THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN YEMEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100040023-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: May 16, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
16 May 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Soviet Presence In Yemen
The USSR has played a
significant role in Yemeni developments through its
assistance to the UAR's intervention in the civil
war as well as through its direct economic, political,
and military support for the revolutionary regime.
The Current Situation
2. We estimate there are approximately 700 So-
viet economic and military technicians in Yemen, al-
though some put the total at about
900. (For comparison, t ere are 2,155 in Egypt and
1,250 in Iraq.)
The bloc had found,
during earlier aid efforts in Yemen, it was unable
to depend on local labor and consequently introduced
large numbers of bloc laborers to perform basic con-
projects requiring
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Soviet technicians and laborers include a housing
development and kerosene-tin factory at Hudaydah,
an "international" airport, and a cement plant at
Salta.
Future Developments
6. In expanding its presence in Yemen, the
USSR is undoubtedly aware of possible strategic
advantages in-the establishment of Soviet influ-
ence. Expansion of Yemeni airfields, for example,
could presage an effort to gain civil air rights,
and, at a later date, to convert this access for
military purposes. Soviet interest in developing
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the port facilities at Hudaydah also might be a clue
to Moscow's hopes of eventually using the port as a
logistic base for supporting strategic naval opera-
tions (notably submarine operations) across the In-
dian Ocean and into Southeast Asia. Other strategic
Soviet military installations, such as missile bases,
would not provide coverage of new targets of impor-
tance in the East-West military balance, even though
they would carry major political implications.
7. While we recognize that these further de-
velopments of the Soviet program bear watching, at
the present time we do not have any evidence that
the Soviets have raised demands either in Sana or
Cairo for independently controlled military facili-
ties or bases in Yemen. The Soviets obviously in-
tend to enlarge their presence and influence. They
are likely to request civil air rights to be used
in connection with penetration of Africa. However,
there are important limiting factors on the range
of the USSR's ambitions. The unstable political
situation in Yemen does not make it a particularly
attractive target for large-scale Soviet involvement.
The primitive economic structure of the country is
also an inhibiting factor.
8. An even more important inhibiting factor is
Moscow's desire to avoid antagonizing Nasir unless
the benefits were clearly of major importance. In
view of the heavy Egyptian commitment in protecting
and securing the revolutionary regime against the
royalists backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and in
view of Nasir's desire to develop Yemen as a pliant
ally which will follow his lead in foreign policy
and Arab politics, a Soviet attempt to establish a
dominant influence in Yemen's affairs would inevit-
ably incur Nasir's hostility. While the USSR will
obviously not allow Nasir a veto over its major
policy objectives in the Middle East, it has invested
heavily in its long-standing policy of supporting
Nasir, and is unlikely to risk jeopardizing this re-
lationship for marginal gains in Yemen. The Yemeni
Government, as an Egyptian satellite, is, in any case,
no more likely to agree to the establishment of So-
viet bases than is Nasir himself.
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9. On balance, we think the current phase of
Soviet activity in Yemen stems from Moscow's usual
attempts to take advantage of new opportunities for
extending its influence in the Arab world, rather
than an immediate Soviet build-up on the pattern of
Cuba. Soviet assistance to the revolutionary regime
is part of the USSR's general policy of-supporting
Arab nationalist regimes with the long-range aim of
reducing Western influence and encouraging regional
instability which, the Soviets hope, will provide
increasingly attractive targets for exploitation.
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