CIA REPORTING ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000100020004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 26, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI No. 2927/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
26 September 1963
SUBJECT: CIA Reporting on the Dominican Republic
1. Since the inauguration of President Bosch,
CIA has consistently reported that his administra-
tion was not coping with its problems, that it was
permitting Communist infiltration, that for these
reasons it was in danger of a rightist overthrow,
and that September and October were critical
months. CIA also reported the rising political
tension of the last few weeks, identified most of
the leaders of yesterday's coup as disaffected and
engaged in plotting, and indicated that the crisis
was rapidly coming to a head. It did not pinpoint
the exact circumstances under the overthrow actually
took place.
2. Some excerpts from pertinent intelligence
issuances follow.
a, CIA Memorandum, 14 June 1963
There is currently under way a con-
certed campaign to discredit Bosch by
charging that he is himself a crypto-
Communist engaged in establishing a 'Com-
munist dictatorship, or else that his
ineptitude will lead to a Communist take-
over in the Dominican Republic. Manifest-
ly, this campaign represents the reaction
of vested interests who see their privi-
leged position threatened by Bosch's re-
volutionary purposes. It also reflects
genuine concern regarding Bosch's re-
markably tolerant attitude toward Com-
munist activities.
With reason, Bosch believes that the
principal immediate threat to the ac-
complishment of his mission is the pos-
sibility of a reactionary coup....
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The present danger of Bosch from
the right resides in the fact that he
does not have effective personal con-
trol over the armed forces and the na-
tionalpolice. A military move to de-
pose him might be instigated by dis-
affected civilians who see their vested
interest threatened by his reformist
programs, or by the personal ambition
of a military leader. The principal
deterrent to sick a move is the well-
known attitude of the US in support
of the Bosch administration as the
duly elected constitutional govern-
ment.
b. Central Intelligence Bulletin 9 August 1963
President Bosch and disgruntled con-
servative military and civilian leaders
are increasingly at odds.
...recent political developments
make a move against Bosch--or his re-
signation--a growing possibility. Mili-
tary leaders are increasingly concerned
about Communist activity,. and Bosch is
unlikely to meet their demands for a
crackdown.
During September and October,
domestic unemployment--already high and
a major economic problem--is due to
rise sharply, and Bosch's inability to
impelement popular reforms could be an-
other reason precipitating a showdown.
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f. Current Intelligence Weekly Review (CIWR)
16 ugus
President Juan Bosch of the Dominican
Republic plans key changes in his cabinet
and possibly will make other moves aimed
at staving off a growing threat of his re-
moval from office.
Ambassador Martin attributes Bosch's
multifarious political troubles largely
to the President's
_ failure to accomplish significant re-
form.... Me is7 still unwilling to re-
strict Communist activities. Many opposi-
tion charges on the latter issue are vague
and calculated to foster an atmosphere
favorable to a coup, but Bosch's failure
to take any effective action is a source
nuine concern to many Dominicans.
Bosch expects increased efforts to
overthrow his government during September
1963, including assassination attempts.
He believes that General Antonio Imbert
Barrera, who was a member of the coun i
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of state and one of the two survivors of
the assassination of the late Dominican
dictator, is involved in these plans. The
removal of Miolan from the political scene
is an attempt to decrease the possibility
of an overthrow by the military or right-
wing opposition groups.
h. CIB, 17 August 1963
Associates of President Bosch fear that
a coup led by elements of the Dominican
Air Force is imminent.
Angel Miolan, leader of Bosch's Domini-
can Revolutionary Party, reportedly believes
that the current; period is critical for
the government. He thinks that Viriato
Fiallo, leader of the right-wing National
Civic Union, is giving moral support to
air force plotters and hopes to be a mem-
ber of a civilian-military junta that would
succeed Bosch.
said that he has received a substantial
number of letters from military personnel
and civilians in the Dominican Republic,
expressing the hope that he can be counted
on if a crisis develops. de-
plored the fact that the Dominican armed
forces are being destroyed by Communist
infiltration and by the deliberate acts of
Bosch. Explaining the latter, he said
that the Dominican armed forces are being
converted from soldiers into smugglers,
particularly citing the air force, which
he said is engaged in smuggling of arms
and merchandise from Miami, Florida, into
San Isidro Air Force Base in the Dominican
Republic.
25X1 C j .
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President Juan Bosch has been meeting daily
with selected young Dominican army officers
in order to win their confidence so that
he can count on their support when he re-
volts against the older military officers.
k. CIB, 14 September 1963
President Bosch's opponents may try to
take advantage of his 14-17 September
visit to Mexico to promote plans for oust-
ing him.
The chance of an early move against
Bosch by the military may have increased.
Armed Forces Minister Victor Elby Vinas
Roman--a supporter of consitutional Gov-
ernment--seems to be losing his restrain-
ing influence on militar leaders hostile
to the President.
Mounting evidence that
Rib, air force commander General Atila
Luna Perez, and other officers have been
using their positions for personal gain
has heightened existing tension between
them and the government. (Published in
At approximately 1900 hours it was
learned
that Dominican troops had been confined
to quarters.
During 15 September APCJ President
Manuel Tavarez Justo cancelled a meeting
with a member of his organization that had
been scheduled for the night of 15 Septem-
ber, saying that he was called out on a
very important matter. comment,.
Tavarez was probably concealing his where-
abouts for fear of a possible coup.)
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in. CIWR, 20 September 1963
The growing political isolation of
Dominican President Juan Bosch appears to
be increasing chances of his ouster, with
extreme leftist elements the possible long-
range beneficiaries.... The survival of
the Bosch regime is increasingly threatened
by the President's inability to bring about
a rapid economic and social "revolution"
and by a political atmosphere charged with
a mixture of opportunism and genuine con-
cern about domestic Communism.
The President is especially handicapped
by a lack of personal loyalty from military
and police leaders, whose support is cru-
cial to his remaining in office.
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