SPAAK'S 8 JULY CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200010013-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 15, 1963
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Relea1007/03/08SB 4T00429A00 2200 010013-2
OCI No. 1581/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
15 July 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Spaak's 8 July Conversation with
Khrushchev
1. In briefing the NATO Council last Friday
on his 8 July talk with Khrushchev, Belgian Foreign
Minister Spaak emphasized At the outset that there
were many ambiguities in the Soviet Premier's re--
marks,. Spank stressed that there was a "marked dif-
ference" between the 8 July talk and their precious
talk in September 1961.
2. Spaak pointed out that in 1961 Khrushchev
had clear ideas on the then existing situation and
had suggested "some possibilities for settlement of
the Berlin and German problems" with the hope that
these would be restated to NATO. Accordingly, Khru-
shchev had then put forward clear and categorical
ideat, since he wanted to make practical and pre-
cise suggestions to the West. This was not the case
during the 8 July talk. Spaak said Khrushchev's
opinions, as set forth in their recent Kiev conver-
sation, were "more confused, more vague, more fluc-
tuating and often contradictory." Spaak's report,
therefore, contains a great deal of personal inter-
pretation and, in his own words, "a greater chance
of error."
3. According to Spaak, the subject of disarma-
ment was the "most positive part" of the 8 July talk,
Spaak said Khrushchev "appeared to think" it would be
possible to conclude a partial test-ban agreement
which excluded underground testing. The former NATO
Secretary General "had the impression" that Khrushchev
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2007/03M. 6t y9T00429A001200010013-2
 Approved For Relea 007/03/0&S G Tf00429A0012 10013-2
might be willing to set up more than three "black
boxes" to control a ban on underground testing. The
Soviet Premier, however, indicated no change from
his well-known position that there is no distinction
between international control--i.e,, on-site, inspec-
tions with roving international personnel--and es-
pionage,
4. Spaak said that while the Soviet leader
mentioned a NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty,
"it did not seem to be a particular importance" to
Khrushchev. Spaak stated that although Khrushchev
expressed agreement with the "idea" of a nonaggres-
sion accord, he was "not as enthusiastic" as Spaak
had expected he would be.
5. Spaak was "surprised and disturbed" by
Khrushchev's raising of the subject of Germany and
Berlin. According to Spaak, Khrushchev put forward
his ideas on these matters "in an extremely vigorous
manner." (Khrushchev had also conducted himself in
this way during his early June talk with Laborite
leader Harold Wilson. He was very mild on Berlin
and Germany, however, in his public statements dur-
ing his recent visit to East Germany.) There is no
i dicatioih in Spaak's report that Khrushchev set any
deadlines for a settlement of the German question.
Spaak himself noted that Khrushchev "reduced somewhat"
his aggressiveness on the German and Berlin questions
during the course of their conversation.
6. The Belgian Foreign Minister also noted
that Khrushchev stressed "peaceful coexistence," and
a stand against war. At one point Khrushchev said
that "even incidents" in Berlin and Germany "could
not lead" to a nuclear war and "only a fool" would
start such a war.
7. Khrushchev did not, apparently, discuss
Cuba or Castro. Nor did he discuss his differences
with the Chinese Communists. Spaak believes that the
Sino-Soviet negotiations are the "missing link" in
Western efforts to understand that Soviet policies
will be !!tomorrow."
-2
Approved For Release 2007/OE gZL4RF79T00429A001200010013-2
 Approved For Relea 1007/03/08SS t00429A001010013-2
8. In contradistinction to 1961, Khrushchev
talked a great deal about the Soviet Union and its
"great industrial power." According to Spaak, he
"seemed primarily preoccupied" with domestic.prob-
lems and gave a long dissertation particularly on
Soviet agricultural difficulties.
Approved For Release 2007/0SI?(. P79T00429A001200010013-2