ORIENTATION OF THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00429A001100030009-3
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 27, 2006
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 9, 1963
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
r ~s= Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO0110003000 -3
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
OCI No. 0520/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
9 April 1963
SUBJECT: Orientation of the Burmese Government
1. The totalitarian aspects of the year-old
Ne Win regime have generated considerable discontent
and fear among the Burmese populace. The Revolu-
tionary Government as a result has lately been trying
to play down these aspects, and Ne Win has specifi-
cally disclaimed that his socialist program is Com-
munist.
2. The socialist goals of Ne Win actually
differ little from those of all political leaders
since Burmese independence. However, the addition
of Communist slogans and methodology, and emphasis
on the establishment of an all-powerful Burmese
Socialist Program Party (BSPP) have alienated most
of the country?s civilian political leaders. The
resignation of the able and moderate Brigadier
Aung Gyi from the government last February increased
the influence of leftist advisers on Ne Win and was
followed by an acceleration of the pace of national-
ization.
3. Popular resistance to this crash program
to bring the economy under government control--
particularly the implementation of controls on the
rice trade--apparently has given Ne Win some pause.
His new caution is illustrated by the announcement
on 1 April of a general amnesty for non-political
offenders for the stated purpose of forging greater
national unity. Moreover, he continues to tolerate
the existence of civilian political parties, although
previously he had intended to suppress them entirely
in favor of the BSPP.
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100030009-3
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: IA-RD 00 A001100030009-3
CONFDE1w
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
4. Ne Win, however, still aspires to a single
national party; this goal was a major topic at a
recently concluded military officers' conference in
Rangoon. A large-scale recruitment campaign for the
BSPP among civil servants and the-military has failed,
however, because these elements reacted unfavorably
to Ne Win's reliance on pro-Communist advisers and
the party's typical Communist features. Ne Win used
the military officers' conference to lecture on the
"Burmese" character of the BSPP, and denied that he
had any leanings toward Communism. In attempting to
override concern expressed by some army officers
over the government's trend to the left, Ne Win
warned that disunity would only play into the hands
of external enemies of Burma.
5. Ne Win has made no formal change in Burma's
traditional policy of neutrality and nonalignment.
His suspicious nature and xenophobia, nevertheless,
have contributed to reserve in acceptance of external
aid and have resulted in cancellation of foreign
development contracts not on an intergovernmental
basis. US aid to Burma has always been limited as
to amount and purpose. Burma, however, does purchase
some military equipment from the US and the US is
participating in the Rangoon-Mandalay highway project.
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429A001100030009-3