INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF HURRICANE DAMAGE IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000600030034-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: October 22, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 2373/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 October 1963
SUBJECT: Interim Assessment of Hurricane Damage
in Cuba
Between 5 and 9 October, Cuba was struck by
Hurricane Flora, one of the worst natural disasters
in the island's history. Damage from the hurricane
was sustained primarily in the two eastern provinces
of Oriente and Camaguey. Further west, Las Villas
Province was subjected to heavy rains and high winds
but damage was considerably less severe than in the
two easternmost provinces. In general, Cuban agri-
culture was dealt the heaviest blow by the hurricane,
but transportatiop,lcommunica.tionp,.and electric
power-aleo suffered extensive damage. Industrial
facilities and the military establishment in the
hurricane zone appear to have escaped with relatively
light damage. The population in Oriente and Cama-
guey suffered heavy loss of personal property and
homes. According to the most recent estimates, more
than 1,000 Cuban deaths resulted from the hurricane.
This memorandum presents an interim analysis
of the economic consequences of the storm based on
data presently available. It discusses a variety,
of factors bearing on the short-term effects of
Flora on the Cuban economy, some of which may tend
to mitigate and others to magnify the damage. It
concludes that the long-term effects of the disas-
ter are likely to be more serious than those faced
immediately by the Castro regime.
NGA Review completed.
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OCI No. 2373/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 October 1963
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Interim Assessment of Hurricane Damage
in Cuba
Between 5 and ,9 October, Cuba was struck by
Hurricane Flora, one of the worst natural disasters
in the island's history. Damage'from the hurricane
was sustained primarily in the two eastern provinces
of Oriente and Camaguey. Further west, Las Villas
Province was subjected to heavy rains and high winds
but damage was considerably less severe than in the
two easternmost provinces. In general, Cuban agri-
culture was-de.alt the heaviest blow by the hurricane,
but transportation, communications, and electric
power also suffered extensive damage. Industrial
facilities and the military establishment in the hur-
ricane zone appear to have escaped with relatively
light damage. The population in Oriente and Camaguey
suffered heavy loss of personal property and homes.
According to the most recent estimates, more than
1,000 Cuban deaths resulted from the hurricane.
The economic consequences of the storm are im-
portant but present indications are that the econ-
omy can probably absorb the short-run effects with-
out serious strain. The loss in volume of exports
from the 1964 sugar crop may be largely offset by
the fact that prices for sugar exports to free world
countries will be substantially higher than the 1963
average price. On the other hand, the total value
of additional imports required to replace the crop
damage due to the storm probably will be about $25
million, less than four percent of total imports
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estimated for 1963. The longer term effects of the
hurricane may be more significant, however, as the
reconstruction of storm-damaged buildings will di-
vert resources from new investment activity and thus
further restrict the ability of the economy to achieve
some improvement over the next few years.
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DISCUSSION
1. AGRICULTURE
1. Oriente and Camaguey are the leading agri-
cultural provinces in Cuba, supplying the more densely
populated western half of the island with a large part
of its food. Many of Cuba's important crops were in or
were about to enter the harvest stage when the hurricane
struck. In the case of several of these--for example,
cotton, coffee, and cocoa--it will be another year be-
fore a new harvest can be brought in. For other crops,
however, such as beans, corn, and several additional
vegetables, important to the Cuban diet, replanting
has already begun and a new harvest will be ready in
considerably less than a year. A new rice harvest will
be brought in during the spring; however, the size of
this crop normally is considerably smaller than that of
the fall since it receives less rainfall and available
irrigation facilities are inadequate to make up the dif-
ference.
Sugar Cane Production
2. Together, Oriente and Camaguey contain over
50 percent of the sugar cane area of Cuba. Moreover,
the cane grown in these provinces has the highest sugar
content of Cuban grown cane. Although normally a hurri-
cane affects the hardy bamboo-like cane plant much less
severely than other more succulent plants, the severity
of Flora and the length of time she remained over Cuba
make it highly probable that large areas of cane were
damaged. On the basis of present evidence, however,
it appears unlikely that the total reduction in the 1964
sugar harvest resulting from cane damage will exceed
400,000 metric tons, about ten percent of the previously
estimated crop. The Rio.Cauto basin, which was the
most heavily flooded area, normally produces no more
than 150,000 metric tons of sugar. Although much of
this sugar might have been destroyed,. reports indicate
that cane damage outside the Rio Cauto valley was not
extensive. (See photograph no. 1 in annex).
3. It will be virtually impossible to salvage
the uprooted and damaged cane by milling it now. The
cane is presently too immature to contain much sugar
and most of the sugar mills have not yet been over-
hauled and put in readiness for 1964 operations.
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Moreover, the labor force necessary to salvage the
sugar from the damaged cane could not be mobilized
in time since the sucrose content of cane severed
from the rootstock decreases rapidly.
4. Reports indicate that large areas of cane
planted this year in anticipation of the 1965 har-
vest were washed out in both Oriente and Camaguey
Provinces, Newly planted cane requires approxi-
mately 18 months to reach maturity and it is not
likely that the washed-out cane areas can be re-
planted in time to contribute to the 1965 harvest.
The effects of Flora will be felt therefore not only
in 1964 but also in the 1965 sugar harvest.
5. Although several sugar mills reportedly sus-
tained wind and water damage, this probably will not
have a significant impact on 1964 sugar production.
Virtually all of Cuba's sugar mills have been oper-
ating below capacity for the last two years and would
have done so again in 1964 even if cane had not been
destroyed by the hurricane. Damage to the mills ap-
pears to have been confined to the roofs of four or
five relatively small installations, with some of the
milling machinery receiving a soaking. It is highly
probable that most of the necessary repairs can be
made before the 1964 harvest begins. (See photographs
no. 2 and 3 in annex.)
6. A substantial number of railroad tracks,
roads, and bridges have been washed out throughout
the two eastern provinces. Consequently, the trans-
portation of sugar cane from the fields to the mills
probably will be slowed down in 1964. Although the
Cubans have about three months before the harvest is
scheduled to begin, it is unlikely that all of the
destruction can be repaired in that short a time. Re-
covery problems will be aggravated if the heavy rains
that usually occur during this season of the year con-
tinue and prevent the draining of the flooded areas.
7. Even in the absence of a hurricane, the short-
age of labor which has hampered the production of sugar
during the last two years was expected to be a major
limiting factor on the 1964 harvest. With extensive
hurricane damage throughout eastern Cuba that must be
repaired, competing demands upon labor will be increased
during 1964. It is highly probable, therefore, that
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the problem of inadequate cane-harvesting manpower
so evident during the last two years may well be
further compounded.
8. Cumulatively, the effects of the hurricane
on sugar milling capacity, transportation, and the
availability of labor may amplify the loss of sugar
production from the next harvest beyond the tentative
figure of 400,000 metric tons. A quantitative esti-
mate covering these factors, however, cannot be made
at this time,
Other Crops
9. About 90 percent of the coffee produced in
Cuba is grown in areas of Oriente Province that were
hard hit by the hurricane. The coffee harvest was
partly completed when the hurricane struck, however,
and some of the crop can . be ,salvaged by simply pick-
ing up from the ground the berries that were blown
down. Probably no more than 25 percent of the total
Cuban coffee crop (or 9,000 metric tons) was destroyed
by the storm.
10. Almost all of the nation's small cocoa crop
is produced in Baracoa and Santiago de Cuba, areas
severely hit by Flora. It is likely that much of
this crop has been destroyed.
11. Rice is a basic component of the Cuban diet
and about one fourth of the island's total require-
ments is harvested from October to December in Oriente
and Camaguey. The Rio Cauto basin is a primary rice
producing area and it. is likely that about half of
the rice crop in Oriente and Camaguey has been destroyed.
This would amount to a loss of about 40,000 metric tons
of milled rice or about 12 percent of total domestic
requirements.
12. Cuba produces about 25 percent of its cotton
fiber requirements and of this amount about 50 percent
is produced in Oriente. This crop was also entering
its harvest season and it has been reported from Ha-
vana that about 50 percent of the cotton, crop in Oriente
has been lost. This would amount to a loss of about
1,000 metric tons of ginned cotton.
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13. Oriente and Camaguey are also the main pro-
ducers of several other crops all of which probably
were severely hit by the hurricane. The.primary ba-
nana producing area is in the vicinity of Baracoa in
eastern Oriente which was battered very sheavily
aby
the storm. Important orange growing
located in both Camaguey and Oriente. Oriente leads
all the provinces oduicmtpoiron
vegetable,, beans.
cultivation is near Holguin, which was one of the
regions hardest hit by Flora. Cuba's chief agricul-
tural official, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, has esti-
mated that as much as 19,000 metric tons of corn
might have been destroyed. This is almost ten per-
cent of total Cuban, annual production of this crop.
14. One major Cuban crop which apparently was
not significantly damaged by the hurricane was`to
bacco. Only a very small amount of tobacco is grown
in Oriente, and the tobacco grown in Camaguey is lo-
cated in the far western area which was not severely
hit by the storm. Moreover, this is the planting
season for tobacco and it should be a relatively easy
matter to replant any damaged tobacco seed beds.
Livestock
15. It has been reported that large numbers of
livestock have been drowned by the flooded rivers.
Oriente and Camaguey together contain about 50 per-
cent of the. cattle population of Cuba and it seems
reasonable to assume that some cattle were lost. It
is probable, however, that many of the cattle were
simply scattered rather than killed. It is highly
unlikely that-more than 30,000 head of cattle or
about one half of one percent of the total Cuban
cattle population was drowned. With respect to
other livestock such as swine and poultry, import-
ant sources of meat for the Cuban diet, it is prob-
able that losses were much higher. Unless adequate
measures are taken to prevent the spread of live-
stock diseases, the number of livestock killed might
increase'substantially.
II. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
16. Next to agriculture, the most serious loss
to the Cuban economy from Hurricane Flora almost
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certainly was sustained by the transportation sector.
In addition", reporting indicates that internal Cuban
communications and radio both have sustained fairly
extensive damage. Floods and landslides have ren-
dered many railroads and highways impassable. Seg-
ments of highways and railroads and bridges have been
washed out (see photographs no. 3,4, and 5, in annex).
Virtually all of the reported damage to land trans-
portation was in Oriente Province; currently available
information indicates that Camaguey Province appears
to have sustained very little railroad and highway
damage.
17. At one time or another, the cities of Antilla,
Bayamo, Gibara, Holguin, Manzanillo, Puerto Padre,
Sagua de Tanamo, and Victoria de las Tunas, all were
reported to have been isolated by the storm. Some
of these cities are accessible by sea, but Bayamo,
Holguin, and Victoria de las Tunas are landlocked.
For the cities served by ports, the damage to land
transportation probably can be offset to some extent
by increased usage of coastal shipping. The fleet of
ships available to Cuba for this purpose, however, is
not very large.
18. Most of the ports probably did not sustain
serious damage to their piers and wharves. Santiago
de Cuba, the largest port in the eastern half of the
island, was almost completely unscathed (for example,
see photograph no. 6 in annex). Some damage to port
facilities is evident, however, and Cuban radio has
reported that the port of Antilla suffered consider-
able damage,
19. Civil air facilities in Cuba appear to have
suffered very little from the hurricane. Aircraft
were moved to safe areas on the island. The runways
and associated airfield buildings in Oriente and
Camaguey provinces have not been reported as being
seriously damaged; only fields at Bayamo and Baracoa
were unusable. Civil air communications probably
suffered more damage than any other part of the air
transport sector.
20. The transportation system in the two eastern
provinces probably can be restored to an adequate
level of operab~Llity within a matter of a few weeks;
the complete restoration of the system probably will
require a great deal of time as well as the allocation
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of considerable resources of manpower, materials,
and equipment. Temporary repair of washed-out
roadbeds and bridges may be carried out in a fairly
short time if priority is given to the job so that
men and equipment are made available. Furthermore,
many of the bridges and sections of railroads and
highways that have been knocked out appear to be on
secondary rather than main lines.
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III. ELECTRIC POWER
22. Electric power services, in general, do not
appear to have incurred extensive long-term damage.
Service poles and lines were down in some locations
and electricity was off in a number of areas for var-
ious periods of time during the hurricane. Accord-
ing to Cuban reports, Gibara and Holguin will be with-
out electricity until about 25.October. The only
power plant of any consequence that was reported to
be out of operation was the 13-megawatt plant at Cam-
aguey, which was flooded with six feet of water. With-
in a week of this early report, Cuban radio stated
that work was in progress on restoring 246 motors that
got wet and that the plant was expected to go back
into operation almost immediately. This expectation
probably was overly optimistic; but even if the plant
is not yet back in operation, it is likely to be so
shortly. The Hector Pazon powerplant in Santiago,
which accounts for more than half of the installed
capacity of the eastern power system, appears from
photography to have suffered no damage at all (see
photograph no. 6 in annex). Cuban radio.did, however,
report that some of the plant's motors were wet, but
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they apparently were not so wet that production was
seriously affected. The pylon located in the middle
of Santiago de Cuba Bay, which supports the power
line from the Hector Pazon plant to the petroleum re-
finery, was still standing after the hurricane. There
have been no reports that the line itself was knocked
down and photography does not indicate whether the
line is still up or not.
IV. INDUSTRY
23. As more evidence becomes available, the pic-
ture of hurricane damage to Cuba's industrial sector
becomes a little clearer than it was at the time of
our last assessment. In general, industrial facilities
in Camaguey and Oriente provinces do not appear to
have sustained significant damage. Photography since
the hurricane of the Santiago area, the major industrial
center in eastern Cuba, reveals little or no damage
to plants such as the Hermanos Diaz petroleum refin-,
ery, the Jose Merceron cement plant, the Rente ther-
mal'power plant being constructed by the USSR, or the
large-scale Frank Pais flour mill (see photographs no.
7,8, and 9, in annex). Cuban radio reports tend to
support this assessment except in the case of the
Rente plant which, according to an early Havana state-
ment, suffered severe damage. A reassessment of pho-
tography of the Rente plant has been requested. Dam-
age to other industrial plants in Camaguey and Oriente
provinces has been assessed from photography as rel-
atively minor (see photographs no. 10,11, and 12, in
annex). Although no damage was observed at the Nicaro
and Moa Bay nickel plants, somewhat more serious dam-
age appears to have been sustained by mining operations,
not only of Nicaro and Moa but of other mines as well.
The manganese mine of Charco Redondo in Jiguani, the
Ponupu mines at El Cobre, and the El Cristo mines all
were seriously flooded. Some time probably will be
required to pump out the mines and to dry and'repair
damaged equipment.
V. MILITARY
24. The military establishment in Camaguey and
Oriente provinces apparently lost only a few person-
nel, but there appears to have been a fairly substan-
tial loss of ammunition, miscellaneous equipment, and
military housing. The naval port at Caimanera was
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reported to be under three feet of water at one time,
and the military camp at Felicidad reportedly was de-
stroyed . and its su l ie:s s lost
CRAF (Cuban air force facilities, owever, were no
damaged very extensively. On Balance, Cuban military
organizations appear to have sustained losses that
essentially are of short-term consequences.,
VI, PUBLIC WELFARE
25. The population suffered heavy loss of homes
and personal property, and Castro reported on 13 Oc-
tober that more than 1,000 men, women, and children
had lost their lives up to that time. As the flood
waters recede and a more accurate assessment by the
Cubans becomes possible, recorded losses of life and
property very probably will climb much higher. One
of the biggest problems for Cuba in these two provinces
will be that of public health. Disease will need to
be controlled, the population will need to be vaccinated,
and safe drinking water will need tobbe assured, The
aqueduct at Bayamo was reported to be out of order, and
the town of Mayari reportedly had no drinking water.
Emergency supplies of medicines, food,', and clothing
donated by both bloc and nonbloc countries have begun
to arrive in. Cuba, and shipments of food and medicines
apparently have been started from western Cuba to the
flood-ravaged provinces, However, currently available
evidence does not permit assessment as to the adequacy
of the measures being taken to offset the health threat
in the stricken areas.
VII, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FLORA
26, It is clear that the effects of Hurricane
Flora were felt chiefly by agriculture, the founda-
tion of the Cuban economy, While the impact of the
storm will hurt, the evidence indicates that the econ-
omy can probably absorb the short-run effects without
serious strain. The hurricane will force adjustments,
however, which will further retard the ability of the
economy to achieve some measure of growth over'the
next few years.
27. The short-term.economic effects of the'storm
will appear principally as a reduction in the domestic
supply of foods and fibers and a reduction in the
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exportable surplus of basic agricultural products
over the next year. The estimated reduction in
foreign exchange income resulting from damage to
the sugar crop will depend upon the price applied
to the sugar loss. If the current world market
price of 11.5 cents per pound is applied, the esti-
mated loss of 400,000 metric tons would be worth
about $100,million; if the average bloc price of-
about 5 cents per pound is applied, the loss would
be valued at $44 million. Total export income will
be reduced by more than this amount, however, as a
result of damage to other export crops such as fruits
and vegetables and damage to mines and mineral pro-
duction. Probably about $10 million would be added
to the foreign exchange loss from these factors.
28. In spite of the magnitude of these losses,
it seems likely that Cuba's foreign exchange income
for 1964 will be about that of the current year:
that. is, it will fall within a range of $450 to $500
million. This results from the fact that current
free world sugar prices are substantially higher than
the average price which Cuba received for sales to
free world countries in 1963. Because of the current
tight supply situation in the world sugar market, a
situation compounded,. by Hurricane Flora, high prices
may be expected to continue through most of 1964. If
exports of Cuba's 1964 sugar to all areas are sold
at an average price of only a little more than one
half of one cent per pound higher than the 1963 av-
erage, foreign exchange income from sugar will re-
main substantially unchanged next year, even consid-
ering the storm loss.
29. The effects of Flora on the supply of foods
and fibers will force the Cuban Government either to
reduce domestic consumption or make larger expendi-
tures of scarce foreign exchange in order to import
additional amounts of these goods. The cost of ad-
ditional imports required by the estimated damage of
the storm probably would: be about $25 million, less
than four percent of the total value of imports in
1963. Since export earnings are not expected to
change much in 1964, these additional imports would
mean an added $25 million to Cuba's foreign trade
deficit, currently running at $200 to $250 million
annually. It seems probable that the bloc would be
willing to finance such a modest increase in the trade
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imbalance, particularly in view. of the circumstances
which gave rise to it. If additional aid is not forth-
coming, however, a 12 to 15 percent reduction in Cuba's
capital goods imports would probably free enough for-
eign exchange to finance the necessary imports.
30. Repair of hurricane damage to buildings and
to the transport and communication system will prob-
ably require an extended period of time, perhaps as
long as several years before full restoration is made.
The diversion of manpower, materials, and equipment
from new construction to repair work will restrict
the amount of new capital formation possible during
the next year or so. To the extent that imports of
capital goods may need to be cut in order to finance
additional food and raw materials imporrts,.new invest-
ment activity will be further retarded. In view of
these factors, it seems possible that the long-term
effects of Flora may be more important than its short-
term impact. The hurricane is thus one additional
factor, among a number of others, which will restrict
the ability of the Cuban economy to register any im-
provement over the next few years.
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ORIENTE PROVINCE
2t7 36N 76-53W
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TACAJO SUGAR MILL
CUBA
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vmr~im
ROOF DAMAGE
w
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PHOTO #3
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EFFECTS OF HURRICANE FLORA
ORIENTE PROVINCE
20-37N 76-25W
ROAD WASHOUT
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PHOTO #5 HIGHWAY BRIDGE WASHOUT
SECRET
FLOOD DAMAGE WEST OF MAYARI
CUBA
20-40N 75-50W
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nc x-sio jtaas SECRET
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PHOTO #6 HECTOR PAZON POWER PLANT
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HERMANOS DIAZ PETROLEUM REFINERY, SANTIAGO DE CUBA
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JOSE MERCERON CEMENT PLANT
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PHOTO #9 RENTE POWER PLANT
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PHOTO #10 INEJIRO ASANUMA SPINNING MILL
INEJIRO ASANUMA SPINNING WILL
GIBARA, CUBA
21-06N 76-08W
ONES
NPC H-5096 ii 0%83I
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PHOTO #11 NICARO NICKEL PLANT
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