BACKGROUND ON 8 FEBRUARY REVOLT IN IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100020007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 8, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/121 79T00429A001100020007-6
OCI No. 0487/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Officd of Current Intelligence
8 February 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Background on 8 February Revolt in Iraq
1. On the morning of 8 February Iraqi mili-
tary elements launched a-coup'attpmpt against the
Qasim government. Although fighting was appar-
ently still going in Baghdad, as of 0800 EST,tho
odds seemed definitely in favor of the new revolu-
tionaries, most of whom are Baathists.
2. The Baath Party was formed in Syria in
1954 by Michel Aflaq and Akkram al-Hawrani. It is
"socialistic," pan-Arab, anti-West, anti-Communist,
and the most widely organized political party in
the Arab world today. However, it is rent with dis-
sension and divided into pro- nd lip anservice ti-Nasirtfac-
tions. In Iraq, the party pays
Nasir's pan-A.rabism, but it has no wish to see
Iraq's identity submerged in a Nasir-controlled
state. While anti-Communist, we would not expect
the Baath to reverse present Iraqi policy toward
Moscow in such fields as arms procurement and trade.
However, the Baathists would favor a more neutral
policy between the Soviet Bloc and the West than
has Qasim.
3. Several of the key leaders of the present
revolutionary group have been identified-as.Baath-
ist army officers. They had been reported conspir-
ing against Qasim for some months.
4. The move against Qasim was sparked by a
number of factors. Qasim has attempted persistently
to Brush the Baath. (The Baath in October 1959
nearly succeeded in killing him and he was hospital-
ized for two months.) His strongly pro-Communist
policies,-hit unsuccessful 20-month-old campaign
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saoi
against the Kurds, his bitter feud with Nasir, and
the loss of face caused Iraq by his insane antics
were further incentives to revolt. The immediate
stimulation for today's move was probably the ar-
rest of Baathist: leaders on 5 February, this com-
ing on top of Qasim's recent dismissal of a num-
ber of anti-Communist army officers.
5. The USSR has suffered a setback in Iraq.
There is little doubt that the new revolutionary
regime will do its best to crush the local -Iragi:,Com-
munists for good. A blood bathlis likely. Street
fighting between Communists and anti-Communists is
going on in Baghdad now.
6. Nasir will be given a great boost by the
success of the coup--he will do his best to capital-
ize on this. Instability is likely to increase in
Syria and Jordan as pro-Nasir elements in those
countries are heartened.
7. Even if the revolution succeeds, the
Baath will not, at least at the outset, be com-
pletely dominant. The immediate outgrowth is likely
to be a provisional coalition government bringing
together a variety of anti-Community nationalist ele-
ments. In any event, an accommodation with the re-
bellious Kurds in Iraq will be attempted, and prob-
ably also a reconciliation with Kuwait.
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