CUBA - - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000300050022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 5, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

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5 February 1963
CUBA -- POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
I. The most significant discernible change in Cuban
policy since the missile crisis is the greatly
increased attention being given to subversion in
other Latin American countries.
A. While this has always been an element in
Castro's program, indications are multiplying
that it is now a high priority Cuban objective.
B. Castro himself stressed, in his two speeches
in January, the importance of guerrilla war-
fare in the "people's struggle for liberation"
and ridiculed all thought that ":liberation
from imperialism" can be accomplished except
through violence.
1. This was his strongest statement on
this theme in at least two years.
2. Castro's speeches were followed by similar
public expressions on the subject by
leading veteran Cuban Communists.
C. In all these speeches, it was made abundantly
clear that Cuba's leading target in Latin America
is Venezuela.
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1. Leading veteran Cuban Communist Bias
Roca stated this most explicitly in
his 23 January speech honoring the
anniversary of the ouster of Vene-
zuelan dictator Perez Jimenez in
1958.
2. Roca stated flatly that "we shall
continue to give our support, each
day in greater proportions, to the
Venezuelan people" in their struggle
for "liberation from imperialism."
3. Be praised the Venezuelans for the
acts of sabotage in the Venezuelan
oil fields during the crisis and
called this an:example of "prole-
tarian internationalism."
4. Roca closed his speech with the pre-
diction that "when the Venezuelan
revolution takes place, then all Latin
America will be'ablaze" and this will
be "a tremendous boost for Cuba ...we
will have a nation on the continent
to back us."
a. Roca may have been thinking of
the fact that until mid-1960 Cuba
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got the bulk of its oil from
Venezuela; now it is wholly
dependent on the USSR.
D. Reasons for the increased Cuban aggres-
siveness on this issue are probably
several.
1. It could be a reaction against So-
viet "betrayal" last fall, The Cuban
statements appear much closer to the
Chinese than to the Soviets on this
issue and there may be an element of
competition between Castro and Khrush-
chev for control of Latin American rev-
olutionaries.
2. Castro needs the kind of "boost" which
a successful pro-Castro revolution in
another country would give him and his
prestige.
3. The issue is one of the few left to
Castro to give his people a sense of
mission and distract them from domestic
problems.
E. One of the most effective Cuban tactics is
the training and indoctrination of Latin
American "students."
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to We estimate that between 1,000 and 1,500
people from other countries received guerrilla
warfare training and ideological indoctrina-
tion in Cuba last year.
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Cuban Economy
III. The Cuban economy continues to deteriorate and
there are no signs of significant improvement
in the foreseeable future.
A. Inadequate supplies and poor distribution
of food and other consumer goods are major
irritants among the public.
1. Food rationing, begun last March, has
not solved these problems.
2. While there is much grumbling among
the public, shortages at this point
do not appear to be an inducement to
open revolt.
B. Present indications are that this year's
sugar crop--the mainstay of the economy--
will be less than last year's poor crop
of 4.8 million tons--it may, depending on
weather and labor factors, be under 4 mil-
lion tons.
1. This compares with an average annual
crop in earlier years of close to
6 million tons.
2. Other crops are doing badly too; on
2 February Cuban agricultural chief
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was moved to
blast rice farm managers and workers
for poor organization and insufficient
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spirit or permitting rice crop to
fall below expectations.
C. Cuba-is unlikely to benefit greatly from the very
high current prices for sugar on the world market.
1. The price is now 5.9~ per pound--the highest
in 40 years--compared with 2.430 in January
of last year.
2. In 19619 the USSR and Communist China agreed
to pay Cuba a price--4c per pound--then sub-
stantially higher than the world market price,
though not as high as the then premium US
price of about 5c.
3. We have no information as to what extent the
Soviets have adjusted the 40 price for Cuban
sugar to reflect the current high world prices.
4. While most Cuban sugar sold to the bloc is
bartered for needed imports
D. Negotiations underway most of December and January
in Moscow on this year9s Cuban-Soviet trade have
not been followed by public announcements.
1. Only vague statements that the level of trade
will increase have come forth.
2. If trade does in fact increase, it will mean
that the Soviets have decided to increase
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commodity credits; Cuban ability to pay
for increased imports is prof,,-ably now
lower than at any time since Castro came
to power.
E. Cuba?s commerce with non-bloc countries continues
to decline, which makes it even more expensive
for the Soviet. Union to keep Cuba afloat.
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