CIA POSITION ON CAPABILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST RAILROADS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01100A000200030006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 29, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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ANNEX V
CIA POSITION ON CAPABILITY/OF
CHINESE COMMUNIST RAILROADS
29 January 1954
Statement
In ettempting to assess the capability of Chinese Communist railroads,
the only basic sources of current statistics are statementsraade by the
Chinese Communists themselves. Not all the figures necessary for suchen
aesessmeet are given directly, although some can be derived by calculation
from thoae which are available. Because there has been some question about
whether Communist terminology relating to operations and traffic is exactly
equivaleet to US terminology, CIA has approached Chinese Communist figures
as follows:
So All intelligence which could be obtained on each operating
and traffic factor was assembled, including Chinese Communist statements,
historic a]. Manchukuoan and Chinese Nationalist data, Soviet data,
interrogations of individuals who had left China recently, and reports from
covert s'urces on China.
b. This information as weighei and an estimated figure for each
factor wls derived therefrom.
Altoeugh many of these estimated figures show a slightly lower level of
performaace than the corresponding announcements of the Chinese Communists
would inlicate, they do reveal that the overall traffic movement announced
by the Ceinese Communists is of approximately the proper order of magnitude.
1/ The term capability, as used in this annex, is defined as the maximum
amount ot traffic which can be moved over the railroad system for a sustained
period utlth the existing track facilities* operating methods freight cars,
and locanotives as of a given date. If demands for traffic movement
sufficieetly exceed existing capability* further increases in capability are
possible over a period of time through such measures as further increasing
average :let load per car and per train, improvements in signalling and
communications, increasing the number of operable freight cars and locomotives,
and even by installation of double track on previously single-tracked lines.
.4#, 1?1?10._,
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The CIA position on individual elements which lead to a conclusion
on the capability of Chinese Communist railroads as of the end of 1952 is
follows:
as
1. Total freight car park (units) 51,995
2. Operable freight car park (units) 462100
3. Tons actually originated (millions of metric tons)
4. Net ton.kilometers actually performed (billions)
-5. Average length of loaded haul (kilometers)
6. Ratio of empty to total freight car kms. (percent)
7v Average empty haul of freight car during turn-
around period (kms.) - -
Total movement of freight tar during turnaround
period (kms.)
AVexage freight car speedtetween terminals (km/hr)
Average travel time of freight car during turn-
around period (days)
Average time at loading and :unloading terminals,
ircluding switching and delays (days)
Total turnaround time (days):
Average daily carloadingtapability (units) 13,560
Average net load per loaded freight car
(netric tons)
8.
9e
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15, Average daily tonnage originated (metric tons)
16. Annual tonnage originated (millions of metric
tuns)
17. Annual net ton kilometers performed (billions)
E2Ltg
1. Freight car park. The basefigure for this estimate is the total
of 67,822 freight cars in China proper plus Manchuria in 1945
This figure includes narrow gauge cars
in China gropers but excludes most narrov gauge cars in Manchuria. The
next available figure is the Chinese Coxntunist statement in October 1
that they had on hand 39s600 freight 025X1A2g
This fieure can be derived from the 67,82 cars in 1945 as shown in Tab A.
As estimated December 1952 inventory can be derived from the October 1949
ngure ty various additions and losses as shown in Tab B.
to 59,270
to 53,100
131
59.5
454
30
194
648
12.0
. 2.1
1.3
3.4
to 15,620 al
27.5
373,000 to 430,000 2/
136 to 157 .2i
61.7 to 71.3 gi
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WINNE,
The range of this estimate of the total and operable freight car parks
in expltined in paragraphs 1 and 2 below. The other ranges shown in this
column result from and correspond to the range in estimates of the freight
car park.. CIA has no evidence that capability of Chinese Communist rail-
roads it, 1952 significant1y exceeded the actual level of traffic performed*
It has therefore adopted the lower figure in the range as its estimate of
capability.
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E. Of the 512995 to 59,270 total freight cars in China, it is
estimated that 5,896 to 6,196 were out of operation for repairs in
December 1952. In October 1951 the Chinese Communists announced their
repair performance which indicated that of cars inoperable in February
1950, about 5,296 were still inoperable. It is assumed that 2,500 of
these were repaired by December 1952 and that the remainder should probably
be considered retired but are included here under ears out of operation.
It is estimated that 4 percent of the total park are out of operation at
any time for normal repairs, or 2,100 to 2,400 units. Cars damaged in
North Korea from June 1950 to May 1953 are estimated at 33,000 cars
(CINCFAC cable, S.), of which an estimated 28,000 were damaged to December
1952. It is assumed that about half the damage may be allocated to
Chinese cars, or about 470 cars per month* Therefore, it is assumed that
about 1,000 damaged Chinese cars were out of operation for repairs in
December 1952. This leaves an operable car park of 46,100 to 53,100.
(See Tab C)
3. The 131 million tons originated is based on the Chinese Communist
statemant (FBIS, Peiping, NCNA in Chinese Numeral Code, 16 Feb. 1953, 11,00
The statement does not permit a firm determination of whether this figure
repressmts tons originated, or tons carried (which would include duplication
of them tonnages which moved on lines of more than one region). CIA
concluies that the figure represents tons originated on the following basis:
a) If It were tons carried, then the tons originated figure would be less,
perhapi 100 million tons or less. Sines the Communists claim to have
performed 59.5 billion ton-kilometers, this would give an average length
of haul of 595 Loa. or more. Such a haul seems to be too long when compared
with peewar and wartime experience, while the 454 km. haul derived from
131 million tons seems reasonable* b) The figure of 131 million tons is
of appeoximately the same magnitude as the 114 million tons originated in
all of China in 1941 (excludin central and south China, for which data 25X1A2g
are no yet available) FAD, Ue36430 30
Juae 1153, R; Research Division of Manchuria, Resources Control Commission,
"Transportation in Manchuria," Shenyang; Feb. 1948, R)* Data are not
available for the years 1942 to 19452 but it is likely that tons originated
increased somewhat over the 1941 figure. c) ORR estimates of production
of selected basic commodities in 1952 totaled 203 million tons; it is
conserratively estimated that these basic commodities provided at least
52.4 mellion tons of originated freight. When movements of all other
connedeties are added, the traffic in 1952 comes to at least 84.4 million
tens, idetieh is a minimum figurce(See Tab D). d) The operation of the
Chinese railroads as a unified system would make the compilation of tons
carried, including duplications for different lines; a meaningless and
wantefel procedure. e) Because Of the post-Communist shift in the
Chinese traffic pattern to a general north-south orientation, there has been
a proportionately greater burden placed on railroads compared with the
prewar distribution of traffic between railroads and domestic water trans.'
poet. In addition, there has been el redirection of a substantial volume
of foreign trade from ocean transport to overland rail transport.
4. The 59.5 billion ton-kilometer performance in 1952 is based on
(mews? Communist statements (FBIS, Peiping, NCNA in Chinese Numeral Code,
16 Feb, 1953, U.). While such a figure might be given in terms of gross
ton-ki'aemeters (including both weight of freight and weight of freight
.arma net ton-km. figure would be about 55 percent of gross), it would
be an abnormal practice to announce this as performance. Gross ton-
ki7.ome-ers have no statistical usefulness except in relation to measure-
ment of locomotive performance or (much less likely in China) wear on rail
and track structure. From the standpoint of traffic performance, gross
ton-'k. would be a meaningless figure. Also, if the 59.5 billion ton-Ions.
be contidered as gross, the resulting level of net or revenue ton-lane
32.7 billion ton-kms.) would not require as many cars as the minimum
eel-dame/a of the Chinese car park. By comparison, China railroads in 1941
perforned 36 billion net ton-kms., and that year was not a peak of
performance. Furthermore, average length of haul was somewhat shorter at
that time
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S. Average length of loaded haul is derived by dividing ton-kms.
(paragraph 4) by tons originated (paragraph 3)o The 454 km average haul
in 1952 may be compared with an average length of haul in 1943. for all
China (excluding central and south China) of about 315 km. This figure may
not have been a war-time peak. This is another argument against any theory
that the 59.5 billion ton-kmso might be gross tons. Considered thus,
everage haul would drop to 250 kms, which appears far too low to be
reasonableo
6. The ratio of empty freight car kms0 to total car kmso is based
on the fact that in Manchuria in 193942 this figure ranged between 24.8
and 28,0 percent (South Manchurian Railway, Annual Railway Statistics, 1939-
:L912, U.) In North Korea in 1947 and 1948 the figure was 29 and 28 percents
respeceively (Army, FRC, ATIS Enemy Interrogation, Korea No, 36, 11 May
1951, G.)* The Chinese railroad system was given a slightly higher figure
of 30 percent became it was assumed that in view of the heavy net load
of 27.5 tone per car (paragraph 24), somewhat more cars would be returning
empty enstead of being lightly loaded for return hauls.
7. Average empty haul of freight car during turnaround period was
derived by multiplying the average length of haul (paragraph 5) (which
represents average haul of the loaded car) by the ratio of empty to loaded
haul* Since the empty haul is taken as 30 percent of the total (paragraph
6)e then the loaded haul is 70 percent of the total, and the ratio of the
empty to the loaded haul is 42.9 percent. The average loaded haul of
454 km, (paragraph 5) multiplied by 42.9 percent gives an elPty haul of
194 km,
8. Total movement of freight ear during turnaround period is the total
oZ the 454 km. loaded (paragraph 5) and 194 km empty movement (paragraph 7)0
or 648 kmo
9) Average freight car speed in trains between terminals is based on
Mlinese Communist statements of train speed (excluding etops at division
points enroute) from 1950 to 1953 for various railroad bureaus and for the
nation as a whole. This figures of about 20 km/hr, checks with Manchurian
and China Proper railroad figures (China Ministry of Railroads, "Statistics
of Chilese National Railways, 1935-6," Nanking, 1937, U; South Manchurian
Flail:war, "Annual Railway Statistics for 1942." vol. 2$ .Tables 13 and 16, R).
With a total freight ear movement during a turnaround period of 648 knus
teavel time would thus total 32 hours. With the 648 kme haul, divided by an
estimated 160 km0 beteeen divisions (JIC 635/1? S), the car would pass
throegl 4 divisions or would Make 3 division stops. It is estimated that
each division stop takes 6 hours (J IC 635/1, S); therefore, 3 divisions
stops eould take a total of 18 hours. Thus total transit time from loading
terminal to the next loading tereinal, including division atop,' would
'ftlea1e50-houre, and since this time is required to cover 648 kmoeathe
average travel speed is 13 km/hr. ORR has utilized the slightly lower
figure of 12 km/hr which pertits,slightly longer division stop
1). Average travel time of freight car during turnarcund period is
shown above in deriving average freight car speed between ternzinals.
Since total time is 50 hours, this equals 2.1 days.
llo Average time at loading and unloading terminals is based primarily
on Chiaese Communist information* In making improvements in turnaround
time oT freight cars, it is at the loading and unloading terminals that
the greatest time savings can be made because such a high percentage of the
turnaround period is spent here. It is believed by ORR that significant
improvements are possible in China because the relatively small number of
operable freight cars (I46,100 to 53,100), and the large number of railroad
workers (about 6202000 according to Peiping Jenmin Jihpao? 15 November 19539
U,) mean that a careful check can he maintained on each cars and loading
ard unloading time can be expedited. In addition, the US intelligence
community agrees that there is probably no shortage of locomotives* ORR
believes it is likely, therefore s that this has minimized delays experienced
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tar freight cars at loading and unloading terminals. The Chinese Communists
c3aim that "station stopping time" (elapsed time between arrival of a loaded
car at its destination and its departure from that point, either reloaded
ar empty) for the nation as a whole and for individual railroad bureaus
lies between 10 and 17 hours. (China Project 128, Shanghai Chiehfang Jihpao,
3950, Ti; Peiping Jenmin Tiehtao Mar. 1951, R;
China Project * 2 Jan. 1951, U; FEIS,
Lally Report, Far East, 4 Nov. 1951, believed, therefore, that
25 hours is a reasonable time for this operation. That this is attainable
is indimted by 1934 Chinese Nationalist data showing that detention of
freight ears at stations averaged 19.15 hours (Chuke Ling, "China's Railway
Rolling stack," Univ. of Washington, 1946, U). There is some question of
whether this was time spent only at loading and unloading stations* or
whether it also included division stops. However, the breakdown of detention
time indicates it may be only for time at loading and unloading stations.
Thus, 15 hours for the loading terminal plus 15 hours for the unloading
terminal. totals 30 hours or 1.3 days.
12, Average turnaround time is derived by adding 2.1 days of travel
time of freight car during turnaround period to 1.3 days average time
spent ae loading and unloading terminals, including switching and delays.
Thin gkres a total turnaround time af 3.4 days.
13. Average daily carloadings capability is Obtained by dividing the
operable freight car park (paragraph 2) by the turnaround time (paragraph 12)
14, Average net load per loaded freight car is based pelearily on Chineo Coaniunist statements? The various figures for individual carloads, as
well as average loading in individual bureaus and for the nation as a wholes
indicate an average of about 27.5 net tons per loaded car. (PHIS, Peiping,
28 Aug. 1952, S; FDD, U-3289, 14 Apr. 1953, R; Army, ALO Hong Kong R-4343,
14 Mar. 1953, Jenmin Jihpao, 16 Aug. 1952, U; EMS, Wuhan, 23 July 1952,
'03 IDD 1-3199, 10 June 1952, a; Chiehfang Jihpao, 21 Oct. 1952* U; FBIS,
Shan aa 11 Nov. 1952 C State, Hong Kong 1)1282, 29 Dec. 1952, R;
. With an estimated average capacity per car in
.na metr o tons, the 2745 tons represents a loading to about 92
percent of capacity. A figure of about 80 percent of capacity has been
used in the intelligence community for loading of non-military traffic
(BIC-R4, "Capability of the als-Siberian Railroad and Coneecting Lines
in Mancluria and Korea," 23 Mar 1953, 0. It is estimated that a higher
loading figure has been achieved in China, since great streso has been
placed an the subject in Communist publications, and because photographs
show hem loading of freight, particularly in gondola cars. That this is
attainable is indicated by the fact that in North Korea between 1947 and
1949 the net load per ear ranged batmen 26.9 and 28.5 metric tons derived
by dividing freight handled by number of cars loaded 25X1A2g
and that in Japanese-occupied Manchuria in 1939 and 1942 which
were no the peak years), net load per loaded car is calculated at 24.9 to
26.4 tore (South Manchurian Railways, "Annual Railway Statistics," U).
15. Average daily tonnage-originated capability is derdved by
multiplying average daily carloadings (paragraph 13) by average net load
per loaded freight car (paragraph 14). This capability is based on facilities
and operating conditions existing in 1952, including the temporary
disturbances of railroad operation caused by the Five Antis campaign.
16. Average annual tonnage-originated capability is derived by multiplying
average latl,y tonnage originated (paragraph 15) by 365 days.
17. Annual tonakilometer capability is derived by multiplying average
arnaal tmage originated (paragraph 16) by the average length of haul
(paragraah 5). This capability can be increased by greater average length
of haul, since the movement time of a freight train is not a large part of
total turnaround time. By contrast, a ton-kilometer increase resulting
from a sbationary average length of haul and increased tonnage originated
would reauire considerably more increase in rolling stock or in efficiency
of rolliag stock use.
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TAB A
to
ANNEX V
rerivation of Total Chinese Communist Freight Car Park in October 1949
Statemext
Tha Chinese Communists stated in October 1949 that they had in use 30,000
raiiroal cars and 9,600 out of service An 25X1 A2g
attempt has been made to account for this inventory by estimating losses and
additioas from the last previous reliable figure,
Sso_maLt pv_a_idence
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1. The base figure for this estimate is the total of 67,632 freight cars
in China proper plus Manchuria in 1945 China,
rirectoeate of Statistics, "Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China.,"
1947, U). This includes narrow gauge cars in China proper, and includes 549
narrow eauge cars in Manchuria, but does not include 6,668 narrow gauge cars
owned be logging railroads in Manchuria.
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2. The Chinese Communists stated in October 1949 that they had in use
30,000 railroad cars and 9,600 out of service
At the time the statement was made, some freight cars were still in Nationalist
hands ia South China,
3. The following tabulation repreeents ?Ws estimate of deductions
from an additions to the 1945 freight car park which would have reedited in
an inveetory of 39,600 cars in October 1949. The major unknown
rueber ef freight cars taken by the USSR,
factor is the
Freight Car Units
1945 fraight car park, China plus Manchuria . 0 0 ?
67,832
Minus: letirements Deo 1945 to Oct 1949 (estimated
at 2% of 67,832 per year) . . . ? .. . . . . . .
5,196
USSR 'ieparatione (estimated at 15% of 1945 Manchurian
parc of )41,984 cars) ? 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0
6,288
Estimated civil mar losses. . . ? ? .7 ? ?? 0 ? 0 ? 01
2,500 to 50000
Lost 3ars found by Communists in Feb 1950 inventory /o
10,270
Losses not accounted for; poseibly taken by USSR. . ? .
7,867 to 5,367
Total deductions 2/ ? . , . . ...? ?..?.??
' 32,129
Flue: Inports0 1945 to Oct 1949 ? .., ?,???0
-7Fiodu3tion,
30445
1945 to Oct 1949. ? ? 0 IA 0 04100 *00
452
Total additions V . . . . . . . .. ...???.
3,897
Freight car park reported by Communists, Oct 1949 . . . .
39,600
Iletir.luou.....111????149s. ratriumewneamamisaivem
21 A nationwide inventory of freight cars made in China in February 1950
resalted in "finding" 10,278 more etre than were originally on the
statistical records of the Ministry of Railways (FBIS, Peiping, NCNA,
8 March 1950, R),
Ass ames that cars were neither lost to nor received from North Korea
from 1945 to, Oct 1949.
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TAB B
to
ANNEX V
IA, ORR Position on Total Chinese Communist Freight Car Park
in December 1952
Statemeni
It :Is estimated that the total freight car Inventory of the Chinese
Communira.-, railroads (standard plus narrow gauge, excepting forestry lines
in Manchnria) is between 51,995 and 59,270 units in December 19520
Sue2.92_,timAri_Lence.
The following tabulation shows the estimated losses and additions
to the October 1949 park of 39,600 freight cars, from which the estimated
park of December 1952 was derived:
Freight car park reported by Communists, Oct 1949 ? ? 0
Minus: Letirements, Oct 1949 to Dec 1952
per year
Fore= war losses/
Total deductions ? ? . ?
Plus:
(2% of 50,000
? . 0 ?
...0
0 a 0 0 a a a ? a a 0
Imports, Oct 1949 to Dec 1952 . 0 0 CP ? ? ?
froduction, Oct 1949 to Dec 1952. . . . .
Found in Feb 1950 inventory (see Tab A above).
I:estimated returned by USSR
Total additions. . . .
Total estimated freight car park, Dec 1952. .
4111014111...11...Parl????1120.1.
* S ? 0
. 39,600
? 39250 ,
? 4,500E/
^ 7,750
. ? 0 700 to 2,200
. ? 3,800 to 7,075
. ? , 10,278
. . 5,367 to 708672(
. 200145 to 279420
. 51,995 to 5902701,
Korean war losses to Hay 1953 are estimated at 15,000 (CINCPAC cable, 0,
of this number, it is estimated that 13,500 were lost to Dec 1952.
This figure includes both Chinese and North Korean cars.
These represent net loss of Chinese cars to and in North Korea, derived
as follows: original North Korean pelt, 149000; destroyed in North Korea
to Dec 1952, 13,500; operating in North Korea at end. of in.ro 50000; net
removals from China, 4,500.
In view of the destruction of rolling stock in North Korea, and the
increased tightness of the freight car park in China, it is believed
that the USSR would have returned any cars taken from Manchuria (see
Tab A, item 6 of table). There is no documentation available at present
for teis belief.
First figure is calculated with minimum gains; second figure is calculated
with ,naximum gains.
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TA33 c
to
Men V
Positice ozi Operable Chinese C
Statement
1M is estimated that of the total freight oar inventory of the Chinese
Cearamaist railroads shone in Tab A, about ?1.6,100 to 33,100 =its ewe
Varable In December 19520 The zoemirting cars, repreeenting about 31.
percent of the total Inventory, mem either Tesler normal malattenexce,
or verb. cars? devregad. in Nona 'which vex* und.er %weir
,ort
1 The October 19149 park of 39p6oc contained 9,600 inoperable cara
and th 10,278 cars round in February 1930 contained. 7,190 'inab1? cars,
giving a total of ebaut 16,790 Inoperable 25X1A2g
?BIS, Peiping, WN!, 8 March 19302 It)* In October 19511 it vas reported
that 11,494 .cera previousie. Inoperable had been repaired. (reoplels Handbook,
1930, tY)0 This left 5,296 cars still inoperable* It is estimated that
by Dee 1952 =zither 2,500 a these had been repaired; the etemainder
probably tehoull be considered retired*
2 It is estimated. taut the normal percentage of free:ft cars cut of
operation at tany one time is approximatelyi percent or the total park*
3* Cara damaged in North Norea from June 1930 to May 1953 are
eatimated at 33,000 cars (CINIIPAC *able, S)0 Of. this number, an estimated
28,00C Imo ateleSed, to Deo 19520 It ia assumed, on the basis of relative
frequenoy of exposure of Noreen and Chinese care that no more than half
the damage eley be allocated to Chireate cars, or :bout 14,000 freight ears
over the period of 30 mortha, or about 470 cars per alcutto For lack of
specific information, it is enema that about 1,000 damaged C0X13 were
out of operation for repairs in Dec 3952.
The total lumber a freight wee out of operation in Dee 3952 is
eatimatod at from 3,496 to 6,196 ears, or roughly 11 percent of
the es' ted total Inventory, leaving an ?parable inventorl of from
24.6,09S, to 53,o7h cars, aa shown In the tailoring tabulation*
Total estimated freight car park, Dec 1932
t Damaged cars Item Civil War mot repaired.
Oct 1951
Daseged in North Nom'
Constant inopertdele park for normal mai=
ot 51,995 and 591270) 2,100 to 2,400
Groan abductions 21,396 to 21,696
P1us ed, cars teem Civil. War r Arad after
Oct 1951 2,300
cars free North Korea repaired. to Deo 3.92 130000
additions 13,300
imated out of operatiou, Dec 1932 o 6,196
ble freight car put, Dee 1932 4-t-e099 to 53,074
21 Total. ember of cews dameged eatimatzd t 33,000 from Jure 1930 to May 1953*
Title would give about 28,000 damaged from June 1950 to Dec 19320 It is
eat:mated that halt a toe dammed ewe MiXtea* cars*
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54995 to 59,270
5,296-