CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000300010033-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 8, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved F Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T0011000300010033-0
DRAFT
DCI Briefing
8 January 1963
I. The Soviet military presence continues to be
substantial despite the withdrawal of all
strategic missiles and jet bombers known to
have been in Cuba.
about 17,000 Soviet military personnel
remain.
1.
than 5,000 Soviets--probably assoc-
iated with the strategic missiles and
bombers--have left the island since
November.
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000300010033-0
 Approved Fo
Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429 0300010033-0
(continuing construction
of permanent facilities at the four major So-
viet armored group encampments in Cuba, where
an estimated 5,000 Soviet troops now are lo-
cated.
C. There has been no significant recent change
in the status of the three coastal defense
cruise-missile sites and related installations,
or in the Soviet-operated air defense system,
which includes 24 SAM sites.
one SAM site has been moved from its former
location in northern Camaguey Province to
a new spot in the center of the province.
revealed that
F. The display of surface-to-air and cruise mis-
siles in the 2 January parade in Havana, to-
gether with Castro's reference in his speech
25X1
25X1 D
Approved For Pelease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T0042PA000300010033-0
 Approved N )r Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T0 A000300010033-0
to a Cuban unit in the parade as "the
first ground rocket training unit,"
imply that Cuba will keep and eventually
operate these weapons systems.
II. Substantial Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba
continues as'part of Moscow's effort to
shore up the Castro regime.
A. Arrivals currently average about one
ship a day, considerably below the rate
at the height of the military buildup
last summer, but comparable to the first
half of 1962.
25X1
25X1
Approvedi For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TOQ429A000300010033-0
 Approved Foi'
elease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T004 00300010033-0
D. We expect increased use of Soviet bloc
ships on the Cuban run this year in
order to circumvent US efforts to cur-
tail Western shipping to Cuba.
2. If US restrictions are successful,
the USSR probably will charter
Western ships for runs to other
areas, and divert as much of its
own fleet to the Cuban trade as nee-
essary.
III. Neither the Castro regime?s goals nor its
methods have changed significantly since
the missile crisis.
ever since the crisis
Castro has been. taking a long, hard
look at his regime's policies and
possibly even the direction of his rev-
olution; this was suggested by his ab-
sence from the public limelight during
November and December.
-4-
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T0042PA000300010033-0
 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A0003000100P3-0
1. But despite Castro's chagrin over the
removal of the missiles, there is no
evidence that he will break his eco-
nomic lifeline to Moscow or will, side
openly with Peiping in the Sino-.Soviet
dispute.
B. Castro's 2 January speech confirmed his
regime's continuing hatred for the US and.
its determination to foment Communist rev-
olutions elsewhere in Latin America.
1. He singled out Venezuela, where oil
installations were sabotaged in late
October and early November, presumably
on direct orders from Havana, as'being
one example of a Latin American country
showing real "revolutionary solidarity."
25X1
Approved Fora Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TOP0429A000300010033-0
 Approve
25X1
C. Internally Castro's position remains secure;
there are some indications
Cuba's "new" Communists are in the ascendancy,
but no major purge of the Moscow-oriented
"old" Communists seems likely,
25X1
25X1
Approved Fort Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TOQ429A000300010033-0
 Approved For r lease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TI 0429A000300010033-0
DCI Briefin
g 8 January 1963
DIRECT SOVIET CIVIL AIR ROUTE TO CUBA
I. A Soviet TU-114 turboprop transport made the first
regularly scheduled flight from Moscow to Havana via
Murmansk on 7 January.
A. The flight opens the first Soviet air route into
the Western hemisphere and is billed by Moscow
as the "world's longest regular nonstop air
service."
14 The USSR advised the US on 17 December that
such a route would be inaugurated and a test
run was made in late December.
2. A roundtrip flight is now scheduled to be
flown once a week rather than twice as an-
nounced previously.
B. By flying nonstop from the northern USSR, the
Soviets are avoiding the problem of obtaining
overflight and landing rights from Western
countries.
1. Moscow has had increasing difficulties in
acquiring such rights since the outbreak
of the Cuban crisis.
2. The new route goes north from Moscow to
Murmansk for refueling and from there
direct to Havana.-a total distance of
more than 6,500 miles.
Approved or Release - 00429A000300010033-0
 Approved For F2elease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TQ0429A000300010033-0
3, The route does not pass through the air-
space of Western countries, but the
Soviets have requested navigational and
weather aids from Norway, Iceland, Canada,
the UK, and the US.
C. Although frequently alleged to be an undependable
aircraft, we believe the TU-114 is fully capable
of regular service on the Moscow-Havana route.
1. Maintenance difficulties are common to the
TU-114, however, and the Soviets have
announced they are assigning five aircraft
to the Cuban route to assure the schedule
is carried out.
2. Previously the only regularly scheduled
TU-114 service was on a route connecting
Moscow and Khabarovsk in the Soviet Far
East.
3, For the flight to Cuba the passenger load
has been reduced from a maximum of 170 to
about 60; in addition, up to 17,000 pounds
of freight could be carried depending on
the fuel load.
Approved For F2elease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TOO429A000300010033-0