U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF CUBA, 29 AUGUST THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000400040013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 27, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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27 February 1963
The attached paper and its enclosure is for
background use only. It will not be used as a
verbatim briefing paper.
OSD, State Dept. reviews completed
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S E C R E T
27 February 1963
SUBJECT: U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through
14 October 1962
The August 29th flight flew over most of the island and photo-
graphed much of it. The photography revealed that eight SAM sites
were under construction in the western half of the island. The flight
also discovered an installation at Banes in the eastern end of the
island that was not familiar to the photo interpreters.
The finding of SA-2`.s in Cuba on the August 29th flight presented
us with a new problem in planning U-2 flights over Cuba.
Today, there is general acceptance of the fact that we are
carrying out overhead reconnaissance of Cuba and that we will continue
to do so as long as our national security requires it. This almost
universal approval of U-2 flights over Cuba is an attitude that has
existed only since the middle of last October. Prior to the finding
of offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, quite a different public
attitude existed.
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In planning for any U-2 operations over well-defended, denied
territory we were always aware of criticism that attended the U-2
incident over the USSR in May of 1960.
Within the intelligence community there was always at the
backs of our minds the knowledge that in the event of a mishap we
would have to be able to explain, convincingly and in detail, the
justification--in terms of the highest priority intelligence needs--
for having undertaken the mission.
Elsewhere in Government and among persons whose stated
views strongly influence public opinion there were serious reservations
regarding the use of the U-2. There were expressions of extreme
concern from some public leaders over the increase in tension that
might result from overflights, and others voiced the opinion that
such flights were illegal or immoral. Although many public figures
conceded the necessity of the United States securing intelligence by
whatever means required, they were quick to caution that the use of
the U-2 was quite a different matter from the classical use of spies
and agents.
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The vulnerability of the U-2 to Soviet SA-2 systems and the
discovery of those systems in Cuba contributed further complicating
factors in weighing risks against the need for hard intelligence.
The situation as of September 1962 must be viewed against this
background of universal repugnance, or, at the very least, extreme
uneasiness regarding overflights.
Because of the widespread apprehension over use of the U-2,
we took particular care to ensure that each flight produced the
maximum of information of value to the entire intelligence community.
Each track was drawn to cover high priority targets agreed upon by
an inter-agency group known as the Committee on Overhead Recon-
naissance, a committee of the United States Intelligence Board.
We were also concerned with the conservation of the asset.
The U-2 is not a sturdily-built aircraft. It is designed for one
purpose--long flights at very high altitudes and at relatively low
speeds. We had very few of these planes. Therefore, before we
committed one to a mission we wanted to be absolutely certain that
the intelligence need was great enough to justify the risk of loss of
the pilot and aircraft. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
was the intelligence community's vehicle for making the target studies.
All CIA overflights were programmed through the medium of
the CIA Monthly Forecast. At the time the Soviet arms build-up
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began in Cuba, flights over Cuba were being forecast and flown at the
rate of two per month.
Because of the need to husband our resources and to ensure
that highest quality photography was obtained from each U-2 flight,
it was the practice not to launch a mission unless weather over
most of the critical targets was predicted to be less than 25 per cent
overcast.
After reviewing the result of the August 29th mission, the
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, in undeniably good judgment,
recommended that the next mission should cover those areas of the
island which were not photographed on the August 29th flight and that
particular attention should be paid to the then unidentified site at Banes.
It was important to learn whether the Soviets had made a limited deploy-
ment of SA-2's to Cuba or whether an island-wide defense was being
built.
The next mission was successfully flown on schedule on
September 5th over the eastern and central portions of the island.
Three additional SAM sites were detected in the central portion of
the island. Unfortunately, the flight encountered heavy cloud cover
over eastern Cuba.
Late in August, Mr. McCone suggested to General Carter,
who was acting as DCI during Mr. McCone's absence, that low-level
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reconnaissance of Cuba be proposed. General Carter requested the
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to consider the kind of
information that could be obtained thus. The Committee met on
September first and third and reported its views on what might be
accomplished through low-level flights.
Asa result of the Committee's deliberations and because of
the heavy cloud cover encountered over eastern Cuba on the
September 5th mission, General Carter, on September 10th, 1962,
addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending
that the Secretary initiate the necessary action to provide for employ-
ment of tactical-type reconnaissance against Banes, which was still
unidentified, or other targets identified by the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance as being suitable for low-level reconnaissance. The
Secretary of Defense felt it preferable not to mount a low-level
reconnaissance of Banes until the results of CIA high-level reconnaissance
Now, let us return to the matter of the September U-2 flights.
One mission had already been flown on September 5th. One flight
remained yet to be flown in September. A special meeting was held
on September 10th to consider the specific track for that second flight.
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General Carter presented a CIA proposal for a single high-level flight
designed specifically to photograph the Banes area, where earlier
photography had not been conclusive, and generally to search for
SAM sites in those areas of central and eastern Cuba that had not
been covered since the September 5th flight.
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The Secretary of State expressed concern at CIA's planned
coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well
as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He
said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact,
thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over
international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the neces-
sity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the
eastern portion of Cuba. He felt, however, that it was unwise to
combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual
overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would
draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the
aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred,
this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing
on its rights to overfly international waters.
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Taking these views into account the plan was changed and four
flights were substituted for the one. Two flights were to be wholly
peripheral, involving no land overflight. One was to cover the Isle
of Pines, and the other was to overfly the eastern end of the island
targeted against Banes and Guantanamo.
There was a three-week period from the 5th to the 26th of
September during which only one flight was flown (on September 17th),
and it yielded no useable photography. We finally acquired a rmd-
erately complete mosaic of the SA-2 defense of Cuba by piece -meal
photography search carried out in late. September and early October.
The delay in completing the photographic coverage was due solely
to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period.
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Much of Cuba was under heavy cloud cover throughout most of
September, and the cloud patterns were rapidly and continually
changing. The few periods of acceptable weather were so fleeting
that they had passed before flights could be mounted.
The weather was checked for a possible mission every day
beginning on September 6th. There was a one- or two- day period
around the middle of the month when the forecasts were moderately
favorable. A flight to the northeast was scheduled for the 16th. It
went to the final briefing on the 15th, but was delayed for 24 hours
because of weather and was cancelled when the weather continued
unfavorable. Planning for a flight over the Isle of Pines was under
way on September 15th. At the final briefing on.the 16th, the
forecast remained favorable. The mission was flown on September
17th, but by then. the weather had turned sour and no useable
photography was acquired.
Another mission was under consideration between September 18th
and 21st, but the weather was bad and the mission was cancelled.
The mission to cover the Guantanamo and Banes areas was under
consideration beginning 22 September. It went to alert daily, but
weather was not acceptable until the 26th. On that date the mission
was successfully flown and three SAM sites were discovered. This
was the first of the four flights agreed upon on September 10th, and
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it was the first day on which weather permitted a successful
flight.
One of the four tracks was originally approved to cover only
the Isle of Pines. Mr. McCone called Mr. U. Alexis Johnson on
September 28th and got approval to include coverage of the Bay
of Pigs area. The flight was successfully flown on September 29th.
Two of the three remaining. missions for September were
considered during the period September 29th through October 2nd.
Both were cancelled because of bad weather.
The next flight under consideration was that along the periphery
of the southeastern coast. It was delayed because of weather on
October 3rd. It was briefed on October 4th and successfully flew
the mission on the 5th. One additional SAM site was discovered.
There was good weather along the northeastern coast on October
6th. A flight was launched but it aborted because of aircraft fuel
problems.
The flight along the northeastern coast was successfully flown
the next day, October 7th. Four more SAM sites were discovered.
The mission of October 7th completed the September flight
program.
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As the September overflight program progressed, identifying
additional SAM sites, it became apparent that an island-wide SA-2
defense was being constructed. The next step was to discover how
far advanced the earlier SAM sites were. This information could
be obtained only by taking the risk of overflying an SA-2 site that
might be operational.
At. an interdepartmental group meeting on October 4th, the
DCI made a strong representation for extensive overflights of
Cuba. The group requested NRO, JCS, and CIA.to examine all
alternative means of conducting aerial reconnaissance and to report
back as soon as possible. A meeting was called on October 9th
to hear this report, and at this meeting the flight was planned which
was actually flown on the 14th of October.
Additionally, from September 18th through October 2nd,
reports dovetailed sufficiently to create a suspicion
that there. was something of unusual importance going on in a
definite. area west of Havana and that this unusual activity might
be concerned with MRBM's. These reports, however, were not
of sufficient credibility to warrant their being used in intelligence
publications. Accordingly, the track of the flight planned at the
October 9th meeting to test the operational readiness of the known
SAM sites was drawn to cover the area in which MRBM's were
suspected.
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The weather was checked daily on October 10th, 11th and 12th,
but the forecasts were unfavorable. On October 12th, operational
control of U-2 overflights of Cuba was transferred to the Strategic
Air Command of the U. S. Air Force. The weather forecast
continued unfavorable on October 13th. The mission was success-
fully flown by SAC on October 14th over the suspect area west
of Havana and near the SAM site thought most likely to be opera-
tional. The flight was the first to discover the presence of MRBM's.
As of October 16th, blanket authority was given for unrestricted
overflights of Cuba.
Attached at Tab A is a summary of weather forecasts and the
status of missions, 5 September through 14 October 1962.
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