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A} ~ ase.. 2001/08109 :-CIA-k DP79T-00 9AQOQ;40AQ-2,( 1 DRAFT STAATEYMNT BY AS SI TMT &r P.C.57:-:2ARY 74IN ?I. VP,7, IN 3LX'OYE THE LATIN 1I 1111C say C.::T IVITME OF `'I'i E f C nE FOREIGN AFFAIRS CC"2,11TT:E 011 THE SUBJECT OF COs UAIST S R 11 1N a rn IS1 ; IP1TJiCtI?t .'ION I welcome this opportunity to appear before this Sub- Committee to testify on the irnpo tant problem of communist subversion in the hemisphere. In recent months public attention has focused to such a coerce on the Soviets' arms buildup in Cuba that it has tendd to overshadow the serious dancer of subversive activities throughout Latin America? aided' In many ways by Cuba and other bloc countries. The problem of extra-conntin ntal totalitarian powers try. ing to subvert established COvern entr in this he risphere is not now. During World liar 11 the American Republics faced the challonce of fascist subversion sponsored by the Axis powers. Through individual and collective action they successfully dealt with this threat. Since 19118, in the aftermath of the cormunist seizure of power In Czechoslovakia, the inter-American c? mariunit;y has been dealing with the problem of co:- munict sub- version promoted by countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, now aided by Cuba. I mention this at the outset to point out that the American Governments have been confrontin this issue loz before tbore t o the leadi: - , unist parties ortaa -: s ~ '?: it pry n countrlos,, ?~Mii'w'p_ &. k _ ;arl .!. ,'. "3 ~ ~. an iniwl.i+CS yJc am thew' pill-. By the Approv d For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 1953 m. kka w;lca Sias improving. The swollen, These parties the lose of 1953, th 11 nit parties and tho it z 1 rely con 'ined to ;heir continued hold in labor organizations and anion intellectual. and common a t parties co i ndinl a m4ass iollowing an they generally exc epttonally were they able to make common caauua remained on the detengthe.. czar period before the C as t~ period 1950- 54* whore reached ,,.nail high levels in the late l95O's, the eomn unist leader- The outstandin success of the post 0 takeover was in Guatemala in the he ccirmurlists came to dominate the Arbcnz Goverrt"ner t and entabli h eft fwt:iv'e control over the country's labor and peasant orjani%ations. As the Soviets # peer and status ship, however, gained new confidence, but Latin America was till isolated from tho ccnt;ero off` international c o m.unism and the local p, rttes were unable to translate this srovwth of Soviet po er. into greater capabilities for influence and penetration in the national societies of LatIn Arncrlca, entering- a period of c.ypansion.n the aftermath t World War 11, Soviet relations with Latin America,. which seemed to be lod 1947-52 as o country after another suspended` relations with talheA same time that they were beginning 1953 with overtures to the Perlin Government 'or in- operations in the area entered on the present period of expansion creaaeda @d Fo ale o ce aOP v o b o oat as was par t Approved for Release 2005/06/09 CIA=RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 part of a vorldwide operation keyed to the underdeveloped countries,, and spearheaded by trade and aid proprama As of December 31, 19580 the European bloc countries had 20-odd trade and payments agreement: v-1th five Latin American countries (Arsentina, Brazil,, Oolom'bia,* UTru uay and Mexico..) One or more of the bloc, governments at this time had resident diplomatic missions in these same tin American countries and also in trade. ? burins the period 1955-57, fourteen Latin American countries were visited by bloc trade missions, and seven of these countries world, to x''75 million in lt' ~ ..7 of Latin American trade. The peak was reached in 1955, reflecting trade with Argentina under the Perlin regime - $340 million or 2.5% of Latin American Bolivia. Soviet bloc trade w.1th Latin America rose from 70 million In 1953,E only Q. of Latin America's trade with the sent mirsicns to the bloc. between Latin America and and bloc radio broadcasts American audiences, In addition,, during the l95O's travel e bloe reached a fairly high level, cttod more and more time to Latin During the peri 1953--58, the Soviets failed to gain any secure foothold throe h tholr diplomatic and economic offensive. What apparent suceessek3 they achieved were based on the need of various Latin American countries to sell surplus raw materials and. their willingness Go take Soviet goods in exchange. Argentina, and Uruguay, the main theaters of Soyiet operation Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 Approved.For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 during; this period, 'C12"'01 Cove ri :do no lac tin,; gains . . general, the first ph.-;-,se YFiet operations in the area was one of probing for oppor tunities. AM-NY O CAS1110 Since 1959 the metal pattern of communist subversion. in the hemisphere sho,?ts a continuation of the tactics of i.nfiltration, popular front action and insurgency,. 'with a marked shift tosward z:oore v ic>1 erce . r101 is has coincided with the advent of Castro . d tE zl-arpenin of differences between Moscow and. Pelting on w c? t : t tc to be followed in pressing forward the communist ca+ p ni,A of =:orld domination, The Soviets undoubtedly ro and Latin America as an area offering unusual possibilities, but they have been cautious in their tactics, except where special opportunities have developed, as in the Ouse of Cuba. On the other hand, there is no evidence that they have in any u-ay ioat ?ained Cuba or local communist parties from violence of many f+c rnma, The Strategy and Taet;too or-the Castro fe i e The strategy of the C o* tro re irie from the beginning, pite all the disci Approved For Release 2D L06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 to Weaken and MsoreUit the Castro Per lJhile subversion has bay; as we have seen, a lon -'term efforts, its strength Ss unquestionably af'f'ected by the position, prest ge and stability of Castr and his regima in Cuba. We have had a considerable raea ure or success from our efforts to isolate Cuba and discredit the Castro Government. In this card, the missile 0r-isia proved to be of i,nosti i$a'ble value :.: unmasking the Castro re-Imo, previously regarded as a model for new Latin American type revolution, as Just one more tool of 11,oscOW.. The inepittde of Cuban leaders, coupled with our efforts to increase isolation of Cuba from access to the industri- alized zed markets of the froc world, has brow ht about Serious economic uateriorat .on in the ir:land. In the political field ;we have achieved a major reduction in the influence of tide3.ismo. The, stro Goverment has been ausponded from participation in: the OAS. 'f fteon American Republics no loner have diplomatic . rela- tions with Cuba. Last October during the missile crisis achieved complete hemiapherio solidarity on OAS action to protect the peac a and. security of the continent. he a result of economic deterioration, Soviet d o: ination and political ostracirim, the Cuban example has becone increasingly less attractive. to Latin .merica,. in quite a diffcr:nt arena, USIA Is taaging a 1battle for men's minds in tolling the s tort' of the betrayal of the Cuban revolution . Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 Approved For Release 22QW06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 revolution and ' hab conditions in Cuba and other cc,mmuniat countries are like today. sThroti-II radio, procs, books, tole- vision and films a this rossa ;;o it being carried daily to the Latin Anori.can public. 'T'oo 4+ a few cxa Ales i (a) 4,500 OUT- of ' -f ni hed cl r cd radio pro ;rams- aria boin broad.. cast over some 1400 Latin American stations par tjeckk; (b) Bone 10,000 v"ords of nevis and co wentary are being sent, daily via .;eiet e to all Latin Atiori,cz n pouts for placement in the local veaax and (c) a ileekly 'iftoen-minute video taped show in boin televised rcaularly in forty-tuo oities of o. ,ht en Latin American countries, with an estimated 10 million viewers. In addition to this mar, r its efforts to make contact,, voach, USIA has greatly expandod b half of the . free world, In ,perial groups auk ,es labour,', student bodies* and intellectual and cultural elite who ?re the priority targets of the eommuntst 'or is A _gs of the succo our effo to to discredit and isolate the Castro re Giro politically and ocoho ically is' to be found in the inability of the extreme left to cr ize anti,- ri.can public del ns.trationa or any si nificant proportions during the critical days of therfamias to crisis. One is reminded of the oft-repeated boast of the Caitro re2imrme of how the hemi- sphere would rise In dofense of Cuba if measures u ere taken against it. 'the 'record shows Otherwise. Only in Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay" were popular der= nstratttons of any size mounted and only in Venezuela Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 .n Venezuela were there any cftectivc sabota e effort Minor protest r etinws, student parches, and bombings vicr'e reported from other countries, but ware regarded as failures in terms of generating popular opposition to the action of the United '8t.atoe in Colombia itaeppeered that the immediate reaction of the communist party and other ex4remists was dcfiensive,, and, rather than attempting to o t;;,anize demonstrations, they avoided hostile action. In Chile there were only small, limited demon- tions, despite much propaganda and planninS action by the extreme left during the preccdin+? months calling for dements strationa and strikes if the united States were to Cuba, against Pro-Cuban ele r s in !cuador made a n Jor o, though so wwhat uncoordinated, effort to protest United States and OAS actions, Those efforts were 1nIoat totally unsuccessful. Despite vitriolie attacks by extreme leftist; publications and the exhortations f party loaders, there were only minor dernone trationa in Guaya4uil and Quito. It Peru,, front organizations organized anti-United States rallies * Other than one at the University of lea, which degenerated into a bloody b cavil, these rallice were . notable for the small attendance, In Montevideo, 'Vru uay, a oor nuiist-Organized demonstration was attended by some 7,000, students and workers,' ..The demonstration Was peaceful Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 was peaceful and broke up aft;wr a few anti-4t 4tcd States spceches. The organizers eo ;-ldore+ .tie demonstration dit - as )ointin . The Central of Uru uayan Workers twice failed in efforts tc stage der onstr at .+ n3 f Do ,ivie1 the pro-cant: + c1-monatration ware mats by an equal number or pro-United States demonstrations. The pro.. U33 dormstr'ators did not hesitate to clash with the extreme loft damor strators ? In Chi e, exi00 an d thho Dominican Republic there were only minor demonstrations. In Brazil, Haiti Costa Rica, El Salvador# Guatemala, NNcaraGua, Panama araguay 9 # o ura l and P there were no dwohs franc , This was all tha comnur s to were Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A00040002001.8-5 -37- United StC es in.tornal Sncur it. Pro a s Whereas the problem for the United States in, strengthening Latin American cooperation; towards hemispheric security had, until the advent of the Castro movement been largely One of maintaining its influence in the area and developing the capability of the Latin American countries to make at least a token contribution for collective defense, the problem has now become one requiring a United States contribution to the capability of the Latin ' Americs police and military elements to maintain internal law and order against communist inspired violence. This task is by no means confined to providing arms for the suppression of the CastroOcommuniat movement. If the Latin American military and public safety forces are to win'popular support for the measures that may be necessary to-curb-such violence, they must establish themselves in the public mind, as a constructive,, economically responsible element in the national life. In this connection I would like to touch briefly' on what we are doing in this field. From Its inception in 1952 until the Castro.. communist takeover in Cuba, our grant military assistance program was limited to improving the capability of specific military units which ten Latin =-merican countries had Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 agreed Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 agrec4 in bilateral military. agrees ents, to maintain for collective dcfenee, under the Rio Treaty, against external aggression. However, two major dovelopments required us to reorient our military policies aid programs t (a) the growing reliance of Latin Ariierioa on the United States for defense against external attack brought about by technological advances in warfare and (b) the Growth of the Castro-cormmuni st subversive movements. With. respect to the latter development # it became apparent in 1960 with the avowed intention of the Castro regime, to promote the overthrow of Latin American governments by indirect aggression and subversion, that the security of nearly every government in the hemisphere would be jeopardized, in varying degrees In anticipation that many countries would be confronted with Com nunist inspired disorders, terrorism, sabotage, and possibly guerrilla operations,, a careful and intensive assess:ont was made by the United States in 1961 of the potential security threat to each country with the view to the immediate development and implementation of the United States military assistance and training; programs reoriented to this new danger.: Where critical deficiencies in the capability of local security forces. wore found, we moved rapidly in 1961 Aproved 2r6 a ease, 5 6 0 R 3 'p0( ti~t~fdA~b~1020018-5 training, Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 -39- training, and servieos undor our military assistance and public safety pro rnxi to make up such deficiencies. While those measures served as ui immediate response to the threat, we rer li'.r_,d that over the long term the ultim8.te solution to tie Comnsulast violence problem would require nothing le rs that.the establishment of political, economic and social stability through joint United States-Latin Amcric-nSL endeavors winder the Alliance for Progress.. However, we could not disregard the intention, of the Castro-coy m nist movement to utilize subversion and force, wthcn fiver necessary to retard or prevent economic and social development through democratic processes. Conoequontly, our objectives have been reused nd our pr o;rxs reshaped to provide Latin 'American countries with the training and equipment required to frustrate such efforts. The # adamental objective of our internal security programs in Latin America, is the establishment of Latin American military leadership and security forces dedicated to the tanks oft (1) preserving democratic constitutional oxrder; (2) contributing' to collective defense on A. scale coin :ensura to vrit - Latin American rzi ,ita7r and economic capabilities and (3) promoting social and econonsie development through civic action programs, Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A00040002U 18-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 To these ends, we are providing the type of materiel, training and services required for the control of Communist inspired civil disturbances, for vigilance and control-of movements of subversion and arms inside those countries aaid across their borders, and for the maintenance of observation and patrol of rural areas for detection and dispersion of guerrilla movements. Resolutions 1 cm 2 of the Punta del l ste meeting, which. define the present threat and collective measures that may be taken, are the multilateral keystones on which. our present bilateral programs are based to improve the internal defense capabilities of the satin American countries. Closely related to the task of providing Latin American security forces with appropriate materiel, is the,-Indoctrination and training of Latin American military personnel with the ooraplete portfolio of Communist techniques and counter-measures throu;h. training in the United States and Canal :Joie Schools. During the pst two years Increased emphasis h been placed on training the Latin American. 'mill t pry ortot control, oountor-.guerrilla operations and tactics, intelligence and counter-intelligence,, public 'information, psychological warfare, and other subjects which will contribute to they maintenance of public order and the Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79TOO429A0004000200 8-5 upport Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 support of cons tit;uticr?=::a F-,ovorn onto. These courses are . given at United t n1lit-cry r schools at Fort Gulick, -Canal ,aao e?nd at Port Brag, north Carolina, Moreover, for&i n officorr attending the longer term, career comm nd courses, in the United States, receive formal instruction t h.ich,. in part, treats with the rights of government v constitution, ersip"r of the land, and rte ~ > ind iuiciual. under the v> pro ?or regard for laws t' a application of legal procedures under c er;;oora c systoms, in October of '062, tl- r l ,ter-American Defense College was established un6or the auspices of the Inter-AAmcriea. Defense i o4rc at Fort 1c air and began its first course for senior officers tram' the armed forces of the various An=nie. Republics The purpose of the College is to con duct courses of study on the In.ter..Americt a. system = id the military, economic political and social f : ctors that constitute essential components of defense of our free societies. In our military as l t mce end training programs, we are emphasizing to tie L tin American countries the need for participation luz the economie development of the country through civic action programs,- ate are including in our oc tzip'pcrt equipment. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 The interest of th1- L.tin Armoric , military in contributing to ~rvti~ projects 1-ras exemplified by their' eridorscr:}ent of ra Inter-American Defense Board Resolution of December 1960, which recommends, in port: "That the Governrmmcxnt,s of the American States take into consideration the advisability ofemploying organs of their Armed r arcos , oferably in regions considered be underdeveloooed, in order tot (a) undertake highway and settlement work,. a:, { prro;ride end establish technical services; (b) broaden the economic bases directed towards raising the +rds of living of their people; end (6) educate the native pop7.Alati.ens In their own surroundings and create roservec . of special labor for specific types of Work, In assessing the intexual security situation in the region, we found that the civil polite forces in many of the countries need assistance In the matter of police administrat1on, training and operational techniques and partieul;,riy required greater mobility and more adequate syste n.s of communications Consequently, we developed.. a ptaalic safety program; as an integral part of the AID 'rogr z in effort to. increase the effectiveness of civil police end to seek elimination of any duplication and coif 1lct between civil police and military forces hh e a~ r a~ u efforts are based on the Unite4 Stater: public i-,-! vices coca ept . stemming from Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020e 8-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 the philosophy that in r democratic society are sal-imposed it s trumont; of control ?nd therefore should be responsive to the E}:, ~.{;:~:~y#s economic, political and social needs. This thln!,J_:.7 is compatible with other AID objectives clealin. ~ 7ith the?dovolopment of free political institut iorr #`.?:"id also those which deal with prtecting the inc iviCAu., .l from clcxaloitaticn or abuse. The Program at the sr-:,,e of a strong internal In this connection r, supports establishment ty base. ,kro *tonal Inter-American Police Academy was establish :d l.n F;t ; Year in the Canal Zone to which we Invite selector; me ergs of Latin American civil police torcas for= training in organization, administration, riot records, and investigations, all based on the r,ublii rvi.ce concept.` fealizing that pro of internal security can only be resolved by the Joint efforts of the civil G dlmilitary sec ':_rs of society, our programs are being designed so that to will ;T: ?nort of non-Communist civilian element:, and the icca.l military and are being carefully tailor< rd to meet the` individual requirements of the Lr -~, iun ,, erican. countries. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 STEPS BEING TAKEN IN THE OAS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST SU 3'JE ?STQN- As I noted at the outset, thest'ruggle against extra-continental subversion is not a now experience for the inter-American system. The' problem arose during World War II with the activities of Axis agents. To help the governments deal with it, the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Rio de Janeiro, 19k2) established the "Emergenvy.,Advisory Committee for Political Defense". This Committee functioned until the end of the war, rendering a most useful service to the inter-American community by assisting the member governments to identify centers of Axis propaganda, espionage and subversive activities and to develop suitable control measures, The danger of international communism has been: a topic of discussion and action in major inter-American forums from the outset of the Cold War. .Beginning with the Ninth 'Inter-American Conference in '1948 to the present,.the OAS has demonstrated a steadily growing preocupation over this threat and readiness to assist the governments to deal with it. I shall not attempt in this presentation to trace the history of OAS action against the subversive activ.. ities of international cor raunism. A good resume is coast&ined in the Initial General Report of the SCCS to whit pr v r '[ 1o O o `.eg rPP9T00429A000400020018-5 At Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 At Punta del Este last year the Foreign Ministers verified, to use the wording of Resolution I. "that the subversive offensive of communists governments, their agents and the organizations which they control has increased in Intensity." Concerning this offensive they said% "The purpose of this offensive is the destruct.. ion of democratic institutions and the estab. lishnent of totalitarian dictatorships at the service of e titracontinental powers. The outrstandin ; facts in this intensified offen. sure are the declarations set forth in official documents of the directing bodies of the international communist movement, that one of its principal objectives is the establish. ment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped countries and in Latin America; and the existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly aligned ti :ith the doctrine and foreign policy of the communist powers." "In order to achieve their subversive purposes and hide their true intentions, the communist governments and their agents exploit thelegit.r imate needs of the less-favored sectors of the population and the just national aspirations of the various peoples. VWtth the pretext of defending popular intoreste, freedom is sup. pressed, democratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are villated and the individual is subjected to materialistic ways of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party. Under the slogan of "anti-imperialism" they try to. establish an oppressive, aggressive imperialism which subordinates the subjugated nations to the mi iitraristic and aggresive in., terests of extracontinental powers. By maliciously utilizing the very principles of the inter-American system, they attempt to undermine democratic institutions and to strengthen and protect political penetration and aggression. The subversive methods of Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T AbUtO020018-5 Approved. For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 x.46- communist governments and their agents con- stitute one of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries." I want to note that this assessment was unanimously approved, with the sole exception of the Cuban delegation. Based on this finding the foreign Ministers established OAS procedures for assisting the governments to meet the challenge. They directed the Council of the CASs To maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggres-- sionI subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino..Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make-recommendations to the governments of the member" states with regard thereto," At the c same time they, made provision for ,the establish- ment of a Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS), Council and the member governments, upon request, on composed of experts on security matters,. ' to advise the The SCCS was organized last spring and has met on three occasions since that time: to prepare an initial general report on communist subversive activities to advise the Dominican Government, and to assist in the preparation of studies on subversion for the Council. The Council meanwhile has established a special committee of its own,.- composed of ovornmental representation, to Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A0008ag0018-5 technical problems in this field. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 carry out its vigilance responsibilities. Both groups in recent weeks have been working together on special studies requested by the Foreign Ministers at their in. formal meeting in Washington last October 2.3. At the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers, considerable time was devoted to the problem of sub. version, as is reflected in the communique issued at the end of the meeting. The Foreign Ministers found that at the present juncture the most urgent of the problems confronting the hemisphere was "the Sino-Soviet inter- vention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of democratic Institutions". They expressed the desire that in the idlogical struggle against communism "the resources and methods inherent in the democratic system should be mobilized to bring the peoples to realize fully the differences between totalitarianism and democracy". They also agreed "that is necessary for the countries, in accordance with their laws and constitutional precepts, to intensify measures to prevent-agents and ;roues of international communism from carrying on their activities of a subversive nature." In this connection they rsked that studies be made in the three areas where Castro-Communise appeared to be con- centrating its effort: the transfer of funds to other Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T0042SaQj( 0018-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 -48- American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propa- Banda, ,and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive activities. The SCCS has just completed a preliminary study of these three topics setting forth its conclusions and specific recommendations for indiv- idual, and. cooperative action by governments. The @ouneilts Special Committee received the report in Spanish last Monday. After it has been translated and circulated among all the members of the Council, I hope it will be made public, The Special Committee is meeting this afternoon to consider this point. I should add that the SCCS report is ,a technic, study prepared by experts acting in their individual capacity. It is to be used by the Special Committee composed of governmental representatives in the pro- paration of a report to the Council setting forth recom- mendations for measures which governments may wish to adopt to strengthen their capacity to counter subversive activities in these three fields, 1eahwhi.le the Special Committee maintains a close watch over the incidence and pattern of Cabtro-Communist subversive activities for the purpose of warning the governments and recommending appropriate action Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 Approved.For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5 confronted the Soviet Union bluntly and directly over the missiles in Cuba, tho Finance Ministers of the 2 member countries of the Alliance for Progress met in Mexico City, President Kennedy sent a message to that conference, which rovie.rcd the progress of the Alliance during its first year of operations, which established the clear and direct relationship of t1fir pro ram to our and the heir isphere''s security, He said to the Alliance conferees : "Your meeting is a vital reminder that the central task of this generation Of Americans is not merely the avoid pence of conflict. It is the construction of anew cog=t unity of American nations in which all ,our citizens c