ESTIMATES OF CAPABILITY OF RAILROADS IN COMMUNIST CHINA, 1952
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79S01100A000200030001-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 27, 2000
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 29, 1954
Content Type:
REPORT
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ESTIMATES OF CAPABILITY OF RAILROADS IN C01414M ST CHINA, 1952
Report of
Working Group of the EIC Subcommittee on Transportation
29 Janus, 1954
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I. Suaa of Conclusions
This working group, while agreeing that 1952 Chinese Communist railroad
performance approximated capability, has reached estimates of capab.lity
falling into two groups? which are on two distinctly different levers of
magnitude. These two are so far apart that it has been found imposi;ible to
reach a unified position.
A. Army, Navy and Air Force are of the opinion that the approach to
the problem and the magnitude of the conclusion (41 million metric a;ons
originated.9 plus or minus 25 percent) in "Capabilities of the
Chinese Communist Railroads, Roads and Inland Waterways," are basicitlly
valid. These agencies have each conducted independent examinations of
presently available intelligence, and have arrived at estimates of ?;he
capability of the Chinese Communist railroads to originate freight. These
4n
estimates,, rangf.ng from 45 to 6OOmetric tons, indicate that a slighf; upward
revision of the conclusion may be in order.
B6 . It is the opinion of State and CIA, on the basis of their taeparate
analyses of available evidence, that the estimate of Chinese Commmist 1952
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railroad capability es stated in is much below actual performance.
CIA estimates a capability of at least 136 million metric tons originated,
and it concurs with State that the railroad system in 1952 was capable of
originating the 131 million tons claimed "hauled" by the Chinese Communists.
The following table summarizes the conclusions of the respective
agencies. Annexes setting forth the details of their respective viewpoints
are attached.
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Position of the TSO/Working Group on Oapability/ of
Chinese Commmist Railroads, 1952
1. Operable Freight Car lnrentor~.
2. Average Turn-Around Time (days) . . . ... .
3. Average Not Load Per Loaded Gar (metric togas) .. .
4. Average Length of Loaded Haul (kilomleters)...
Capabili s
5. Net Tons Originated (million metric tons, annually)
29 January 1954
Lr.M-z AU A state OIL,
40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 46,100 to 53,100
6.2 6.0 5.57 to 9.2 2.9 3.4
24.0 24.4 23.1 to 28.7 26.0 to 28.7 27.5
640 600 500 to 688.2 454
60.65 45 to 60 45.1 to 60.5 131 136 1/
C. I ~t Tc /'K is cstero (billion metric, manually) ... 38.8 28 to 36 25.S to 31 59.5
Note.- The figu.'es contained in this table cannot be properly luatsd without reference to the supporting annexes.
a~ it is the opioat of the group that 1952 performance approximated 1952 capability.
Snoluding oars under and awaiting heavy repairs.
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11 a Pechora Un~in Capabili t Calculations,
One) measure of capability is tons originated, assuming a constant
length of haul and traffic pattern. There are several methods of calculating
tons-originated capability. Among them are:
a. Dividing ton-kilometers by average length of haul;
b. Multiplying annual carloadings by average load per loaded car; or
c. Dividing operable car park by tun around time, and multiplying by
average load per loaded car and by 365 days.
For each of the three methods there is at least one figure which is
not directly available from any source, and interpretation and validity
of those given is in dispute. Therefore, it has been necessary to derive
needed figures by the use of sub-fonulaw, the figures for which were in
turn derived, and therefore equally open to question down to their most
rd.nute tasic constituents. Minute disag~?,eements in one direction on many
of these elements accumulate into large differences in the final figure.
Fuurthervrore, several agencies have used methods of calculating tons originated
which differ in some respects from the three given above. Thus, any collated
statement of the differences among the a encias would of necessity be 'nary
complex and lengthy; and within this working group there can be no resolution
of these differences short of the introdt ction of significant new intelli-
gence,
111. Underlying Reasons for Dis eesner~ y
The only contemporary figures or, the performance of Chinese Communist
railroads are those given by the Chinese Communists themselves, and there
is basic disagreement among the agencies as to the interpretation and
validity of these figures. For example, it has been suggested that the
figure on tons "hauled" might be interpreted as mean ng either net or gross
tons originated, not or gross tons carried (in the US, not tons carried
average twice the net tons originated), or net or gross tons handled.
Therefore, various indirect approaches were attempted, consisting of:
a. Comparisons with past performenca of the railroads within
this area;
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be Comparison with other railroad systems; and
car An application of "planning-factor" figures and procedures,
In using comparative figures, either historical or from other countries.,
questions of interpretation of the figures, of validity of the comparison,
and of the relative performance to be expected from the Chinese. Communists
have al L been grounds for di sagreernent e P or example, loading time in 1935-36
Chinese Nationalist data was given in ton-hotsrs, and no agreement could be
reached as to whether they were net, gross, or rated tons, or whether the
figures included handling of both loaded. and empty cars. Furthermore,
there was no agreement as to the number of operating procedures included by
the Nations l.i.sts in the term "loading time." Even if these differences
could have been reconciled, there was no universally accepted tons-per-loaded&
car figtire to divide into ton-hours to produce average loading time per car..
In utilzing 1950 Soviet statistics on loading time, agreement could not be
reached as to the efficiency of Chinese Communist performance relative to
that of the Soviets a In the application of the planning-factor approach, it
has been found impoasiwb1e for the agencies to agree on the formulae, or on
the figwurec to use therein.* For example one of the elements in a planning
factor approach is the running repair and pooling figure, the use and
iicitwion of which is not agreed to by t0l agencies,
TU Rea:ommendatione
Thu working group recognizes the need f ,r an agreed estimate of capa-
bility of Chinese Communist railroads, and believes that if certain items
of inte4.li.gence were availables progress toward agreement would be facili.-
tated. The working group's analysis of f.ntelligence currently available
has shown major gaps in intelli.gence,, sdnse or all of which need to be filled
before agreement as to capabilities can be arrived at within this group,
The major need is a reliable Chinese Camunist compilation of railroad
s tatist!.cs < Lacking such a ccmmpilation, marry of these gaps could probab]y
be fillEad from available Intelligence sources. Some of these gaps area
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Precise definitions of Chinese Communist., Chinese Nationalist.,
and "Manchukuo" railroad traffic and operating terms.
2m Reliable statements by competent individuals presently or
previously associated with Chinese Communist railroads with
respect to the validity and interpretation of various Chinese
Communist railroad statistics,
3? Understanding of methods used by Chinese Communists in collecting
and compiling railroad statistics.
Descriptions by competent observers of loading., unloading, and
fright car handling procedures at terminals and enroute
(including freight car delays).
Edwin Jones) Department of State
Ray Donner )
Stephen liclcelsburg m Department of the Army
Louis Sandine - Department of the Navy
Francis Armbruster ) Department of the Air Force
Charles Ransom
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