US AND SOVIET STATEMENTS ON THE TERMS OF A CUBAN SETTLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00428A000200050019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 2, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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"A' DIAL
';q 11
2 November 1862
NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.
9/28/07
Director of Central intelligence
US and Soviet Statements on the leans
of a Cuban Settlement
1. jhrushchev's initial overture for a settlement
was net forth in guarded language in his private letter
of 26 October to President gennedy. This letter was in-
tended as a "feeler" to probe the President's willing-
ness to provide Xbrushchev with a face-saving formula
to cover a major backdown. It was, therefore, cast in
vague and imprecise language as regards the specific
terms of a settlement. dhr'ushchev, however, made it
clear that the basic formula he was offering the Presi-
dent involved Soviet withdrawal of offensive weapons in
exchange for a US guarantee that it would not attack
Cuba:
"If assurances were given by the President and
the government of the U9 that the USA itself would
not participate in an attack on Cuba and would re-
strain others from actions of this sort, if you
would recall your fleet, this would immediately
change everything. I an not speaking for Fidel
Castro, but I think that he and the governaeart of
Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilisation and
would appeal to the people to get down to peacfal
labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would
disappear, since, if there is no threat, then arma-
ments are a burden for every people. Then, too,
the question of the destruction, not only of the
armaments which you call offensive, but of all
other armaments as well, would look different....
"Let us therefore show ^tatasaatnlike wlado-m.
I propose: we, for our part, will declare that
our ships bound for Cuba will not carry any kind
of armaments. You would declare that the US will
not invade Cuba with its farces and will not sun-
port any sort of forces which might intend to carry
4TE _P; I DOCUMENT NO.
V` F t LJ_.; tQ, g f;- A$ NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
AUTH; Hip IJ-2
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CONFIDENTIAL
Out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for
the presence of our military specialists in Cuba
would disappear."
2. In less than 24 hours Ihrushchev sent another
letter which was publicized insediste1y and was prob-
ably designed to stimulate pressure on the US to begin
negotiations at once. This letter, which centsined
10mushchev's first public proposals for a settlement,
called for reciprocal Soviet-US withdrawals of offen-
sive weapons from Cuba and Turkey under international
supervision and for mutual non-aggression guarantees
covering thee* two countries. ghrushchov expressed the
belief that his scheme for a Turkey-Cuba exchange pro-
vided the "basis for a settlement."
3. O 27 October, President Kennedy replied to
ghrushchev's private letter of the previous day and ig-
nored the subsequent public letter. The President ac-
cepted the basic formula presented in the 26 October
letter, made procedural proposals for negotiating a for-
mal agreement, and not forth his understanding of Khru-
shchev's proposal in sore precise term. The President
made it clear, however, that the "first thing that needs
to be donee... is for work to cease on offensive missile
bases in Cuba and for all weapons system in Cuba capa-
ble of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under
effective T arrangements. " The President then stated
that, "assuming this is dome promptly," 98 representa-
tives at the Op had been given instructions which would
permit then to work out, is cooperation with g Thant,
"an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban
problem along the lines suggested in your letter of Oc-
tober 26th." President Kennedy then specified the "key
elements'" of ghrushchev's proposals which, he said "seen
generally acceptable as I understand then." Those were :
"1) You would agree to remove these weapons
systems from Cuba under appropriate tlaite d Nations
observation and supervision; and undertake, with
suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduc-
tion of such weapons system into Cuba.
412) We, can our part, would agree---upoa the
establishment of adequate arrangements through the
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United Nations, to ensure the cars ing out and con-
tinuation of theme commitments--(a) to remove promptly
the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give
assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I an confi-
dent that other nations of the Western Hemisphere
would be prepared to do likewise."
4. Nhrushchev'a public backdown letter of 28 Octo-
ber was confined to stating the =BR's intention to dim-
mantle and remove the weapons under some undefined form
of U[ verification. No did not elaborate on the terms of
his 28 October proposal, and he did not challenge or ques-
tion President Kennedy's definition of the proposed mutual
undertakings .. But he did not specifically accept the Pres-
ident** statement of tie comalt-111 to
"The Soviet government, in addition to earlier
instructions on the discontinuation of further work
on weapons construction sites, has given a now or-
der to dismantle the arms which you described as of-
fensive, and to crate and return thou to the Soviet
Union. "
Khrushchev represented the President's 27 October of-
for to give assurances against an attack on Cuba as a for-
mal commitment
"I regard with respect and trust the statement
you made in your message of 27 October IOU that
there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and
not only an the part of the US9 but also on the part
of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you
said in your nano massage. Then the motives which
induced us to reader assistance of such a kind to
Cuba disappear."
Khrushchev added: "We are prepared to reach agree-
ment to enable tS representatives to verify the dis-
mantling of these means. Thus in view of the assur-
ances you have gives sad our instructions on disman-
tling, there is every condition for eliminating the
present conflict."
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CONFIDENTIAL
S. President Kennedy's 28 October reply to [hru-
ehchev's usage of the same date concluded the ex-
change: "1 consider my letter to you of October 27 and
your reply today as firm undertakings on the part of
both our governments which should be promptly carried
out,"
May 8, Cline
uty Director (Intelligence)
C P-1
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