THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN BOLIVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200010031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: July 30, 1963
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Rele 2006/03/1 -SB!R f r00429A00t 0010031-2
OCI No. 1588/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
30 July 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Internal Security Situation in
Bolivia
1. The presently tense situation in Bolivia
is largely an outgrowth of the approaching show-
down between President Victor Paz Estenssoro and
Vice President Juan Lechin over the Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement's (MNR) presidential nomi-
nation next year. Lechin's political power is
based on Bolivia's well-organized union movement
and particularly in the far-leftist dominated tin
miners' union, which is presently carrying out
sporadic strikes to thwart President Paz' rehabili-
tation plans for the mines.
2. The Paz regime periodically has encountered
the defiance?of ambitious and opportunistic local
political leaders backed by armed civilian militia
forces. The civilian militia, of which the most
important units are those of the peasants and those
of the miners, has enjoyed a privileged position in
Bolivia because it is credited with playing the
major role in the MNR defeat of the army in the
1952 revolution. This paved the way for the com-
ing to power of the present MNR regime in the same
year.
DIA review(s) com
rpleeg or Release 2006/0 -79 1 00429A001200010031-2
7
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Releisi 2006/03/1SZI9jW29T00429A000010031-2
D
3. Units of the militia vary considerably in
size, training, and. weapons. Militia units at the
tin mines are considered the most effective in part
because of their access to explosives. Total strength
of the civilian militia (16,000 plus) is greater than
that of the army (12,000) and police (3,500) combined,
but it is not a unified force. Militia weapons gen-
erally consist of rifles and possibly some light
machine guns which are old--1932-1935 Chaco War vin-
tage--but which are nonetheless serviceable.
4. The principal cause for outbreaks of vio-
lence in the past has been the desire of individual
leaders to dominate provincial areas. Conflicts be-
tween rival peasant leaders have frequently resulted
in serious disorders in the Cochabamba Valley in cen-
tral Bolivia and in the Achacachi-Coroico area north-
east of the capital of La Paz. The principal centers
of strength for the miners' militia are the larger
tin mines of Catavi, Huanuni, and Milluni,
5. Since early March 1963, President Paz Estens-
soro has been successful. in supplanting a number
or pro-Communist or Communist peasant leaders in the
Department of La Paz. He also has been successful
in garnering the support of some influential leaders
in the Cochabamba Valley and in the eastern Depart-
ment of Santa Cruz. There are still peasant leaders
in the rural areas, however, who are anti-regime and
probably pro-Communist, and who have a potential for
disruptive actions against the government. The pro-
Paz leadership of the National Peasant Organization
which claims.to represent all Bolivian peasant groups
is a force which has been used by the government to
carry out its campaign against the extremist peasant
leaders. This organization augmented by government
security forces is sufficient to preserve relative
order and foster pro-regime sentiment in the rural
areas,
6. The miners' militia, especially the armed
miners at Catavi, represent the single most impor-
tant threat to the stability of the government at
this time. The Catavi miners are led by two Com-
munist-Trotskyists, Federico Escobar and Ireneo
Pimentel. An October 1962 report prepared by the
US Army Attache places the strength of the Catavi
militia at over 2,000. The leaders at Catavi and
Approved For Release 2006/
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Releafid 2006/03/1-8RCr" f00429A00 010031-2
at the other nationalized mines in Bolivia are focus-
ing their militant opposition against the governmeft's
desire to carry out mining reforms to end the uneco-
nomic operations in the mines in accordance with the
recommendations of the Triangular- Plan.
7. The Triangular Plan is a joint undertaking
by the US, West Germany, and the Inter-American
Development Bank to rehabilitate Bolivia' tin mines.
The goal is to strengthen Bolivia's economy by de-
creasing the state mining corporation's costs--tin
productions costs are now often in excess of world
prices--and increasing the government's foreign ex-
change earnings, thereby making economic diversifica-
tion more feasible. The Triangular Plan has been a
main target for Communist opposition, because the
success of the plan probably could lead to a large
measure of growth and stabilization of the Bolivian
economy.
8. The situation at present is tense. Work
continues only sporadically at Catavi, the country's
largest tin mine. Locals of the Lechinist, pro-Com-
munist led Factory Workers Union have struck in
Cochabamba, and at a key flour factory in La Paz.
The army has been placed on alert and confined to
quarters. The Commander of the Bolivian Air 2orce
stated on 19 July to the US Air Attache that the
Bolivian government may find it necessary .to request
US Special Forces assistance in order to maintain in-
ternal security. He indicated that this might be
necessary if open conflict breaks out between the
miners militia and government forces. No further
mention of this matter has been made, however, by
any Bolivian military or government official,
9. Unless the negotiations between the miners'
union and the state mining corporation (Comibol)
arrive at an "adequate solution" to the mine, rb-
habilitation problem, the union threatens to call
a general strike in all the Bolivian tin mines.
Because of the political loyalty to Lechin of most
of the unions in Bolivia, many of which are led by
Communists or extreme leftists, such a strike could
spread to othbr industries. In addition, those peas-
ant groups whose leaders are still of an extremist
inclination could possibly be expected to join in
the general strike.
Approved For Release 2006/
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Reley ' 2006/O3/17q,;l&jW'j9T00429A00 0010031-2
10. The unrest at Catavi is likely to come to
head in early August,
12. The government probably will be success-
ful in preventing a march on the capital, and the
rather isolated miners' militias probably will be
kept from joining forces among themselves and with
such outside forces as sympathetic peasant groups.
If the government can "seal off" crucial areas such
as Catavi, the withdrawal of wages and the stopping
of normal Comibol supplies to the local mine com-
missaries will likely be sufficient to bring the
miners to a point of capitulation. Nevetheless, the
situation is. such that an open conflict between the
miners' militia and government forces could be
touched off should an incident develop to sufficiently
inflame the miners,
13. This memo has been coordinated with the
Department of State/ARA and INR.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/ 00429AO01200010031-2
iMM U2nx1MqjT
 Approved For Relea '2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO012&010031-2
Iquique}
Tocopillai
Baquedano
Antofagasta El Boquete
Villa Aroina
^Sicasica
,Buhr de ~'
+_Coipusa
a Huanchaca
Uyuni i
SUCRE (legal `a\
(& ?Lambo
r~aa o-nly-
Curlchl?
I.[!'t'TntNl~
.Villa Mantes
BOLIVIA
STRATEGIC MINERAL RESOURCES
Sb Antimony Pb Lead
Fe Iron Q Tungsten
(D Tin
-??- International boundary -------- Selected road
tt National capital --~-~- Railroad
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
UNOARY REPRESENTATION IS
T NOCK56ARILY AUTHORITATIVE
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01200010031-2
 Approved For Relea2006/03/17s'AlLPV+f00429AO0'010031-2
') f
Approved For Release 2006/0311-7-- P, 79T00429A001200010031-2