THE BAATHIST-NASIR STRUGGLE IN SYRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100040011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 1546/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
10 May 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Baathist-Nasir Struggle in Syria
1. Both Nasir and the Baathists want to unify
the Arab states under revolutionary socialist lead-
ership. To the politically conscious Arab, politi-
cal..unity seems the touchstone by which the Arabs
will recover their full dignity and independence--
lost first to the Ottoman Turks and subsequently
to the Western powers. Both the 'Baathists and Nasir
subscribe to a neutralist foreign policy.
2. Arab socialism, a combination of Arab na-
tionalism and socialism, is aimed at "social jus-
tice" by nationalization of commerce and industry
owned by both Western interests and the Arab upper
class. In the Nasir and Baath scheme of things
there is no room for the traditional political lead-
ership of-landlords, merchants, and bankers. The
Arab nationalists, however, have been incapable of
developing a political framework for bringing their
objectives about.
3. The Baathists and Nasir differ over the
roles of leadership and parties in a unified Arab
state. Nasir insists on a monolithic party system
controlled by himself, while the Baath--an interna-
tional Arab movement founded in 1953--is committed
to the idea of freedom of political activity by all
leftist parties and groupings, except the Communists.
Baathism has been described as "Nasirism without
Nasir."
4. Baathist-Nasir relations,go`back'to+the
years 1955-58 when they were allied against the old
oligarchy in Syria. When the Communists became a
serious threat in late 1957 Syrian Baathist leaders
rushed to Cairo to beg Nasir to unite the two coun=tries. Nasir agreed only after Baath agreement to
make Syria an integral part of his domain.
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5. Nasir then proceeded to liquidate all
Syrian parties, including the Baath, and this was
one of the actions that eventually led to Syria's
break away from Egypt in September 1961. With
this experience impressed on their memory, Baathist
leaders are bitterly opposed to allowing Nasir to
get into a position where he could repeat the process.
6. Nevertheless, Iraqi and Syrian Baathist
leaders went to Cairo in late March to discuss union
with Nasir because they found themselves prisoners
of their own propaganda for the emotional concept of
The Baathists had
great reservations on approaching Nasir because they
feared his authoritarianism, and the federated Arab
state was announced on 17 April only after a month's
bickering over the forms of union. The crucial ne-
gotiations over how the union's institutions were
to work were put off. The vision was that military
and foreign affairs would be unified first, followed
gradually by other political and, finally, economic
institutions,' while a plebiscite would be held to
formalize Nasir's assumption of the presidency.
7. Both the Iraqi and Syrian Baathists are
trying now to build up their strength to the point
where they can resist power grabs by Nasir and his
followers as these steps occur. The present Syrian
crisis is a product of this struggle.
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