RUMANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00429A001100040004-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 24, 2006
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 6, 1963
Content Type:
IM
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 108.81 KB |
Body:
Approved For Rele 201
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
6 May 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Rumanian-Soviet Relations
1. We have noted a series of developments
which leads us to believe that there has been a
worsening in Rumania's relations with. Moscow.
Bucharest's dissatisfaction with CEMA integra-
tion plans has led the Rumanians to adopt posi-
tions from which they cannot easily back down.
There are also signs of Chinese interest in ex-
ploiting this dispute.
2. Among the issues involved in Rumania's
disagreement with CEMA are the 'following:
a.. Drastic reduction or possibly elimi-
nation of Soviet aid toward a mammoth metal-
lurgical combine at Galati, which is the
key project of Rumania's current economic
plan.
b. A formal request in February by the
CEMA Executive Committee that Rumania in ef-
fect abandon plans for most major new in-
dustries, and concentrate instead on petroleum
products, fertilizers, and agriculture.
c. Rumania's refusal to accede to the
CEMA request, coupled with a reported threat
to withdraw from CEMA unless the request
were withdrawn.
3. Other signs, while not conclusive, which
contribute to a picture of discord between Bucharest
and Moscow, are:
a. Bucharest's criticism of Soviet party
handling of the Rumanian party's part in World
War II.
Approved For Release 206/05/24 : CIA-RDP79T004P9A001100040004-7
Approved Foleas
b04201100040004-7
b. Rumanian reticence last year to express
an opinion about the Sino-Soviet dispute, and
more lately the complete absence of commentary
on important developments in the dispute which
have received wide publicity in the bloc.
c. Rumania's failure to restore party re-
lations with Yugoslavia--the only Soviet satel-
lite not to have done so.
d. The return on 28 March of the Rumanian
ambassador to Tirana.
e. The signing in March of a Rumanian trade
agreement with China calling for a 10 percent
increase in trade--the first planned increase
since 1960 between China and a Soviet bloc coun-
try,
f. The signing of top level officials of
the annual Rumanian-Albanian trade protocol.
This contrasts with the handling of other such
satellite agreements with Tirana by lesser rank-
ing officials and may indicate both countries
attach unusual significance to the agreement,
Communist China's People's Daily's re-
h
.
rinting on 28 April of the early March.com-
p
munique of the Rumanian central committee plenum
which revealed Bucharest's differences with
CEMA.
i. Rumanian diplomats have
deliberately been cropping hints about the
Rumanian-CEMA disagreement, possibly with the
hope that it will receive publicity in the West.
Approved For Release
25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100040004-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100040004-7