STATEMENT ON CUBA BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000300050026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: February 6, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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STATEMENT ON CUBA BY DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
In view of the many conflicting rumors and reports con-
cerning Soviet missiles and troops in Cuba, the Director of
Central Intelligence, Mr. John A. McCone, has issued the
following statement on the current status of Soviet military
forces and equipment there. This statement represents the
agreed views of the United States Intelligence Board, of
which Mr. McCone is Chairman. This board is made up of the
chief intelligence officers of the United States Government.*
It rests on the most up-to-date and reliable data avail-
able to the United States Government and is derived from all
of the intelligence gathering resources at its disposal, in-
cluding daily aerial surveillance.
*The members of the United States Intelligence Board are:
General Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence;
Mr. Roger Hilsman, The Director of Intelligence and Re-
search, Department of State; Lieutenant General Joseph F.
Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Depart-
ment of Defense; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army;
Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; Major
General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, United States Air Force; Lieutenant General
Gordon A. Blake, Director, National Security Agency; Ma-
jor General Richard Collins, Director for Intelligence,
Joint Staff; Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Assistant General Mana-
ger for Administration, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Alan
H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
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STATEMENT
Hundreds of reports on Soviet forces in Cuba are re-
ceived weekly by United States intelligence agencies and
each of them is checked carefully for reliability and credi-
bility by trained and experienced intelligence analysts.
The totality of information derived from all sources, in-
cluding extensive photographic coverage, gives the best
picture available in the United States of the Soviet mili-
tary presence in Cuba today.
At the President's direction the situation in Cuba has
been regularly reviewed and information has been made avail-
able through the Department of Defense over the last several
months.
As has been frequently reported, there was a substantial
buildup of Soviet military equipment and military forces
prior to the "quarantine" of October and November 1962. The
USSR had in fact supplied a great deal of military equipment
to Cuba prior to July 1962, including tanks, field artillery
pieces, anti-tank guns, and jet military airdraft, all of
which had been positively identified. On 1 July 1962 there
were about 500 Soviet military technicians in Cuba advising
and training the Cuban armed forces, then estimated at
about 75,000 regulars, 100,000 militia and 100,000 homeguard.
In mid-July 1962 began the influx of Soviet military
equipment and military personnel which was detected by our
Intelligence Community and monitored into the crisis period
of September and October, when the offensive nuclear weapon
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systems (missiles and bombers) appeared. This build up
ceased on October 24th, with the establishment of the
quarantine. We are convinced beyond reasonable doubt,
as has been stated by the Department of Defense, that
all offensive missiles and bombers known to be in Cuba
were withdrawn soon thereafter. Photography of ships
loading in Cuban ports and at sea proves to our satisfaction
the withdrawal of 42 medium range missiles and 42 bombers,
their related equipment and attendant personnel. Recon-
naissance has not detected the presence of offensive
missiles or bombers in Cuba since that time.
Many rumors and reports of the continued presence
of the offensive weapons in Cuba have been received. For
instance, there have been a number of reports that of-
fensive weapons have been concealed in caves. Some of
these reports evidently derive from the known Cuban
practice of using caves for storage of small-arms, am-
munition and other items of military hardware. All
statements alleging the presence of offensive weapons
are meticulously checked. So far the findings have been
negative, Absolute assurance on these matters, however,
could only come from continuing, penetrating on-site
inspection.
Prior to the 24th of October, however, very substantial
quantities of Soviet military personnel and Soviet equip-
ment, in addition to the offensive missiles and bombers,
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had already reached Cuba. The inventory of tanks, jet
aircraft, military trucks and field pieces more than
doubled during this period. In addition many sophisticated
Soviet military items appeared for the first time.
Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba
From a few hundred military technicians in the summer
of 1962, the Soviet armed forces in Cuba grew by October
24th to include regular troops manning the tanks and other
weapons of mobile armored groups, specialists in charge of
an extensive surface-to-air missile system, and a large
number of other air force, naval and army personnel.
Our current evaluation, based on all sources including
known tables of organization of Soviet units, is that a.
total of about 22,000 Soviet troops were in Cuba during
September and October. Since then about 5,000 troops
associated with offensive missile systems have left. Some
17,000 Soviet military personnel now remain in Cuba.
Air Defense System
The USSR also planned and largely built an integrated
air defense system employing surface-to-air (SAM) missiles,
complex radars, anti-aircraft batteries and jet fighters.
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There are 24 operational SAM sites, each with 6 launchers.
There is probably a total of about 500 SAM missiles in
the system. The SAM sites appear to be manned entirely
by Soviet personnel.
To supplement surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets
brought in additional MIG fighters, reaching a total of
about 100, including 42 MIG-21 aircraft, a modern high-
speed (Mach 2) interceptor which can be used both for
ground support and air defense. About 200 modern
Soviet radars were installed to tie the system together.
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Cruise Missiles
The Soviets have brought in approximately 150 coastal
defense missiles and have thus far established 4 operational
sites. A large number of these cruise missiles are still
in storage, which suggests that the Cuban crisis interrupted
a Soviet program to construct several more sites. There
are probably missiles enough to establish 15 more sites.
These coastal defense missiles have an estimated range of
30 to 40 nautical miles and hence the entire installation
would provide a formidable coastal defense system.
Missile Patrol Boats
In addition, the Soviets brought in 12 KOMAR guided-
missile patrol boats. These units appear to be operated
by mixed Soviet and Cuban crews. They are Soviet motor
torpedo boats with the hull modified to carry two missile
launchers, The missile employed has a range of 10-15
nautical miles (limited by radar line-of-sight).
Soviet Armored Groups
The Soviets also introduced four mobile armored groups
deployed at camps throughout Cuba. These four units have a
total strength of about 5,000 officers and men. They also
have tanks, armored personnel carriers, assault guns, mor-
tars, and infantry rocket launchers. In addition there are
several advanced-type tactical rocket launchers, anti-per-
sonnel weapons with a range of about 25 miles.
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Shipping to Cuba
The U.S. intelligence agencies are closely observing
Soviet ships calling at Cuban ports. The massive Soviet
military deliveries to Cuba ceased on 23 October. At
that time more than 15 ships at sea, undoubtedly fully
loaded with military cargoes, turned back to the USSR.
Fifty odd Soviet-dry-cargo vessels have arrived in
Cuba since 1 November. Of these only one has delivered
any significant amount of military equipment to Cuba al-
though small quantities may have arrived in other ships.
An arms-carrying ship, the Simferopol, delivered a cargo
on 17 January which we believe was exclusively military,
but which, we know from dependable sources, did not con-
tain offensive missiles or aircraft. Another ship with a
similar cargo is probably now en route between the USSR
and Cuba. The remaining Soviet and Bloc ships now en route
to Cuba appear to be carrying principally commercial cargo.
Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba is substantially higher than
a year ago, and though free world shipping has decreased
sharply, the total cargo tonnage now being received in
Cuba is about the same as a year ago.
From all of this, we must conclude:
a) there remain large quantities of Soviet tanks,
guns, aircraft and troops, most of which arrived before
the quarantine; and
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b) a relatively small amount of Soviet military
equipment has reached Cuba in the period since the
quarantine.
The intelligence community of the United States
Government continues to keep under close surveillance
and to report currently on this extraordinary deploy-
ment of sizeable Soviet military forces into the Western
Hemisphere. All evidence reaching us, including reports
from Cuban refugees but also including photography and
other reliable sources, is carefully sifted and weighed.
The United States Government must be provided the most
accurate, responsible and balanced evaluation of the So-
viet military presence in Cuba. Significant information
concerning conditions in Cuba received by citizens or
government officials should be transmitted to the intel-
ligence community promptly for evaluation in our continu-
ing close scrutiny of this grave situation.
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