THE EAST GERMAN PARTY CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100010033-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 30, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI No. 0479/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Office of Current Intelligence
30 January 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The East German Party Congress
SUMMARY: One of Khrushchev's main purposes in
atten inT ng t a East German party congress was to in-
troduce personally a new phase in the Sino-Soviet
dispute whereby he hopes to isolate the Chinese Com-
munists and prove them to be solely responsible for
any aggravation of it. On Berlin and Germany, he in
effect conceded that the USSR was not now in a posi-
tion to press the Western powers on a Berlin settle-
ment which would meet even minimal Communist demands.
Events at the Congress indicated that Ulbricht has no
intention of easing domestic policies although the re-
gime may be somewhat more flexible in carrying them
out.
Sino-Soviet Relations
1. One of the main purposes of Khrushchev's
attendance at the East German party congress appar-
ently was his desire to take a personal hand in in-
troducing a new phase in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The central theme of his speech to the Congress on
16 January was Moscow's readiness to mute the argu-
ment with Peiping and to employ patience and moder-
ation in discussing differences.
2. After Khrushchev's speech, however, it be-
came clear that this line was but a tactical maneuver
to isolate the Chinese and make them solely responsi-
ble for any further aggravation. Khrushchev's speech
and those of his bloc allies continued to attack the
substantive position of the Chinese and ,Albanians and
in so doing indicated neither a serious interest in work-
ing toward a compromise nor any belief in the possi-
bility of resolving the dispute.
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3. Khrushchev's call for an end to public
argument and his equivocal endorsement of another
international Communist conference in the distant
future left the Chinese with the hard choice of
not answering their critics or rejecting the call
for a truce. By returning to the attack, they
would prove themselves incorrigible.
4. The Chinese delegate, Wu Hsiu-chuan, at-
tempted to parry Khrushchev by agreeing that an
end to recriminations between "fraternal" parties
was necessary before an international conference
of Communist parties could be held. Wu noted that
his party had formally proposed a meeting as long
ago as April 1962 and had always been against the
airing of the dispute in public. The crux of the
issue, however, lay in defining a "fraternal" party.
Wu made it clear that Peiping, unlike the Soviet
Union, would include Albania but not Yugoslavia.
He also defended his country's record in the Sino-
Indian border dispute and its view of peaceful co-
existence, both attacked by the Soviet camp.
5. The stage uproar which greeted Wu?s remarks
on Yugoslavia and the treatment accorded his speech
by TASS (it reported that his "completely inadmis-
sible tone" met with unanimous disapproval) were
attempts to prove the Chinese responsible by their
persistence in making matters worse.
6. The Soviet bloc has, at the same time,
tried to portray the Chinese as alone in their
opposition to the views of the majority. The
speech of the North Korean delegate, which in many
respects supported the Chinese, was not reported
by East European media, but was repeated in broad-
casts by Pyongyang and Peiping. Even such minor
matters as the memorial service for German heroes
of the International Communist Movement received
treatment from Soviet bloc media calculated to
ignore Chinese participation. Only NCNA noted that
the Chinese delegation also placed wreaths on their
graves; it, in turn, omitted the fact that Khrushchev
and Ulbricht, among others, were present.
7. It was necessary at the congress for the
Chinese to assert their views so as not to appear to
have retreated in the face of Khrushchev's demands.
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They have been at a disadvantage at each of the re-
cent party congresses which preceded that in East
Germany. This has been recognized by both sides
and has led the Soviet party to claim that each of
the congresses was "a kind of international Commu-
nist meeting." In his speech,closing the debate on
18 January,.Ulbricht echoed this Soviet claim. The
North Korean delegate, however, specifically attacked
this point, and the New Zealand party, which supports
the Chinese and had in the spring of 1962 called for
an international meeting, has again stressed the need
to hold one now. Its official paper stated a few days
ago that the party has "decided to take all steps nec-
essary to have this conference called in February."
8. The difficulty arises in the differing defi-
nitions of what form an international conference
should take and under what rules it should be con-
voked, The Soviet Union, supported by a majority of
the Communist parties, favors reaching conclusions on
the basis of majority rule, The Chinese, encouraged
by the successes they scored in the last international
conference, want one that would arrive at resolutions
on the same basis as previously--that of unanimity.
9. A recognition of the difficulties in arrang-
ing for a congress was indicated in proposals made by
Togliatti and Indonesia's Aidit. Both suggested a
conference be called, but each noted that preparations
would have to be long and drawn out. Aidit's saw the
need for "careful preparation which might take a year
or two" before such a conference. Both the Soviet
and the Chinese press have reprinted this line.
10. A pause such as Khrushchev requested in his
speech would be necessary if the Soviet leader were
not yet prepared to face an open break with the Chi-
nese. The ever more direct accusations which they
were trading, if continued, would have brought a show-
down guaranteed to split the movement asunder. This
possibility was causing serious concern in Communist
parties around the world, and their leaders have prob-
ably been exerting heavy pressure upon both sides to
prevent their carrying the conflict to this conclusion.
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11. In the game that is now being played out,
the position of other Communist parties takes on
increased importance for both sides. The Soviet
delegation at the East German congress reportedly
organized a series of meetings with various Commu-
nist parties to lobby for support. The Chinese
also bid hard for support. A pause in the argument,
if the Chinese eventually come around to one, will
not bring a comparable pause in this type of activ-
ity, and it.is almost certain that this will lead to
a revival of more direct attacks.
Berlin and Germany
12. In his address before the East German con-
gress, Khrushchev all but conceded that the Soviet
Union was not now in a position to press the West-
ern powers on a Berlin settlement which could in any
way be represented as satisfying even minimal Com-
munist demands. Khrushchev said in his 16 January
speech that the conclusion of a German peace treaty
was "no longer the problem it was before the protec-
tive measures" in Berlin (the wall) were taken. In-
deed, the cautious, defensive tone adopted by both
Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht in their discussions
of the Berlin and German problems reinforces our be-
lief that the USSR does not contemplate any new
threats or proposals with regard to Berlin in the
immediate future.
13. Khrushchev pointed out that the Berlin
wall had contributed to the stabilization of the GDR
regime and practically admitted that the political
gains which a peace treaty might have secured must
now give way to the priority consideration of the re-
vitalization of the East German economy. This line
was forecast in Khrushchev's Cuban apologia before
the Supreme Soviet on 12 December when he asserted
that "all our thoughts are turned to creative con-
struction, to the building of Communism."
14. Khrushchev's remarks, as well as those of
other Bloc leaders, strengthen the view that while
Moscow remains committed to further negotiations,
it envisages a hiatus until the Soviet bar-
gaining position is strong enough to resume
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serious discussions. Although Ulbricht promised the
congress on 15 January that Khrushchev would report
on the US-Soviet talks on Berlin, the Soviet premier
ignored the subject. Nor did he clarify his pro-
posal to replace the "occupation status" of West Ber-
lin with the UN flag,
15. Against this background, it seems doubtful
that Moscow has any genuine interest in pressing for
a settlement of the Berlin and German problems now.
Khrushchev probably looks upon a future exchange of
views with the US on these questions as an opportun-
ity to elicit US reaction to his proposals as well
as to determine whether the Western position has be-
come more rigid in the Cuban aftermath.
16. Khrushchev's pointed reference to the GDR's
"right to control its frontiers" and Ulbricht's as-
sertion that any Berlin settlement must recognize
East German sovereignty over all Berlin access routes
suggest that any new proposal would still rule out
any form of administrative jurisdiction which could
interfere with GDR control. Moscow will probably fol-
low the temporizing line advanced by Khrushchev and
Ulbricht and recently reaffirmed by Gromyko in his
18 January conversation with Ambassador Kohler. While
urging that the dialogue be resumed soon, the Soviet
Foreign Minister declared that the USSR would not set
a deadline for its completion or for a peace treaty
because this would "complicate" the question for both
sides,
East German Internal Affairs
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18. On the very eve of the conclave, Erich
Apel, Ulbricht's capable economic aide, replaced
Karl Mewis as chairman of the State Planning
Commission. Mewis is known to have been at odds
with other top economic planners. His ouster,
however, may prove to be the seed of new differ-
ences within the party. It has already caused
apprehension within the party's ranks, probably
for fear that it heralds a thoroughgoing purge of
his supporters. Significantly, Mewis was among
the regime leaders who met Khrushchev on the
latter's arrival in East Berlin. Also, he was
present for at least the first session of the
congress. These appearances after his dismissal
are certain to create more confusion.
19. In his opening speech to the conclave,
Ulbricht was more reasonable than is his wont on
international affairs. However, to make Soviet
proposals under which Allied forces would remain
in West Berlin under UN aegis more palatable to
those party functionaries who suspect Moscow of
being susceptible to some type of compromise which
would prove damaging to East Germany's interests
and "prestige," Ulbricht presented them as only
the first step in a "gradual settlement" of the
Berlin problem. He did not comment extensively
on the Sino-Soviet dispute, being aware that a
fuller and more authoritative statement would be
forthcoming from Khrushchev. To the extent that
he did address himself to the question, however,
Ulbricht introduced an element not previously
mentioned by bloc leaders--Peiping's failure to
give advance notice of its intentions to attack
India.
20. Ulbricht paid little more than lip service
to the concept of de-Stalinization. Throughout the
congress there was a manifest effort to create the
image of a "collective" leadership with Ulbricht
pre-eminent within it. The First Secretary defended
himself against any charges of complicity in the
"personality cult," arguing that he and his party
had supported "Leninist norms" even during the Sta-
linist purges of the thirties. He said that "con-
sequences of the Stalinist personality cult" had
been avoided in East Germany during the immediate
postwar period "because the Soviet comrades who were
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here at the time-were Leninists." It remains
to be seen whether Ulbricht succeeded in divesting
himself completely of his Stalinist heritage. Al-
though Khrushchev's remarks on arrival in Berlin
and at the congress approved the East German leader-
ship in general, insofar as Ulbricht was concerned,
they lacked the effusive quality so noticeable four
years ago and so typical of the plaudits recently
paid at the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czechoslovak
congresses to Kadar, Zhivkov and Novotny, respec-
tively.
21. Discussing the economic outlook, the SED
First Secretary declared that "hard necessities"
must determine future economic planning. The new
seven-year plan envisages an annual industrial
growth rate of 7.2 percent. While this goal is
more within the country's capabilities than the am-
bitious rates demanded by the last congress in 1958,
it is higher than the average 6 percent growth
achieved in 1961 and 1962. In his treatment of prob-
lems which have plagued agriculture since the col-
lectivization drive of 1960, Ulbricht called for
sweeping changes in the party's management of the
farms and announced the establishment of a new ag-
ricultural bureau within the politburo. This bureau,
with subordinate organizations down to the county
level, will be responsible for over-all management
of agricultural affairs. This will tighten party
control, but it is doubtful that it will increase
production. The new bureaus reportedly are being
staffed by young activists whose assignments will
take them directly to the collective farms, to en-
sure that the peasants put forth maximum efforts.
The peasants will not welcome such "encouragement"
and will continue to cultivate their private plots
at the expense of communal lands and herds.
22. Ulbricht's complaint that the East German
people "now are spending considerably more for food,
beverages and similar goods',' than for consumer dur-
ables suggests that the populace is in for a long
period of austerity--a suggestion lent weight by
Khrushchev's stress at the congress on increased
labor productivity as the only means of improving
the living standard and his contemptuous remark that
"We Russians are not waiting for the rich uncle."
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23. Changes in the party's leadership, an-
nounced on 22 January, like the speeches at the
congress, suggest that the regime intends to deal
somewhat more realistically than heretofore with
its domestic problems. The politburo now includes
several potential successors to Ulbricht. Two of
these are new members: Paul Froelich and Paul Verner,
respectively party leaders in the pivotal Leipzig
and Berlin districts. Another is Erich Honecker,
Ulbricht's longtime right-hand man and a politburo
member since 1958. Even though Ulbricht remains at
the head of the party and state, his responsibilities
and authority may diminish as these men assume a more
prominent role.
24. The politburo's candidate membership has
been overhauled, with five former members dropped
and seven new members added. These changes seem to
reflect the party's intention to use technically
trained specialists to deal with pressing problems.
25. The central committee also appears to
have been thoroughly overhauled. Of the 108 full
members in the old committee, only 79 have been re-
elected and their influence is certain to be diluted
by the addition of 42 new members who bring the
body's membership to 121. Candidate members of the
central committee have jumped from 37 to 60. Both
changes suggest a major effort by the leadership to
broaden the party's base and may presage shake-ups
of the lower levels of the apparatus.
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