FACTORS AFFECTING SHIPMENT OF MISSILE SYSTEMS FROM CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00428A000200050036-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: November 1, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005 P79T00428A000200050036-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FACTORS AFFECTING SHIPMENT
OF
MISSILE SYSTEMS FROM CUBA
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CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00428A000200050036-2
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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CONFIDENTIAL OCI No. 3600/62
1 November 1962
FACTORS AFFECTING SHIPMENT OF
MISSILE SYSTEMS FROM CUBA
1. If Moscow has given the order to dismantle
and remove Soviet offensive weapons systems from Cuba,
the time necessary for final implementation of such
an order will be governed by the availability of So-
viet ships suitable for return transport of the bal-
listic missile units. We believe three weeks would
be the minimum time required for the proper Soviet
ships to reach Cuba and load missile cargoes. It is
more likely that at least four weeks would be required
to accomplish this.
2. The MRBM/IRBM systems being installed in
Cuba involve Soviet equipment which would be valued
at between a quarter and a third of a billion dollars
in US terms. They also represent a military capabil-
ity that Moscow would not wish to jeopardize even
though the systems were removed from Cuba. Therefore,
for both economic and military reasons, this equipment
probably would be carefully packed and shipped back to
the USSR in a manner designed to prevent damage. The
Soviets, therefore, would not willingly carry these
missiles on ships which were not able to stow them be-
low deck in the same way they were originally brought
to Cuba.
3. At least seven Soviet ships capable of carry-
ing MRBMs/IRBMs have been identified so far among the
ships carrying military equipment to Cuba. We do not
know the number of missiles carried on each trip by
any given ship and cannot be certain when any ship did
or did not carry missiles. We believe, however, that
each ship could carry about six missiles on transport-
ers, plus the erectors and much of the other associated
gear. We have seen 33 MRBMs in Cuba, but so far have
not identified any IRBMs. We believe that not less
than five and possibly as many as eight voyages by these
special Soviet ships were necessary to bring in the num-
ber of missiles in Cuba thus far.
rnNFIDENTIA-
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