ADENAUER'S ATTITUDE TOWARD DE GAULLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100020003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 4, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI 0749/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 February 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Adenauer'sAttitude Toward De Gaulle
The followin received
from our comments are
attached.
1?
Adenauer spoke
of the treaty with pride, saying a felt it was West
Germany's guarantee against a possible French move to
seek a separate arrangement with the Soviets. Further-
more, he said, the treaty gave West Germany the ad-
vantageous position of having a voice in both French
and NATO nuclear defense policies. He said French
President De Gaulle considered separate arrangements
with the Soviets necessary because of the US attitude
on defense matters. De Gaulle also wanted to reach
an agreement with the Soviets before the US. did.
Adenauer attacked the US for having driven De Gaulle
to extremes by refusing to cooperate with him in
nuclear defense.
2. Adenauer said De Gaulle had told him that
the French president's reason for refusing to accede
to the Nassau agreement was because'this agreement
deprived Europe of the ability to use,the nuclear
deterrent as a counterthreat to any Soviet threat.
Any such.counterthreat would, under the agreement,
require prior US approval. In these circumstances,
De Gaulle had said, Europe would not be able to speak
authoritatively in times of crisis or to determine
independently when Soviet threats were strong enough
to require counteraction. According to Adenauer,
De Gaulle claimed the Cuban crisis had shown the US
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ability to deal with problems in the western hemisphere
in a determined way, which, in itself,'was proof that
the Europeans, too, could best deal with threats to
Europe. Adenauer also said De Gaulle had been justifi-
ably furious over the US trickery-in the Nassau agree-
ment of offering to supply only Polaris missiles for
which the French had neither warheads nor submarines.
Adenauer said De Gaulle thought the US move was a
deliberate effort to humiliate France by. demonstrating
for all the, world that the French were not ready for
such weapons. De Gaulle had also told Adenauer that
he did not consider the Polaris to be the ultimate
weapon. De Gaulle thought this weapon, as well as
long range bombers, might become obsolete, especially
for the. European powers which had the advantage of the
element of surprise inherent in the relatively short
distance between western Europe and the Soviet Union.
3. Adenauerl basically agreed
with De Gaulle on a issue of r sh membership in
EEC since the inclusion of Britain in the European
Community would be another means for the US'to dominate
political decision-making in Europe. British member-
ship in EEC would also, according to Adenauer, have
serious repercussions on Europe's future role in
Africa. He said the Americans were jealous over the
strong French influence in Africa, as was evident
in the current Congo crisis, and that the US wanted
to reduce Europe's role on the dark continent. Adenauer
said, however, that Franco-German cooperation in
Africa was very promising and also desired by the
Africans.
AI
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B. In respect to the passage in the current
report dealing with Adenauer?s views on the nuclear
--- -_ r I -------------
Germany, of course, is not involved in the
o aris question, and Adenauer has enthusiastically
supported the idea of the NATO multilateral force,
in sharp contradistinction to De Gaulle. But in
visiting De Gaulle and listening to the General pour
out his woes about France'snationalnuclear position,
Adenauer is most likely to be sympathetic.
C. In regard to paragraph 3, we have known that
Adenauer does not really want the UK in the EEC,
though he has had to go along with the overwhelming
sentiment in Bonn in favor of British membership.
The reasons given here for Adenauer?s. negative at-
titude should probably not be taken seriously. For
one thing., Adenauer's policy has not been to eliminate
US influence from the Continent. For another thing,
the language of the report on this-point is open to
varying interpretation. Obviously no European states-
men wishes the US to "dominate" decision-making in
Europe. Adenauer's more likely reasons for doubting
the wisdom of British membership are that he is not
convinced that Britain could ever work toward his
cherished federation of Western Europe, and that he
is worried about tendencies in the UK toward a "soft"
policy in the event of negotiations with the USSR on
central Europe.
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