ANALYSIS OF THE LATEST CHINESE LETTER TO THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100050043-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: June 26, 1963
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100050043-3
li~ CONFIDENTIAL :,,
OCI No. 1576/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
26 June 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Analysis of the Latest Chinese Letter to
the Soviet Union
1. The Chinese Communists, believing that they
are riding a wave which may engulf Soviet pretensions
to leadership of the international Communist move-
ment, have increased their pressure against the Soviet
party on the eve of the 5 July talks. Central in
their renewed attack upon Soviet policies is their
comprehensive letter, dated 14 June and handed to the
Soviets the next day, in reply to the 30 March Soviet
letter to the Chinese party. They have pursued their
campaign through editorials in the Chinese party paper
condemning the Soviet caution in Laos, criticizing the
Soviet response to the President's American University
speech, and intensifying attacks on Tito and (by im-
plication) Khrushchev. A communique signed jointly
with the North Korean party provided yet another vehicle.
2. The timing of the Chinese letter and some of
its content suggest that it was planned to anticipate
the opening on 18 June of the Soviet central committee
plenum. However, its over-all content--it is a long,
intransigent position paper, insulting in tone and
bristling with unconcealed attacks on the Soviet party--
seems intended more for the international Communist
movement than for Moscow. It was immediately published
by the Chinese, along with the other letters in the
series, in a pamphlet which is being distributed in
Moscow and the rest of the Soviet Bloc, as well as
around the world.
The Chinese Letter:
3. Much more insulting and extensive than earlier
Chinese letters to the Soviet Union, this diatribe runs
to 30,000 Chinese characters, approximately 50 closely
written English pages. It was designed to define more
sharply than ever before the differences between the
Chinese and Soviet Union on "25 Crucial issues." The
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429A001100050043-3
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100050043-3
' CONFIDENTIAL
,ooi
issues have been broadened. They now include the mis-
taken view of general policy the Chinese profess to
see in Soviet words and actions, the USSR's incorrect
tactics in foreign policy, its mishandling of problems
in the international Communist movement, its exercise
of "great nation chauvinism" in respect to other Com-
munist regimes, and the degeneration of Marxism-Leninism
in Soviet domestic doctrine and society.
4. Peiping's decision to set forth in so stark a
fashion its rigid, fundamentalist views, in opposition
to the somewhat more pragmatic Soviet approach, re-
flects its arrogant confidence, perhaps overconfidence,
that it can subvert presently pro-Soviet parties by ap-
pealing to their rank and file over the heads of their
"revisionist" leaders. The letter makes a transparent
call to Marxists "inside and outside" these parties--
including the Soviet party--to overthrow leaders who
adopt "non-revolutionary" policies. Peiping's claim
to be the only legitimate arbiter of "correct, Lenin-
ist" Communist theory and practice makes its determina-
tion to replace Moscow as leader of the international
Communist movement clearer than ever before. The Chi-
nese explicitly reserve the right to damn "anyone" who
follows the "erroneous opportunist" line of "a certain
socialist country."
5. The exposition of Peiping's position on the
first 17 of the "crucial issues" is a succinct recapitu-
lation of the argumentation the Chinese developed at
enormously greater length during last winter's heightened
exchange of polemics. Condensing the argumentation, how-
ever, has the effect of highlighting the differences be-
tween the Chinese and the Soviet party, virtually ruling
out any possibility for meaningful compromised Peiping
rudely dismisses Moscow's attempt to establish as the
"general line" for Communist policy its views on the ne-
cessity for peaceful coexistence, its realistic appraisal
of the menace of nuclear war, and its assertion of the
possibility of negotiating outstanding dangerous issues
with the West. In place of this, the Chinese advance
their own "general line." This includes Bloc unity on
the basis of the Chinese interpretation of the statements
of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow meetings of world Communist
leaders, intransigent opposition to United States "im-
perialism," militant support for revolutions, and renewed
warnings against over-reliance on negotiations to the
detriment of revolution.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429A001100050043-3
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100050043-3
.,r CONFIDENTIAL wS
6. In its 30 March letter, Moscow tried to de-
flect some of the fire of the Chinese attack by describ-
ing its relations with the Albanian and Yugoslav parties
as peripheral issues; Peiping elevates them to "crucial
principles." The question of Soviet-Albanian relations
is called "an outstanding one at present," and Peiping
insists that the CPSU must take the initiative toward re-
admitting Albania to the fold. On the other hand, the
document reiterates Peiping's position that the question
of the re-admission of Yugoslavia into the socialist
camp is not negotiable. By asserting that, "these two
essentially different questions must on no account be
placed on a par," Peiping rules out in advance the pos-
sibility of a trade hinted at by the Soviet party. The
Chinese extended their attack on Tito in People's Daily
the same day their letter was delivered to the USSR.
Tito's May plenum speech attacking China was character-
ized as "spittle collected from the cuspidors of the
imperialists and other revisionists," and the differ-
ences between the Chinese and the "modern revisionists"
were baldly declared to be "irreconcilable."
7. The Chinese letter opened new areas for Peip-
ing's withering condemnation. The Soviet party program,
which had advanced some new theories involving the "State
of the Whole People" and 'the Party of the Whole People,"
are treated as doctrinally nonsensical, practically
disastrous, a degeneration of Marxian theories of the
State and the class struggle. Terming these ideas a
"great historical retrogression" the letter implies that
such views have led to the development of a "petty bour-
geois" atmosphere in the Soviet Union which will inevi-
tably lead to a restoration of capitalism if not stopped
in time.
8. Another new area opened to Chinese attack is
the recent Soviet attempts rapidly to increase integra-
tion of the Bloc economies under the Council for Econom-
ic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Passages on these problems
are clearly meant for sympathetic ears in Rumania espe-
cially, and elsewhere in the Bloc as'well. Peiping has
already reaped a small return on this investment. Ru-
mania has published a long summary of the Chinese letter
in its party newspaper. Although the summary omits the
most polemical parts of the document, the simple fact of
publication--set against the Russian refusal to print any
of the letter--reflects Rumania's dissatisfaction with
Bloc economic developments and indicates its growing wil-
lingness to act independently of Moscow.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100050043-3
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100050043-3
..' CONFIDENTIAL
The Soviet Reaction:
9. The temporizing Soviet reaction to the heavy
dose of venom emanating from Peiping suggests that
Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders are somewhat
at a loss in their search for the best way to deal with
their relentless antagonists. Although the statements
from Moscow, including a decision of the central com-
mittee plenum on 21 June, accused the Chinese of "ground-
less, slanderous" attacks on the Soviet party, the So-
viets have refused to counter even the blatant Chinese
criticism of internal Soviet policies with a charge of
interference in the affairs of another party. Clearly
seething with restrained anger, the Soviet leaders have
contented themselves with reaffirming their intention
to maintain the entire Soviet line in the forthcoming
meeting with the Chinese and with explicitly demonstrat-
ing that Khrushchev and his views have the entire, un-
divided support of the Soviet party.
10. The Soviet party's decision to maintain its
pose as the champion of Bloc unity and non-polemics is
an attempt to place on the Chinese the responsibility
for the widening split in the international Communist
movement while at the same time avoiding coming to grips
with the sensitive questions raised by the Chinese.
Moscow's refusal to meet on their merits the openly pro-
vocative Chinese attacks suggests that it fears that a
renewal of the polemics will lead to greater Chinese
successes in winning supporters within the international
Communist movement. Since the Chinese have made it clear
that they will continue their oblique attacks anyway and
have threatened in their letter to extend them to direct
and personal attacks on Soviet leaders, this can only be
a temporary Soviet solution.
Prospects for the Talks:
11. Each side has indicated that it intends to go
ahead with the bilateral negotiations now scheduled to
open on 5 July. The recent exchanges, however, make it
clear that each looks upon the talks as but another
forum in which to continue their contest and not as ne-
gotiations which might lead to some amelioration of their
strained relations. The meetings are certain to be acri-
monious in the extreme and will probably be used by each
party to demonstrate that it made every effort to maintain
unity and that the responsibility for the failure is due
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429A001100050043-3
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429A001100050043-3
44.. CONFIDENTIAL
to the intransigence and erroneous views of the other.
The Chinese will emerge from the meeting more right-
eous than ever about their attempts to undermine Soviet
authority and replace it with their own.
12. Since each party has set forth diametrically
opposed notions of what should be discussed, the talks
may well founder on the procedural question of the
agenda long before they get to substantive issues. In
this event, the Chinese are likely to insist that only
an international Communist meeting such as the 1957 and
1960 meetings can resolve the problem and may demand
the early convocation of such a meeting. The Soviets,
who lost considerable ground in the last such meeting,
are likely to stall as long as possible, asserting that
sound preparations through further bilateral talks are
necessary to ensure the success of a future international
meeting. Eventually, however, they will probably be
forced to agree by the desires of the smaller parties
for an active role in discussions. Even more intense
efforts by the antagonists to solidify their support
among the other parties, and an increasingly rapid de-
terioration of the situation, is the certain result.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429A001100050043-3