SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUED FRICTION ALONG THE MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN FRONTIER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200040026-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: October 18, 1963
• Content Type: IM

25X1
Approved For Rely'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office Of Current Intelligence
18 October 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Some Implications of Continued Friction
Along the Moroccan-Algerian Frontier
1. Border clashes probably will continue and
new areas of hostility may develop along the Moroc-
can-Algerian border pending negotiations to delineate
at least informally the disputed border between Tindouf
and Colomb-Bechar. An all-out war seems unlikely in
view of the limited capabilities of both armies.
a. The Moroccan Army consists of 32,500 men
organized in 18 infantry battalions, 3 each cavalry
and artillery battalions, one each armored and en-
gineer battalions, one light security group and two
air squadrons, with support units, The Moroccan Air
Force numbers 1,940 men and has 105 aircraft (includ-
ing 22 jets).
b. The Algerian Army consists of 60,000 men,
and might be able to expand into a motley force of
200,000. It is inferior in organization, training,
and equipment to the Moroccan Army, lacks significant
aerial support ('. IuIG jets), has very limited capa-
bility for aerial surveillance, and is seriously de-
ficient in transport.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429AQ01200040026-5
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001200040026-5
3. Should limited hostilities continue or de-
velop into more serious confrontations at points
other than Hassi Beida and Tinjoub, where the pres-
ent skirmishes are occurring, a diplomatic break
would be likely. Even if the present crisis sub-
sides, the suspicion with
which Morocco and Algeria
regard each other certainl
l
y w
`. In Morocco th
h
e border difficulties prob-
e will serve to
, rally support around King Hassan.
The crisis in relations with Algeria could even pro-
vide the coup de grace to his organized o
which was already disintegrating badl posent
ion,
pockets of dissidence would remain but~would bewith-
Out immediate prospect of uniting into a dynamic and
cohesive opposition,
5. In Algeria, on the other hand, difficulties
with Morocco could provide the occasion for new out-
breaks of anti-Ben Bella and anti- Boumedienne activity.
Mobilization seems likely to exacerbate the frictions
that already exist between remnants of the former
rebel army of the exterior and the army of the interior
and that are preventing the development of an effective
and reliable Algerian army. Concentration of many
Algerian troops on the Moroccan border would almost
certainly encourage the Kabylie dissidents to renew
activity and embolden potential dissidents in the Or-
leansville and Aures areas.
6. Even limited engagements along the border
and small-scale mobilization would be a serious drain
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79Tg0429A001200040026-5
 Approved For Rele
on the overburdened Algerian treasury--dependent on
transfers from Paris--which has never been able to
meet the public payroll regularly.
7. Algeria has already initiated steps to
have Morocco labeled the aggressor in international
forums. It is working initially through the Organ-
ization of African Unity, created last May and not
yet fully effective. It can be expected to work
assiduously at the United Nations to line up sup-
port, but as yet there is no indication that it seeks
UN condemnation of Morocco. Both Tunisia and Syria
have initiated mediation efforts.
8. Border friction has already increased Al-
gerian animosity toward the US. Fallacious press
and radio reports that American pilots ferried Mo-
roccan transports in reinforcing the border excited
an Algerian group in Constantine to break the win-
dows of the USIS center. The Algerian press, never
friendly toward the US, probably will step up its
slanted news coverage of events concerning this coun-
try.
25X1
25X1
10. While Ben Bella appears unlikely to press
for additional material Soviet su ort he ma ask
for moral support.
25X1
Approved Fob- Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00449A001200040026-5
 Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01200040026-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01200040026-5