ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MR. MAHON FOR INCLUSION IN THE RECORD OF THE HEARINGS FOR 5 AND 6 FEBRUARY 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000100090001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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12 February 1963
SUBJECT: Additional Information Requested by
Mr. Mahon for Inclusion in the Record
of the clearings for 5 and 6 February 1963
1. Purse of the soviet Space Effort
a. We have not yet detected or identified
any Soviet military space program,
b. We believe, however, that the USSR al-
most certainly is investigating the feasibility of
space systems for military support and offensive and
defensive weapons. We believe the USSR will produce
and deploy those military space systems which are
feasible and advantageous in comparison with other
types of weapons and military equipment. The first
Soviet military space vehicles are likely to be earth
satellites used in support roles such as reconnais-
sance, early warning, weather surveillance, communica-
tions, and navigation.
c. We do not believe that the Soviets have
yet launched such vehicles for military purposes,
However, the recovered satellites in the "COSMOS"
series probably accomplished cloud photography and
could have performed experiments involving pl3otc-
graphic, electronic and, nuclear reconnaissance.
d. We do not believe that Soviet space
technology has progressed sufficiently for the So-
viets to have made the decision to proceed with large
scale programs for offensivo or defensive space
weapons. Within this decade an orbital bombardment
system almost certainly will not compare favorably
with TCIWs as a military system,
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2. Antisubmarine Weapons Systems
+i..rr. mown n.rrmrrr
a. Killer submarines
1) The USSR has an urgent requirement
for high performance ASK submarines as a partial counter-
measure to the US Polaris fleet. The Soviets have three
classes of submarines, the nuclear ?4 and the conventional
F. and R. with characteristics that make them suitable
for use in antisubmarine warfare (MM).
2) The N-class nuclear-propelled torpedo-
attack submarine may have a maximum speed of 20-22 knots.
It appears to be well equipped with sonar, and probably
carrier 24 torpedoes. About seven N-class ships are in
operation, all in the Northern Fleet. The convention-
ally powered F- and R-class submarines are also well
equipped with sonar installations but have such less
range and speed, particularly underwater. They would
therefore pose only a limited threat to Polaris sub-
marines. Twenty-five F-class units and 20-25 R-class
units are operational.
3) Although these are the best equipped
of known Soviet submarines to carry out AS', there is
only slight evidence that they have been given this as
i
their pr
mary mission.
~ during hostilities most conventionally armed 5ovi
et submarines would take up defensive stations along
broad barriers at some distance from the Soviet coasts.
Their objective would be to attack any targets that
approached their positions, whether surface vessels or
submarines.
b. Air-launched Antisubmarine Weapons
1) There is no evidence that the Soviets
have developed an air-to-surface missile (ASM) designed
for use against submarines.
2) The Soviet Naval Air Force has
some 260 Badger (TU- l6) Jet medium bombers which are
equipped to carry air-to-surface missiles (ASS!). Most
of these ASMs are Kipper (AS-2) cruise types with a
range of 100 nautical miles (n.m.) although some of the
older and less sophisticated Kennels (AS-I) which have
a range of SS n.e. are still in service. These ASMs
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would be employed against sharply defined radar targets
such as aircraft carriers. They might have some marginal
effectiveness against a surfaced submarine at short
ranges. They have no capability against a submerged
submarine.
3) The Soviets may have developed air-
dropped torpedoes and nuclear depth bombs for antisub-
marine warfare (ASK) use. The effectiveness of these
weapons would, however, depend on the Soviet's ability
to detect the submarine:. Although ASS` is a major con-
cern of the Soviet Navy, the development of an air po-
tential in this field generally has been hindered by
deficiencies not only in the number and type of air-
craft employed but also in detection systems, weapons,
training and tactics. Air search and attack capabil-
ities apparently are extremely limited outside of
coastal waters--i.e., 200 to 300 n.m.
25X411
a. The Radio Interference Monitoring Croup
of the Atlantic Missile Range (A14R) reports there have
been no significant instances of interference from Cuban
sources. There have been instances of the US Range
inadvertently using frequencies assigned to Cuba and
vice-versa, but all such instances have been quickly
corrected, and in the opinion of the AMR there have
been no instances of deliberate interference.
b. Cuba is suitably located for monitoring
US missile tests at Cape Canaveral, especially those
in excess of SOO n.m. range. These, together with all
space operations, are exposed to electronic observation
from Cuba in their critical pre-burnout. phases. From
almost any place on the northern shore of central Cuba,
there exists a line of sight to all missiles fired from
Cape Canaveral after they reach 100,000 ft. altitude.
For example, an Atlas missile has been exposed to the Cuban
horizon for about three minutes by the time it reaches its
critical shut-down phases at an altitude of 910,000 ft.
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4. purpose of the Soviet Military presence in Cuba
a. The USSR is maintaining a substantial mili-
tary presence in Cuba for a variety of military and politi-
cal reasons.
b. This continuing ri;li.tary presence reflects
the USSR's deep commitment of prestige to protect Cuba from
external efforts to undermine and destroy the Castro regime.
The Soviet leaders are anxious to avoid any appearance of a
decline in their support for Castro. They feel obliged to
demonstrate their determination, to secure his regime against
US pressures. Furthermore, Khrushehev strongly desires to
avoid any impression that he might be induced to make fur-
ther retreats on such vital issues as Berlin by another dis-
play of US firmness.
c. The Soviet leaders also place a high value on
their position in Cuba as a demonstration of their equality
with the US as a great power and their ability to respond
to the thain of bases which the US has established around
the periphery of the Soviet bloc by developing a strong mil-
itary presence in an area traditionally within the US sphere
of influence. They also bolieeve that failure or inability
of the US to overthrow a Communist-supported revolutionary
regime in the Western Hemisphere will in the long run weaken
US prestige and influence in Latin America as well as in the
world at large.
d. In addition to these considerations bearing
primarily on the USSR's posture vis-a-vis the US, the So-
viet leaders probably have felt since the October crisis
that any substantial reduction or complete withdrawal of
their military personnel and equipment in Cuba would seri-
ously aggravate their already strained relations with Castro.
The Cubans were not consulted on Khrushchey's decision to
withdraw the strategic missiles and they almost certainly re-
sisted the removal of the IL-28's. They would bitterly op-
pose any Soviet decision to withdraw the SAYS, 4IC-21s,
KOMAR boats, and other advanced equipment.
e. Aside from these requirements of deterring ex-
ternal intervention and managing a difficult political rela-
tionship with the Castro government, the Soviets may believe
that maintaining a substantial military presence will provide
then with effective leverage to influence Castro's policies.
They probably have been irritated by his unwillingness to sup-
port the USSR in its conflict with the Chinese Communists
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and his clearly expressed sympathy for Pcipin 's more
militant, revolutionary line. The presence of Soviet
forces could also enable Moscow to support Castro in sup-
pressing any popular uprising and, possibly, to intervene
decisively in any internal Cuban leadership struggle.
f. The possibility cannot be excluded, of
course, that the USSR wishes to maintain a military pres-
ence so as to retain the option, at some more propitious
point in the future, of taking action to foreclose US sur-
veillance of Cuba or of proceeding with other activities
which slight be a direct-threat to the US.
S. Restrictions on Publication. A restriction on
"publicat can o n or! a on on'* offensive weapons in Cuba
was put into effect on 31 August, after the presence of
defensive surface-to-air missiles was confirmed. A formal
control system was instituted on 12 October. By "publica-
tion" is meant the use of such information in formal in-
illgeencee publications, which are widely circulated within
the government through classified channels; these restric-
tions did not affect either the study and evaluation of in-
coming information by analysts or the dissemination of
their findings to key policy-makers.
6. Differences in dates on charts. The Intelligence
Community mains a ns a can- moos running count both on So-
viet military equipment and on Soviet personnel in Cuba.
The figures presented on the two charts were chosen for par-
ticular illustrative purposes. The equipment chart was de-
signed to show the extent of build-up; the dates 1 July (be-
fore the build-up), 1 November (the, peak of the build-up),
and I February (the present) were selected. The personnel
chart was designed to show the evolution of our personnel
estimates over the period in relation to statements on
specific dates by government officials. More dates were
required for this purpose: 1 July (before the build-up);
I August and 1 September (our initial assessments of
personnel arrivals); 19 September (date of the National
Intelligence Estimate on Cuba); 22 October (date of the
President's speech); 1 December (date by which we had re-
assessed our information on the peak build-up) ; 15
December (date by which we had made a detailed assessment
of those remaining after the withdrawals); and 1 February
(the present).
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Questions Posed by Congressman Mahon
1.
Are Soviet efforts in space, for military or peaceful
uses? (Coord OSI)
2.
a,
b,
Are the Soviets building killer submarines? (Coord OSI)
Have the Soviets developed an air-launched anti-
submarine missile? (Coord ORR)
3,
a,
Is there any evidence that the Soviets in Cuba
have been or could "use electronics to interfere
with US missile or space flights on the Atlantic
Missile Range"? (Coord OSI)
b, In this make a complete statement on why the
Soviets are in Cuba. (Coord ONE) use Stennis 112
4, Date that the restriction was placed on information
concerning offensive weapons in Cuba, (RL will handle)
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Senator Saltonstall. I 'Would like to just ask this one or perhaps
two questions: How does the CIA assess the reason for continuing the
Soviet combat :units in Cuba. Is it to suppress Cuban insurrection and
rebellion? Is it to repel any attempted invasion or is it to serve as
a tripwire or direct confrontation with the U.S. and Soviet Union on any
U.S. action concerning Cuba or to aid in the exportation of subversion and
infiltration.
You passed on that partly yesterday. But why is it that they are
keeping their 17,000 men in Cuba, in your opinion?
Mr. McCone. You can only express a view on that, because we don't
known, but one obvious reason might be tomake it very costly for us to
invade Cuba and hence destroy a Communist base in the western hemisphere.
Another reason might be concern over Castro's stability and his con-
tinual adherence to the Con]munist cause and to keep a knife at his back.
A final reason might be to maintain a type of military establishment
that would, could, at any time foreclose our surveillance of Cuba and to
permit them to proceed with other types of activities which might be a
direct threat against the United States.
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ESTIMATE. AS OF DATE
LISTED OF SOVIET MILITARY
PERSONNEL IN CUBA
(EXCLUSIVE OF CIVILIANS)
IJULV b2 500
0 1 AUG.62 AT LEAST 2,0 0 0
'
? 1 SEPT.
62 2,300
? 19 S EPT.'62 ABOUT 4,000
? 22 OCT '62 8,000-10,000 *,,
? 1 DEC.'62 159000-229000
(PRESENT AT HEIGHTOF BUILDUP)
? 15 DEC.'62 17,000
(PRES.AFTER DEPART. OF MISSILE E.BMBR)
? 1 FEB.'63
17,000
*AGREED INTELLIGENCE COMMUN-
ITY ESTIMATES BASED ON KNOWN
NORMAL PASSENGER CAPACITY
OF SHIPS. DURING AUGUST
THE DCI REPORTED 4-6,000.
**RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS SHOWS
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