SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AT A NEW CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000300020013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 14, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL I NTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
AT A
NEW CRISIS
14 JANUARY 1963
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER To
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM: Sino-Soviet Relations
14 January 1963
1. Attached is a CIA memorandum dealing with the
status and implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The
paper points out that the ideological conflict between the
two Communist parties and the divergence of the national
policies of the two governments are already so funda-
mental that, for most practical purposes, a "split" has
already occurred, From the viewpoint of most of the
rest of the world, the USSR and China are now two
separate powers whose interests conflict on almost every
major issue.
2? A formal and definitive break between Moscow and
Peiping would obviously have many important advantages
for the West. However, the emergence of a separate
Asian Communist Bloc under the leadership of China
could have grave implications for U.S. security interests
in the Far East because of Peiping's militant and intense
anti-Western line.
25X1A
R
S, CLINE
Deputy Direr (Intelligence)
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OCI No. 0581/63
14 January 1963
MEMORANDUM: Sino-Soviet Relations at a New Crisis
1. The conjunction of the Cuban crisis, the
Sino-Indian border war, and Tito's visit to the
USSR have led to a rapid intensification of the
Sino-Soviet struggle. The mutual denunciations
have taken the two parties a long step toward pub-
lic and explicit accusations of heresy which would
mark the end of any pretense at unity. They-are
nearer to such a rupture than at any time, and avoid-
ing the definitive step of open condemnation is in-
creasingly difficult. With or without this step,
however, we believe that the entire relationship
is bound to deteriorate further, and only the pace
of this process is in question.
2. The dispute seems to be gaining a momentum
of its own. Each new clash of polemics is sharper
and more extensive than the last. Both sides feel
compelled to attack and defend with increasing vigor.
The Chinese had begun to unfold a new ideological
attack on Soviet policy even before the Cuban and
Sino-Indian crisis, but these latter developments
led Peiping to carry the argument beyond previous
levels; the Cuban affair opened up a great Soviet
vulnerability, while the Sino-Indian conflict found
the USSR "neutral," a position which, among Commu-
nists, is hardly distinguishable from hostility.
Peiping wrapped up its indictment in two fundamental
critiques, published on 15 and 31 December, designed
to leave the impression that the Soviets had sold
out the international revolution. Meanwhile, the
Soviets have themselves gone over to the offensive
in speeches by Khrushchev and by his spokesmen at
a series of party congresses in Eastern Europe. The
latest and most thorough Soviet counter attack ap-
peared in Pravda on 7 January.
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3. In the current exchange, the basic doctrinal
arguments have not changed.* What is new is the open-
ness with which each side treats the possibility of a
formal rupture. Both refer frequently to "splitting"
activities and the "organizational" consequences of a
trend toward "fragmentation." A highly significant
article by Gromyko on 4 December used an historical
analogy from the 1920's to warn against naive illusions
that such a break could not take place; the dispute,
he implied, "continues, develops and goes further."
Pravda's long editorial of 7 January warned that "di-
visive activities" could not be tolerated because they
would lead to a "minority trend" in the movement and
"then to the emergence of the danger of a split...."
For their part, the Chinese warned that if the Soviets
continued their activities in condemning China they
would be moving "further and further along the road to-
ward a split." They even went beyond this to cite
Lenin's precedent when he broke with the majority of the
international movement in order to preserve the purity
of the ideology. Thus both parties are maneuvering to
place the onus for a split on the other, and to prepare
the best possible record against this day.
4. The ideological conflict between the two Com-
munist parties and the divergence of national policies
between the two governments are already so fundamental
that for most practical purposes a "split" has already
occurred. From the viewpoint of most of the rest of
the world, the USSR and China are now two separate
powers whose interests conflict on almost every major
issue. The issues in conflict are not merely tactical:
the Soviets and Chinese can no loner a_gree on a common
line of political guidance for the international move-
me , nor concert a common policy against the non-Com-
munist world.
Some Implications
5. Whatever happens next, it is likely that the
two other Communist states in Asia, North Korea and
*A representative sampling of contrasting Chinese
and Soviet views on key issues is set forth in attach-
ment.
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North Vietnam, will be key areas for new moves by
both sides. The position of these states is of
the greatest importance, for the adherence of North
Korea and perhaps North Vietnam to the Chinese camp
would mean more than the defection or expulsion of
one or two more separate parties judged heretical
by the USSR. It would mean the splitting of the Com-
munist structure on territorial lines with the Chi-
nese heading a rival Bloc in a commanding position
in the Far East and Southeast Asia.
6. Soviet tolerance of North Korea's support
for thin ,seems ng. Although there have
been continued military deliveries to Korea, includ-
ing newer types of equipment, it is likely that the
Soviets have begun to use Korean military require-
ments as a lever for political concessions. A North
Korean military delegation went to Moscow on 29 No-
vember but departed abruptly and apparently without
any new commitments. Almost immediately thereafter,
the North Koreans hardened their support for China
at the Czech Party Congress and were openly censured
for it. Subsequently the North Korean party issued
a defiant Central Committee statement stressing the
importance of strengthening their military position,
on the basis of "self-reliance."
7. The North Vietnamese are being assiduousi
cultivated byboth sides. The Soviets have recently
been investing considerable time and energy in culti-
vating General Giap, on whom they may count for sup-
port in Hanoi. Giap's stay in the USSR this summer
has been followed by a visit to Hanoi of General
Batov, the Deputy Chief of the Warsaw Pact. This
has been followed by the departure for Hanoi of the
Soviet official charged with Bloc Communist party re-
lations. The Chinese have greatly increased their
verbal support for the liberation movement in South
Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh, who is probably personally
sympathetic to the S v_iet Union. has managed to main-
tain a neutral stand, but this Is likely to become
an increasingly complex position for the North Viet-
namese leaders. The danger for the West in this sit-
uation is that Moscow may feel it necessary to com-
pete with China by offering more support to the opera-
tions in South Vietnam.
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8. The worsening of the dispute is apparently
becoming a factor in the Cuban situation. One Cu-
ban paper, usually identified with Fidel, published
the complete text of the highly provocative Chinese
editorial of 15 December, while another Cuban paper
of lesser importance published the text of the 7
January Pravda reply. Castro took note of the "dis-
crepancies"in the Bloc in his public statement of
2 January and urged a new try at unity. At this
stage in the dispute, such acts of apparent neutra-
1ity_are in Soviet eyes, tantamount o ges lures of
support for the C'inse
It is likely that Cas-
ro's stand in Sino-Soviet ma ters will add to cur-
rent frictions with Moscow, but neither the Soviets
nor. t ~ ap .cap , afford to abandon ,thee r, pu ic
om tmentssoof solidarity.
9. The preoccupation of Moscow with the dis-
pute is evident, and the sharp turn for the worse
in the past weeks probably has reinforced Khrushchev's
preference for a quiet period in East-West relations
in the wake of the Cuban setback. Numerous Soviet
spokesmen have privately implied that no movement on
East-West questions could take place while Bloc af-
fairs were in their present tense state. Gromyko in
his article of 4 December, went somewhat further and
hinted that when a break with China might be develop-
ing, it was prudent to consolidate relations with
the West, or at least to cease "attacks" on the West.
10. Recriminations are likely to continue and
may even reach a new level at the East German party
congress (15-19 January.) Khrushchev will lead the
Soviet delegation, and he is backed by key Soviet
officials who deal with the intricacies of Sino-So-
viet polemics. Khrushchev is likely to follow the
hard line of Pravda on 7 January. The presence of
the Yugoslavs in an important Communist party gather-
ing for the first time since 1948 is bound to provide
ample provocation to the Chinese who have consistently
and bitterly attacked Tito and Soviet rapprochement
with him. At a minimum, the Chinese will reply in
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kind to whatever denunciations they recCeve from
Ulbricht and Khrushchev. In the present tense sit-
uation this could mean the long-awaited public con-
demnations.
11. At bottom, and in the long run, it prob-
ably is not crucial whether the Soviets and Chi-
nese explicitly part company or formally remain
partners. Their diverging interests and concep-
tions are basic and will persist in either case.
Rival proselytizing will go on, either within the
existing international movement or between two com-
peting movements. The two powers will in their for-
eign policies pursue their own national interests,
clashing or cooperating as these may dictate. I_.T_
nor aurall laws 2.Lpolitics, in other words, will con-
tinue to prevail over the myths ae'-n`ons "of
Marxism-Leninism.
12. But these myths and definitions are not
wi jk4 ut their sbi nificance, fvr ,they still, have a
st ron h4ldon the minds of Communists. All con-
cerned regard it as a fateful move to take the step
of public denunciation which has historically been
the decisive move in quarrels of this magnitude.
The tortured effort to condemn by implication indi-
cates that, for Communists everywhere, this would
be an important ritual act. Even though the conse-
quences of a rupture are working themselves out in
practice anyway, the formal admission of :rupture
would dramatize and sharply intensify these strains.
Inside various parties, fragile compronises'which
might withstand a more gradual disintegration at
the core of the movement could be wrecked in the
factional forces loosed by an acknowledged split.
13. In addition to the organizational conse-
quences, there will be important political and
pyschological ramifications for Communists as well
as non-Communists. The failure to maintain even
a minimal unity would be a tremendous blow to the
self-confidence of Communists and to their belief
in the efficacy and infallibility of their doctrine.
It would suggest that both China and Russia placed
their national interests above the international
movement. The existence of two rival centers of
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power would probably be reflected throughout the
movement. New parties would appear. Some parties
would be opportunist and bargain away their allegi-
ance. Other parties would move toward an independ-
ent position. Initially the Soviets would retain
a vast numerical superiority, but over the long
run the Chinese may gain strength in undeveloped
areas, and particularly in Asia. Some parties would
be paralyzed by internal dissensions, and gradually
lose public political support and appeal,. Many of
these consequences are occuring throughout the move-
ment already, but the formal proclamations of dis-
unity would serve to aggravate these tensions and
accelerate the trend toward diversity and polycentrism.
14. Throughout the dispute, a decline in Sino-
Soviet state relations has paralleled the worsening
of ideological argument. Diplomatic contacts have
steadily been constricted, economic relations have
been substantially reduced and the Chinese have had
to forfeit most Soviet assistance for their military
programs. This trend is likely to,'bonti:nue as part
of the larger political deterioration, although dip-
lomatic relations would probably be maintained even
in the face of a collapse of formal unity. The pub-
lic military alliance between the two countries
Y _Qpen1y?repudiated, but this
is not really a key question. Already, neither side
can consider treaty obligations as an important ele-
ment in future calculations; each recd.nizes_ -'.hat,
in crisgs- whirh.._rai.se the possibility o nuclear war,
o. 4Ple _ in .:tike,-Taiwan Strait, _neither_ ca.n expect
to expose itself to major military risks
unless itself feels its vital _interests
Jo bp,.threatened.,, However, the Soviets would prob-
ably continue to believe that the preservation of
some kind of Communist regime in China was of vital
interest to them. They would hope that this re-
gime under new leadership would purge itself event-
ually of its present heresies. But in all matters
short of survival, China and the USSR will increas-
ingly view each other as hostile rivals and compet-
i pg powers.
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A SAMPLING OF CONTRASTING SOVIET AND CHINESE
COMMUNIST POSITIONS ON KEY DOCTRINAL ISSUES
Soviet Positions
"Basing himself on the Marxist-
Leninist theory of the class
struggle,...Mao Tse-tung has
summed up.,.that imperialism and
all reactionaries are paper tigers,
powerful only in appearance, in
reality inwardly weak..., and thus
not terrifying at all...By oppos-
ing this Marxist-Leninist thesis
..., the modern revisionists re-
veal themselves. as completely ig-
norant of revolutionary dialectics
and distrustful of the strength
of revolutionary peoples..."--Red
Flag, 4 January.
"The 'paper tiger' defini-
tion of imperialism speaks
only of its weaknesses...
What we need are not paper
def initions,..but a genuine
analysis...Marxism-Leninism
teaches us to approach the
enemy with a sober estimate
of prospects and actual for-
ces...The world Communist
movement is well aware that
imperialism is on the decline
..., but it is also aware
that it has atomic fangs, to
which it may resort...--
Pravda, 7 January.
"Imperialism always tries to in-
timidate the people with the weap-
ons at its disposal, but, whatever
the weapons may be, they cannot al-
ter imperialism's fatal weakness of
being divorced from the people...
The factor that decides the destiny
of humanity has never been any weap-
on, but always the masses of people
... Imperialism's use of nuclear.
weapons to intimidate people .can
never intimidate-the _.masses... , .
/but only/ the modern revisionistp_,_
... cringing before the might of im-
perialism and disseminating fear of
imperialism..." --Red Flag, 4 Janu-
ary.
ortant .thing ?in__
toavert war.,. This is par-
ticularly necessary in view
of the unprecedented destruc-
tive force of modern weapons
... Such a war would bring
death and suffering to hun-
dreds of millions of people
... In contrast, ...the dog-
matists emphasize that nu-
clear war is not to be feared,
that modern weapons are mon-
strous only 'in the opinion
of imperialists and reaction-
aries,' that 'the atom bomb
is a paper tiger'..."--
Pravda, 7 January.
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War and the Cuban Crisis (Continued)
"What we have strongly opposed,
what we still strongly oppose and
will strongly oppose in the future,
is the sacrifice of another coun-
try's sovereignty as a means of
reaching a compromise with imperi-
alism. A compromise of this sort
can only be regarded as 100 per-
cent appeasement, a 'Munich' pure
and simple..."--People's Daily,
31 December. "A political leader
must know how to distinguish com-
promises that are permissible
from those compromises that are
impermissible and are an expres-
sion of treachery..."--Red Flag,
4 January.
"The postwar years have not wit-
nessed a more acute internation-
al crisis,,.than the recent cri-
sis ...in the Caribbean... The
firm and flexible policy of the
Soviet Government..., which
prevented a thermonuclear catas-
trophe, is highly assessed by
grateful mankind... Now that
the crest of the crisis is be-
hind..., the 'leftist phrase-
mongers' are trying to present
the case slanderously, as if
the Soviet Union had capitu-
lated to imperialism and had
even agreed to a 'second Munich'
--Pravda, 7 January.
"Peaceful Coexistence"
"Those who attack the Chinese Com-
munist party...are opposed to re-
lying on the masses and their
struggles. They want the people
of the world-to place their hopes
for world peace on 'mutual con-
ciliation,' 'mutual concessions,'
'mutual accommodation,' and 'sen-
sible compromises' with imperial-
ism..." --People's Daily, 31 De-
cember.
The Cuban crisis "was settled
on the basis of mutual con-
cessions and sensible compro-
mise. The solution of dis-
puted questions between states
without wars, by peaceful
means--this is precisely the
policy of peaceful coexistence
in action." --Pravda, 7 January.
"The socialist countries-must
resolutbly support wars of na-
tional liberation and people's
revolutionary.wars. In branding
this correct-view of ours as 'war-
like,' those who attack the CCP
are placing the struggle in defense
of world peace in opposition to the
national liberation movements,...
They are opposed to revolution by
oppressed nations and peoples, and
demand that these nations and
"The entire activity of the
Soviet state, of the CPSU, in
the international arena is the
practical struggle against im-
perialism..., for rendering
real assistance to the peoples
who are defending freedom and
fighting for freedom. The broad
support of the liberation strug-
gle of the Algerian people...,
the defense ...of the people of
Laos, the support of India and
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The "Liberation" Movements (Continued)
peoples should abandon their revo-
lutionary struggles and forever
submit to the dark rule and en-
slavement of imperialism and reac-
tion... To take the stand of fear-
ing revolution, of opposing revolu-
tion, results in setbacks and de-
feats for the national liberation
movements..." --People's Daily, 31
January.
Indonesia..., the all-out as-
sistance to the consolidation
of the independent states of
Asia, Africa, and Latin Ameri-
ca--are but a few facts which
show how consistently the So-
viet Union fights...for the na-
tional liberation of peoples
... Our country's actions in
international organizations...
help to rally all progressive
forces in defense of national
liberation movements..." --
Pravda, 7 January.
Building Communism
"Chen Yi said that China had made
great progress in science and tech-
nology under the guidance of the
three red banners of the general
line, the great leap forward, and
the people's communes. Now, he
said, we can declare confidently
that by relying mainly on our own
efforts, ...all scientific and
technical problems in China's
economic construction and national
defense can be solved..." --People's
Daily, 5 January.
"Unwillingness to make use of
the experience of fraternal
countries and political with-
drawal are greatly harming
the Communist cause and hin-
dering the construction of
socialism. Economic autarchy
and national reticence are in-
admissible, particularly be-
cause we are not building so-
cialism and Communism in a
vacuum but under conditions
of competition and struggle
between two systems..."--
Problems of Peace and Social-
ism, January 196T.
Authority and Discipline
"The principles governing the re- "At the 22nd CPSU congress
lations between fraternal parties... and the congresses of Bul-
laid down in the Moscow Declaration garia, Hungary, Italy and
grant no right whatsoever to any Czechoslovakia, the delega-
party, big or small, to launch at tions of the Chinese Commu-
its own congress an attack on an- nist party claimed that it was
other fraternal party. If such an a mistake to openly criticize
erroneous practice is accepted, the line of the Albanian lead-
then one party...can attack this par- ers and tried to place on the
ty today and that party tomorrow..." fraternal parties the responsi-
--People's Daily, 15 December. bility for the differences
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Chinese Positions
Soviet Positions
The "Liberation" Movements (Continued)
"Those who accuse the CCP of...
the error of so-called 'national-
ism' ...themselves have violated
the principles governing rela-
tions among fraternal parties and
fraternal countries..., have fol-
lowed the wrong practice of na-
tionalism and great-nation chau-
vinism..." --People's Daily, 15
December.
"Some people have said: 'We are
the majority and you are the mi-
nority. Therefore, we are cre-
ative Marxist-Leninists and you
are dogmatists; we are in the
right and you are in the wrong.
But.. .such questions as who is
right and who is wrong...cannot
be determined by who is in the
majority or minority at a given
moment.... At the time of the
Second International, Lenin and
the Bolsheviks were in the minori-
ty..., but truth proved to be on
the side of Lenin and the Bolshe-
viks... All those who dare to
uphold truth are never afraid of
being in the minority for the
time being... We will never sub-
mit ourselves to the dictates of
any anti-Marxist-Leninist bludgeon
.,." --People's Daily, 15 December.
which had arisen. But to
make such contentions means
to go against irrefutable
facts, to absolve of responsi-
bility those who are in fact
fighting against a common line
of the Marxist-Leninist par-
ties,.,"--Pravda, 7 January.
"The disease of leftist sec-
tarianism is fed by national-
ism, and in turn feeds na-
tionalism. As shown by ex-
perience, it becomes particu-
larly intolerable when it
manifests itself in the ac-
tivities of a party in power
,.." --Pravda, 7 January.
"Communists cannot but feel
gravely concerned over the
thesis advanced recently that
there is a 'temporary majori-
ty' in the world Communist
movement which 'persists in
its mistakes' and a 'tempo-
rary minority' which 'boldly
and resolutely upholds the
truth.' To insist on this
thesis would in effect mean
to lead matters to fragmen-
tation of the international
communist movement... This
contention is especially
harmful in that it is asso-
ciated with the incredible
pretension of proclaiming
one party the true heir of
Lenin... Lenin was in favor
of recognizing international
proletarian discipline..."
--Pravda, 7 January.
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