic policy have caused pressure towards a higher price for copper instead of increased taxes. Finally., graft and dishonesty among some high officials who stand to gain in copper deals have probably contributed to the administration's ill-defined copper policy. Chile has diverged from the terms of the May agreement with respect to export controls on its free-disposal copper and by not cooperating in distributing exports for essential needs. Chile accepted the recommendation of the International Materials Conference only with respect to the large-mine production - that is, the production specifically available for purchase by the United States. In spite of assurances given in the agreement, and verbal assurances by President Gonzalez Videla, the Minister of Economy and Commerce has dis- played an admittedly noncooperative attitude on the matter of transshipment. Using 1950 production statistics as a frame of reference, free-disposal copper for the first year of the agreement would amount to approximately 100,000 metric tons., including the small and medium size mines' output and some 27,000 metric tons allocated to local fabricators by ministerial resolution prior to May 1951, Quickly earmarked for domestic consumption were 5,000 metric tons and between May and October 1951 the government issued allocations for more than half of the free-disposal copper. No specific period for these allocations was given. While the allocations have probably been changed, it is signi- ficant that a substantial part of this copper was scheduled to go to countries in which there are well-known transshipment points and in quantities consider- ably in excess of normal exports to those areas. Further., there has been considerable evidence of cases in which the Chilean Government has authorized 19 25X1 25X1 ApprovedIFor Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79SO106OA000P00300001-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved F~ the sale of free copper to European firms known and reported by US missions as East-West traders; In addition to the transshipment problem.,, there is the matter of proposed legislation in the Chilean Congress which could militate against certain terms of the existing agreement with the USJ* and which could adversely affect the International Materials Conference recommnendation on copper. One bill already passed by the Chamber of Deputies and pending before the Senate provides that the President "will" periodically fix. the export quota for copper to be sold by the large companies.. that is the US-owned companies. An article of another proposed law would authorize Chile to'make sales abroad directly. The US Embassy in Santiago stated in December that "a real danger exists" regarding this type of legislation' and that it may be politically inexpedient for the Chilean Government combination to accept any measure not containing something similar to the first provision. Both provisions could pave the way for an increased diversion of copper to the Soviet Orbit. boool-1 25X1 Considering the Chilean position on copper in the last six months, and in view of the approaching election, it is doubtful that the present Chilean Government will cooperate on the copper problem unless'.it obtains a satisfactory price increase from the United States. 25X1 Approved For