KHRUSHCHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 25 OCTOBER 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200040035-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: October 28, 1963
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Reese 2004/10/OiSECRMUT00429A( 00040035-5
OCI No. 2377/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
28 October 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Press Conference
on 25 October 1963
1. Khrushchev took advantage of the presence
in Moscow of more than 50 Communist and leftist jour-,
nalists from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe
to make his first major statement in several months
on a wide range of foreign and domestic questions.
The tone of his remarks reflected his apparent con-
cern that publicity in the non-Communist world con-
cerning Soviet agricultural failures and the split
with the Chinese Communists has not only degraded the
USSR's power position but may encourage the West to
try to take advantage of this situation.
2. Khrushchev clearly was seeking to refurbish
the image of the USSR as a confident and growing
world power when he predicted the eventual solution
of weaknesses in Soviet agriculture, forecast sub-
stantial overfulfillment of the industrial goals of
the seven-year plan and warned the West not to expect
that current Soviet economic problems will lead to a
relative decline in the USSR's military strength,
He appeared sensitive to Western speculation that
Soviet defense spending will have to give way to pro-
vide resources for his ambitious program for the chem-
ical industry. He challenged alleged statements by
the "imperialists" that the West will "exceed the So-
viet Union in the development of military technology,"
and asserted that "what we did for defense before, we
will continue to'do. The rockets have already been
built and stand where they should stand." He,added
that "expenditures'for the development of chemistry
and irrigation will not reflect on our defense."
3. These remarks provided no additional spe-
cific information on Khrushchev's intentions with re-
gard to his military programs, It continues to seem
61
Approved For Release 2004/10/$A4J4
,WRj7,9T00429A001200040035-5
 Approved For Re se 2004/10/01 ECAMET00429A0"200040035-5
probable that any serious attempt to implement his
new economic course will require a reduction in the
rate of growth of military expenditures, though not
necessarily a cutback in the absolute level of these
expenditures.
4. Khrushchev's statement on a manned lunar
landing suggests that at least one program bearing
on defense may already have fallen victim to his
new economic priorities. It should be noted, however,
that Khrushchev's actual remarks hardly warrant the
dramatic US news agency treatment that the Soviet
premier has "withdrawn" from the moon race. In re-
sponse to a question whether Soviet cosmonauts plan
a moon flight in the "not too distant future," Khru-
shchev replied, "I cannot at present say when this
will be done." He added that the USSR has ,no "pres-
ent plans" for a lunar landing, but said that Soviet
scientists are working on the problem and that the
"necessary research is being done." Khrushchev's
subsequent comments on the US lunar program seem to
convey strong skepticism regarding the feasibility
of such an operation at this time. He contended
that no benefits would be derived from Soviet-US
competition in this field and said "much work will
have to be done and good preparations made for a
successful flight to the moon by man,"
5. Although we would not discount the impor-
tance of economic factors in Khrushchev's down-
grading of a,manned lunar operation, it is worth
recalling that. his remarks closely parallel views
expressed last July by the president of,the Soviet
Academy of Sciences. This official claimed that
Soviet scientists, at least for the time being, re-
gard manned lunar missions as unfeasible because of
the hazards of solar flares and the tremendous launch
propulsion requirements. He added that unmanned in-
strumented probes can solve the scientific problems
involved in lunar explorations more cheaply and quickly.
6. Khrushchev's remarks on major foreign policy
issues contained no hints of any abrupt departures
from the current "detente" line. His statement on
the German problem, however, reflected the frustra-
tions long experienced by the Soviet leaders over their
inability to interest the West in serious negotiations
on Berlin and Germany during periods of relative re-
laxation of tensions. He asserted that if the Western
Approved For Release 2004/10 P4&1 ,79T00429A001200040035-5
 Approved For Rise 2004/10/0SEGWT00429AQQ*200040035-5
powers are genuinely interested in a relaxation of
tension, they "must adopt a more realistic position"'
toward a German settlement. On Cuba, the Soviet pre-
mier seemed to go out of his way to refute Western
speculation regarding growing Soviet-Cuban differences,
He made the customary references to "national hero
Comrade Fidel Castro" leading the Cubans in building
a "socialist society." He also pointed out that the
USSR had decided to render "fraternal assistance" in
overcoming hurricane destruction in Cuba. Khrushchev
appealed
to "peoples the world over" to demand
renun-
ciation
by US "aggressive circles" of hostile
actions
against
Cuba, "without which no real easing of
inter-
national
tension can be achieved."
7. Khrushchev renewed the call for a cessation
of Sino-Soviet polemics, last voiced in the Soviet
government statement of 21 September. But aside from
seeking to portray the USSR as calm and confident of
its eventual vindication in the dispute--Let time
determine which point of view is the'most correct"--
his comments provided no further indications of So-
viet intentions with regard to a possible international
Communist conference in the near future.
. 8. On the domestic front, Khrushchev blamed this
year's crop failure on "bad climatic conditions,"' which
is in large part true. But he also admitted by impli-
cation that there are other fundamental disorders in
Soviet agriculture--for one, the cumulative effect of
many decades of under-investment in the agricultural
program. He reiterated his new panacea--a drastic in-
crease in the production of chemical fertilizer and
much more extensive irrigation--with its implied' redress
of agriculture's long-standing position at the bottom
of the Soviet scale of resource allocations. The pro-
gram, essentially, is to increase fertilizer output from
the present 20 million tons to 35 million tons "or more"
by 1965, thus bringing Soviet production even with the
present US level. By 1970, the USSR plans to produce
about 100 million tons of fertilizer annually. Along
with this, extensive irrigation projects are to be un-
dertaken, though these goals have been even less clearly
spelled out.
9. For the first time, Khrushchev gave some idea
of the magnitude of his plans for the chemical industry,
which, besides 'laying heavy emphasis on fertilizer, are
Approved For Release 2004/10/S8jJ 9T00429A001200040035-5
 Approved For Rise 2004/10/OSRGR&BT00429A 200040035-5
apparently also to favor the production of synthetic
materials and fibers. He said that as a preliminary
estimate, 20 billion rubles would be invested in the
next seven years. (A ruble is nominally equal to
$1.11). This compares to a planned investment in the
industry for the present Seven-Year Plan period (1959-
65) of 10.0-10.5 billion rubles and a performance of
the last five years of less than half that amount.
10. Khrushchev seemed keenly aware of the pres-
sures on economic resources which this undertaking
will entail. He admitted that some branches of the
economy will have to be "restrained" somewhat during
the next three or four years, although he did not
identify them. It seems likely that many economic
programs will have to be trimmed in the search for
resources.
11. Khrushchev clearly indicated that the,cur-
rent purchases of wheat are needed for domestic re-
quirements And that without them the government would
have been forced to introduce rationing. He hedged
on the present US-Soviet grain talks, however, saying
that the USSR might not buy US wheat if "discrimina-
tory conditions" are attached. While the Soviets are
in a relatively better bargaining position now that
large purchase agreements have been concluded with
Canada and Australia, they probably continue to have
a pressing need for more wheat and there are indica-
tions that they will need fodder grain as well.
Approved For Release 2004/10~79T00429A001200040035-5