ISRAELI PROPAGANDA AND THE ARAB THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100040025-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: May 17, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 1794/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
17 May 1963
SUBJECT: Israeli Propaganda and the Arab Threat
1. For years Arab propaganda has routinely car-
ried the threat to "push the Israelis into the sea."
Israel in turn has used this threat in its propaganda
to elicit support for its cause. The present upsurge
of Israeli emphasis on Arab hostility dates from the
early months of this year following the revolts in
Iraq and Syria and the subsequent moves by these
states toward unity with Egypt.
2. The Cairo proclamation of 17 April which an-
nounced the new United Arab Republic calls for the
"liberation of Palestine," i.e., Israel, as a national
duty of the new UAR. It is this statement that is
currently being cited by Israeli sources in the New
York Times and other media as indicative of an in-
creased Arab threat to Israel's security. In addi-
tion, the Israelis are pointing to the continuing
flow of Communist-bloc war material into the Arab
countries, Egyptian progress in rocketry, Egypt's al-
leged nuclear potential, and the stream of anti-Isra-
eli statements issuing from the Arab captials.
3. Israel's cry of alarm at moves toward Arab
unity is probably genuine. Israel fears that a large,
unified Arab state must inevitably come to feel it-
self strong enough to attack. The danger posed to
the Jordanian monarchy by the revolutionary changes
in the Arab world is also a cause of major concern
to Israel. Israeli officials have stated clearly
that they could not countenance the installation of
a Nasir-dominated government in Jordan, which would
leave Israel surrounded by radical Arab nationalist
governments.
4. However, Israeli warnings about the urgency
of the Arab threat are unwarranted. The Baathist-
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Nasirist rivalry over control of the Arab union has
slowed unification to a crawl. The threat to King
Husayn's throne has receded, at least temporarily.
No Arab military forces have undertaken action that
increases the danger to Israel's security. Almost
one-fourth of Egypt's armed forces, by far the lar-
gest Arab force, is tied down in Yemen. Plans for
unification of the various Arab military commands, a
part of the new union design, have been postponed in-
definitely.
lindividually
a$azoIIeZ i e y a armed orces o the Arab states
are inferior in quality to those of Israel, even
though they are superior in numbers and equipment.
Egyptian rockets, only a few of which are expected
to be deployed by mid-1964, are believed capable of
carrying a 500-pound conventional payload. Egypt
will be unable to develop a nuclear capability in
less than ten years. Over-all Israeli military su-
periority will probably obtain for the next several
years. The several Arab states probably recognize
that they could not attack Israel and win. The
infra-Arab cooperation essential to a successful at-
tack on Israel is unlikely to be achieved in the
foreseeable future.
6. The most likely occasion for an outbreak of
hostilities would be a major shift in the political
structure in the area, bringing one or more of Is-
rael's neighbors into Nasir's orbit. In particular,
if Jordan were to come under pro-Nasir leadership,
Israel would be greatly tempted to seize the West
Bank area of Jordan.
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